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A b s t r a c t
My PhD is entitled Sub-Versions of Reading. The thesis is concerned with 
critical refractions such as reading, interpretation, criticism, 
commentary... activities which resemble each other in that they do not 
resemble that from which they derive; thus derived rather than original, 
secondary rather than primary, their status is also deemed second-rate. My 
aim has been both to reread their inferior plight and rewrite this plight 
through the theoretical insights culled from recent literary theory. I 
therefore compare two theoretical frameworks, one hermeneutic, the other 
ppSt-StirHfliUraHst'i bath fit which have contributed, each in different ways, 
towards a theorization of reading. Following this, I come to argue that the 
kind of Unitarian, totalizing hermeneutic approach, which seeks to reduce 
the original text's polysemantic possibilities, unlike a post-structuralist 
strategy which renders the "original” indeterminable and unleashes the 
isotropisms of textuality, can make no real critical difference to empower 
the refractor, be it the reader, critic or translator. Thus my argument 
finally uses translation, as the very site, that 'impossible place' where 
the multiple discourses on reading, re-reading, misreading, <un)readabl1ty, 
reading/as/writing connect, and where the (sub)version of translation can 
be theorized differently. Here, theories can be seen to multiply, and in 
multiplying, they not merely transform the "state" of translation (as a 
re/writing) but also the state of "theory" (as a multiplication of 
theorems).
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It is arming people with the power to read, which I see 
as an absolutely fundamental necessity in order for 
them to make their way in the present world: this is 
what I think the study of literature can really do.
1Preliminary Remarks: Re-reading Criticism
There are some exquisite echoes in India. . . The echo in the Marabar 
cave is not like these, it is entirely devoid of distinction. Whatever 
is said, the same monotonous noise replies and quivers up and down the 
walls until it is absorbed into the roof. 1 Bourn' is the sound as far 
as the human alphabet can express it, or ' bou-oum', or •ou-boum' , -
utterly dull. Hope, politeness, the blowing of a nose, the squeek of a 
boot, all produce 'bourn'. (14-5)
But suddenly at the edge of her mind, Religion appeared, poor little 
talkative Christianity, and she knew that all its divine words from 
'Let there be Light' to 'It is finished' only amounted to 'bourn'. Then 
she was terrified over an area larger than usual; the universe, never 
comprehensible to her Intellect, offered no repose to her soul... 
(149) Mrs. Moore in Passage to India by E. M. Forster
If much of human activity has been the pursuit for ultimate knowledge and
truth, to unravel the mysteries of the universe, and man professed himself
to have discovered his and her place in this universe, thereby giving both
purpose and meaning to his life and death, this world he thought to have
understood adhered to a stable, divinely controlled order, able to define
and reaffirm value for him. The reality of this existence was commonly
shared - at least by its patriarchial order - and thus provided a stable
basis to which humankind, or to be more specific, to which mankind was able
to refer for its meaning. In the light of intellectual developments leading
into the twentieth century (Darwin's relegation of the human to 'animal
status', Marx' questioning of our place in history and society, Nietzsche's
death of God, and Freud's exploration into our unconscious psyche... >, the
human subject's comprehensive concept of Reality fragmented into a welter
of realities, thus reducing the world's Reality into a mere interpretation.
"Reality", phallocratlc comprehension, crumbled under a welter of
realities, entailing the subjection of "meaning" to power (os the
mathematicians say)^ meanings then, all lacking in divine, superior, or
final, Judgement. Unable to fall back on reason for good Judgement, for
2Kant had already dismantled It back ln Königsberg, Western man and woman's 
scientific and rational way of knowing was proving incapable of 
comprehending the universe. Uncertainty thus took over from truth, leaving 
poor Mrs. Moore, a victim of this dissipating phallocracy, groping for "the 
meaning of meaning" in an increasingly meaningless universe.
I have, I am aware, told this story in a very rambling way so that it 
may be difficult for anyone to find their path through what may be a 
sort of maze. I cannot help it. . . One remembers points one has 
forgotten and one explains them all the more minutely since one 
recognizes that one has forgotten to mention them in their proper 
places and that one may have given, by omitting them, a false 
impression. I console myself with thinking that this 16 a real story 
and that, after all, real stories are probably told best in the way a 
person telling a story would tell them. They will then seem most real. 
(167)
I don't know. X know nothing. I am very tired. (220)
I don't know. I leave it to you. <220)
Perhaps you can make head or tail of it; it is beyond me. <213)
I know nothing in the world - nothing in the world - of the hearts of 
men. I only know that I am alone - horribly alone. <14)
Mr. Dowell in The Good Soldier by Ford Madox Ford
We can chart a shift, then, in our attitudes to comprehension, a shift, the
effects of which, can also be discerned in twentieth century literature.
While the nineteenth century author seemed to share a social sense of
significance with an audience, ' guiding the reader to a conclusion,
twentieth century literature explores, to a large extent, "inner
experience", ways in which the subject attempts to constitute itself in the
writing process, leaving the reader to make up his/her own mind, thus
finally involving the reader in epistemological quests through literature's
formal devices. Meanings are not so much deposited or given by the author,
but are produced, or later, de/constructed by readers. In the modernist
work, the reader is to fill out the meaning and in the post-modern text, the
t
reader becomes the player in games of signification. This 'birth of the reader'
N  '
3then marks the end of the reign of the author or the closing of the 
convention of authors creating authoritative meaning <a reflection of the 
desire to comprehend truth as single and unequivocal); it is not long until 
"text" is seen not as an autonomous, identifiable, and coherent entity, but 
as a site to be explored in its relation to other texts, readings/contexts; 
thereby also displacing the text's priority.
There is nothing - I mean no incontrovertible evidence - that might 
allow anyone to place Simon Lecoeur's story among tales of pure 
fiction. n the contrary, one can observe that numerous and important 
elements of that unstable, incomplete text, fissured as it seems, 
coincide with facts (commonly known facts) with a strange recurrence 
that is therefore disconcerting. And while other elements of the 
narrative stray deliberately away from those facts, they always do so 
in so suspicious a manner that one i6 forced to see there a systematic 
Intent on part of the narrator. . . (7-8)
About the author himself, little is known. His true identity is itself 
open to question. Nobody knew any of his relatives, distant or close.
(8)
The Narrator in DJinn by Alain Robbe-Grillet 
What this brief sketch of European intellectual history charts, are 
linkages between specific cultural and literary developments, which may 
then be mapped onto certain approaches to literature itself. The shift that 
can be charted here is one from literary scholarship to literary criticism 
to literary theory. These three categories can be broadly summarized as 
follows. Literary scholarship 'studied literature almost exclusively in its 
relation to its factual causes or genesis: the author's life, his recorded 
intentions in writing, his immediate social and cultural environment, his 
sources.,, it was an extrinsic rather than an intrinsic approach to texts'. 2 
Literary scholarship thus regarded the literary text ' as the expression 
of the psychology of an individual, which in it6 turn is the expression of 
the mni»u of the period in which the individual lived, and of the race he 
belonged to* (Jefferson A Robey 1982: 3), disregarding questions of
4intrinsic literary merit, i. e. literariness. In a nutshell, it is a source 
and authoi— centered approach, an approach though, which has guided much of 
European and American academe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.
Literary criticism on the other hand, focuses its attention on the 
text. It is inclined to discuss areas such as literary value or the nature 
of literature in general. In this sense it calls for the definition of the 
subject-matter of literary study, and is consequently eager to discuss 
literature's intrinsic properties. The criticism of F.R. Leavis for 
instance, concentrated on those aspects of texts which he considered most 
significant from a literary point of view, 'stressing the centrality of 
rigorous critical analysis, and foregrounding a disciplined attention to 
the words on the page• (Eagleton 1983: 32). This kind of practical
criticism or close reading closes in on the 'words on the page' rather than 
opening up 'the contexts which produced and surround them' <44>. And to
quote Eagleton once more, 'It was the beginning then of a 'reification' of 
the literary work, the treatment of it as an object in itself, which was to 
be triumphantly consummated by the American New Criticism’ (44).
In an early attack by Wellek & Warren on Leavis, we can already see, 
how the acknowledgment of a theoretical impulse in literary studies 
began to undermine this kind of practical criticism. Wellek, though 
admiring Leavis* writings, made an incisive critlcsm. As Ann Jefferson and 
David Robey sum up Wellek's point, 'it CLeavls' criticism! failed to state 
•xpllcltely and defend systematically its assumptions concerning the nature
and value of poetry' <1982: 5). This call, in Wellek's words, for
5'defendting ones] position more abstractly and to become conscious that 
large ethical, philosophical and, of course, ultimately, also aesthetic 
choices are involved1 <Wellek 1937: 376, qu. in Jefferson & Robey 1982: 5), 
marks a turn towards a more systematic, self-reflexive and theoretical 
approach in literary studies. Wellek's view of the critic here invokes a 
set of norms and standards as well as a conceptual formulation of the task 
of literary criticism. This stands in stark contrast to Leavis' advocacy 
of the aims of the critic, which he saw for the most part as the same as 
that of a good reader who feels Into the experience of the text in its 
'concrete fullness' (Jefferson & Robey 1982: 6). This reader or supremely
humanist subject belongs to a minority, upon which depends 'the discerning 
appreciation of art and literature... a small minority t...] who are 
capable of endorsing such first-hand Judgement by genuine personal 
response...' (Leavis 1930: 3-5). 3
Wellek & Warren's influential book Theory of Literature may be seen as 
one of the earliest formulations of a theoretical approach to literature, 
an approach to literary studies as a self-aware discipline. It singles out 
three areas for literary study. The first one is concerned with the 
definition of literature. The theorist here is primarily Interested in 
isolating those qualities or properties which all literary works and only 
literary works possess. The second area is concerned with the function of 
literature. The theorist here asks what function, purpose, or need 
literature has fulfilled for society and its members. The third area 
concerns the institution of literature and looks to the reader. The 
theorist in this instance, seeks to discover what the reader does when he 
reads something as literature. Recognizing that society thinks of certain
I
6writings as being literary, and assuming that It deals with them In a 
special way, this sort of theorist tries to discover the conventions or 
Implicit rules that comprise that literary Institution.
We have now charted some of the major shifts in nineteenth and twentieth
century approaches to literature; two things have consequently began to emerge:
firstly we can discern a shift from unsystematic,-anti-theoretical positions to
systematic, theoretical, in other words, self-reflexive accounts of what Is
involved in literary study. Secondly, we can trace a shifting emphasis in
approaches to literary studies: from a more traditional concern with the
figure of the author, to a text-centred emphasis, to a reader— oriented
approach. To formulate this differently, we may see a shift from
understanding the author's experience, to understanding a particular text,
to the very terms of understanding in general, 1. e. to a kind of reading of
making sense. ■* In brief then, we can see a shift from literary scholarship
to practical criticism to literary theory, a shift from an authorial
intention to close reading to the description of signifying effects. “
My own view is that it is most useful to see ' literature' as a name 
which people give from time to time for different reasons to certain 
kinds of writing within a whole field that Michel Foucault has called 
•discursive practices', and that if anything is to be an object of 
study it is this whole field of practices rather than Just those 
sometimes rather obscurely labelled 'literature'. (Eagleton 1983: 205)
What is inherent in Eagleton's statement is a paradigm shift. A6 Antony
Easthope points out, 'only two generations separate Leavls from Eagleton
here. Yet in those fifty three years modern literary studies was invented,
institutionalised in the academy, fell into crisis, and is now being
transformed into something else, cultural studies' <1991: 5). If literature
1b to be opened up as a 'whole field of practices', then we literally have
7•exploded English' to use a phrase coined by Bernard Bergonzi to describe
the recent struggles In English Literature departments and we are well on
the way to Cultural Studies (also anticipated by Bergonzi, though in a
rather different vein from Easthope). The crisis which has been gnawing
away at English as a discipline has also pervaded most of the other
humanities disciplines. The crisis that is much discussed, debated,
quarreled over, may most aptly be summed up through Thomas Kuhn's 'paradigm
shifts'. K If consensus has broken up, and the Habermasian ideal of
communication broken down, giving over to doubt, (even celebrating)
contradiction or Lyotardian dissent, we find ourselves at the very shifts
and Junctures of the Kuhnian crisis. In Easthope's words, we find ourselves
at 'a return to "first principles" and an Intense Interest in theory'
(1991: 3). Martin Krelswirth's 'theory wars' are thus still raging in the
nineties, Indeed, theory is the rage of the post-graduate, the post-modern
PhD student attempting to push research beyond this fin-de-siecle. Should
we then rather say, as Paul de Man does in Blindness and Insight, that 'the
notion of crisis and that of criticism are very closely linked, so much so
that one could state that all true criticism occurs in a mode of crisis.
To speak of a crisis in criticism is then, to some degree, redundant' (1983:
8). If we excuse De Man here for a faintly Leavlslte tone, we may instead,
see this crisis positively rather than falling victim to the 'conservative
myth', Partick Brantllnger characterizes:
The conservative myth that 'theory' - structuralism, deconstruction, 
Marxism, feminism, psychoanalysis, and bo on - has caused the crisis 
in the humanities needs to be turned around: theory is a response to 
crisis, not its cause. (1990: 10)
i
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\'What then is the crisis'? we may ask more specifically. Is it theory, 
the move from literary into cultural studies? Undoubtedly, the two are 
connected, for theory is precisely that field which irrigates all the 
different disciplines in the humanities, even the sciences. If it has thus 
broken down the protective boundaries which a discipline has erected around 
its identity, theory has proven itself truly interdisciplinary, pervading 
and fecundating the multi-disciplines. It does more than this though: it is 
not only limited to the 'literary field' as Brantlinger has it 
'structuralism, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, feminism, and Marxism re­
read and "decenter” familiar texts and strive to revamp "the canon" and 
hence the curriculum in radical ways' <1990: 11, my emphasis). And we may
add other critical theories to Brantlinger's list, particularly those which 
concern themselves with reading. For to read is to re-read, or to push it 
one step further with Barthes: 'And no doubt that is what reading is: 
rewriting the text of the work within the text of our lives'. 'r
Reading thus becomes critical in more than one sense. The reader no 
longer slave to his master or author, the reader freed from the bounds of 
the text, opening up the boundaries of textuality, the reading subject 
becomes intimately tied up with recent developments in literary theory as a 
whole. As Elizabeth Freund points out, '[rleading-oriented criticism is the 
smaller probe, as it were, within the larger nexus, which entails a 
reopening (perhaps infinitlzlng) of the question of the authority or 
grounding force we desire to claim for the negotiation of our meanings or 
our knowledge' <1987: 18). Reading, or to be more precise re-reading, as
the larger probe, is that which has pushed the larger nexus into crisis. A6 
Freund reminds her reader, 'the so-called crisis in contemporary criticism
8
I
9(which repeatedly emphasizes the etymological relationship of "crisis” to 
"criticism") arises with the problem of understanding "understanding"', and 
she urges her reader to keep in mind, 'that no discourse, even that of 
primers, is transparent or innocent* (19). It is this self-awareness that 
Susan Suleiman sees as a recent evolution in all the disciplines, the 
•questioning and making explicit the assumptions that ground the methods of 
the discipline' <1980: 4). This self-reflexiveness, she continues, 'has its
analogue in the principles of relativity and uncertainty as they emerged in 
Physics early in this century' (4). At this point we can recall our 
opening paragraph, but we may also go one step further, for this self- 
reflexivity, according to Suleiman, 'necessarily shifts the focus of 
enquiry from the observed - be it defined as texts, psyche, society, or 
language - to the interaction between observed and observer' (4).
This is what this thesis will set out to do: to consider the relation 
between the observed and the observer, or more to the point, the multiple 
relays between texts, readers, the text's many versions and those other 
refractions, ** to use André Lefevere’s terra, which generate sub-versions; 
and to situate the discourses which surround these Issues within the 
general field of theoretical conflict, known as post-modernism. Thus we 
will move beyond the traditional boundaries of literary studies, will argue 
against the kind of literary approach which has hailed the great (unified) 
literary text as its sole object of study, and will turn to those critical 
refractions, such as reading, criticism, interpretation, double writing and 
finally translation, which not only have the power to reread, Indeed
I
rewrite their "originals", • but also have the power to make a discursive 
difference, both to the object of their enquiry and to our perspective as
enquirers. And If our readings are never innocent, but motivated - even 
manipulative - then our readings are always already politicized. As Jane 
Tompkins points out aptly, 'twlhen discourse is responsible for reality and 
not merely a reflection of it, then whose discourse prevails makes all the 
difference' <1980: xxv). *
10
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1. 1 The Death of Authors
The notion of the author according to Michel Foucault, 'constitutes the 
privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, 
literature, philosophy and the sciences' (1984: 101). This Is to say, since
'we are accustomed... to saying that the author is the genial creator of a 
work in which he deposits, with infinite wealth and generosity, an 
lnexhaustable world of significations' (118), and since 'we are used to
thinking that the author Is so di f f erent f rom all other men, and so
transcendent with regard to all languages that, as soon as he speaks,
meaning begins to proliferate, to proliferate indefinitely' (118), we have 
created a dominion and hierarchy for the author which re sembles that of a 
pre-Nietzschean God. If the author's role is one of control, his function 
is also regulatory: 'to group together a number of texts, define them, 
differentiate them from and contrast them to others (107), thus 'marking 
off the edges of a text' (107). It is in this sense that the author becomes 
'the principle of a certain unity of writing' (111). If this 'unity of 
writing' constitutes the author's work, his/her oeuvre and we contend with 
Foucault that 'ttlhe word 'work' and the unity that it designates are 
probably as problematic as the status of the author's individuality' (104), 
we abandon old premises. Instead of endowing individuals with the free 
agency to 'penetrate the substance of things and give it meaning' (118), we 
analyze their position as subjects within discourse, we examine the 
function of the subject within discourse and the system of dependencies or 
rules which the subject obeys (118). This Is to say we no longer hold 
with the notion of the free individual, bearer of meaning and utterer of
eternal truths, but see the subject as part of a 'system of dependencies'.
a
Foucault puts it like this, 'it 1b a matter of depriving the subject (or
13
its substitute) of its role of originator, and of analyzing the subject as
a variable and complex function of discourse' (118). Since the formation,
mode of circulation, valorization and appropriation of discourses 'vary and
are modified within each culture' (117), the function which is attributed
to the author is therefore never given but itself subject to change. This
then is Foucault's revision of the author function:
... the author is not an indefinite source of significations which 
fill a work; the author does not precede the work, he is a certain 
functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, 
and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the 
free manipulation, the free composition, and recomposition of fiction. 
(118-119)
As Foucault puts it elsewhere, the author's function is,
to master and control the great proliferation of discourse, in such a 
way as to relieve its richness of its most dangerous elements; to 
organise its disorder so as to skate round its most uncontrollable 
aspects. (1972: 228)
The author here becomes a means of control (a function of discourse) 
of the 'cancerous and dangerous proliferation of signification' (1984: 
118); the author is also however, the prolific ‘initiator of discursivity',* 
of 'endless possibility of discourse' (114). What goes hand in hand here 
is the diffusion and power of knowledge. But there occurs a subtle shift of 
emphasis in power relations: once 'an indefinite source of signification, a 
powerful 'originator' of discourses - now the 'initiator' of powerful 
discourses; once the master of knowledge - now the facilitator of 
knowledge. This revision of the functionary principle of the author 
constitutes a resistance to the reign of the author, which has further 
consequences. For, if we accept Foucualt'6 point that 'power and knowledge
I
directly imply each other' (1977: 27), moreover, if we accept his premise
that 'where there is power, there are resistances' (Sheridan 1980: 184), we
I
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can see how discourse 'transmits, produces, and reinforces power', but also 
how it 'undermines, exposes and even blocks it' (184). This is to say, 
points of resistances can effect shifts in power relations. And it is at 
this Juncture that we may bring the reader and reading to Foucault. Whilst 
Foucault's 'What is an Author’ never considers the reader (contrary to 
Barthes's 'The Death of the Author'), we may formulate this reader in 
Foucau/dian fashion. We may see the function of the reader as that site of 
resistance where those initiators or 'founders of discursitivlty' who have 
established 'an endless possibility of discourse' have their discourses 
'curtailed, divided, overthrown, caricatured, theatricalized or what you 
will' (Foucault 1980: 81). To put this differently, it is precisely because 
we see the author no longer as a 'genial creator', an 'originator', but as 
an 'initiator of discourses' that we can prepare the strategic ground for 
the function of the reader.
If the function of the author is to channel, control the proliferation 
of meaning and the function of the reader is the site of its resistance, 
can we then 'imagine a culture in which the fictive would operate in an 
absolutely free state' (Foucault 1984: 119)? Are we not then to be accused
by Foucavldlan discourse of 'pure romanticism' (119)? The answer is no here, 
for if we begin to map the power relations between author and text and 
reader that have hitherto dominated literary practice, and begin to see the 
function of the reader as thi6 site of resistance, we may call for reading 
as a strategy and/or a tactics by which we, as readers, may freely 
'circulate', 'manipulate', 'compose' and 'recompose' the fictive, the 
literary. In brief then, we may see the reader empowered to read, resist 
readings, re-read, misread, recycle our texts, re-read, write, re-write our 
textual past.
15
1.2 The Birth of Readers
Whilst Foucault's essay pays its last debt to the function of our authors, 
Roland Barthes' famous essay 'The Death of the Author' acts as a kind of 
manifesto to and for the reader. According to David Lodge, it is 'an 
assertion that struck at the very heart of traditional literary studies' 
(1988: 166) and we may add, that it has remained one of the most serious 
challenges to our literary humanist sensibilities. This is what Barthes 
writes,
Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite 
futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to 
furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing. Such a 
conception suits criticism very well, the latter then allotting itself 
the important task of discovering the Author (or its hypostasis: 
society, history, psyché, liberty) beneath the work: when the Author 
has been found, the text is 'explained'... (1977a: 147)
In liberating literature from the authority of an all-powerful presence
behind it which organizes and gives it meaning, Barthes not only shakes the
ancient assumption of discovering a single and univocal meaning, put there
for all eternity by the mysterious and wonderful mind of the great author,
but he also releases the text from the constraints of a single and univocal
reading. This is to say, the reader Is no longer the discoverer of the
author's meaning and intentions, a mere consumer of the work, but is
allowed the pleasure of producing the signif icatlons of the text. If
literature refuses 'to assign a 'secret', an ultimate meaning, to the text 
(and the world as text)' (147), it 'liberates what may be called an anti- 
theological activity, an activity that i6 truly revolutionary since to 
refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases - 
reason, science, law,. (147).
I
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Hence, we are beginning to move Into the age of the "post-"; as Lodge 
points out, the essay represents 'one of the most controversial tenets of 
post-structuralism' (1988: 166); this being undoubtedly the case, we must
draw attention to one particular aspect of this controversy. Whilst 
Barthes's work is difficult to categorize, because of the great variety of 
his writings 'which have been structuralist, ideological, semiotic, 
Freudian, and more' (Bennett 1990: 63), 1 this particular essay may be seen
as containing two tenets on which later literary theorists, theorists 
working from very different premisses, could draw.
Written in 1968 thus preceedlng the bulk of post-structuralist 
writings as well as audience centered criticism, Barthes not only 
formulates one of the most important features of post-structuralism, but he 
also anticipates some aspects of German and American reader— response 
criticism of the 1970's and 80's. If readei— response criticism elevates the 
reader to a central position, makes him into 'that someone who holds 
together in a single field all the traces by which the text is written' 
(Barthes 1977a: 148), post-stucturalism celebrates the text 'not as a line
of words releasing a single "theological" meaning (the "message" of the 
Author— God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, 
none of them original, blend and clash' (146). The Author is 'buried' then; 
and 'the modern scriptor' merely 'traces a field without origin', a field, 
which 'has no other origin than language itself' and language itself 
'ceaselessly calls into question all origin' (146). If the 'text is a 
tissue of quotations' and if 'a text is made of multiple writings, drawn
t
from many cultures' (146), then it spins a post-structuralist web of 
textuality. 'In this multiplicity of writing, everything is to be
I
17
disentangled nothing deciphered' (147), and It Is here that the role of the 
reader emerges for Barthes. Rather than deciphering the meaning of the 
text, this reader disentangles the multiple threads spun by textuality. 
Moreover, the reader becomes the 'one place where this multiplicity is 
focused', the reader is 'the space on which all the quotations that make up 
writing are inscribed without any of them being lost' (148); and it is 
precisely here that we encounter the German response to the reader, this 
unified construct which lives on in much of American audience-centered 
criticism. As Barthes has put it so succinctly, 'a text's unity lies not in 
its origin but in its destination' (148).
On the one hand then, Barthes debunks the comforts and solutions of 
classical humanist criticism, destabilizes what is perhaps the most 
foundational representation in the philosophical traditions that inform our 
culture - that of the subject: on the other hand he resurrects that subject 
in form of the reader. 'Without history, biography, psychology' (148), this 
seemingly transcendent reader is a unified construct as opposed to the 'I' 
of the author which is 'never more than the instance of writing' (145). 
And, since writing is never more than 'a ready-formed dictionary, its words 
only explainable through other words, and so on indefinitely* (146), the 
author becomes the product of a text rather than the reverse. Any rigorous 
poststructuralist move is deferred though, at least until S/Z, for if all 
writing is gathered, inscribed in the Bartheslan reader, we have returned 
to a unity which has gripped our critical imagination for a long time; too 
long as this thesis will come to argue. As Susan Suleiman puts it, 'the 
notion of the unified text, like that of the unified self, is an illusion, 
and the virtue of deconstructlve criticism is that it places this
I
18
potentially tragic insight at the center of its activity* <1980: 43).
Barthes, nevertheless, evades the full force of poststructuralist criticism 
or deconstructive logic, for whilst he raises his suspicion about the 
"subject" of the author, he places his full trust in the reader. Whilst he 
dismantles the unified origin of both the text and the author, postulating 
the differential nature of textuality, he gathers that which was dispersed 
in the reader.
His essay may thus be argued to play out a hermeneutics of suspicion 
and a hermeneutics of trust, or alternatively a negative and a positive 
hermeneutics. A hermeneutics of suspicion is nothing else than the post­
structuralist doubt in unities, and a hermeneutics of trust is nothing else 
than the hermeneutic faith in overcoming difference. 2 What these terms 
signify then, is a debate about the privilege of authority and identity - 
whether authorial, textual or readerly; in a nutshell, whether these 
Identities are marked by difference or unity, whether we take difference as 
a mark or trace which is always already within the text or whether we 
strive to gather that which is dispersed to form a new comprehensible 
harmonious whole. Barthes' essay may therefore be argued to contain two 
irreconcilable 'interpretations of interpretation'. As Derrida puts it in 
'Structure, Sign and Play':
There are more than enough indications today to suggest we might 
perceive that these two interpretations of interpretation - which are 
absolutely irreconcilable even if we live them simultaneously and 
reconcile them in an obscure economy - together share the field which 
we call, in such a problematic fashion, the social sciences. <1978: 
293)
Barthes may be accused here of living these lrreconcl11ble 'interpretations 
of interpretation' 'simultaneously', and of recpnciling these tenets in an
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'obscure ecomomy'. Thus his essay gives rise to a debate (which we shall
return to in more detail later) which raises ‘issues', which in Susan
Suleiman's words, 'not only constitute the crux of contemporary literary 
theorizing, they also function as dividing lines within and between the 
varieties of audience-centred criticism' <1980: 38).
It is here that we shall return to the reader. First, we turn our 
attention to the unified reader which the early Barthes has given birth to 
and which lives on in the work of many readei— response critics, before we 
consider Barthes' other someone, 'this "IH which approaches the text as 
already a plurality of other texts' (Barthes 1974: 10), the textual reader
of the later Barthes of S/Z In other words, Barthes' early and late
reader, is used as a linchpin from which to chart the work of literary 
theorists such as Iser, Culler and Fish - unified “positive hermeneuts" and 
the work of theorists such as Hartman, Bloom, Miller, and de Man -
"negative hermeneuts".
l
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2.1 Wolfgang Iser's Subjected Reader
Iser is both a reader— response critic as well as a theorist from the 
Constance School of reception theory. Whilst reception theory is to be 
understood as a 'cohesive, conscious, and collective undertaking' <198*: 
xiii) within literary theory according to Robert Holub, thus representing a 
particular re-orientation in West German literary thinking, reader-response 
criticism is a more loosely defined term for those theorists which have 
placed the reader in a central position for literary investigation. Whilst 
readei— response critics share several important features, they cannot be 
grouped into a school of thinkers with common aims, for they had 'very 
little contact with or Influence on one another'. Holub therefore 
concludes: 'Cilf readei— response criticism has become a critical force... 
it is by virtue of the ingenuity of labeling rather than any communality of 
effort' <1984: xiii).
Nevertheless, this thesis will single out two broad directions in 
reader-response criticism. One direction, which Iser is clearly part of, 
takes its impetus from a German critical and philosophical tradition, the 
other direction, takes it Impetus from recent French thinking. It is also 
at this point that we return to the faith a "positive hermeneutics" 
expresses in the subject and the doubt with which "negative hermeneutics" 
seeks to undermine that subject. More specifically, however, we turn to 
those theorists such as Iser (Culler and Fish) who implicitly argue for 
unity, coherence, consistency and the stabilisation through the act of 
reading; before turning to those other theorists who doubt such
certainties.
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Within the work of the Constance School, Iser is less concerned with
the 'macrocosm of reception' than with the 'microcosm of response'. For
within the aesthetics of reception Iser's special concern is the reading
process. He is therefore best known for his interest in the reader and the
reading process. Hence, his book, The Act of Reading, poses the question:
how and under what conditions a text has meaning for the reader? In
contrast to traditional interpretation, which has sought to discover a
hidden meaning in the text, he sees meaning as the result of an interaction
between text and reader, as 'an effect to be experienced', not an 'object
to be defined' (Iser 1978: 10). Meaning is therefore not directly
accessible or even present in any way either to the reader or in the
textual object, but is something that emerges in the process of interaction
between the two poles. As Iser puts it in The Act of Reading-.
Meaning must clearly be the product of an interaction between the 
textual signals and the reader's act of comprehension 1...J. As text 
and reader thus merge into a single situation, the division between 
subject and object no longer applies, and it therefore follows that 
meaning is no longer an object to be defined, but is an effect to be 
experienced. (1978: 9-10)
His emphasis on the Interactive nature of the reading process opens up a 
space between the two poles. 'From this polarity, it follows', Iser writes, 
'that the literary work cannot be completely identical with the text or 
with the realization of the text, but in fact must lie halfway between the 
two' (1980: 50). But how does Iser describe this relation between the two
poles more precisely.1 Or more to the point, how does the text signal the
reader and how does the reader then realize, concretize or construct the 
work.1 How, in short, do text and reader merge in this happy and harmonious 
unison which 'brings the literary work into existence' (50), which produces 
meaning for the literary work?
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The text is 'a pattern', 'a structured indicator to guide the 
imagination of the reader' <1978: 9). Elizabeth Freund summarizes Iser's
position:
This set of instructions it gives, however, is incomplete, full of 
•gaps' or ' blancs' or ' indeterminacies' which must be filled by the 
reader, both according to his disposition and to the perspectives 
offered by the text. [...] The reader is free to fill in the blanks 
but is at the same time constrained by the patterns supplied in the 
text; the text proposes, or instructs, and the reader disposes, or 
constructs. <1987: 142)
As Iser puts it, 'the written part of the text gives us the knowledge, but 
it is the unwritten part that gives us the opportunity to picture things;
indeed, without the elements of indeterminacy, the gaps in the text, we
should not be able to use our imagination' <1980: 58). The gaps or
Leerstellen, thus 'stimulate the reader into f illlng the blancs with
projections' <Iser 1989: 33-34). The reader is consequently 'drawn into the 
events and made to supply what is meant from what is not said' <33). 'What 
is said', Iser continues, 'only appears to take on significance as a 
reference to what is not said; it is the implications and not the 
statements that give shape and weight to the meaning* <33>. If blanks thus 
indicate 'that the different segments and patterns of the text are to be 
connected' <34), thus prompting 'acts of ideation on the reader’s part' 
<34), completion can finally occur 'when the schemata and perspectives have 
been linked together', and as a result, 'the blanks "dissappear" <35>. In 
other words, 'Iwlhenever the reader bridges the gaps, communication begins' 
<34). The importance of the gaps for Iser becomes clear: they 'function as 
a kind of pivot on which the whole text-reader relationship revolves' <34>. 
They also, however, allow the reader to act, in Jane Tompkins' words, 'as a 
co-creator of the work by supplying that portion of it which is not written 
but only implied' <1980: xv).
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There is another point to be made here. These gaps, according to Iser, 
may be filled in differently since variations in ideation are always 
possible.
... one text is potentially capable of several different realizations, 
and no reading can ever exhaust the full potential, for each 
individual reader will fill in the gaps in his own way; thereby 
excluding the various other possibilities; as he reads he will make 
his own decision as to how the gap is to be filled in... By making his 
decision he implicitly acknowledges the inexhaustibility of the text; 
at the same time it is the very inexhaustibility that forces him to 
make a decision. (1980; 55)
Iser can therefore draw this conclusion; 'With all literary texts... the 
reading process is selective, and the potential text is infinitely richer 
than any of its individual realizations' (55). In this sense, ' the literary 
text makes no objectively real demand on its readers, it opens up a freedom 
that everyone can interpret in his own way' (Iser 1971: 44). To put this
differently then, the text is a plenitude and by virtue of this fullness, 
the text allows for, creates, even programmes different responses for the 
different readers. If the text then, as Iser argues, is 'infinitely richer 
than any of its individual realizations', the corporate body of the text 
seems "economically" more powerful than any or all of its potential 
readers. The text may be said then, to be the dominant partner on the 
board, so to speak, with its potential readers. In other words, the 
literary work does not 'lie half-way’ between the text and the reader, but 
lies very much on the side of the text. In Tompkins words, 'Ctlhe text's 
Intentions may be manifold, they may even be infinite, but they are always 
present embryonically in the work Itself, implied by it, circumscribed by 
it, and finally traceable to it* (1980: xv). Iser throws further light on 
the issue.
The text is constructed in such a way that it provokes the reader 
constantly to supplement what he is reading. .. Whenever this occurs, 
it is clear that the author is not mobilizing his reader because he
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himself cannot finish off the work he has started: his motive is to 
bring about an intensified participation which will compel the reader 
to be that much more aware of the intention of the text. <1971: 32-33, 
qu. in Suleiman 1980: 25)
Iser is making several revealing points here. For one, the text, as 
was already indicated by Tompkins, has an intention; secondly, there is an 
indication that the work may be "finished off" - if not by the author - 
then, by Implication, by the reader; more importantly though, the author 
seems to be smuggled in through the back door, or to put it in Isererian 
terms, the author is smuggled in through the gaps. Is this to say then, as 
Suleiman suggests, that 'the kind of pattern the reader creates for the 
text is foreseen and intended by the author’ (1980: 25), and the reader
merely "finishes off" what was initiated by the author? Iser makes the 
following points.
If the reader were given the whole story, and there were nothing left 
for him to do, then his imagination would never enter the field, the 
result would be the boredom which inevitably arises when everything is 
laid out cut and dried before us. <1980: 51)
and in more precise terms,
The author of the text may, of course, exert plenty of influence on 
the reader's imagination - he has the whole panoply of narrative 
techniques at his disposal - but no author worth his salt will ever 
attempt to set the whole picture before his reader's eyes, If he doe6, 
he will quickly lose his reader, for it is only by activating the 
reader's imagination that the author can hope to involve him and so 
realize the intentions of his text. <1980: 57)
Is Iser saying here that 'the whole picture' can be set before a reader?
This indicates a wholeness which can never be more than a comprehensiveness
and totality rather than an inexhaustibility. We may also add as a kind of
footnote, that Iser, at this Juncture, is furthest removed from Barthes'
formulation of textuallty as an infinite web. And, he is closest to
Foucault's function of the author as 'the genial creator of a work in which
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he deposits, within Infinite wealth and generosity, an inexhaustable world 
of significations C...1 by which, In our culture, one limits, excludes, and 
chooses...* (Foucault 1984: 218-219). Iser never, of course, leaves the
humanist terrain of subjects as agents of decision and control. 
Nevertheless though, Iser seems confused who, infact, is in control, who
wields authority over the production of literary meaning. This not only 
permits us to argue that Iser defines his object rather than allowing for 
its effect to be experienced; moreover, It commits us to re-read the 
Iserlan reading subject. For, in the final Instance, this subject Is 
subjected to the author.
Iser's spots of Indeterminacy begin to take on the appearance of 
bllndspots in his own thinking. Moreover, spots of indeterminacy, gaps, 
blanks are less spaces of undecldablllty, ambiguity than gaping, yearning 
holes to be filled. To put this differently, if the author does not
lay the whole picture before his reader, then the reader is charged with 
the responsibility of reconstructing the latent whole picture. The question 
which remains to be aswered here, is, whether this is, indeed, the Iserlan 
reader's task and if so, how does he accomplish this task, and finally, 
what are the wider implications of closing holes, drawing 'whole pictures' 
to a dosé?
In the initial stages of the reader's engagement with the text, s/he 
builds up a consistent picture of the text. If the text cannot be grasped 
as a whole, it is to be grasped as 'a series of changing viewpoints, each 
one restricted in itself and so necessitating further perspectives' (Iser 
1978: 68). This then, according to Iser, is 'the process by which the
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reader "realizes" an overall situation' (68). As Freund sums it up, 'ttlhe
reader's acts of comprehension are structured by his attempts to build up a
consistent view of the textual segments as he moves between the shifting
perspectives of the text' <1987: 144). Of central importance here is the
•wandering viewpoint'. The reader's wandering viewpoint has the task of
'consistency building'; 'that is, of developing an account of the text
which can provide an explanation of it which satisfies all of the
information provided by the text up to any point by the reading' (Maclean
1987: 131). Iser likens the reader*6 activity to,
a traveler in a stagecoach who has to make the often difficult Journey 
through the novel, gazing out from his moving viewpoint. Naturally, he 
combines all that he sees within his memory and establishes a pattern 
of consistency, the nature and reliability of which will depend partly 
on the degree of attention he has paid during each phase of the 
Journey. At no time. however, can he have a total view of that 
Journey. <1978: 16)
When we read a text it is composed of a variety of perspectives 
between which the reader’s wandering viewpoint moves. Iser outlines four 
main perspectives in narrative texts, 'that of the narrator, that of the 
characters, that of the plot, and that marked out for the reader' <1978: 
96). Freund explains, 'Cals the reader's viewpoint travels between 
segments, his focus on a perspective will form a theme (or foreground) in 
relation to which the rest are horizon (or background) - until she/he moves 
on, and the theme of a moment ago will in turn become horizon.' <1987: 144)
The wandering viewpoint thu6 'permits the reader to travel through the 
text... unfolding the multlpllcly of Interconnecting perspectives which are
offset whenever there is a switch from one to another' (Iser 1978: 118). As 
Holub puts it, '[tlhe assumption behind this description of the reading 
process is, of course, labelled "consistency building"'j he concludes that
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•liln confronting the various signs or schemata of a text, readers try to 
establish connections between them that lend coherence to their activity* 
(1984: 90). Coherence is finally achieved, and the Journey through
perspectives and shifting themes and horizons is finally accomplished by 
the reader's incessant acts of ideation. Ideation is the formation of ideas 
in the reader's mind or the final gathering that makes up a complete 
impression. In other words, it is by virtue of the reader's acts of
ideation that segments from the text are organised and connections between 
them are construed. Acts of ideation are, in Freunds's words, 'gap-filling 
activities that ultimately produce the synthesis we think of as
comprehension or meaning' <1987: 145).
This ‘synthesizing process', Iser tells us, 'is never sporadic - it 
continues throughout every phase of the Journey of the wandering viewpoint' 
(1978: 109). This is not only because incompleteness 'necessitates 
synthesis' (109), but also because 'the reader will strive, even if
unconsciously, to fit everything together in a consistent pattern' <1980: 
58). Consistency is never simply a yearning the reader may have, it is more 
than that:
If we cannot find (or Impose) this consistency, sooner or later we 
will put the text down. The process is virtually hermeneutic. The text 
provokes certain expectations which in turn we project onto the text 
in such a way that we reduce the polysemantic possibilities to a
single interpretation in keeping with the expectations aroused, thus 
extracting an individual, configurative meaning. (Iser 1980: 59, my
emphasis)
And it is precisely here that we can see the twofold function of reading 
for Iser. It produces coherence, it gathers the blanks, gaps and spots of 
indeterminacy into a consistent whole, a totality. It tames polysemantic 
potential into some order. Or as Eagleton sardonically puts it, the Iserian
29
•reader, it would seem, is engaged in fighting the text as much as
interpreting it, struggling to pin down its anarchic "polysemantic"
potential within some manageable framework* <1983: 81) Furthermore, through
formulating this totality, it enables us to formulate ourselves, and I may
add, it formulates us as a unified subject. Iser makes the point.
The constitution of meaning not only implies the creation of a 
totality emerging from interacting textual perspectives..., but also, 
through formulating this totality it enables us to formulate ourselves 
and thus discover an inner world of which we had hitherto not been 
conscious. <1978: 158)
Reading becomes a medium through which consciousness comes to realise 
itself. It is that 'need to decipher', that, according to Iser, 'gives us 
the chance to formulate our own deciphering capacity - i.e., we bring to 
the fore an element of our being of which we are not directly conscious'
<1980: 227).
In conclusion, we may therefore say, rather than opening up a space of 
'dynamism' between text and reader, as he so clearly states in The Act of 
Reading, Iser ressurrects the author to oversee a "subjected reader". The 
impulse which underlies this covert move is, undoubtedly, a quest for 
stabilisation. The making sense of reading is not only a reading of making 
sense, but a "raiio-nalisation" of sense <Bedeutung), a subjection of <the 
readers') sense to <authorial) reason. For to eliminate textual authority - 
be it from the text or the author - is to eliminate the unity, wholeness 
and identity of the text on the one hand, and the unicity of the subject as 
master of his discourse on the other hand. The Iserlan reader who gathers 
the text's perspectives, who fills and completes the circle is that 
faithful hermeneutic slave, still serving the continuity of a circumscribed 
and cohesive tradition. In other words, the reader remains the subjecting
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and subjected humanist subject par excellence - the deserving marionnette 
of the Barthesian (author— )God and 'his hypostasis - reason, science, law’, 
whilst simultaneously assuming the 'author— function', the Foucauldian 
ideological construct which marks not only 'the manner in which we fear the 
proliferation of meaning', but by which "we" mark "our" consistent efforts 
to conceal the totaJ-ltarlanlsm that masquerades as bourgeois liberal 
pluralism.
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2.2 Jonathan Culler's Conventional Reader
If Iser guides us towards the phenomenology of the text as an object of 
experience by Individual readers, reading necessarily constitutes a 
somewhat "private" affair; and If Iser's reader thus makes sense in 
solitude, Culler's reader participates in 'highly social activities which 
cannot be separated from interpersonal and Institutional conventions' 
(1980: 53). His reader's Interpretations are never the result of
'subjective associations', but are 'public and can be discussed and 
Justified with respect to the conventions of reading [literature)..., of 
making sense' <1975: 116). Whilst the Iserlan reader experiences and
perceives thus paying his debt to phenomenology, Jonathan Culler's reader 
exercises competence. This competence, according to Elizabeth Freund, is 
nothing else than 'the bringing to bear of a whole latent system of 
interpretive conventions for deciphering the meaning of literary texts' 
(1987: 82).
This is also the point at which Culler's structuralist programme
begins: if language is defined as a culturally constructed system rather
than a natural entity, so also must the reading process be thus defined; if
structuralist analysis of language sets itself the task of isolating the
underlying set of laws and principles which structure the linguistic system
as it constructs meaning, then this task must also be put to reading. If
meaning is thus explained in terms of conventions - so is the subject, the
reading subject, the reader. This, of course. denies the subject any
conscious agency, denies it the role as source of meaning:
once meaning is explained in terms of conventional systems which may 
escape the grasp of the conscious subject — the self can no longer be 
identified with consciousness. It is 'dissolved' as its functions are
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taken up by a variety of Interpersonal systems that operate through 
It. [...] the self comes to appear more and more as a construct, the 
result of systems of convention. (Culler 1975: 28-29)
Culler never dispenses with the subject entirely, for one can gain evidence
of the conventions of reading through it/her/him: 'thle may no longer be
the origin of meaning, but meaning must move through him. . . it takes place
through him... (1975: 30). This then is how Culler sets the analyst's - his
own task: 'to reconstruct the conventions' (31). In short, Culler argues
for our awareness of the interpretive conventions which guide our reading,
which operate through us. Whilst Iser stressed that through formulating
'our own deciphering capacity', we may formulate oui— selves thereby raising
our consciousness, Culler calls for 'the expansion of self' (1975: 130)
through a reflexivity brought to bear on the conventions that govern our
reading practices. A turn which has also characterized a general trend in
the humanities, a turn towards self-reflexivity: to question and make
explicit the assumptions that ground the methods of our disciplines
(Suleiman 1980: 4).
What we are describing here, is the structuralist premise from which 
Culler seeks to explain the enabling systems of competence which make 
intelligibility possible. His exploration of the reading process does 
therefore not centre on the notion of determining meaning in the work, but 
on the question of how works have meaning. A purely interpretive task is 
abandoned in favour of 'the task of formulating a comprehensive theory of 
literary discourse and assigning a secondary place to the interpretation of 
individual texts' (Culler 1975: 118). As Freund puts it, the object of
interpretation becomes interpretation itself, leading to 'a theory not only
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of reading but of the reading of reading' <1987: 72). This citation 
summarizes Culler's position well:
To account for the form and meaning of literary works is to make 
explicit the special conventions and procedures of interpretation that 
enable readers to move from the linguistic meaning of sentences to the 
literary meaning of works. To explain facts about the form and meaning 
works have for readers is to construct hypotheses about the conditions 
of meaning, and hypotheses about the conditions of meaning are claims 
about the conventions and interpretive operations applied in reading. 
In brief, I am arguing that if the study of literature is a 
discipline, it must become a poetics: a study of the conditions of 
meaning and thus a study of reading. <1980: 49)
For Culler then, 'the work has structure and meaning because it is 
read in a particular way, because these potential properties, latent in the 
object itself, are actualized by the theory of discourse applied in the act 
of reading ' <1975: 113). To take this one step further, the text is never 
Inherently meaningful, but 'can', however, 'be made intelligible if one 
invents appropriate conventions' <1975: 123). In this way, the invention of 
conventions is never more than a demand for sense. As Culler puts it, 'if a 
difficult work later becomes intelligible it is because new ways of reading 
have been developed in order to meet what is the fundamental demand of the 
system: the demand for sense' <123). The importance of this argument, as 
Freund puts it, ' is that some interpretation is always guaranteed and that 
consequently there would be no aberrant texts, Just as there would be no 
aberrant readings' <1987: 82). Reading here is always greater than the 
text. Reading can and will make any text mean, interpretation will always 
have the last word in that no text can ever escape the 'drive', as Culler 
says, of our sense making capabilities. In brief, no text will ever be able 
to resist the force of being "tamed", "domesticated”, "institutionalized" 
by the reader. To quote Freund once more, 'this is precisely the enabling
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assumption of poetics: every Interpretation Is an instance of the laws 
governing the system of interpretation’ C1987: 82).
This 'demand for sense' is accompanied by a 'drive towards totality*.
If texts are neither inherently meaningful, nor 'harmonious totalities,
autonomous natural organisms, complete in themselves and bearing a rich
Immanent meaning' (Culler 1975: 116), it must be the reader, who becomes
the organizing principle of order. In Culler's words:
The crucial point, however, is that even if we deny the need for a 
poem to be a harmonious totality, we make use of the notion in 
reading. Understanding is necessarily a teleological process and a 
sense of totality is the end which governs this process. Ideally, one 
should be able to account for everything in a poem and among 
comprehensive explanations we should prefer those which best succeed 
in relating items to one another rather than offer separate unrelated 
explanations. And poems which succeed as fragments or as Instances of 
incomplete totality depend for their success on the fact that our 
drive towards totality enables us to recognize their gaps and 
discontinuities and to give them a thematic value. <1975: 171, my 
emphasis)
Culler can, therefore, conclude that to interpret a poem 'is to assume a
totality and then to make sense of gaps, either by exploring ways in which
they might be filled in or by giving them meaning as gaps' (171). The
overall quest here, is, of course, unity:
. . . and there seem good reasons to suppose that if in reading and 
interpreting poems one Is seeking unity one must have at least a 
rudimentary notion of what would count as unity.
We can see Culler, the structuralist, and Culler, the dialectician, at work
here:
The most basic model would seei to be the binary opposition, the 
dialectical resolution of a binary opposition, the displacement of a 
an unresolved opposition by a third term, the foui— term homology, the 
series united by a common denominator, and the series with a 
transcendent or summarizing final term. It is at least a plausible 
hypothesis that the reader will not feel satisfied with an 
interpretation unless it organizes a text according to one of these 
formal models of unity. <1975: 174, my emphasis)
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The desire for unity may, ultimately, be less fulfilling or satisfying for 
the reader than Culler may have envisaged. Readers become constrained and 
restrained, since their meaning-making becomes utterly dependent upon a 
meta-convention - that of creating a sensible unified totality. Their 
differences as readers and the differences of their readings are always 
subject to what this master-convention deems to be appropriate. This may be 
the weak point, at which different, even contradictory readings are 
neutralized, for they may differ in detail, but are ultimately regulated in 
accordance with the mastei— convention. This is more than apparent in 
Culler's claim that '[disagreement about a text is of interest only 
because we assume that agreement is possible. . . Indeed, we notice 
differences of interpretation precisely because we take agreement for 
granted as the natural result of a communicative process based on shared 
conventions' (1975: 258). 1 If shared conventions assure agreement, 2 it is
because they create a uniformity of expectation. This citation seems to 
support our point:
The claim is not that competent readers would agree on an 
interpretation but only that certain expectations about poetry and 
ways of reading guide the interpretive process and impose severe 
limitations on the set of acceptable or plausible readings. <1975: 
127)
In the final Instance though, Culler's meta-convention does not so 
much impose agreement "from above", but secures a kind of Gramsclan 
hegemony by subordinating differences to the overarching horizon of 
Culler's own metadiscourse. Since we already know that conventions are 
never natural or universal, but are constructed and learned, we begin to 
see the close link between interpretive conventions and our institutions of 
learning. As Culler puts it, 'conventions are the constituents of the
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institution of literature' <1975: 116), and we may add that, here, Culler 
is primarily interested in 'what an ideal reader must know implicitly in 
order to read and interpret works in ways which we consider acceptable, in 
accordance with the institution of literature' <1975: 123-124, my
emphasis). This is our point: the stress is on knowing, and this knowledge 
supposedly constitutes our mastery of the system. For, as Culler puts it: 
■talnyone lacking this knowledge, anyone wholly unacquainted with 
literature and unfamiliar with the conventions by which fictions are read, 
would, for example be baffled if presented with a poem', hence, 'it is 
obvious... that understanding depends on mastery of a system* <1975: 114).
Knowledge is defined as knowledge of the system of convention, 
yielding a position of mastery: the competent <ideal) reader has gained a 
certain mastery of the "moves" permissible within the 
literary/institutional discourse. This is precisely the point - the shift 
from student to master, from recipient to lecturer - at which the meta­
discourse that purports to DESCRIBE the system, slips into the
consolidation of a community of masters who, by advancing their learning 
coextensively with their power within the institution, effectively 
PRESCRIBE and maintain the meta-discourse that both regulates this system 
and consolidates their power. What we are describing then, are the 
positions of mastery within the power structure of the institution; and 
Culler's blindness in relation to how thoroughly infiltrated his alleged 
conventions are by precisely these power structures, As Eagleton says, 
'ttlo be on the Inside of the discourse itself is to be blind +o Cits! 
power, for what is rpore natural and non-dominative than to speak one's own 
tongue' <1983: 203). Culler's reflexivity on the systems of conventions
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which govern our reading practices thus never includes a self-reflexive 
moment or questioning of his own preferred conventions, his own mastei—  
convention.
Culler's reading conventions beg for a Foucauldian analysis here. 
Power and knowledge are linked, because discourse is never merely an intra- 
lingulstlc phenomenon, but a practice, which has effects. These effects 
distribute roles which necessarily embody certain power relations. If we 
accept, however, that literary discourse is not merely a reflection of 
reality, but is also to some degree responsible for constructing it, then 
the prevailing dominant discourse 3 or competent reading convention will 
make all the difference. What Culler does in the end then, is to set up the 
mastery of a meta-convention which is nothing other than a conventional 
mastery. For to limit the potential range of conventions and discourses is 
to concentrate power in the hands of the institution. This citation from 
Robert Morley bears relevance here:
The meaning of the text will be constructed differently according to 
the discourses (knowledge, prejudices, resistances etc.) brought to 
bear upon the text by the reader and the crucial factor in the 
encounter of audlence/subject and text will be the range of discourses 
at the disposal of the audience. (1980: 18, qu. in Turner 1990: 133)
This range or multiplicity of discourses constitutes a powerful resistance
to the hegemony of any metadiscourse. Differing, even conflicting
discourses thus undermine the institution's claim for unity and totality by
which it has always consolidated its hegemony. And it is this concentrated
power which a multiplication of differing discourses can undermine and
disperse. We would like to note this point here and bear it in mind for
later discussion.
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2. 3 Stanley Fish's Communitarian Reader
'Scourge* of the literary establishment (Shepard 1989: 95) and enfant
terrible of the readei— response world, Stanley Fish represents the rather 
extreme pole of readei— response criticism. Through a ”vary-orum" of often 
conflicting literary readings/crltical writings, Fish has never ceased to 
annoy his army of critics. In an essay entitled 'Constraints and Politics 
in the Literary Theory of Stanley Fish', William E. Cain summarizes Fish's 
position from an early piece of his writing: 'Literature in the Reader:
Affective Stylistics'. Though Fish tells us, 'I would no longer stand 
behind its every statement', ' we shall nevertheless provide Cain's lengthy 
account here:
In 'Literature in the Reader', Fi6h describes his method in detail. He 
wants, first of all, to guard against the charge that his theory
invites ' inpressionism', whereby each reader (merely) reports on his
personal responses. Borrowing from 'modern linguistics', Fish outlines 
a 'competence model' which assumes that 'if the speakers of a language 
share a system of rules that each of them has somehow internalized, 
understanding will, in some sense, be uniform: that is it will proceed 
in terms of the system of rules speakers share' tFish 1970: 1411.
Because these rules act as 'constraints', they establish the
•boundaries' within which responses are made, and even suggest that 
response is 'to some extent, predictable and normative'. Far from 
lapsing into impressionism, Fish argues, his accounts of the reader 
are based on the fact that, within a certain range, readers' responses 
are the same. (1981: 78)
Cain protests, that 'this argument bypasses critical history', since 
readers do respond in very different ways, so that one might ask 'whether 
they are even reading the same text' (78). Fish's argument does not 
'bypass' Jonathan Culler in our account though. For what is most apparent 
in Cain's summary of Fish's position, is, of course the striking parallel 
between Culler's theoretical stance (his meta—convention, as we discussed 
in the previous section), which remains unacknowledged as such, and Fish's 
rather more honest 1 and often very self-reflexive account of his own
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critical enterprise. This is to say, Fish does not hide behind the 
pluralist mask of a Culler who falls to acknowledge the subtle enforcement 
of interpretive constraints in his own discourse. Nor does Fish preach 
determinacy of meaning for fear of 'off-the-wall' interpretations and 
interpretive anarchy as Meyer Abrams and E. D. Hirsch do. What is at stake 
for Fish, then, is not so much a debate between pluralism and constraints 
on the one hand, and Indeterminacy and determinacy of meaning on the other, 
nor is Fish concerned to constrain interpretive activity; instead, as he 
reminds us in Is there a Text In this Class, 'the mistake is to think of 
interpretation as an activity in need of constraints, when in fact 
interpretation is a structure of constraints' (1980; 358>. In short, what
Fish is working towards and what his later writings in particular 
acknowledge and expose, are the forces of constraints Implicit in 
interpretive activity.
Another case in point is Fish's account of the institution. We are 
quite openly reminded of the constraining role it plays. For Culler, this 
constraining role is concealed behind an overt consensual liberalism: 
readings and interpretations have to be 'acceptable', 'plausible', 
'Justifiable', 'defensible'. If meanings or new meanings thus have to be 
'acceptable', 'defensible' before the 'institution of literature', then the 
critic's role Is that of a lawyer defending his case before the court, 
before the institution. For Fish, meanings and interpretations also have to 
be 'acceptable', but rather than 'defensible' they have to be 'persuasive'. 
The Fishian "lawyer" takes on a different role here, he does not so much 
defend his beliefs, but persuade of his bellef-systems. He does not justify 
his Interpretations, but gains them through "rhetorical ploys". He no
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longer believes in the Ideal of Justice, but he knows how the court works 
and how to work It. He Is, In other words, aware of its limitations and 
contraints. If the early essay 'Literature in the Reader: Affective 
Stylistics' 6hows many similarities with Culler's position, it shows little 
resemblance with Fish's later work. It nevertheless points to one endeavour, 
which permeates the Fishian canon. Against the grain of the arguments many 
other critics have put forward, we take Fish's moral at its word - 'Ctlhe 
moral is clear: the choice is never between objectivity and interpretation 
but between an interpretation that is acknowledged as such and an 
interpretation that is at least aware of itself.' <1980: 167>
Of late then. Fish has been arguing for the abolition of the very 
distinction between reading and writing. This seems to have struck at the 
very heart of the readei— response establishment. Accused of monism by 
Culler <1985: 5), accused of undermining the entire readei— response project 
by Freund <1987: 6), he maintains that texts become the products of readers.
In this sense, texts dlssappear and in Freund's words, 'our "texts" are our 
readings, the poems we "write"' <1987: 106). The aim of the 'Interpreting 
the Variorum' essay, according to Fish, is that it 'begins by declaring 
that formal features do not exist independently of the reader's experience 
and ends by admitting that my account of the reader's experience is itself 
the product of a set of interpretive assumptions' <1980: 147). 2 It is
these two points of Fish's argument which we shall follow most closely.
'What', Fish is, 'suggesting is that formal units are always the 
function of the interpretive model one brings to bear, they are not "in" 
the text...' <1980: 164). His argument is clearly directed at theorists
tsuch as Iser, who discern a pattern In the text which guides the reader's
Interpretive endeavour. For Fish concludes:
If I read Lycldas and The Waste Land differently (In fact I do not), 
it will not be because the formal structures of the two poems (to term 
them such is also an interpretive decision) call forth different 
interpretive strategies but because my predisposition to execute
different interpretive strategies will produce different formal 
structures. (169)
To put this differently, if 'interpretive acts are the source of forms
rather than the other way round' (167), then, 'interpretive strategies are 
not put into execution after reading... they are the shape of reading, and
because they are the shape of reading, they give texts their shape rather
than, as is usually assumed, arising from them' (168). If texts do not
shape readings but interpretive strategies shape readings, it suggests 
that, 'these strategies exist prior to the act of reading and therefore 
determine the shape of what is read rather than, as is usually assumed, the 
other way round' (171). It is here that we find the thrust of Fish's 
argument. Texts are the products of the interpretive strategies readers 
use; readers do not extract structures from texts but ascertain that
which by prior interpretive procedures is always already in place. Thus 
assuming that an interpretation is already in place, we have to face two 
consequences: texts cannot therefore control readers' responses, nor can 
readers control interpretive strategies, for they merely put them into
operation.
Fish's notion of 'interpretive strategy' according to William Ray, 
'thus unites writer and reader, reading act and textual structure, under a 
single conceptual umbrella' (1984: 167) Having thus dissolved the
hierarchical structure governing the relationship between 
author/text/reader, Fish can put forward his case:
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This then is ray thesis: the form of the reader's experience, formal 
units, and the structure of intention are one, that they come into 
view simultaneously, and that therefore the questions of priority and 
Independence do not arise. <165)
The function of interpretive strategies is more than a mere deconstruction 
of hierarchies. It is a way to both account for and preserve the stability 
of the interpretive process. The question why the same reader may perform 
differently when reading two different texts (167) and why different 
readers may perform similarly when reading the same text <167>, is 
intimitely linked to the existence of interpretive strategies. Moreover, 
it is linked to the prior existence of interpretive strategies. For these 
strategies not only give rise to both similar and different readings but 
always already preserve the stability and guarantee the variety of 
interpretations amongst readers. Their prior-ity is not simply temporal but 
part of a structure of prioi— ltles. This is to say, interpretive strategies 
are part of a higher authority. They are the very operations by which 
'interpretive communities' execute their interpretive moves. For as Fish 
tells us,
Interpretive communities are made up of those who share interpretive 
strategies not for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing 
texts, for constituting their properties and assigning their 
intentions. (171)
The ' repertoire of strategies' at the disposal of an interpretive 
community for interpreting texts will differ from that of another 
community. Henceforth, 'ttlhe assumption in each community will be that the 
other is not perceiving the 'true text’, but the truth will be that each 
perceives the text (or texts) its interpretive strategies demand and call 
into being' (171). According to Fish, '(tlhis, then is the explanation both 
for the stability of interpretation among different readers (they belong to
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the same community) and for the regularity with which a single reader will 
employ different interpretive strategies and thus make different texts (he 
belongs to different communities)' (171). If the existence of Interpretive 
communities thus explains and ensures stability, on the one hand, it can 
also explain 'why there are disagreements and why they can be debated In a 
principled way: not because of a stability in texts, but because of a 
stability in the make-up of interpretive communities and therefore in the 
opposing positions they make possible' (171). Fish, of course, concedes 
that interpretive communities 'grow and decline', that 'individuals move 
from one [community] to another', their overall function though - not unlike the 
function Foucault attributes to the author - is to Impede the 'cancerous 
and dangerous proliferation of signification* (to use Foucault's words 
here). In this sense, their function is also deeply ideological. For as 
Fish insists:
The notion of interpretive communities thus stands between an 
impossible ideal and the fear which leads so many to maintain it. The 
Ideal is of perfect agreement and it would require texts to have a 
status independent of interpretation. The fear is of interpretive 
anarchy, but it would only be realized if interpretation (text making) 
were completely random. It is the fragile but real consolidation of 
interpretive communities that allows us to talk to another, but with 
no hope or fear of ever being able to stop. (172)
Interpretive communities are intimately linked with our institutions 
for Fish and it is at this point that the charge of his critics takes hold. 
As Freund puts it, 'ttlhe appeal to the imperialism of agreement can chill 
the spines of readers whose experience of the community is less happily 
benign than Fish assumes' (1987: 111), Ray accuses him of supplying a 
theory that may be used 'to bastion the institutions and traditions' (1984: 
167), and 'of proposing a stasis of certainty that makes the individual an
1
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object of history rather than an agent' (169). In this sense the Fishlan 
reader may well be the fixed Althusserian subject - interpellated in the 
discourse his interpretive strategies call into being; in another sense, 
this reader may well be the more liberated Gramscian subject - which is 
never forced but can "freely" consent to belonging within a community of 
interpretors. We may well charge him with not resisting the power of the 
institution, and its drive for stability and consensus; or reprimand him 
with Culler and Ray for not provoking any change, criticise him for not 
' outflankting] the beliefs of the institutions that define him' (Ray 1984: 
169).
All these criticisms are valid, in that they point to the Ideological 
dangers of his position - but only to an extent. For, unlike Culler as we 
have seen, Fish does not prescribe a "communitarian" readership, but 
performs the role of that Fishian reader who describes the function 
Interpretive communities fulfil within the institutional system. And he is 
never blind to the institutional discourse he describes, the stability it 
demands, the ideal of consensus it sets and the controlled freedom it 
grants. Instead, his preferred arguments for instituting constraint with 
which he regales us, also expose the institution's drive for order and 
control. Accusations of blindness, or sheer 'conservative submission to 
authority' (Freund 1987: 111) miss the point, precisely because of the
extent to which Fish constantly theorizes t/his position. In other words, 
Fish's discourse is self-reflexive: the product of a set of interpretive 
assumptions, he produces 'Just one more intepretation', using one amongst 
many interpretive strategies which may be at his disposal. This is to say, 
he 'humbly acknowledges the limitations of his discourse'; ■“ and when asked
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about the Implications his argument has for literary criticism, he can 
candidly assert - 'none whatsoever' CFish 1980! 370).
This is the point at which we humbly agree to disagree with Fish. His
discourse may be limited and celebrate limitations, but it is not limiting.
This is to say the content of his argument moves within the context of a
closed system, i. e. Fish reading how Fishian readers read in Fishian ways,5
the Fishian reader who writes the text within the confines of the
interpretive strategies that are open to him. The form his argument takes
though, is rhetorical, one of persuasion. And it is in this sense that his
writing takes on a more radical edge, for his moves become strategic. In
this sense, also, he does make a difference to literary criticism, or to
literary-critical practices. David Shepard summarizes Fish’s stance:
The authority of a given community, and that of the interpretations it 
puts forward, is for Fish something persuasive rather than coercive. 
Criticism is 'a matter (endlessly negotiated) of persuasion' in a 
world where ‘political and persuasive means... are the same thing! 
<1989: 99, my emphasis)
If Freund sees his theory as a powerful tool that wields and is wielded by 
the political power of the institution and sees his literary criticism 
'reduced to no more than a gesture of persuasion, which dangerously 
trivializes the vigilant travail of reading' <1987: 110), she misjudges the
radical thrust of persuasive power. For if 'political and persuasive 
means... are the same thing', we have moved into a post-modern condition,
where the goal '1 6 no longer truth but perforraativity' <Lyotard 1986: 46)
to use a phrase of Lyotard's. Fish's theory is never true or false, but
performs a function, rhetorically persuades us of one belief—system amongst 
many. It is a world where external forms of legitimation have been usurped 
and deposed, where we are left with an agonistic field where each
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discourse, or in Fishian terms, where each interpretive community, defines 
its own stakes, sets its own strategic aims in direct conflict with every 
other discourse. This competition amongst communities is not a deadly 
struggle between true and false, good and evil assumptions, but a 
competitive game for the persuasive edge one community may have over 
another. As Fish declares 'this is the whole of critical ability, an 
attempt on the part of one party to alter the beliefs of another so that 
the evidence cited by the first will be seen as evidence by the second' 
(1980: 365>. If critical ability rests on persuasion, then we may say with
Fish that 'no-one can claim privilege for the point of view he holds ar.d 
therefore everyone is obliged to practice the art of persuasion' (Deleuze 
1985: 143).
Critical writing thus becomes freed from the great hypostases: truth, 
reason, law. By implication, writing is thus freed from the source, the 
origin and eternal truth. No longer slave to an original truthful moment, 
the Fishian reader only knows one style and writes his texts in accordance 
with this style: playfully, performatlvely and above all persuasively. The 
three p's take another p on board, so to speak. Here the persuasive becomes 
the political and vice versa, for the aim is to subvert by persuasion 
rather than convert by coercion. The politics of Fishian writing manoeuvre!, 
is thus stateglc: it negotiates in specific moves rather than mediates in 
grand gestures. And it is in this sense only that we can see the real 
political power of Fish's reader. This reader becomes empowered to "write" 
her/his text performatively without having to read it first truthfully. To 
paraphrase Gilles Oeleuze, Fish's emphasis on persuasion as strategy, or 
the rhetorical use of language 'permits him to transmit something
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uncodiflable: the notion of style as politics' (Deleuze 1985: 143). This
potential empowerment of the reader and/or critic constitutes an important 
move in the 'interpretation game':
... perhaps the greatest gain that falls to us under a persuasion 
model 16 a greatly enhanced sense of the importance of our activities. 
(In certain quarters of course, where the critical ideal is one of 
self-effacement, this will be perceived to be the greatest danger). No 
longer is the critic the humble servant of the text whose glories 
exist independently of anything he might do; it is what he does, 
within the constraints embedded in the literary Institution, that 
brings texts into being and makes them available for analysis and 
appreciation. The practice of literary criticism is not something one 
must apologize for; it is absolutely essential not only to the 
maintenance of, but to the very production of, the object of its 
attention. (Fish 1980: 368)
I2.4 Fellowships of Discourse: Iser, Culler and Fish
We ask authors to answer for the unity of the works published in their 
names; we ask that they reveal, or at least display the hidden sense 
pervading their work. . . The author is he who Implants, into the 
troublesome language of fiction, its unities, its coherence, its links 
with reality. (Foucault 1972: 222)
As we have seen though, Foucault exposes the author in 'What is an Author' 
as a function by which we impede the free circulation of discourse; a 
figure we elevate as that founding father of discursivity only to constrain 
through him the 'cancerous and dangerous proliferation of significations' 
(Foucault 1986: 118); an ‘ideological figure' by which we can measure, 
'mark' the very 'manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning' 
(119). If for Foucault, the authoi— function safeguards the unity of the 
text, act6 as a strategy to contain the multiplicity of writing, for 
Barthes, the author is used 'to impose a limit on that text... to close 
writing’ (1977a: 147). If for Foucault, the authoi— figure holds together 
those uncontrollable aspects of textuality which threaten to explode the 
Ideal of coherence, for Barthes, the authoi— god is the means by which we 
'furnish it Cthe text) with a final signified' (147). If for Foucault, the 
author is the attempt by which we tie language to its extra-textual 
reality, for Barthes, the author is our way of saying that writing is ‘an 
operation of recording, notation, representation, "depiction"' (145), in 
other words, that reality preceeds language. If Foucault thus exposes the 
authoi— function, Barthes dethrones the author-god. In a nutshell, both 
Foucault and Barthes dis-close the figure of the Author as the limit and 
ultimate constraint which our society uses to organize and tame the 
potential disorder and proliferation of discourse. The author is not the 
only safeguard, ho'wever, that our society uses to preserve order, to
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Iensure coherence, to maintain unity, to master and control textuality, to 
delineate the borders of discursive practices.
We tend to see, in an author’s fertility, in the multiplicity of 
commentaries and in the development of a discipline so many infinite 
resources available for the creation of discourse. Perhaps so, but 
they are nonetheless principles of constraint (...)
It could even be that the act of writing, as it is institutionalised 
today, with its books, its publishing system and the personality of 
the writer, occurs within a diffuse, yet constraining, 'fellowship of 
discourse' (Foucault 1972: 224, 226).
With the notion of 'fellowships of discourse' (.sociétés de discours), ' 
Foucault introduces another means by which we de-limit the free circulation 
of discourse; for their 'function is to preserve or to produce discourse, 
but in order that it should circulate within a closed community, according 
to strict regulations, without those in possession being dispossessed by 
this very distribution' (225). In analysing the regulatory principles which 
govern discourse, Foucault singles out signification, originality, unity, 
creation as the very benchmarks of our logophilic thinking, as the very 
ideals on which humanism has based its sovereignity. They, according to 
him, 'have in a general way, dominated the traditional history of ideas; by 
general agreement one sought the point of creation, the unity of a work, of 
a period or a theme, one looked also for the mark of individual originality 
and the infinite wealth of hidden meanings' (230). These regulatory
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principles are a response, of course, to our fears of the anarchic
potential of discourse. To organize into order. to control the
uncontollable is nothing other than the ' dumb f ear' or 'logophobia' as
Foucault puts it, 'of this mass of spoken things, of everything that could 
possibly be violent, discontinuous, querulous, disordered even and perilous 
in it, of the Incessant, disorderly buzzing of discourse' (229). Hence, if
logophobia as the fear of proliferation of meaning makes the author a 
guardian/controller of discourse, imposes 'strict regulations' on 
discursive practices and confines these practices within ‘closed 
communities', it must also guard itself against the critic and by extension 
the reader.
The early Barthesian reader falls prey to precisely this, for we have 
to remember that 'there is one place where this multiplicity tof writing] 
is focused and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said the 
author... a text's unity lies not in its origin but its destination' 
(1977a; 148). If writing is a multiplicity, dispersed, and knows no limits,
the early Barthesian reader gathers the multiple threads of textuality thus 
unifying and delimiting writing. This reader's function here, to put it 
into Foucauldian terms, 'is to preserve or to produce discourse... 
according to strict regulations' . The regulation is, of course, that of 
unity, since it is unity which neutralizes the potential 'disorderly 
buzzing of discourse' . The Barthesian reader of ' The Death of the Author' 
thus belongs to a 'fellowship of discourse', a community which strictly 
maintains the demand for unity in the figure of the reader. And it is here 
that we may see Barthes part of a fellowship with Iser, Culler and Fishj 
for their readers also fulfill a Foucauldian function. If Iser works 
according to 'strict regulations' of consistency, and Culler works towards 
the regulating force of totality, Fish also works 'to preserve or to 
produce discourse, but in order that it should circulate within a closed 
community', a closed Interpretive community. And it is precisely in this 
sense that the early Barthes, Iser, Culler and Fish not only regulate 
potential disorder but champion stability in unity.
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\Discourses must be treated as discontinuous practices, which cross 
each other, are Juxtaposed to each other, but can Just as well exclude 
and be unaware of each other. (Foucault 1972; 229)
However discontinuous the writings of Barthes, Iser, Culler and Fish may 
be, however discontinuous their critical heritage is, 2 their discourses 
cross each other at the very point at which they adhere to a principle of 
unity. The unifying reader of the early Barthes, who lives on in the work 
of Iser, Culler, and Fish, is that unified 'positive hermeneut' who knows 
no doubt, but has faith in the unity, coherence, consistency of 
interpretation, and provides reading with a sense of certainty and 
stability. If Iser's reader will impose consistency on the text, by 
'fit!ting] everything together in a consistent pattern* <1980: 58), then it 
is because he fears the 'buzzing' of textuality, the proliferation of 
meaning. The Iserian reader can make no difference, because his priority is 
to 'reduce the (text's! polysemantic possibilities to a single 
interpretation* (1980: 59). If for Culler texts merely 'give the impression 
of strangeness, incoherence, incomprehensibility' <1975: 122), and it is
the reader's 'drive towards totality' (171) which compels him to organize 
this multiplicity into a 'model of unity' (174), to 'account for 
everything' (171) in a text and fit it into a meaningful whole, then it is 
because he fears the 'discontinuous, querulous.,, disorderly buzzing of 
discourse*. Unity here becomes the meta-convention which guides our reading 
expectation and ensures academically acceptable readings. The Cullerian 
reader can make no difference, because he is willing to allow this meta­
convention to ' Impose severe limitations on the set of acceptable or 
plausible readings' (127). If Fish adheres to the regulative principle 
exercised by interpretive communities in order to reassure us of the 
stability of the interpretive process and the consensus amongst readers,
Ithen it 1 e because he answers to our fears of the potentially 'off-the- 
wall' interpretive anarchy of 'buzzing' readings. The Fishian reader is 
thus unwilling to make a difference for he happily accepts the subjugation 
to and force of a communitarian consensus.
What these 'fellows' share then is this: their demand, be it for 
consistency, totality, stability, is a demand for unity, at the basis of 
which we can discern a new hidden set of safety measures, a new set of 
constraining mechanisms by which we seek to regulate discursive practices 
and their perilous proliferation of meanings. If readei— response theory saw 
through the function of the author, dethroned this author to make space for 
the reader, to thus allow for the free play of signification, this reader 
now finds its power equally impeded. The potentially 'many infinite 
resources available for the creation of discourse' in the figure of the 
reader is thus curtailed. This is to say, readers here cannot but read 
consistently and coherently, they cannot but render a text intelligible, 
they cannot account for all the 'buzzing' in anything other than a
managable framework, they cannot but put unity above all else. This not 
only ensures a measure of stability in the reading process, it also ensures 
a level of consensus amongst reading communities.
Whether textual gaps are completed and deciphered A la Iser, whether 
any text whatsoever 'can be made intelligible if one invent appropriate 
conventions' <1975: 123) 4 la Culler, or whether texts are always
intelligible because readers merely activate 'systems of intelligibility' 
(1980: 307, 321) which are already in place 4 la Fish, all these stories of
k
reading share a drive towards comprehension, sense-making and
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Intelligibility. Nothing is disentangled, but everything is deciphered. 3 
Intelligibility here constitutes a drive towards the full understanding of 
the text, it is a vision of absolute comprehension which institutes a 
rationalising order. Intelligibility is, in other words, driven by a sense 
of totalization and mastery. To make a text decipherable then, becomes a 
means of tying the text down, taming its multiplicity, even to eliminate 
indeterminacy. It is also here that ' the vexed issue of (in)determlnacy, 
touches on some of the central problems of readei— response criticism at 
large* (Freund 1987: 148>.
If Iser*s gaps 3 or '[tJextual indeterminacies Just spur us on to the 
act of abolishing them, replacing them with a stable meaning* (Eagleton 
1983: 81), then we may say that Iser's reader accomplishes determinacy. If,
on the other hand, Culler's metaconvention does to an extent ’secure
agreement about what should count as proper "understanding" of a text 
(1975: 122) then we may say that ' as soon as we register similarity of
interpretation, we are bound to admit something determinate, controlling 
our agreement in interpretation'. B Finally, if 'systems of 
Intelligibility', as Fish has it, 'exist prior to the act of reading and
therefore determine the shape of what is read* (1988: 327), then we may
argue with Freund, that 'from Fish's metacritical perspective, it would 
make Just as much sense to say everything is determinate as to say
everything is indeterminate, for these categories are irrelevant when there 
is no way for a reader to place himself beyond the assumptions of a system 
of intelligibility' (1987: 149) It is precisely here that Holub's criticism
of Fish, has bearing on all three of their enterprises: in the final
tInstance, Iser, Culler and Fish have 'accomplished little more than a shift 
in determinacy from the text to another construct, whether it be called 
reader, convention or community' <1984: 151).
Thus far, we have seen how the function of the "Isei— Culler— Fish- 
fellowship*' is 'to preserve or to produce discourse, but in order that it 
should circulate within a closed community, according to strict 
regulations' . To put this differently, we have seen how their discourses, 
not only regulate, order and organize the potential multiplicity of
writing, but also how their theories thus reinforce the institution's very 
need to maintain stability and consensus for the activity of
interpretation. Whilst Iser takes this stability for granted and Culler 
never acknowleges it as the very impetus behind his theoretical thinking, 
Fish at least shows himself aware of it. What we have drawn attention to in 
the final instance, is the very 'regulating, ordering, systematizing force 
of theory'. In Elizabeth Freund's description, theory is a 'regulating 
principle', with a 'definite plan or system', a generalized abstraction, a 
grand vision which 'is set off from and governs the random disorder of the 
reading of individual texts' <1987: 16). In this sense, we could also
argue, that for Iser or Culler or Fish theory is an Instrument for 
reduction-, 'of everything', as Foucault had it, 'that could be violent, 
discontinuous, querulous, disordered even and perilous in it, of the 
incessant, disorderly buzzing of discourse' <1972: 229). Since as Geoffrey
Hartman puts it, 'the unitive and reconciling critic... his devotion to 
"unity" may become a demand for "totality" and turn against art in the name 
of a more comprehensive... vision' <1978: 10-11), we may well accuse the
"Iser/Culler/Fish/-Order" of mastery over its object - here, the literary
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\text. Freund pushes this point further, when she sums up the mastery of 
such a position:
To invoke an order is not only to claim Intelligibility; it is also to 
invoke some notion of a scale of being or a disposition of things in 
which the conditions of mastery and authority (or, alternatively, the 
solace and sanction of a brotherhood or community) are evident to all. 
<1987: 16)
We may therefore say that all principles of regulation share an underlying 
'temptation* to 'reify such an order into a reflection of a "natural" state 
of affairs instead of viewing it as a culturally determined artifice, an 
institution' (Freund 1987: 16). The institution hides behind the claim of
such a 'natural state', because otherwise it would have to admit that order 
is also coercion and 'coercion is camouflaged as the statement of the 
obvious' (Moriarty 1991: 36).
And this is the precise Juncture where Barthes's account of the reader 
begins to differ, where Barthes's theory differs from theirs and itself. It 
is where Barthes's discourse of 'The Death of the Author' no longer 
'crosses paths' with the "Iser/Culler/Flsh-fellowshiff', but finds itself 
'Juxtaposed' to their discourses. It is also where Barthes’s discourse, to 
borrow Foucault's words once more, 'must be treated as ta] discontinuous 
practice! s) ' . 'The Death of the Author' is discontinuous with itself, for 
it is where the Bartheslan reader 'holds together in a single field all the 
traces by which the written text is constituted' (1977a: 148) and where 
this same 'someone' never deciphers the hidden meaning of a text, but 
disentangles the 'tissue of quotations', this 'ready-formed dictionary', of 
which 'its words only explainable through other words, and so on 
indefinitely' (146). To put this differently, whilst 'the reader is the 
space on which all the quotations that make up writing are inscribed
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without any of them being lost* <148>, the text for Barthes is
intertextual thus indeterminate, and can never be deciphered, merely
repeatedly, endlessly disentangled. This is to say, the text can never be
accounted for and can only be accounted for by the reader; the text can
never be made intelligible and can only be intelligible for the reader. If
the text for Barthes is discontinuous, so is 'The Death of the Author* as a
text for us as readers. As Michael Moriarty points out:
The structure of the essay is fragmentary, discontinuous paragraphs 
articulated by no linear logic. It gives its own reason why this might 
be so: the linear utterance seems to suggest the unfolding of a single 
message towards a predestined conclusion; an eschatological, 
theological model... The fragment, on the contrary, prevents the 
discourse cohering into a continuous utterance of a single subject: it 
de-authorizes discourse. For what is at stake in 'La Mort de 1* auteur* 
is the subversion not Just of the ideology of authorship but of 
authority in all its forms... 'La Mort de 1*auteur* Juxtaposes, making 
no attempt to synthesize, a plurality of discourses. . . (1991: 101) *
This passage by Moriarty foregrounds two important points. The
fragmentary nature of Barthes's style coupled with the discontinuous form 
his conceptualization takes, marks a first stage in what we shall later 
call the destabilisation of theory. Theory here cannot be identified as a 
grand narrative, a meta-discourse which expresses a total vision. Instead, 
Barthes plurallses theory, for the essay 'simultaneously lives' two 
irreconciliable 'interpretations of interpretation', 'reconciling these 
tenets in an obscure economy* (Derrida 1978: 293). What Derrida sketches
here is, of course, the debate between a discourse of unity and a discourse 
of dispersion: 'ttlhe one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth, 
an origin which escapes play... the other affirms play* (292). 7 This not
only echoes the crux of a debate in contemporary literary theorizing which 
we pointed to earlier (see Preliminary Remarks), but also highlights the 
very 'dividing lines within and between the varieties of audience-centred
criticism' (Suleiman 1980: 38). What Barthes's essay plays out then is both
a 'positive hermeneutics' and a 'negative hermeneutics'; or putting it 
differently, the essay stages the very debate between a hermeneutic search 
for unity and a post-structuralist upsurge of difference, more
specifically, it rehearses the difference between the concern of the Isei—  
Culler— Fish 'brotherhood' of faith and the Yale 'hermeneutical Mafia', 13 
albeit suspicious (we shall turn to the latter shortly). If 'the 
brotherhood' attempts to hold writing together, to unify multiplicity, the 
'Mafia' disperses writing.
Barthes's essay not only spotlights the 'dividing lines within and
between' reader— response theory, but, in its very structure, it dramatizes
the plurality of disparate/divided discourses, performs the multiplication
of discourses. In Moriarty's words, '[tlheory here is itself implicated in
this process: it assumes the status of a word-hoard, a store of signifiers
used to produce further signifiers (writing)' (1991: 102). There has
occurred a shift then, theory is no longer held as an authoritative global
vision, but to use Foucault's term, becomes a 'local criticism'. With this
notion, Foucault seeks to redirect our thinking; for his avoidance of the
word theory, throughout his writings, is indicative of his rejection of
theoretical thought as a unified, omniscient gaze. This comment by Moriarty
with regard to Barthes echoes the Foucauldian project:
For in so far as theory is identified with science or truth, it turns 
out to be no more than a dei ty, thus compllclt, whatever its implicit 
assertions, with a theological frame of reference. Forestalling as 
they do the unification of the text under a single authorial message, 
the fragmentation of discourse, and the multiplication of discourses, 
are thus the indispensible conditions in which writing about writing 
can be true to its object* (1991: 102).
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The use of style In Barthes's essay crosses paths briefly with the 
Fishian discourse here, for we remember that Fish's rhetorical use of
language to persuade in specific moves rather than by grand gestures 
'permits him', to recall the words of Deleuze, 'to transmit something 
uncodifiable; the notion of style as politics' (1985! 143). It is also at
this point that Barthes's writing is never merely stylish, playful,
literary, but becomes subtly political. Or as Moriarty states, 'Barthes is 
and remains emphatic on this point: the place of politics in writing is as 
politics of writing'. Writing becomes political because it 'de-authorizes 
discourse', it is, for Moriarty, 'the subversion not Just of the Ideology 
of authorship but of authority in all its forms'. Moriarty elaborates his 
thesis:
The author in Western culture is an authority because in the
prevailing Ideology he functions as a barrier against interpretation: 
the text cannot mean what he did not consciously want it to mean. But 
he is not the only figure of authority: 'society' and 'history', in 
short, any idea or agency that can be presented as the signified of a 
text, can be invoked in the same way. The fragmentary structure keeps 
the signifier on top, where it belongs, prevents an ultimate meaning
from arriving to close down its operations. It favours, moreover, the
multiplication of discourses that the essay identifies as a
characteristic of text' <1991: 101).
If authorship and authority are always implicated in positions of hierarchy
and power, then Barthes's essay opposes this drive in style and
conceptualisation. We may also say that whilst discourse or theory are not
figures of authority, but can be used as principles of authority,
regulation and control - in short, power - that this essay then works
precisely against, resists the force of any such totalization. Deleuze's
words, which will take on an increasing importance in the course of our
thesis, here, spoken in conversation with Foucault bear relevance:
A theory does not totalize but is an instrument for multiplication and 
multiplies Itself. If it i6 in the nature of power to totalize and it 
is your position, and one I fully agree with, that theory is by nature 
opposed to power. ' (Foucault 1977a: 208, my emphasis).
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3. 1 Qui parle? - Barthes?
In the opening paragraph of ‘The Death of the Author', Barthes raises the 
question 'Who Is speaking thus. Is It...?' <1977a: 142) In the concluding
sentence of 'What is an author?', Foucault asserts 'What difference does it 
make who is speaking?' <1986: 120). If the question for the speaker, is
the question for the origin of the utterance, and its rejection signifies 
the refusal of an origin, then we have abandonned our probing for the 
single voice once and for all. By implication, we have avoided according 
privilege to a single speaker, the voice of the Author-God. When Barthes 
poses the question once more in S/Z, he draws a distinction between the 
modern and the classical text:
' Who is speaking?... The more indeterminate the origin of the 
statement, the more plural the text. In modern texts, the voices are 
so treated that any reference is impossible: the discourse, or better, 
the language, speaks: nothing more. By contrast, in the classic text 
the majority of the utterances are assigned an origin, we can identify 
their parentage, who is speaking: either a consciousness (of a 
character or an author) or a culture (the anonymous is still an 
origin, a voice)... <1974: 41-42)
What we find here is, of course, Barthes's evaluatory classification of 
texts: the modern Text is the scrlptlble (writerly) polyphonic text and the 
classic Work is the llsible (readerly) unlvocal text. Whilst the latter 
imposes an order, is 'serious, fixed, closed structured, constrained, 
authoritarian, and unitary', the former is 'playful, fluid, open,
triumphantly plural, and in its plurality impervious to the repressive rule 
of structure, grammar, or logic' (Suleiman 1990: 37). Whilst the readerly ' 
text asks of its reader to merely consume that which is given, thus 
reducing the reader to a passive pawn faithfully following the promptings 
of this text, the writerly text 'gives no indications as to how it is to be 
read', but 'opens up a vast range of potential meanings' (Moriarty 1991:
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118), thus engaging the reader to participate In the writing of It. The 
readerly Is devalued and the wrlterly becomes 'our value' for Barthes, as 
he puts It, 'Cblecause the goal of literary work <of literature as work) Is 
to make the reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text' 
<(1974: 4).
A text we read for consumption, Is a text we 'devour', and once It is 
'devoured' and known, It Is exhausted and may be discarded. 'This reduction 
of reading to consumption is clearly responsible for the "boredom" 
experienced by many In the face of the modern ("unreadable") text, the 
avant-garde film or painting: to be bored means that one cannot produce the 
text, open it out, set It going.'1 Barthes is Implying here that we need 
to free ourselves from the habit of reading for consumption, and play with 
the text in the sense of opening up its plurality and diversity. The 
writerly text facilitates this enterprise; the readerly 
text takes a little more effort (this is the effort Barthes makes in S/Z). 
To arrest consumption then is to read a text in its plurality, and for this 
reason we need to reread texts:
Rereading, an operation contrary to the commercial and ideological 
habits of our society, which would have us ' throw away' the story one 
it has been consumed (' devoured' ), so that we can move on to another 
story, buy another book, and which is tolerated only in certain 
marginal categories of readers (children, old people, and professors), 
rereading is here suggested from the outset, for it alone saves the 
text from repetition (those who fall to reread are obliged to read the 
same story everywhere), multiplies it in its variety and its 
plurality. (Barthes 1974: 15-16)
If rereading thus 'multiplies [the text! in its variety and 
plurality', it it because, we only come to appreciate the text's 
multiplicity when we reread it; this is to say, we only realize that texts
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are plural, because when we reread them, we can read them again
differently. As Barthes put It 'rereading Is no longer consumption, but
play (that play which Is the return of the different)' (15). Difference
here is not meant as the difference between types of text, or the
difference which 'designates the individuality of each text' (3), or
difference in our imposition as readers, instead 'it is a difference of
which each text is a return' <3>. If we reread then, 'it is in order to
obtain, as though under the effect of a drug (that of recommencement, of
difference), not the real text, but the plural text; the same and the new'
(16). It is in this sense that according to Barbara Johnson, 'the rereading
of the same engenders what Barthes calls the text's difference’ (I960: 3).
In other words, the text becomes different because it was already
different. This passage by Johnson sums up the points brilliantly:
... a text's difference is not its uniqueness, its special Identity. 
It is the text's way of differing from itself. And this difference is 
only perceived in the act of rereading. It is in this way that the 
text's signifying energy comes unbound... through the process of 
repetition, which is the return not of sameness but of difference. 
Difference is not what distinguishes one identity from another. It is 
not difference between (or at least not between independent units), 
but difference within. (1980: 4)
To put this in another way, the text here is 'a multidimensional space in 
which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash' 
(Barthes 1977a: 146). It is an intertextual space where a network of voices
differ and defer. In Barthes's words, '... in their interweaving, these 
voices (whose origin is "lost" in the vast perspective of the already 
written) de-origlnate the utterance: the convergence of the voices... 
becomes writing, a stereographic space...' (1974: 21). ' Qui parle' I d ? The 
answer must be, the roultlvocal, plurallzed text. What reading does here is 
deconstructlve: 'the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification
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within the text itself' (Johnson 1980: 5). What rereading does here is to 
point to the plurality of readings from within one text. And it is 
precisely in this sense, that we are never dealing with a single reading, 
nor with a first reading ' (as if there were a beginning of reading, as if 
everything were not already read)' (Barthes 1974: 16), because the
possibility of rereading the same text differently has already plurallzed 
the activity of reading. The sound of Barthes's call: 'for those of us that 
are trying to establish a plural, we cannot stop this plural at the gates 
of reading: the reading must be plural* (15), can be picked up as it begins 
to echo in the pages of S/Z
If the text one prefers to read is the plural text, then the reading
one prefers to do is a plural reading, even when one is reading a classic
text. Hence, in S/Z, Barthes does not simply read the classic text of
Sarraslne. Instead, this classic, classically readerly text by Balzac, is
reread by Barthes as a “writerly reader". This is to say, Barthes begins to
erase the voice of Balzac by listening to the voices within the text.
... however it may happen that in the classic text... the voice gets 
lost, as though it had leaked out though a hole in the discourse. The 
best way to conceive the classic plural is then to listen to the text 
as an Iridescent exchange carried on by multiple voices, on different 
wavelenghts and subject from time to time to a sudden dissolve...' 
(41-42)
Barthes here does not only want to highlight that which is 'productive in 
the classic text* (12), but wants to affirm the classic text's plural. The 
new model of reading which this Involves, is a 'step by step method', a 
'decomposition of the work of reading: a slow motion, so to speak, neither 
wholly image nor wholly analysis' which 'avoids structuring the text 
excessively, avoids giving it that additional structure which would come
\from a dissertation and would close it', thus 'startringl the text, instead 
of assembling it' (12-13). Such a reading or 'commentary, based on the
affirmation of the plural, cannot therefore', Barthes tells us, 'work with 
respect for the text'; this is to say, 'the work of such a commentary, once 
it is separated from any ideology of totality, consists precisely in
manhandling the text, Interrupting it'; in other words, 'the tutor text 
will ceaselessly be broken, interrupted without any regard for the natural 
divisions...' (15). As Barthes puts it, ’ C i 3 f we want to remain attentive 
to the plural of the text. . . we must renounce structuring this text in
large masses, as was done by classical rhetoric and by secondary-school 
explication: no construction of the text' (11-12). Barthes's reading of 
Sarraslne is therefore not geared towards 'establishing the truth of the 
text', nor directed to provide a 'metameaning which would be the ultimate 
construction', but a reconnection 'of certain sequences which might have 
been lost in the tutor text' (14). Thus, Barthes does not ’set forth the 
criticism of a text, or a criticism of this text’, but the proposal of 
'several types of criticism': be it 'psychological, psychoanalytical,
thematic, historical, structural', 'it will then be up to each kind of
criticism (if it should so desire) to come into play, to make its voice 
heard, which is the hearing of one of the voices in the text' (14-15).
Consequently, no one reading becomes privileged, for 'Ctlo privilege one
reading over the other is to silence one of the voices of the text thus
betraying its constitutive plurality...' (Moriarty 1991: 134). The plural
reading of this readerly text, is really its rereading as a writerly text.
If the text one prefers to read is the plural text, and the reading is 
a plural reading, then the text one prefers o write is also the plural
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text. Barthes's reading of Balzac and Barthes's writing of S/Z go hand in 
hand here: his reading breaks apart. Interrupts and breaks open Sarraslne, 
while his writing style is broken up, fragmentary and loose. S/Z is thus 
broken into 561 fragments and Sarraslne is heard through five different 
voices. In Barbara Johnson's words, 'ttlhe purpose of these cuts and codes 
is to pluralize the reader's intake, to effect a resistance to the reader's 
desire to restructure the text into a large, ordered masses of meaning. . . ' 
<1980: 6). This 'resistance to the reader's desire to restructure the text' 
into a wholeness is performed doubly: Barthes as a reader of Balzac resists 
the integrative force of Sarraslne and transforms this classic text into a 
'complex network' with 'multiple entrances and exits'; and S/Z remains 'as 
heterogeneous and discontinuous as possible', thus avoiding ‘the 
repressiveness of the attempt to dominate the message and force of the text 
into a single ultimate meaning'. 2 The point is succinctly put by Moriarty: 
'A performance rather than an exegesis of Sarraslne, S/Z calls for a 
similar performance on the reader's part, and thus invites him or her to 
become a producer rather than a consumer of text. To this extent, it 
realizes the goal of the scrlptlble text' <1991: 142).
If the text one prefers is the plural writerly text, then it is, in 
Moriarty's words, because 'the scrlptlble text liberates writing in that to 
read it means in effect to rewrite it' (118). In turning a classic text, 
like Sarraslne, into a writerly text, Barthes empowers the contemporary 
reader to resist the Ideology of a text with a determinate tale to tell of 
"that foreign country'', the past. In other words, his deconstruct ive 
reading opens up ,the text as a site for different reading positions. Its 
usefulness, particularly, for the feminist reader re-reading the texts of
our patriarchial past, whilst simultaneously being able to re-write this 
past must be noted here <we will make more use of this later). :a For the 
moment though, it suffices to say that the Barthesian reading practice of 
S/Z, exemplifies a reading strategy which has freed Itself from any slavish 
reconstruction of an origin, for it has already pluralized this origin; S/Z 
illustrates the need to plurallze the text first, before it becomes viable 
to read it plurally; S/Z performs, what it states: 'Ctlhe more plural the 
text, the less it is written before it is read* (Barthes 1974: 10), Reading
here is no longer 'a parasitical act, the reactive complement of a writing 
we endow with all the glamour of creation and anteriority' (10), but it can 
become 'a form of work' because we may write our reading. ■* Reading here is 
no mere act of interpretation; it is no longer a derivative, parasitic and 
secondary discourse, but is productive. This blurring of the boundaries 
between the critical and the creative, brings reading and writing, 
criticism and literature into the realm of écriture. To put this 
differently, ‘if an author comes to speak of a past text, he can only do so 
by himself producing a new text (by entering into the undifferentiated 
proliferation of the intertext)' (Barthes 1981: 44). 'Qui parle ainsi', we
may ask?
[flrom the desert of the lisible the Promised land of the scrlptlble 
is glimpsed... the lisible, its plural can give the sense of what an 
unlimited plural might be. The gaps of the classical text, when it is 
no longer possible to answer the question "Qui parle?", offer the 
desirable image of a kind of text where that question was simply 
Impossible to put. (Moriarty: 137)
To reformulate this point, we may say, that 'from the desert of the lisible 
the Promised land of the scrlptlble C can be] glimpsed' - here, for the
reader, who may gain a 'sense of what an unlimited plural might be' for
»
him/her as this new readei— writer, at the very moment when ' Qui parle' is
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suspended as the question for the speaking subject, as the quest for the
origin. At this moment, we should not really be asking: ' Qul parlait' (In)
S/Z Balzac, Barthes? For convenience's sake though (and after all we are
writing a llslble Creaderly/readable! thesis), let's hang on to Roland
Barthes, who 'step by step', in 'slow motion' makes ' Qul parle' an
impossibilty, and cite this fragment to support our claim:
... one never knows If he [the author! is responsible for what he 
writes (if there is a subject behind his language); for the very being 
of writing (the meaning of the labor that constitutes it) is to keep 
the question Mho is speaking? from ever being answered (197*: 140). B
If the author is not responsible for what he writes, and the reader 
is said to write the text, this reader/writer is not, however, instituted 
as another author, a new 'father and the owner of his work' (Barthes 1977: 
160). Instead, this reader-writer, is like 'the modern scriptor', 'who is 
simultaneously born with the text' (1977a: 145): for him 'every text is 
eternally written here and not/ (145), & 'CfJor him... the hand is cut off 
from any voice, borne by pure gesture of inscription (and not of 
expression), traces a field without origin - or at least, has no other 
origin than language itself, language which ceaselessly calls into question 
all origins' (145-146). What this scriptoi— reader - as we shall name it - 
traces or disentangles then, is the text as this 'multi-dimensional space 
in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash' 
(146). If writing marks this loss of origin, it 'comes along very precisely 
at the point where speech stops, that is from the moment one can no longer 
locate who is speaking and one simply notes that speaking has started' 
(Barthes 1988: 194).
What we hear,' therefore, is the displaced voice which the reader 
lends, by proxy, to the discourse: the discourse is speaking in the 
reader’s Interests. Whereby we see that writing is not the
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communication of a message which starts from the author and proceeds 
to the reader; it is specifically the voice of reading Itself: in the 
text, only the reader speaks (Barthes 1974: 151).
The scriptor— reader here does not have a voice which can be located or
identified apart from the text, which might be easily separated from the
text. This voice is not anterior to the text, but inter(ior), between
layers of text, embedded, so to speak, in the whole web that textuallty
spins. This then is the intertextual model: both writing and reading are
marked by intertextuality. Or, both writer and reader have ’Centered) into
the undifferentiated proliferation of the intertext' (Barthes 1981: 44).
Rather than speaking of reading as a 'form of work', Barthes here prefers
to speak of it as,
(. . . a lexeological act - even a lexeographical act, since I write my 
reading), and the method of this work is topological: I am not hidden 
within the text I am simply irrecoverable from it: my task is to move, 
to shift systems whose perspective ends neither at the text nor at 
"I": in operational terms, the meanings I find are established not by 
"me" or by others, but by their systematic mark: there is no other 
proof of a reading than the quality and endurance of its systematics; 
in other words, than its function lng. To read, in fact is a labour of 
language. (Barthes 1974: 10-11)
The question clearly can never be 'Qui parle?'here; nor could its answer be 
the reader. We need to recompose this question altogether and ask as 
Barthes does in 'Theory of the Text’: 'The text works what? Language.' 
(1981: 37) What is foregrounded then is language, 'the workings of language 
as autonomous' (1991: 148) according to Moriarty. We may therefore say:
'thu6 is the text restored to language; like language, it is structured but 
off-centred, without closure' (Barthes 1977: 159). And we may add, that the 
reader is also restored to language at this point; 'like language, it is 
structured but off-centred, without closure'. The I of the reader which is 
irrecoverable from the text, is also Inseparable from language. This I is 
nothing more than a linguistic moment, or in Barthes's words, the 'I is
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nothing other than the Instance saying I: language knows a "subject" not a 
"person", and this “subject", empty outside of the very enunciation which 
defines It, suffices to hold language together' (Barthes 1977a: 145). This
then is why in S/Z, the...
I is not an innocent subject, anterior to the text, one which will 
subsequently, deal with the text as it would an object to dismantle or 
a site to occupy. This "I" which approaches the text is already Itself 
a plurality of other texts, of codes which are infinite or, more 
precisely, lost (whose origin is lost). <1974: 10)
In other words, if Barthes once saw multiplicity focused in the reader, saw
the reader as that 'someone who holds together in a single field all the
traces by which the written text is constituted' (1977a: 148), this new
scriptoi— reader of S/Z is already a textualised construct. Its self is
merely a plurality of other texts, or codes, without origin; in Culler's
words, this reader is a 'virtual site' - of intertextuality rather than
intersubjectivity; 7 and in Holub's assessment, our scriptoi— reader
'approximately correspond! si to a "post-structuralist reader"’, which
according to him marks the precise difference between German and French
criticism: 'while reception theorists have displaced their Interpretive
focus from the text to the reader, post-structuralists have displaced all
focus by textualising the reader' <1984: 154). In conclusion we may
therefore say that, the late Barthesian reader, is not the kind of unifying
reader we encountered in Iser, Culler and Fish from which meaning
originated, but is rather 'a construct characterized by dispersion and
plurality' (Holub 1984: 154).
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3.2 Geoffrey Hartaan: Criticism on the Mild Side
If, as Roland Barthes had it in S/Z reading is a 'form of work', and
the reader writes the text, then we have travelled some way towards 
the new world of America. This is to say, we have finally left those 
unified "positive hermeneuts" that we named a 'fellowship of discourse', 
who take their impetus from a German critical and philosophical tradition 
(as we shall see in greater detail in the subsequent chapter), and have 
arrived with those "negative hermeneuts", those mild, or 'barely 
deconstructionists' such as Geoffrey Hartman and Harold Bloom, and those 
'boa-deconstructors' such as Hlllls Miller and Paul de Man 1 , who take
their impetus from recent French thinking, or more to the point, from the 
philosophical writings of Jacques Derrida (whom we shall also deal with in 
the subsequent chapter) . In other words, if, as we have seen, Barthes's 
'Death of the Author' played out both a 'positive hermeneutics' and a 
'negative hermeneutics', staged, so to speak, the debate between a 
hermeneutic search for unity and the poststructuralist upsurge of 
difference, rehearsed the difference between the Iser-Culler-Fish 
'fellowship' of faith and the Yale 'brotherhood' of suspicion, then S/Z 
finally enacted the post-structuralist reader as the 'virtual site of 
intertextuality*, placed this textuallsed reader/writer before us, and 
helped us to now situate the "parasite reader" who operates from Yale, 
enabled us to cite, as it were, those creative critics or critical creators 
who inhabit, in Frank Lentricchia's words, that 'critical house of 111- 
fame' (1983: 162) on the campus of Yale University.
A .  .
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The tenants of this 'critical house', familiar and <in)famous under 
the literary household name of Yale, by no means though form a coherent 
ménage à quatre. In what has often been referred to as their manifesto, the 
book Deconstruction and Criticism, edited by Bloom et al., • C i 3 f it wants to 
"manifest" anything', according to Hartman's preface, then it is precisely 
to 'retain the style and character of each writer* (1979: vii). As the 
preface closes, Hartman emphatically reiterates his concern 'that the 
critics amicably if not quite convincingly held together by the covers of 
this book differ considerably in their approach to literature and literary 
theory' <ix>. As Wallace Martin points out in The Yale Critics: 
Deconstruction in America, 'when presenting themselves as a group, they 
scrupulously point out their differences', nevertheless though, he asserts 
that Hartman, Bloom, Miller and de Man, 'can be lumped together because 
regardless how they differ, they represent what we (as critics, scholars, 
humanists, teachers, and perhaps citizens) should be against'. 2 What then 
is this radical potential, this 'ill-fame' that has characterized these 
critics from the beginning?
Hartman's 'confession': 'I have a superiority complex vis-à-vis other 
critics, and an inferiority complex vis-à-vis art' (1975: 3), provides a
first clue here. For what this statement introduces, is how Hartman et al. 
set about to work out the alleged secondariness of literary criticism vis- 
à-vis literary creation, set out to re-work the question of the primary and 
the secondary. This statement also, however, implies, what Wallace Martin's 
'critics, scholars, humanists, teachers, and perhaps citizens' have worked 
against, and that is, the reversal of these categories, "the putting-into-
t
question" of the clear demarcations between literature and criticism,
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between first-hand art and second-hand criticism, between author as god and 
the critic as priest. 3 For, if the difference between literature and 
criticism is seemingly wiped away, deconstructed, so increasingly, is the 
distinction between writing and reading, between the writer and the reader! 
and we may yet be able to argue that writing involves reading Just as much 
as reading involves writing. Though we welcome and shall work with this
reversal of the primary to the secondary, of master to slave, in our
account, what critics should get worked up about 1 8 not Hartman's
'arrogance in wanting to raise criticism to a level of "genuine" creative
writing1 as Christopher Ricks does ■*, but the assertion of superiority that 
the critic Hartman exerts over non-Yale criticism, his claim to Great 
Criticism at the very point we sought to have dismantled the notion of 
Great Art with all its trappings of the great, eternal canon. Before
turning to the implications of Hartman's claim to superiority though, let 
us examine why Hartman (and his brothers at Yale) may wish to reverse what 
he sees to be the critic* s secondariness vis-à-vis the artist writer.
As a way to make 1 C c] riticism. . . attractive again and haggish no
longer1 (Bové 1979: 12), Hartman et al. attack the kind of 'explication-
centred criticism1 (Hartman 1970: 56) which the New Criticism, had 
initiated and perpetuated from as early as the 1930's and well into the 
1960's. s Against, what Hartman calls the 'Anglo-Saxon formalism' (56),
with its insistence on the organic unity of the work, and its reductionist 
semi-scientific appeals to be able to determine all the literary devices 
which cohere harmoniously in the literary artifact, the Yale Critics hark 
back to an earlier, we might say more philosophical criticism! as Edward 
Said puts it, 'you will see immediately that one novel thing about these
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critics is that their rituals and procedures differ from the ones fathered
on academic literary criticism since the end of the nineteenth century'
(1976: 30). We are referring here to the kind of Anglo-Crit icism as
practiced by Coleridge, Ruskin, Pater, Arnold and Symons, which, on a par
with literature, does not involve ' a mere describing and comparing of
books, a mere paise and blame of this and that', but 'can almost explain
the origin of creation' (Symons 1906: ix). To put this in another way then
we might say, that what Hartman at <\1. are reacting against, is that
particular tradition of criticism which merely serves literature, its
literariness. Murray Krieger explains:
Indeed, during the days of the largely unquestioned supremacy of the 
New Criticism, the critics's role as faithful vassal to the poem 
achieved its strongest assertion: the poetic "object" was to be 
treated as the critic's idol, as the sole Justification of his 
Joyfully acknowledged subsidary existence. Of course, the work was to 
be taken totally» interpretable. so that the critic was to have 
arrogance enough to offer the ultimate key to interpretation, but 
always - so the oath of fidelity went - in the service to each master 
text, from which it was his obligation to keep his own interests 
apart. (1981: 28+) *
Consequently, Hartman £t <al. induce a new sense of worth for criticism, to 
counter this type of internalization of the critic's own inferiority.
To also use a Foucauldian argument at this point, we can argue that 
whilst the New Criticism religiously contains all meaning in the text, 
it uses the unity of the work of art os a guardrail, in order to 
halt the processes of signification at source. Thus to inferiorize and 
reduce criticism to a second-order product, is nothing other than the 
attempt to reduce its potential for unleashing the 'cancerous and dangerous 
proliferation of signification'. In Hartman's rather flamboyant and ironic 
assessment, ''he'', thjs critic,
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subdues himself to commentary on work or writer, is effusive about the 
Integrity of the text, and feels exalted by exhibiting art's 
controlled, fully organized energy of imagination. What passion yet 
what objectivity. What range yet what unity! What consistency of theme 
and style! <1975: 9, emphasis added)
Though the critic here can be seen to have devised mechanisms to Justify
the noble worth of the critical endeavour, he nevertheless is the loyal
servant of that which is deeply logocentric: unity, coherence, presence,
hierarchies, authors, canons... "What profusion, yet what control", we
might exclaim, “What multitude, yet what coherence". This critic, in other
words, integrates, organizes, unifies and builds up consistencies T, not
only to implicit ly praise his master's authorial genius behind the Great
Work, but to foreground the "homeostatic and safe proliferation of
signification". This critic’s works, according to Hartman,
Chlls essays and articles, merchandized in the depressed market place 
of academic periodicals, conform strictly to the cool element of 
scholarly prose. They are sober, literate, literal and pointed. Leave 
behind all fantasy, you who read these pages. <1975: 9)
Hartman's point here is, of course, that this critic 'is writing, after
all, criticism not fiction' and that 1[hie will not violate the work of art
by imposing on it his own, subjective flights of fancy' <9>. This critic,
in other words, knows his place, and knows his dues, will not step out of
line, will not transgress, but will reconstruct an original intention of
unity, will reconstruct the original context of utterance, come what may.
For what is feared above all else is the critic's potential power, the 
power of criticism to decontextuallze literature. What this implies is, 
'that a work becomes detached from its original context or that criticism 
actually helps to detach <decontextuallze> it, and so make it available for 
another purpose, generation or place' <Hartman 1975: 14). To divorce the
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work of art from its 'original context' is for the critic thus 'to appear 
as a thief, or a purveyor of stolen goods' (14). Hartman's analysis of the 
critic as villain in these passages of The Fate of Reading, is reworked 
very effectively in Criticism in the Wilderness, when the very power of 
criticism comes to be reformulated in terms of its positive force; 'the 
perspectival power of criticism, its strength of recontextualisation, must 
be such that the critical essay should not be considered a supplement to 
something else' <1980; 201).
What is at stake here is, of course, the Derridian notion of 
lterability. This is to say, precisely because 'iterability' is the 'power 
of being transferred from one specific context to another' °, that original 
utterance or original intention, once iterated, once repeated in different 
circumstances (be it another 'purpose, generation, place') is always taken 
out of its originary context of utterance, is always at least to some 
extent taken out of context. In other words, the original utterance is not 
only determined by its original context, but, more importantly, when
transferred, it becomes indeterminate in its new context<s>. For as
Derrida describes this double-bind in 'Living On Border Lines': 'no meaning 
can be determined out of context, but no context permits saturation' (1979; 
81). The very possibility of iteration then, is also its re-iteration, its 
multi-iteration, its feast and excess * in a multitude of new and different 
contexts. Which is another way of saying, that in citation, iterability, a 
detachment occurs which is not only a dislocation (decontextuallsation), 
but also a re-location (recontextualisation) and more to the point, an 
Intel— textualisatipn. Texts and contexts in this sense can always be 
grafted on to other con/texts, (re)inscribed in new con/texts which escape
previous formulations. It is here that notions such as citability, 
iterability, and grafting become part of the broader field of
inter textual ity.
Intertextuality, of course, puts the very notion of the clearly 
demarcated text into question, into quotation marks so to speak. Text here, 
conceived in Barthesian terms, is a 'ready-formed dictionary', a 'multi­
dimensional space', a 'tissue of quotations', or in Derrldean terms, is a 
trace of traces of other texts. Thus texts are not closed sites dependent 
upon the scrupulous installation and policing of the borders of these 
sites, but relate, or relay para-sltlcally (in-between sites) to other
texts. As Hartman, if a little tentatively, suggests, ' "textuality" may
lead us indefinitely on to other texts' <1975: 266, emphasis added), by
posing the 'complex [question) of how to decide where a text ends or
begins' (268). This "differential" view of discourse, Frank Lentricchia 
(1983: 188) writes, is based on the 'view that language is a play of
differences', and as such, 'affirms that there are no Isolate texts, no 
atomic cores that can be fenced off as untouchable private properties... 
affirms that there are no larger ranges of discursive territory whose 
boundaries can be securely drawn (as literature, philosophy.,.)', and we 
may add criticism here. The very notion of intertextuality poses, in other 
words, the 'question of the relation between texts once their limits and 
borders can no longer be rigorously determined'. 10 Since all texts, in 
this conceptualisation, are tissues of anonymous citations embedded in the 
language, and since 'so many authors who know or do not know one another, 
criticize one another, pillage one another, meet without knowing it and
obstinately Intersect their unique discourses in a web of which they are
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not the masters, of which they cannot see the whole, and of whose breadth
they have a very inadequate idea...' (Foucault 1972: 126), then we may
reformulate literature or indeed criticism as writing, as écriture. As
Hartman may have put it, " brlcology" :
Writing is always theft or bricolage of the logos. The theft 
redistributes the logos by a new principle of equity, as unreferable 
to laws of property, boundary, etc... writing is an act of crossing 
the line of the text, of making it indeterminate, or revealing the 
midi as the mi-dit. (Hartman 1980: 205; emphasis added) 11
If "bricology" or écriture extends to both creative writing and 
critical writing, and if creative writing is marked by theft and bricolage
just as much as critical writing, then Terry Eagleton's description of
poststructuralism as having 'no clear division between "criticism" and 
"creation": both modes are subsumed in writing' (1983: 139), is appropriate
here. Moreover, in Hartman's thesis, 'Ctlhe writer - critic or artist - is 
a bricoleur and has always been such... if so much is quotation, or a 
bricolage. . . then all writing, not merely criticism, is parasitic' (1980: 
178-79). Hartman seems to be evoking Hillls Miller's notion of the
parasite, which the latter uses as a metaphor for reversal, for
deconstructing the hierarchical privilege of the term primary over the term 
secondary. And it is in this sense that Hartman argues that:
The line of exegesis will therefore tend to be as precariously 
extensible as the line of the text. The subject matter of exegesis is, 
in fact, this 'line'. Yet criticism as commentary de linea always 
crosses the line and changes to one trans lineam. The commentator's 
discourse, that is, cannot be neatly or methodologicaly separated from 
that of the author: the relation is contaminating and chiastic; source 
text and secondary text, though separable, enter into a mutually 
supportive, mutually dominating relation. (1980: 206)
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Though 'lines of exegesis' are not textual webs, 'chiasmus' is a cross-over 
rather than a textual weave, and 'precariously extensible lines' suggest 
that intertextuality is in need of some sort of balancing act, though all 
these phrases indicate that Hartman seems to be steering away from the full 
implications of intertextuality at this point, he nevertheless emphasises 
the 'contaminating' relation between commentator and authorship. Giving 
Hartman the benefit of the doubt, for the time being, the very distinction 
between the secondary and the primary, between the critical and the 
literary is rendered impure or 'contaminated' here, which is to say, the 
very hierarchy between Author— God and critical priesthood is beginning to 
be destabilized. For, if, '[tlhe situation of the discourse we name 
criticism is', as he writes in Criticism and the Wilderness, 'no different 
from that of any other', and if 'this recognition implies a reversal, then 
it is the mastei— servant relation between criticism and creation that is 
being overturned...' <1980: 259>. And since 'the mastei— servant relation'
is overturned 'in favour of... "mutual domination" or "interchangeable 
supremacy'" (259), not only can we see how 'that great divide between 
criticism and creation... is now in dispute' (204), but also how criticism 
is gaining a more equal footing with creation.
Consequently, Hartman can and does argue, that criticism or commentary 
is enabled to exercise its own critical powers rather than merely serving 
to explain or reify existing texts <201-202). Criticism's subordinate 
position ing is thus being reevaluated and we are consequently entering a 
new era:
I think this is where we are now. We have entered an era, that can
challenge even the priority of the literary to the literary-critical
text. Longinus is studied as seriously as the sublime texts he
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comments on; Jacques Derrida on Rousseau almost as interestingly as
Rousseau. (Hartman 1975: 17, emphasis added)
Even though Hartman is giving voice to a newly elevated criticism here, 
which exercises fresh 'critical powers', and illustrates a sense of the 
'fading distinction between primary and secondary texts' (17), we are left 
with an Inkling, however, that he is very much edging towards a 
confirmation of the contaminating Interweaving of texts, is edging towards 
the affirmation of the "bricology" of Of Grammatology, is almost saying 
that Derrida on Rousseau is as interesting as Rousseau. Why is Derrida not 
as interesting as Rousseau, why such reservations we may ask 
given criticism's apparent challenge to the literary, the creative, all 
that which has been deemed primary? Again though, let us give Hartman the 
benefit of the doubt, as G. Douglas Atkins does, and add here the latter's 
observation on Hartman's "creative criticism'' on, or "critical creation" of 
Derrida's Glas in Saving the Text, where 'it becomes Impossible to separate 
Hartman from Derrida, commentator from text(s) commented on’. As he puts 
it, ’Who can point to a spot where Hartman's exposition of Derrida ends and 
his own contribution begins?' <1990: 75)
The 'fading distinction' between the primary and the secondary, 
finally gives over to the bold assertion, finally opens up the possibility 
of a reversal ‘whereby this "secondary" piece of writing turns out to be 
"primary"' (1980: 201). When Hartman utters this claim with respect to 
Derrida's Glas, then it is because Glas demonstrates par excellence that 
'literary commentary is literature' (202). For ' Glas not only interanlmates 
many sources (Hegel, Nietzsche, Genet) by inner quotation and surrealist 
wit; it not only incorporates, in particular, passages from Genet's Journal
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du voleur (1948)... become(s) a thievish book' (204-5), but in Se&ne 
Burke's recent assessment it is
too good to be a distant cousin of literature, so much so that 
[Hartman] predicts for it a destiny comparable to Finnegan's Wake. 
Derrida's text, in short, possesses all the attributes by which we 
have conventionally recognized the great work of literature. (1992: 
161)
Though we will return to the implications of Burke's argument later, it 
suffices to say here that this 'fusion of creation with criticism... in the 
writings of contemporary critics' (Hartman 1980: 190), no longer renders
criticism subservient or subordinate to literature, but allows for it a new 
'freedom of interpretive style with a matchless gusto’ (Norris 1991: 98).
Henceforth we can witness that overcrossing where 'literary commentary may 
cross the line and become as demanding as literature' (Hartman 1980: 201),
where 'literary criticism' can be seen to be 'crossing over into 
literature' (213). But Hartman is careful here to also remind us that 
'twlhat is happening is neither an Inflation of criticism at the expense of 
creative writing nor a promiscuous intermingling of both. It is, rather, a 
creative testing and illumination of limits' (202). Whilst on the one hand 
then, Hartman has described the inter-relation between the literary and the 
critical in terms of 'a textual infinite, an interminable web of texts 
and interpretations' (202), which points towards a promiscuous
intermingling between the critical and the creative, points towards 
"bricology", on the other hand, he polices and limits the full force of 
this argument by denying the contaminating vectors of intertextuality.
The division of literary activity into artists and commentators, 
creators and critics, which Hartman seeks to dismantle, is a division, as 
he puts it, which is 'neither fortunate nor absolute'; nor by implication,
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is the division between 'writers and readers', between writing as a primary
and reading as a secondary activity. As Hartman explains:
It is crass to think of two specialities, one called reading and one 
writing; and then to view criticism as a particularly specialized type 
of reading which uses writing as an “incidental" aid. Lately, 
therefore, forms of critical commentary have emerged that challenge 
the dichotomy of reading and writing. (1980: 19-20)
If Hartman reminds us of Roland Barthes's A Lover's Discourse (as well as
Derrida's Glas) at this very instant, we may also recall Barthes's own
reading in S/Z as a writing of Balzac. Whether we endorse the critic as
creator a la Hartman, or empower the reader as a scriptor-reader a la
Barthes, what we are increasingly discerning, is the reader as a writer.
'What is happening' therefore, in Hartman's account, is that
the reader is taking back some of his authority... Refusing the 
subterfuge of a passive or restrictive role, he becomes at once reader 
and writer - or takes it fully into consciousness that he is both an 
interpreter of texts and a self-interpreting producer of further 
texts. <1980: 162)
Not only does Hartman forge an implicit alliance between the Foucauldian 
'initiator of discourses' and his own reader as 'self-interpreting producer 
of further texts' here, but he also points towards the Barthesian
"scrlptor-reader", that active reader who writes the text. As Hartman 
reminds us, '[lit is the reader who makes the verse responsive, however 
inward or burled its sounds: he also calls a voice out of silence' <1975: 
291). In this sense, he can assert that 'critical reading is not only the
reception (.Rezeption) of a text, but also it6 conception (Empfängnis)
through the ear' <1981: 141-2), and it is in this sense also that we may 
recall once more the voices of the Barthesian text, the plurlvocal voices 
of Sarrasine that Barthes is responsive to in S/Z. If Barthes thus defined 
reading as 'a form of work', Hartman Invokes this when he states: 'We have 
talked for a long time, and unself-consciously, of the work of art; we may
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come to talk as naturally of the work of reading" <1980: 162). (Why 
naturally, we may ask to sow the seeds of further doubt?) '2
If reading turns into a 'form of work', will come to be known as 'the 
work of reading', and if criticism as that '"secondary'' piece of writing 
turns out to be "primary"', then neither reading nor criticism can any longer be 
described in terms of being a 'supplement to something else*. This is to 
say, neither reading nor criticism are merely supplementary additions, 
reading is not a secondary afterthought and criticism is not a mere 
ornamental embellishment. Instead, they also act as replacements.
Replacement here has to be understood in two senses of the word: criticism
(or commentary or reading), it re-places, it re-locates, it 'has the power 
to [recontextualize]' (as we illustrated earlier), but also, it has the 
power to replace or substitute. To take this argument one step further, we 
may evoke Derrdia's logic of the supplément at this point, for the 
supplément is a double movement of addition and substitution. The
supplément, Derrida writes, 'adds Itself, it is a surplus, a
plentitude. . . ' . On the other hand, it 'adds only to replace. It Intervenes 
Itself ln-the-place of, if it fills, it is as if one fills a void' (1976: 
144-155). We may therefore say that the critical work will Inevitably 
display material which is lacking in the literary work, quite likely not 
apparent as lacking until the act of criticism has been performed, but then 
revealed as significant. At the same time, the work of criticism, by
revealing this lack, reveals also a potentially infinite series of future 
readings providing further supplementations. ,3
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One might therefore argue that critical readings put the very notion
of the original in question and all expressions of such readings, and by
extension, all critical works, affirm an excess of signification. Herein
lies the twofold transgressive potential of criticism: it undermines the
uniqueness of the creative work for it can provide an infinite series of
further critical supplementations and it undermines the notion of a unique
and autonomous creative work (as emphasized by the New Critics for
instance) because the latter needs criticism, commentary or interpretation
because it is not a wholeness, it is neither self-determining nor self-
sufficient. In Gayatri Spivak's exposition:
The so-called secondary material is not a simple adjunct to the so- 
called primary text. The latter inserts itself within the interstices 
of the former, filling holes that are always already there. Even as it 
adds itself to the text, criticism supplies a lack in the text and the 
gaps in the chain of criticism anterior to it. The text is not unique 
(the acknowledged presence of polysemy already challenges that 
uniqueness); the critic creates a substitute. The text belongs to 
language, not to a sovereign and generating author. (1976: lxxiv)
If we have now arrived at the conclusion that criticism is, in accordance
with the Derridean vocabulary Hartman shares, a supplement, that is, both
an addition and a substitution, we need to pose the question as to why,
despite Hartman's professed allegiance to Derrida, he institutes a denial
of this very supplement arit y at the very moment that the hierarchical
relation between primary and secondary is removed; at the very moment that,
as Hartman has it, 'this "secondary" piece of writing turns out to be
"primary"' (Hartman 1980: 201), To unpack this, if supplementarlty for
Derrida puts notions such as the original, the unique, the proper into
question, Hartman wishes to remove these question marks and to place, not
only great literary works (as we shall see in a moment), but also great
critical works, above criticism in the domain of the primary. For Hartman
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not only speaks of ' the work of reading', he also has it, as we have seen, 
that criticism 'may... become as demanding as literature' <1980: 201); and 
consequently, he assert that 'literary commentary today is creating texts - 
a literature - of its own' (213). The question which therefore arises here, 
is whether Hartman merely evokes the vocabulary, the “language" of 
Derridian discourse, whether he merely uses the language of the supplément, 
rather than its logic, uses it, in fact, to suggest that criticism can be 
a work in its own right, autonomous and self-sufficient, that it 'can also 
write texts of its own' (1980: 259, emphasis added), can create 'texts - a
literature - of its own* <213 emphasis added), a proper literature, a 
Literature Propre. 1■* Since 'literary commentary becomes literature' <200) 
and also becomes 'as demanding as literature', it also comes to '[possess! 
all the attributes by which we have conventionally recognised the great 
literary work' (Burke 1992: 161). 1s Here, the “secondary" becomes a
"primary", 'turns out to be a "primary", because the "secondary" is also a 
“primary", another "primary". Or as Peter de Bolla has it, the critical act 
is 'promoted' to the 'equivalence* of the literary act <1988: 24).
It is also at this very Juncture that we can see why Hartman does not
explore the full implications of intertextuality (as we indicated earlier),
why he hovers indecisively between the "language" of intei— textuality and
his own "logic" of auto-nomy. Hartman's 'indecisiveness' ,e or 'poise of
balance' '7 vl6-à-vis the radical textual criticism of a fully blown
deconstructive project, is well summed up by Raman Selden:
He both admires and fears Derrida's radical theory. He welcomes 
criticism's newly-found creativity, but hesitates before the yawning 
abyss of indeterminacy, which threatens it with chaos. As Vincent 
Leitch has written, 'he emerges as a voyeur of the border, who watches 
or imagines crossover and warns of dangers'. <1985: 95)
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■What is happening* then to iterate Hartman's words once more, and apply 
them to his own critical project, is, that there occurs 'neither an
inflation of criticism at the expense of creative writing nor a promiscuous 
intermingling of both', but, and here we re-iterate his words with a 
difference, that there is 'a creative testing and illumination of limits' - 
the illumination of the borders of literary criticism, its autonomy as a 
literature in its own right. Let us therefore consider the following 
statement in this light:
There is a great fear in us that to abandon the concept of the primary 
or classic work would mean ushering in chaos again: mingling great 
with inferior, primary with secondary, or even trivial. But I am 
arguing against, not for, chaos. If certain works have become
authoritative, it is because they at once sustain, and are sustained 
by, the readers they find. Only when the work of reading is taken as
seriously as the work of art is confusion avoided. <1980: 170)
Hartman's fear of chaos is nothing other than the fear of the 'disorderly
buzzing of discourse' <1972: 229), Foucault describes in 'The Discourse of
Language'. And it is in this sense that we have to understand Hartman's
pledge to a criticism that is as demanding as literature, criticism that is
Literature Proper. In short, we see Hartman's hankering for a second
"primary" here, as a pledge for canonized criticism: the secondary as
primary, as the other primary in Hartman's discourse, is a canonized
criticism, which 'conserves even as it criticizes' <1980: 170) the great
work of art. As he puts it:
our problem today is that as the quantity of writing Increases, the 
quality of reading should also Increase to preserve the great or 
exceptional work as something still possible... <165)
It is at this very point that Hartman's brand of deconstruction is 
never 'on the wild side' as Norris had it <1991: 92), but moves on the mild 
side for u b. This is to say, if deconstruction for Splvak entertains the
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notion - ’ta] reading that produces rather than protects' (1976: lxxv), we
have to reformulate this as "a reading that protects rather than produces"
when it comes to Hartman. It is in this sense also that we can see that
•Crleading is not a neutral technique' for Hartman, but one that 'is shaped
by classics it in turn supports' <1975: 304). What we begin to see emerging
here is what Christopher Norris referred to, at a recent conference on
Geoffrey Hartman entitled 'Reading after Hartman' (University of Warwick 8.
May 1993), as Hartman's 'appreciative criticism'. The question which was at
stake for Norris, was a sense of Hartman's lack of resistance to poetry, to
Romantic poetry and to Wordsworth, in particular. If Hartman interpreted
Norris's interlude as a question for 'what is effective criticism', we may
both interpret Norris' s point in relation to our own argument and answer it
with an appropriate passage from The Fate of Reading:
The extinction. .. of the personal names of both author and reader 
shows what ideally happens in the act of reading: if there is a
sacrifice to the exemplary, it involves the aggrandizement neither of 
author nor of reader but leads to the recognition that something
worthy of perpetuation has occurred. (1975: 255)
What Hartman is expressing here is, of course, his allegiance to the canon,
his appreciation of 'the great work of art* which according to him is 'more
than a text. It is the "life-blood" of a "master— spirit'" (255). What we
should express at this point then is not our allegiance to Hartman, but to
Norris's call for resistance. For, his claim to Great Art is intimately
connected with his claim to Great Criticism, at the very point, when so
much of criticism, on both sides of the Atlantic, had sought to have shaken
some of the very foundations of the very ldea/1 of a great eternal canon.
His attempted reversal of the opposition between the "primary" and the
“secondary" should not be seen as a sole response to the infériorisation of
the secondary term by particular trends in literary criticism (be it an
87
Author-centred servile criticism, or the "vassalage" of New Criticism), but 
should, in particular, be examined in relation to his confession that he 
has 'a superiority complex vis-à-vis other critics and an inferiority 
complex vis-à-vis art'. For what emerges from this claim is this: 'it is 
envy' (1980: 259) which seems to spur Hartman to rework this opposition and 
endow the critic with the same status as the artist; furthermore, it is an 
outright construction (not even a Yale deconstruction) of elitism that 
gives Hartman the sense of superiority over other critics, critics that on 
his terms, fail to appreciate Great Art and Great Criticism when it is 
handed to them on the silver tray by 'the mastei— spirit', or force-fed to 
them by the silver spoon of tradition.
l
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3.3 Harold Bloom: Poetic Criticism Goes Wild
If Hartman's reworking of the opposition between the critical and the 
creative constituted an effort to put criticism on a par with literature, 
and if, in the final instance, this effort was driven by a sense of 'envy' 
for that primary status which art and artist have always enjoyed, as we 
have previously argued, then Bloom's first and foremost effort has been to 
foreground this very envy, 'rivalry' or ' oedlpal struggle' to use his 
words, as the driving force of literary history. The history of literature 
is thus nothing other than a 'poetic warfare' between great poetic egos, 
and literary history is nothing other than a 'psychic battleground' between 
great poets and 'strong' critics. This is to say, both poets who live 
'anxiously' in the shadows of their 'strong' precursors, in the shadows of 
their fathers so to speak, and critics who take umbrage at their great 
masters, need to wrench themselves from their predecessors' repressive 
hold, free themselves of the burden of the past, or respectively, of the 
Influence of the other, so 'as to open a space for 1 themselves]' (Bloom 
1982: 64). What Bloom sets out to write then, is ‘a theory of literary 
history as canon-formation' (Bloom 1975a: 63), which traces this 'endless 
civil war, indeed [this] family war' which has characterized, in more 
specific terms, the 'history of poetry' (63). Thus, on the one hand,
Bloom focuses on the new poet's anxiety over the precursor poet's influence 
on him and maps the former's routes of escape from this Influence, his 
disarming of the 'strong' predecessor's power over him, so he may carve 
out a space for himself amongst the 'strong' in the canon, whilst on the 
other hand, he provides an account of the part the critic plays in this
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'civil war', his role in being part of this 'family war', and his 
contribution in the shaping of the literary canon.
The history of literature is by no means therefore to be understood in
terms of cooperation, in terms of the harmonic preservation, transmission,
or further development of our literary inheritance, but is seen in terms of
competition and conflict. It is in other words, about the struggle of
'going alone' (Bloom 1975: 24), about the anxiety of being influenced and
the defence against this influence from the predecessor. 'No one',
according to Bloom, ' is ever happy about being influenced; poets can't
stand it, critics are nerv ous about it' (103). This is why,
The dialectics of influence, if examined without ovei— idealizing, 
reveal that literature itself is founded upon rivalry,
misinterpretation, repression, and even plain theft and savage 
misprision... To see literature for what it is, the dark mirror of our 
egoism and our fallen condition, is to see ourselves again as perhaps 
eternity sees us, more like one another than we can bear to believe. 
<1976: xii)
What is at stake here, of course, is ‘the greatest of all human illusions, 
the vision of immortality' (Bloom 1973: 9). The poet's posterity in words
demands that the new poet, the latecomer or the ephebe, as Bloom calls him, 
'open a space for [him! self', ' demands that he should go against his 
precursor, demands that he would assert his 'originality' (Bloom 1975: 24)
and 'uniqueness' (70) against his rival, that he should misinterpret, 
savagely misread and subvert (24) the work and the standing of his
precursor, thereby demolishing the latter's uniqueness. '1 A] poet, 1 Bloom) 
argue! si in consequence, is not so much a man speaking to men as a man 
rebelling against being spoken to by a dead man (the precursor) 
outrageously more; alive than himself' (1975: 19). Only the 'latecomer
poet's' antithetical behaviour, his 'wilful revisionism' (Bloom 1973: 30)
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and his will to power will ensure that his art will survive: for, 'ti)f we 
have been ravished by a poem, it will cost us our own poem' (Bloom 1975: 
18). In other words, only the successful defence against influence, it 
seems, is the making of a great poem or a great poet. 'As the hungry
generations go on treading each other down' (Bloom 1973: 6), only the 
'strong poets' will be capable of mounting a strong defence, only the 
"Obei— poets" of this world will survive as victors thus destined 'to beget 
[their] own self, or become [their] one Great Original' (Bloom 1973: 64).
When Bloom therefore writes that 'a poetic “text", as I interpret it, 
Is not a gathering of signs on a page, but a psychic battlefield upon which 
authentic forces struggle for the only victory worth winning (1976a: 2), he 
is drawing attention to the poetic warfare between poets. This is to say, 
he is making the point that poetic influence, rather than being a source 
study, is a tracing of connections. 2 It is a tracing of connections
between poet and poet, and also between poems. Whether Bloom puts an
emphasis on the warring relations between poets, or whether he emphasises 
the Intel— connectedness between poems, between texts, the point which 
emerges is, that 'any poem is an inter-poem, and any reading of a poem is 
an inter— reading' (Bloom 1976a: 2-3). 3 This is to say, he does 'not 
believe that meaning is produced In and by poems, but only between poems' 
(1975a: 88). He no longer holds with the New Critical doctrine that 'a
single poem is an entity in itself' (Bloom 1973: 43), but advocates instead 
that 'meaning is always a wandering between texts' (Bloom 1975a: 106). And
it is in this sense that Bloom can argue that '(t]he interpretation of a 
poem necessarily is always interpretation of that poem's interpretation of 
other poems. . . to interpret a poem, necessarily you interpret its
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difference from other poems* (1975: 75). In short, influence is a tracing 
of inter-connections, 'influence means that there are no texts, but only 
relationships between texts' (Bloom 1975: 3), and furthermore it means,
that 'I only know a text because I know a reading of it, someone else's 
reading, my own reading a composite reading' (Bloom 1979: 8).
Since influence is therefore the interconnection between one text and 
another, between one reading/interpretation and another, but also the 
interconnection between one poet and another, the intei— textual, as it 
were, also gives way to the intei— subjective. Intei— relations are thus 
never part of an anonymous network of citations, in the Bartheslan sense of 
textuality, but rather they are governed by the heroic struggles between 
"relatives", between the sublime poet and his dominant predecessor, "* 
between the child's text and the parent text, between son and father, which 
is, of course, the precise point at which the subject inserts itself in the 
Bloomian discourse. Therefore, whilst Bloom 'does away with the static 
notion of a fixed and knowable text* (Kolodny 1985: 46), does Indeed hint
at intertextuality, he does not pursue the Barthesian notion of the 
intertext - as this subjectless 'ready-formed dictionary' (1977a: 146) -
but retains the subject at least insofar as textual relations are also 
constitutive relations between subjects, yielding occasional great rival 
poets who deny their great fathers, to constitute themselves as such. 
Bloom, in other words, is 'barely deconstructionist' (Hartman 1979a: ix>, 
for when he writes that 'a poem is a response to a poem', he immediately 
adds that this is so Just as much 'as a poet is a response to a poet, or a 
person to hi6 parent' (Bloom 1975: 18). To quote Christopher Norris, 'Chi is 
argument shrewdly undermines the deconstructionist position by insisting on
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the conflict of wills to expression behind the encounter of text with text' 
(1991: 122).
Bloom not only endows the reading subject with much power, but also 
calls upon the ephebe to exercise his reading power over the predecessor's 
poetic work. The response by a poet to a poet, which is also the ephebe's 
confrontation with his rivalling precursor, must take the form of a powerful 
revisionary interpretation, of a strong (mis)reading on part of the new­
comer according to Bloom. When Bloom therefore writes that 'Cploetic 
warfare is conducted by a kind of strong reading that I have called 
misreading <1979: 5), he is urging the new poet to '[confront! his Great 
Original', which is nothing other than the neccesslty of having to 'find 
the fault that is not there' <1973: 31). This is to say, the ephebe needs
to misread the precursor in order to overcome the influence and power the 
latter exerts over him. As Bloom puts it at some length here:
Poetic influence - when it involves two strong, authentic poets - 
always proceeds by a misreading of the prior poet, an act of creative 
correction that is actually and necessarily a misinterpretation. The 
history of fruitful poetic influence... is a history of anxiety and 
self-saving caricature, of distortion, of perverse, wilful revisionism 
without which modern poetry as such could not exist. <1973: 30)
Misreading by its very definition is thus never non-agonistic, nor weak,
but 'wilfultlyl revisionist'. It is in this sense also that revision might
be argued to be the very ' key to an ongoing literary history' (Kolodny
1985: 59. For Bloom's revisionist reader 'strives to see again, so as to
esteem and estimate differently, so as then to aim "correctively'" <1975:
4). Here we may also Invoke Adrienne Rich's point about a reading practice
- though it predates Bloom's writings in A Map of Misreading by some four
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years, and though it is part of a feminist project - it nevertheless shares
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this revisionist strategy. 'Re-vision' in Rich's account, is 'the act of 
looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new 
critical direction’ <1980: 35). As Annette Kolodny sums up their "mutual"
concerns: 'lalnd each, as a result - though from different motives -
strives to make "the literary tradition... the captive of the revisionary 
impulse"'. “
Bloom's revisionary impulse, unlike Rich's, his wilful revisionism and 
acts of deliberate misinterpretation are, of course, part of an oedipal 
struggle. The survival of the newcomer is based on the displacement of the 
predecessor, or as Bloom has it, 'ttlo live the poet must misinterpret the 
father, by the crucial act of misprision, which is the re-writing of the 
father' <1975: 19).. Such then begins the cycle of literary history, the
ongoing revision and re-writing of poetry, the shaping and re-shaping of 
the canon, where 'Csltrong poets must be misread' and where ' Cel very strong 
poet caricatures tradition and every strong poet is then necessarly misread 
by tradition that he fosters' <Bloom 1975a: 103), thus the ephebe becomes
the Father. Misreadings, induced by and as defences against the anxiety of 
Influence, are strong readings and as such they will ' provoke other 
readings' (Bloom 1975a: 125), they will produce further antagonistic
readings against the "first" strong reading. Since '[ el very poem is a 
misinterpretation of a parent poem', <in fact a Dad poem) *, and Bloom 
consequently has it that ' tal poem is not an overcoming of anxiety, but is 
that anxiety* <1975: 108, my emphasis), then with every new anxiety-
induced, antagonistic reading, with every deliberate misreading, we have a 
re-writing which .is also a new poem. A poem Is that anxiety. To put this 
differently, we may say, that 'tp)oems are defensive processes in constant
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change, which is to say that poems themselves are acts of reading“ (Bloom 
Bloom 1976a: 25-26). Or more to the point, if poems are 'acts of reading', 
then the ephebe's poems are his anxious, defensive readings (taking umbrage 
at his precursor and under the shadow of this influence); and furthermore, 
if readings are also necessarily misreadings, then the ephebe*s poetry is 
his acts of misreadings. It is in this sense that Peter de Bolla can state 
that 'the act of misprision is the creation of a new text' <1988: 24).
It is in this light also that Bloom can argue: 'Inlo one "fathers'* or 
“mothers" his or her own poems, because poems are not "created", but are 
interpreted into existence, and by necessity they are interpreted from 
other poems' <1982: 244); and we can add here they are 'interpreted from 
other poems' as the ephebe's rewritings, as his/her wilful miswritings of 
the precursors' poems. This is how Bloom explains this ' poetic misprision' 
in Kabbalah and Criticism
Poetry begins, always, when someone who is going to be a poet reads a
poem. But I immediately add - when he begins to read a poem, for to
see how fully he reads that poem we will have to see the poem that he
himself will write as his reading... the meaning of a poem [can! only
be another poem. Not I point out, the meaning of another poem, but the 
poem itself, indeed the otherness of the poem. <1975a: 107-108)
The ephebe writes his reading; which are really misreadings. The ephebe's
poetry is his readings, which are really misreadings; the ephebe’s poetry
is his writings, which are really rewritings of the precursor poems, and
as such miswritings. The ephebe's poetry was (the escape from) anxiety.
This is to say, 'ttlhe influence-relation governs reading as it governs
writing, and reading is therefore a miswriting Just as writing is a
misreading' (Bloom 1975: 3).
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Bloom does not therefore 'propose another new poetics, but a wholly
different practical criticism*. As he suggests In The Anxiety of Influence.
'diet us pursue Instead the quest of learning to read any poem as its
poet's deliberate misinterpretation, as a poet, of a precursor poem or of
poetry in general* <1973: 43). The point to be made here is, of course,
that Bloom is rewriting criticism. For, not only is the critic called upon
to read poetry as part of a 'family romance', in terms of rival relations,
not only is he called upon to write literary history as a series of
defensive and deliberate acts of misinterpretation, but by extension the
critic's calling is that he <mis)read, (mis)interpret, (mis)write
poetry/poets in a same fashion as ephebes do. Bloom explains:
A poet attempting to make his language new necessarily begins by an 
arbitrary act of reading that does not differ in kind from the act 
that his readers subsequently must perform upon him. C...1 A poet 
interpreting his precursor, and any strong subsequent interpreter
reading either poet, must falsify by his reading. <1975: 69)
What is at stake here is this: although Bloom tells us that 'tploets'
misinterpretations or poems are more drastic than critics'
misinterpretations or criticism', he adds that 'this is only a difference
in degree and not at all in kind' <1973: 94-95). Indeed, by the time he
writes Kabbalah and Criticism, Bloom is adamant that 'the relation of the
earlier poet to the later poet is exactly analogous to the relation of the
later poet to yourself' (1975a: 63). As he puts it some pages later,
The reader is to the poem what the poet is to his precursor - every 
reader is therefore an ephebe, every poem a forerunner, and every 
reading and act of "influencing", that is, of being influenced by the 
poem and of influencing any other reader to whom your reading is 
communicated. (1975a: 97)
This is to say, ' t wl hen we read/mlsread a poem, then, we do nothing less 
than repeat the sequence of poem/precursor poem, ephebe/poetlc father, 
which had generated the text in the first place' (1988: 28), according to
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Peter de Bolla. It can therefore be argued that the critic as rival of the 
poet, also produces defensive and corrective (mis)readings of the poet, 
also creatively misunderstands (Bloom 1973: 93) the precursor in an act of 
•wilful revisionism* to ward off influence.
Furthermore, since 'there are no texts, but only interpretations', and 
since 'a strong reading is the only text, the only lie against time that 
endures' (Bloom 1979: 7), then we may well extend this argument to the 
critic and say that without the critic 'modern poetry as such could not 
exist' . By twisting the emphasis of this argument one more turn, we may 
also say that since poems are ' interpreted into existence' - and we have to 
remember that this is the creation of a (new) text - since, in other words, 
the critic (Just as much as the ephebe poet) also writes his reading, 
indeed, 're-writes his father', then critical writings, acts of criticism 
are also 'poetic misprisions* and as such are also creations of new texts. 
Critical texts are creations of new texts in the sense that they are 
creative, for if the ephebe's misreadings are his writings, in other words, 
are the poems that he writes, then the critic's misreadings are 'the prose 
poetry' that he writes. In fact, ‘talll criticism is prose poetry' (1973: 
94), according to Bloom: which is why Christopher Norris claims that 
•Cclriticism for Bloom is a kind of poetic re-enactment' (1991: 117), and
Frank Lentricchia can claim that 'Bloom has permitted us to understand that 
what he means by interpretation is the making of a critical poem that would 
go into competition with the poetic text supposedly under consideration'
(1983: 345).
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Thus, the 'critical act is brought into the same orbit as the act of 
poetic creation' (De Bolla 1988: 23). Indeed, as de Bolla hastens to add,
'understanding of the critical act is profoundly poetic' <24). Bloom’s 
statement therefore that 'as literary history lengthens, all poetry 
necessarily becomes verse-criticism, Just as all criticism becomes prose- 
poetry' <Bloom 1975: 3), which renders the poetic critical Just as much as 
it renders the critical poetic, and which, on the surface at least, seems 
to negate the difference between the critical and the creative, is finally 
gathered though under the aegeis of the poetic, under poetry. This is to 
say, since 'the meaning of a poem can only be another poem', Bloom 
ultimately urges us to see that
critical theory [needs to] stop treating itself as a branch of 
philosophical discourse, and adopt Instead the pragmatic dualism of 
the poets themselves. . . A theory of poetry must belong to poetry, must 
be poetry, before it can be any use in interpreting poems' (1975a: 
109).
The critical, in other words, is subsumed under the poetic, which marks a 
crucial point in understanding Bloom's position. For the 'drastic models 
for creative reading and critical writing' (Bloom 1979: 6) that Bloom puts
forward in his work, not only aim, in the end, to lift the critical into 
the realm of the creative, the sublimely poetic, but also endow the critic 
with a newly found creative freedom, with a libertarian creativity that 
many critics have deemed as sheer interpretive anarchy, or utter poetic 
obscurltanism. 7 If 'for Bloom' as de Bolla explains, 'all criticism 
aspires to the condition of poetry* (1988: 24), then 'the critic as poet
Joins the poet as critic' (Lentricchia 1983: 337), then Bloom Joins the
poet, this original arti6t, becomes 'the poet in the reader' (Bloom 1979: 
8), becomes a .'poet-reader' (Bloom 1975: 69), has become, to use
Lentricchia'6 phrase, 'an original theorist' <1983: 346): which is
98
precisely why Bloom has characterized his "poetics" as 'a severe poem, 
reliant upon aphorism and apothegm, and a quite personal... mythic pattern
C1973: 130).
This is also however, another reason why Bloom is 'barely
deconstructionist'. For, as Lentricchia puts it, 'Ci!f the deconstructive 
method could speak to the relations of critics and poets, it would not tell 
us that criticism is poetry' <1983: 345); it would not emphasize the
■personal' artistry, 'mythic' poetlcity of criticism. Neither would it 
exclusively concentrate on 'the titanic willfulness of strong poets', or we 
may add the will to power of the "strong critic", which has the effect, as 
Lentricchia points out, of 'reinstating, against every theoretical point 
[Bloom! has made, the principle of the author - if not in splendid 
isolation, then in splendidly isolated dialogue with his strong ancestors' 
(1983: 343). Has Bloom not come back here via the strong ancesteral poet,
via the great precursor to the Author 'who is reputed the father and the 
owner of his work' (Barthes 1977: 160). Is Bloom, in other words, moving
from text to work when Barthes had already moved from work to text? Whilst 
in the essay entitled 'From Work to Text', the text, according to Barthes, 
'reads without the inscription of the Father', 'can be read without the 
guarantee of its father' (161), 'is a tissue of quotations' (1977a: 146),
of 'citations which... are anonymous, untraceable' <1977: 160), Bloom's
"poetic oeuvres" are never anonymous, but bear the mark of the father, must 
be inscribed by the father, so that they may be re-scripted by the son. Is 
it not also here, as Norris observed that 'Bloom wants to halt the process 
of deconstruction,at a point where it is still possible to gauge the poet's 
creative stature in terms of expression' <1981: 119), or the critic's
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creative expressivity, indeed, any Author's 'wish to express hlmseir 
(Barthes 1977a: 146), his 'strive to create... a working-space of
presence for his own imagination' (Norris 1991: 119>? The poet remains
Authoi— god here, and the critic becomes his own Author, at least insofar as 
Bloom is bringing back the creative expressive genius that Barthes sought 
to dispose of, dispossess.
If the Author is therefore smuggled through the back door here,’ it 
is "tradition" which left this entrance to the house of fame wide open. For 
tradition needs its heroes, the hero-worship 9 which is nothing other than 
that 'splendidly isolated dialogue with Cour] strong ancestors', that 
'exclusive comparison' with our forefathers. '° And it is in this sense 
that Lentricchia writes:
So, despite the fact that he has been received as a radical destroyer 
of traditional methodology, there i6 a conservative impulse in Bloom's 
theory which succeeds in shoring up the institution of literary 
studies as we have always known it. His concentration on the poet in a 
poet, and on strong poets rather than weak ones, are confirmations of 
the way that most literary scholars in America teach and have been 
taught (great books; major - i.e., "strong" - writers of England and 
America; the Olympian perspective of the typical sophomore survey 
which tends to enforce exclusive comparison between strong writers, 
there being nothing else to compare; etc. etc.). <1983: 344)
Strong ancestors, strong fathers, strong poets, strong authors, strong
authorial critics are thus the "substance" that literary evolutions are
made of. Here, 'CpJoets survive because of inherent strength' (Bloom 1975:
200), a stength we may say that they inherited from their strong fathers,
and a strength that, according to Bloom 'is manifested through their
Influence upon other strong poets' (200); here, the "fittest" survives, for
'(olut of the strong comes forth strength, even if not sweetness, and when
strength has Imposed Itself long enough, then we learn to call it
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tradition, whether we like it or 
formed and makes sure it survives
not' <200>. In short, 
for all eternity.
here, the canon is
What then we may ask, is tradition? Where then would we be without
tradition? Or, more to the point and closer to the Bloomian spirit, where
would we be without the Father? 'What', Bloom asks in A Map of Misreading,
'happens if one tries to write, or to teach, or to think, or even to read
without the sense of tradition?' And he cannily answers: 'Why, nothing at
all happens, Just nothing*. This is because:
You cannot write or teach or think or even read without imitation, and 
what you imitate is what another person has done, that person's 
writing or teaching or thinking or reading. Your relation to what 
informs that person is tradition, for tradition is influence that 
extends past one generation, a carrying-over of influence. Tradition, 
the Latin tradltlo, is etymologically a handing-over or a giving-over, 
a delivery, a giving-up and so even a surrender or a betrayal. C...1 
Literary tradition begins when when a fresh author is simultaneously 
cognizant not only of his own struggle against the forms and presence 
of a precursor, but is compelled also to a sense of the Precursor's 
place in regard to what came before him. <1975: 32)
If for Bloom 'the rejection of the precursor serves only to reconfirm the
influence of the precursor' (Burke 1992: 159), then Bloom affirms the very
same ' mastei— spirit* that Hartman saw 'worthy of perpetuation'. This is to
say, if for Hartman 'the great work of art... is a master-spirit', and as
such is 'worthy of perpetuation', and if Great Criticism on a par with
Great Art discerns and hands down that which is 'worthy of perpetuation',
for Bloom, criticism might not be 'appreciative' of tradition, but is
'cognizant' of it, is aware, in other words, of the precursor's presence
and place, and thus the need to rival, measure up, supercede and re-place
this greatness. The Bloomian critic thus rivals poets as well as other
critics for he is in combat with all strong (fore)fathers in order to
Jealously cut out a space for himself amongst the great, amongst those that
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have imposed themselves long enough that we have had to accept them as 
tradition. Bloomian criticism, in other words, ensures that Bloom will be 
able to have an unrivalled pedestal in literary history. A pedestal which 
has inscribed on it the re-inscription of the critic as authoi— poet, it 
reads:
Criticism is poetry; poetry is as criticism defined it; poetry is as 
Bloom defines it; and Bloom, we shall remember, once upon a time, 
defined criticism as poetry; long live Harold Bloom.
*
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3. 4 Hlllis Miller: Reading Unreadability
If Hartman posed the question 'What difference does reading make?' (1989:
19) at the opening in Criticism In the Wilderness and answered it in terms 
of '[tlhe difference that reading makes is, most generally, writing' (19), 
then it was to suggest that reading and writing cannot be easily separated 
since reading does not use 'writing as an "incidental" aid' (20), since 
reading and writing, critical and creative writing are neither 'two 
specialities' (19), nor is one subordinated to the other, but the reader is 
also a writer, or more to the point, 'what a literary critic does is 
literature' (20). This has the effect, of course, of reversing the 
secondary into a primary, of endowing the secondary term, be it reading, 
commentary or criticism, with the same, primary, status as literature. 
Bloom, as we have seen, takes this premise to its “wild'' conclusion. By 
suggesting that poets, critics and readers alike 'write' their reading, 
and more to the point, that critics' (mis)readings are indeed the 'prose- 
poetry' that they (mis)write, Bloom renders the critical also poetic. By 
thus instituting a poet-reader, a creative critic, an 'original theorist', 
Bloom not only revises the relation between criticism and poetry, but 
begins to deny the difference between that which was deemed primary and 
that which was once secondary. Hillis Miller, contrary to Hartman and 
Bloom, sets out to deconstruct "the very ground" which both the critical 
and the creative inhabit. This is to say, whilst Hartman, Bloom and Miller 
are concerned with the relation of the secondary to the primary, Miller 
does not, however, seek to reverse nor to revise the position they hold, 
but seeks to subvert it, attempts to make its very proposition untenable, 
tries to pull away the ground, so to speak, which has fertilized the very
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existence of the two terms, which has provided the basis for the privilege 
of one term over the other. Whether Miller succeeds here, will form the 
crux of our discussion of his work.
What Miller does then is this: he illustrates that language constantly 
undermines its own meaning. This is to say, in his continuous evocation of 
the myriad ways in which language refuses to be constrained by the paucity 
of literalness or by the hard logic of the concept, Miller draws attention 
to language's 'equivocal richness' (1979: 223). In this sense he writes, 
'criticism is in this respect... continuous with the language of 
literature', and further that 'there is no conceptual expression without 
figure* (223). Miller thus draws our attention to the figurality of all 
language. If • literal' language is not ' literally literal* (Eagleton 1983: 
145), but always metaphorical and figural, then all forms of discourse are 
marked by the figurative, all writing is fictional and not only is 
literature no longer the privileged realm of the figural, but neither is 
the critical the bastion of the literal. As Eagleton says, ' Cpi hilosophy, 
law, political theory work by metaphor Just as poems do, and so are Just as 
fictional' (145). This then not only pulls away the ground for the 
distinction between literature and other forms of discourse, but it 
Immerses us in a linguistic universe where 'it is impossible to get outside 
the limits of language by means of language' (Miller 1987: 59). It is in
this sense that readers, critics alike are, to use Terry Eagleton's words 
once more, 'cast dlzzylngly into a bottomless linguistic abyss by a
text which has become "unreadable"' (1983: 145).
%
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Texts for Miller become "unreadable", precisely because the figurality 
of language renders texts undecidable. Another of the resources on which 
Miller draws in order to highlight language's 'equivocal richness*, its 
undecidability, is his 'recognition of a performative function of language' 
(1979: 250). Which is to say - and here we borrow a phrase from Paul de 
Man to re-enact Miller's thesis - because ' Sprache verspricht (sich)‘, 1 
because language promises (itself), speaks the promise of its own truth and 
makes a slip of the tongue, it speaks with forked tongue, speaks in two 
tongues. The undecidability of this phrase is, of course, exemplary of the 
shifting and unstable structure of language. Words, to put this in other 
words, will not stay in place, will not stay still, but will slip, slide, 
perish, decay with imprecision; 2 which is to say, '. . . other meanings 
are always there as a shimmering in the word which makes it refuse to stay 
still in a sentence* (Miller 1979: 219). Thus ambiguous and indeterminate, 
language necessarily opens up 'a margin of unpredictability', which 
inevitably leads us to our 'failure to read’ (Miller 1987a: 214), thereby 
illustrating the unreadability of texts. To use our word-play once more, we 
may say that all texts versprechen (sich)-. texts harbour the promise of a 
truth, hence the promise of a univocal meaning, the promise of their own 
readability, but equally fall into a lapsus linguae which contradicts their 
claim for 'the obvious* readability. The double movement encapsulated in 
the phrase, (sich) versprechen, is therefore already the mark by which 
texts are '"unreadable", if by "readable" one means a single, definite 
interpretation' (Miller 1979: 226). To push the implications of Miller's 
argument one step further then, it follows that texts are both "readable" 
and "unreadable",, they display an irreducible heterogeneity of (at least) 
two contradictory readings. And this is precisely why Miller can argue that
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the failure to read, or that thi6 '"unreadability" is not located in the 
reader but in the text itself’ (Miller 1989: 159). 3 "Unreadability" is, in 
other words, the consequence of the difference within texts, of difference 
within.
If, both the figurality and the performativity of language undermine 
the traditional distinction between literature and other forms of
discourse, and if this gives language an undecidable quality, 'a margin of 
unpredictability', and if in turn it also undermines any notion of a
'obvious or univocal reading', "* then the difference between literary and 
other tropes is evident only in the fact that 'literary works... are in a 
sense less deluded than other forms of discourse, because they implicitely 
acknowledge their own rhetorical status' , because they draw attention, so 
to speak, to the 'figurative structures which render them ambiguous and 
indeterminate* (Eagleton 1983: 143). It therefore follows that literature
for Miller (as well as Paul de Man) 'does not need to be deconstructed by 
the critic' , but ' it can be shown to deconstruct itself, and moreover is 
actually "about" this very operation' (Eagleton 1983: 145). As Miller puts 
it with regard to de Man:
Deconstruction... is not something the critic does to the text from
the outside in the act of 'reading' it, but something all texts
inevitably do to themselves. It is a built-in fatality in language... 
(1989: 157-8)
And we can therefore see once more why • "unreadability" is not located in 
the reader but in the text itself' . This then is the crux of much of Yale 
writing, of those 'boa-deconstructors', and here that 'boa-deconstructor' 
Miller, who to put it in Hartman's words once more 'enjoys his own style of 
disclosing again alnd again the "abysm" of words' (1979: ix). In a practice
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of close reading then Miller 6ets out to demonstrate the 'built-in 
fatality' or Inherent playfulness of language, exposes not only the 
undecldability within texts but also the undecldabillty within words.
The undecidability within texts does not give us - though some critics have 
accused Miller of this - the free reign to make texts mean anything we like
(1987: 9, 10>, does not give us a free licence to be disrespectful to the
words on the page. Miller is emphatic on this point in The Ethics of 
Reading:
As a reader... I should above all have respect for the text, not 
deviate by one iota In my report of the text from what it says. The 
letter of the text must become my law when I read it. <1987: 10).
Thus Miller advocates a practice of 'close reading' <1979: 230), for, as he
puts it, 'Ctlhe thing all readers share is those words on the page' (1982:
20). What is at stake here is, of course, the kind of deconstruct ive
(un)reading which ceases upon 'the undecldable structure contained within
(a) word' <1979: 236), which traces the 'mazy route' (Norris 1991: 93), the
labyrinthine colllngs, the twisted etymological roots of words. Miller's
'tactics in reading a text' then, according to Vincent Leitch, involves
... tract ing] the meaning of a key word back to its etymological 
roots. In doing so, he shifts the apparent stability of the master 
term out of a closed system and into an ongoing bifurcating labyrinth. 
The effect of such semantic dissemination is to deracinate the text, 
revealing the inexhaustible possibilities for interpretation... 
(Leitch 19: 191).
The 'status of these etymologies' according to Miller, is not by any means 
a search for the 'true meaning of the word', instead, '[tlhey serve rather 
to indicate the lack of enclosure of a given word' (Miller 1978: 158). As
Miller puts it in his essay 'Ariadne's Thread: Repetition and Narrative
Line*,
N. .
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Each word Inheres In a labyrinth of branching Interverbal
relationships. . . all words were originally metaphors. Moreover, one 
encounters for a single word, not a single root, but forks in the 
etymological line leading to bifurcated or trifurcated roots C...J In 
any case the effect of etymological retracing Is not to ground the 
word solidly but to render It unstable, equivocal, wavering, abysmal. 
<158-9, emphasis added)
Miller thus concludes that 'only through the patient work of following 
some thread as far, deep into the labyrinth of the text, as it will go' 
(162, emphasis added), that a close reading reveals, or as he has it, that 
'such an effort of interpretation is not the "deconstruction" of a given 
novel but rather a discovery of the way it deconstucts itself in the
process of constructing its web of story-telling' (162). Consequently, 'by 
pushing the analysis of the text in question far enough' that we see 
clearly how 'the impossiblity of a single definite reading emerges' <163, 
emphasis added). Whether Miller homes in on a word, words, or a text, his 
method works via a patient and close analysis. And here we may call up 
Barbara Johnson's point that deconstruction as a word is closely related 
with that of analysis, which ' etymologically means "to undo" - a virtual 
synonym for "to de-construct'" (1980: 5). It is in sense that she argues,
and we may take her argument on board for Miller also, that 'Ctlhe de- 
construction of a text does not proceed by random doubt or arbitrary
subversion, but by a careful teasing out of warring forces of signification 
within the text itself' (5, my emphasis). Neither 'random', 'arbitrary', 
nor "anything-goes", Miller thus engages in close etymological readings 
which carefully unravel the very 'letter of the text', which patiently
(un)read the difference within a text.
Miller's emphasis on close reading makes him wary of the notion of an 
overarching theory, be it of literature, tqxts, or reading. If, as he
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argues, 'too much attention is paid to this theory or that [...I and not 
enough to the readings made possible by the theories in question* <1982:
21), then it is because we do not pay sufficient 'respect' to 'those words 
on the page' and their 'mazy routes', because we do not read carefully, 
patiently enough. This passage from Fiction and Repetition bears out his 
concerns:
A theory is all too easy to refute or deny, but a reading can be 
controverted only by going through the difficult task of rereading the 
work in question and proposing an alternative reading. A skirmisher in 
the rarified atmosphere of pure theory argues that criticism went 
wrong when it became close reading. This, if I may say so, is a major 
treason of our profession. That profession is nothing other than the 
love of words, the teaching of reading, and the attempt in written 
criticism to facilitate the act of reading, What counts for most in 
literary criticism is the citations made and what the critics say 
about those citations. <1982: 21)
If, on the one hand then, Miller 'teases out' the difference within texts 
through his close readings, shows how words versprechen slch through his 
etymological readings, on the other hand, he also uses this tactic to read 
his opponents so carefully as to highlight their unintentional lapsus 
linguae. Miller's 'characteristic form of critical response' to his 
adversaries, is therefore, to put it in Donald Pease's words, a 'co­
optation and neutralization of the language of his critics'. This then 
constitutes the careful deconstructive readings practiced at Yale, and we 
should add Miller's comment here that, 'Cdleconstruction is nothing more or 
less than good reading as such' <1987: 10).
It is also at this precise point that Miller's 'good reading' 
carefully engages with the discourse of his adversaries, etymologically
Iundoes the other's words, in short, 'co-opts and neutralizes' the language
109
of M. H. Abrams. When Abrams accuses Miller's deconstructive readings of
being 'plainly and simply parasitical' on 'the obvious or univocal
reading', s Miller responds by pursuing the implications of the notion of
'citation' and the word 'parasite'. This is to say, if Abrams accuses
Miller of picking 'key words' or key textual passages out of their specific
context to let them run wild in an ceaseless etymological 'echolalia', K if
Abrams thus implies that Miller's etymological readings of any citations -
be it words, phrases or passages of text, he may have singled out for close
scrutiny - are neither 'obvious nor univocal', but 'plainly and simply
parasitical' in that they feed off their host unashamedly, infect their
host like a virus would an alien body, Miller responds to Abrams by
applying the very etymological vigour (or should we say rigour) that Abrams
charges him with. He thus poses the following questions:
What happens when a critical essay extracts a "passage" and "cites" 
it? Is this different from a citation, echo, or allusion within a 
poem? Is a citation an alien parasite within the body of the main 
text, or is the interpretive text the parasite which surrounds and 
strangles the citation which is its host? The host feeds the parasite 
and makes its life possible, but at the same time is killed by it, as 
criticism is often said to kill literature. Or can host and parasite 
live happily together, in the domicile of the same text, feeding each 
other or sharing the food? (1979: 217)
If Miller puts into question here whether a citation is host or a parasite,
whether criticism feeds off its literary host, or whether the literary is
the parasite within the work of criticism, then he has made his first move
in undoing Abrams' s claims, for in Abrams universe, there stand rigidly the
clearly demarcated entitles of the primary and the secondary, of that which
is created by a primary hand and that which is derived second-hand.
Moreover, since we already know that 'twlhat counts for most in literary
criticism’ according to Miller, 'is the citations made and what the critics
say about those citations', we can see how Miller seizes the opportunity to
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make the most ot' his citation of Abrams. For when Miller cites Abrams, the
latter’s assertion that a deconstructive reading of a work ’is plainly and
simply parasitical', is itself a citation, cited from Wayne Booth. When 
Miller thus cites Abrams citing Booth, it becomes ‘a kind of chain which it 
will be part of this] intention here to interrogate' (Miller 1979: 217).
This is to say, any 'citation cut off from its context takes on a different
meaning, becomes a son without a father, defenseless wandering the world, 
more likely to be vulnerable to this) misreading“ (Miller 1987: 42,
emphasis added). 7 And since the citations that Miller is handling here are 
twice removed already, they begin to take on very different meanings in 
Miller' s hands.
To push this further, since misreading, unreadability or the failure 
to read - as we have seen - are inevitable, given the undecidability within 
language, then Abrams's cited words become all the more 'vulnerable* at the 
very point when Miller begins to unpick the 'undecidable structure 
contained within the word "parasite'" (Miller 1979: 236). For when Miller
begins to retrace the Abrams/Booth citation, he (un)reads the failure of 
the word "parasite" to signify uni vocally. As Miller argues his case in 
'The Critic as Host':
"Parasite" is one of those words which calls up its apparent opposite. 
It has no meaning without its counterpart. There is no parasite 
without 116 host. At the same time both word and counterword 
subdivide. Each reveals itself to be fissured already within itself... 
<1979: 219).
In the course of this essay and in a complicated ** retracing of the 
multiple roots and numerous etymological branches of "para", "per", 
"sitos", “ghos-tl" and "hostis", Miller, in Christopher Norris's lucid
summary, thus
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cunningly deconstructs the oppositional semantics of the words "host" 
and "parasite". He traces a ma2y route through the twin etymologies, 
showing how their meanings cross and redouble until both seem to 
partake of an ambivalent, almost symbiotic relationship where the 
"host" (text) is at least as parasitic as the "parasite" (critic). 
(Norris 1991: 93)
If, on the one hand, as Miller has it, an 'uncanny antithetical relation 
exists not only between pairs of words in this system, host and parasite, 
host and guest, but within each word in itself' (221), and if the 
difference within here, * inscribed within the word parasite and its 
associates, host and guest, invites us to recognize that the "obvious and 
univocal reading" of a [literary text] is not identical to the [literary 
text] itself', * then we can re-iterate once more that a text calls up more 
than one reading. And by extension, a word such as "parasite" also calls 
up more than one reading: “parasite" may thus be read as a kind of leech in 
biological terms, as Abrams obviously does, or it may be read as that Greek 
socialite, that fellow guest who shares the food 'there with you beside the 
grain' (220), as Miller does; and incidentally as Michel Serres does when 
he states that '[t]o parasite means to eat next to (1982: 7). ’° One term 
positive, the other negative, one invited, the other uninvited, "para-site" 
moves between one and the other meaning in Miller's account, moves between 
(para) sites.
Thus the Derridian plus d'une langue (more than one language/no more 
of one language) may be invoked here to say plus d' une lecture (more than 
one reading/no more of one reading. Or to use our German play on words once 
more, Sprache hat <slch) versprochen here, language promised to tell the 
truth, promised to be translucent and readable, and made a slip of the 
tongue, which contradicted this readability. "Parasite" promised to mean
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leech and in an etymological twist of the tongue became also a socialite.
"Parasite" promised to be the stanger in the home of the host, when in a
further etymological twist, the Latin host revealed himself to be a stanger
also. To put this differently yet again, we may say that although, on the
surface, the word “parasite" was readable, Miller's deeper probings
('letting language go as far as it will take one') 11 into the etymology of
the word revealed that the word promised more than Abrams was led or wanted
to believe. "Parasite" also versprach slch, made a lapsus linguae, became
unreadable, 'if by "readable" one [has meant] a single, definite
interpretation'. “Parasite'' is therefore readable in Abrams’s world and
readable as well as unreadable in Miller's: for Miller can read Abrams
(Abrams's parasite), but can also unread Abrams (Abrams's parasite). In
short, Miller re-reads "parasite" as plus d'une lecture.
Miller's etymological procedures and his ploy of strategically 
reversing a traditional metaphor, are both powerful tactics borrowed 
from Derrida. They lead to the upshot of his argument: that critics 
are no more "parasites" than the texts they interpret, since both 
inhabit a host-text of pre-existent language which Itself 
parasitically feeds on their host-like willingness to receive it. 
(Norris 1991: 93, emphasis added)
Miller's careful and patient readings of the word "parasite" as this 
irreducible heterogeneity of at least two contradictory readings within its 
own structure, is therefore the very spin-off of a Sprache, die sich 
versprlcht, of the 'fatality in language' to use Miller's words, or of that 
'pre-existent language' which is an only too willing resource 'to receive' 
the kind of linguistic exploits which Abrams so deplores and Miller makes 
such good use of.
Moreover, 'such arguments can clearly be put to a great variety of 
tactical uses' according to Norris. Here against Abrams:
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Miller extends his semantic Juggling to the question of whether 
deconstructionist readings are "parasitic” (as M. H. Abrams had 
claimed) on normal main-line historical interpretations. He is able to 
demonstrate, once again, that the norm not only presupposes but in 
some sense contains whatever deviations it is required to exclude. 
(Norris 1991: 93)
If the norm is the 'main-line historical reading', the 'obvious and 
univocal reading', and if this norm 'contains' its own 'deviation' from 
itself, i. e. contains a deconstructive reading, then again, we come back 
to our phrase Sprache verspricht (slch); for this phrase also 'contains' 
its own 'deviation'. Language promises the truth (verspricht), and language 
contains within it the very deviation from this claim (verspricht sich). 
This is is why Miller can argue in 'The Critic as Host' that ‘the "obvious 
and univocal reading" always contains the "deconstructive reading" as a 
parasite encrypted within itself as part of itself' (224). This is also, of 
course, why the 'obvious and univocal reading' contains its deconstructive 
lapsus linguae, its unreadability. If one reading therefore contains the 
other within itself, is also a trace of the other, it follows for Miller 
that '"the deconstructive reading" can by no means free itself from the 
metaphysical reading it means to contest' (225). ,S! Rather than
illustrating the difference between Abram's (obvious or metaphysical)
readings of literary text and Miller's own (deconstructive) readings, 
Miller seeks to highlight the difference within texts which gives rise to 
the differences between readings.
This is also why Miller often speaks of a 'relation of tense co­
existence' between 'the deconstructive reading, and what he sometimes calls 
the "metaphysical" reading or, following M. H. Abrams, "the obvious and 
unlvocal reading'” according to Jonathan Culler (1983: 269). This co-
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existence between these two readings Is further defined by Miller when he 
writes that, 'logocentrlsm and nihilism, are related to one another In a 
way which Is not antithesis and which may not be synthesized In any 
dialectical Aufhebung1 (1979: 228>. 'Each', In other words, 'defines and Is
hospitable to the other, host to It as parasite' (228). It Is precisely because 
the literary text 'Is neither host nor the parasite but the food they both 
need', that 'tbloth readings are at the same table together' (225), that 
the Abrams reading can share a table with the Miller (un)reading. Since 
both readings are host and parasite to each other, and since both readings 
remain antithetical, remain un-synthesized, we can maintain with Miller 
that this 'tension between dialectic and undecidability is another way in 
which this form of criticism remains open, in Cal ceaseless movement...' 
(250). This is to say, if Abram's is a dialectician who seeks the Aufhebung 
or at least an overcoming of the difference between the literary text and 
Its reading (which is why he holds on to the very notion of ' an obvious and 
univocal reading' which is meant to be identical with the literary text) 
and if Miller is the dismantler who seeks to erheben the undecidability 
within any structure (be it language, a word, a text, reading); in a 
nutshell if both inter-act ceaselessly at the same dinner table, but do not 
eat each other, do not consume each other, do not subsume each other in the 
totalizing movement of a Hegelian grand synthesis (symbiosis not
indigestion), then Miller may indeed claim for his particular brand of 
deconstruction that it ' attempts to resist the totalizing tendencies of 
criticism', that '[lit attempts to resist its own tendencies to come to 
rest in some Bense of mastery over the work' (252); and it has to be added 
here, be it a 'mastery over' a literary work or critical work, or even the 
critical work of M. H. Abrams.
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What Miller then demonstrates again and again is the ' undecidable 
structure within* - be it within a word, a text or language as a whole. 
This linguistic or textual difference within, is what according to Barbara 
Johnson, ‘informs the process of deconstructive criticisra* (1989: 5). 'A
deconstructive reading is,' for her, therefore 'a reading that analyzes the 
specificity of a text's critical difference from itself* <5>. It is in this 
sense also that Miller, for instance, reads Goethe's Die 
Wahlverwandtschaften in his essay 'A "BuchstSbllches" Reading of The 
Elective Affinities?. For here he claims, that the traditional *religio- 
aesthetic-metaphysical interpretation of the novel* that Goethe seems to 
have authorized, also contains 'features of the text [which! lead to an 
entirely different reading of it* (1979a: 11). This produces according to
Jonathan Culler (1983: 269-70) 'an irreducible heterogeneity as these
readings, both of which are thematized in the work, articulate “two 
entirely incompatible notions of our tradition"'. The two traditions Miller 
is referring to here, are of course, the “old" 'tradition of metaphysics' 
and the "new" 'tradition of difference' (Miller 1977: 60) '3 and since both 
sit 'at the same table together', but the latter cannot free itself from 
the former which it really 'means to contest', it can nevertheless undo it 
from within, subvert and neutralize it from the inside. This is to say, 
because 'deconstruction is a form of criticism which is not outside but 
within' (Miller 1979: 251), that it is already within the text, that we may 
also say that texts deconstruct themselves.
This 'incoherence within any single literary text* (Miller 1979: 224)
which is nothing pther than the text's own dismantling of itself, relies, 
according to Miller, on the critic 'to identify an act of deconstruction
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which has always already, in each case differently, been performed by the
text on itself' (Miller 1975: 31). The obvious metaphysical reading
together with the deconstructive reading which are 1 thematized in the text
itself' (31, emphasis added), thus 'wait there in tense co-existence'
according to Culler, 'for acts of identification that will bring them out'
(1983: 269). The very point that texts 1thematize' their incoherence, their
auto-deconstruction, that literature is 'actually "about" this very
operation’ (Eagleton 1983: 145), and moreover that this involves an act of
Identification on the part of the critic/reader, needs to be examined more
closely. Let us consider the following passage from 'A "Buchstäbliches"
Reading of The Elective Affinities' , where Miller argues that both readings
are 'woven into the text, articulated there':
The text is heterogeneous. The novel's lines of self-interpretation 
contradict one another. The meaning of the novel lies in this 
contradiction, in the way each of these readings generates its 
subversive counterpart and is unable to appear alone.
This then according to Miller, makes the novel, makes
Wahlverwandtschaften another demonstration of the seif-subverting 
heterogeneity of each great work of Western literature. This
heterogeneity of our great literary texts is one important
manifestation of the equivocity of the Western tradition in general. 
(13, my emphasis)
The point about this passage is, of course, Miller's emphasis on the notion 
of what counts as great literature. Whilst the New Criticism might have 
proceeded from the assumption that great literature or a 'good novel is 
necessarily going to be homogeneous or organic in form' (Miller 1982: 5),
Miller takes the premise 'that much in many works of literature seems
unaccountable by traditional standards of coherence and unity' (19). 
Leaving behind such 'theories of unity', '*► he 'attempts to Identify and to 
acccount for one form of this unaccountability' (19, emphasis added). If on
1
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the one hand then what counts, so to speak, is unacountability, in other 
words that which "slips, slides and perishes", that which "will not stay in 
place, will not stay still", that which playfully moves within the text, 
differing and defering, that difference within, then it seems rather 
strange that this apparent unaccountability should have a form at all. 
Furthermore, how are we to identify, or account for, that which "will not 
stay in place, will not stay still", that which playfully moves within the 
text, differing and defering? How can difference within or in Johnson's 
more combative words, those 'warring forces of signification within the 
text itself' be accounted for, be accountable? Unless, of course, and here 
we come back to Miller's point that this unaccountability has a form, 
Miller is still holding on to the notion of an identifiable form or entity, 
to the presence of an identity. And if Miller is still holding on to the 
presence of an identity, how then may we Justify his claim for and his 
insistence on difference within? We cannot; for what is an act of 
identification, if not a univocal reading, a sublation of difference? 
Moreover, if Miller can identify the difference between identity and
dif f erence sufficiently to be able to constitute or even formal ate an
identity, then ipso facto, one has also lent credence to the seemingly
paradoxical view that one can also identify dif f erence Itself: one has
ef f ectively forged an identity relation between identity and difference, a
stable opposition in other words that becomes an equation. Difference, to 
put this differently, is as identical to itself as identity, otherwise the 
distinction would not hold.
Let us bear with Miller though for the moment if only to unravel 
another thread of his argument. If through a practice of close reading
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(which is quite unlike the New Critics' close reading), Miller sets out to 
identify an 'act of deconstruction which has always already... been 
performed by the text on itself’ <1975: 31), Miller sets out to identify, 
in other words, the 'tradition of difference* within texts; and since this 
very tradition is also the mark of the ' equivocity of the Great Western 
tradition' of literature, then, rather than seeking to dismantle the notion 
of a great canon, rather than deconstructing the greatest of monoli ths 
which has haunted literary criticism, Miller has indeed merely rewritten the 
criteria which apparently define a canon. Rather than adhering to a notion 
of canon which is based on 'theories of unity', Miller sets different 
criteria, advocating a canon which has no ground other than the self- 
deconstructive difference within; a canon of literature which is ’"about" 
this very operation', a canon, a "logomonolith”, nevertheless.
Isn't this also where we can come back to Geoffrey Hartman, for if
Miller merely sets differentcriteria for why some literary works are great
and others are not, he never averts the charge we levelled at Hartman. He,
like Hartman, whilst questioning our metaphysical base, our logocentric
basis, falls to make that final move or twist, fails to undermine the
capital letter in the word Great: Hartman (re)clalms Great Criticism and
Miller (re)clalms Great Literature. Moreover, since as Miller writes in
'Deconstructing the Deconstructor' that,
Great works of literature are likely to be ahead of their critics. 
They are there already. They have anticipated explicit ly any 
deconstruction the critic can achieve. A critic may hope, with great 
effort, and with the lndlspenslble help of the writers themselves, to 
raise himself to the level of linguistic sophistication where Chaucer, 
Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton, Wordsworth, George Eliot, Stevens, or 
even Williams are already. <1975: 31)
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The auto-deconstruction referred to here, is nothing other than the 
autonomy of the literary text. 'Since the text performs on itself the act 
of deconstruction without any help from the critic* (31), the text itself 
contains, paradoxically, the totality of its dissemination, it retains 
property rights even over Its own, proper dissolution. Is it not also 
precisely here that Miller has, in fact, returned to the old subordination 
of criticism vis-à-vis its object, has indeed rendered the object - here 
the text - the privileged site, the autonomous primary which has determined 
already that which the critic might possibly achieve.
Let us put this in another way. 'The deconstructive critic' who
according to Miller, 'seeks to find by (al process of retracing, the
element in the text. . . which will unravel it all, or the loose stone which 
will pull down the whole building' (Miller 1976: 341), merely finds that
which has already taken place, finds that literature has already done the 
Job, all by itself. Deconstruction is therefore not the 'subversive power' 
(341) he claims for it, at least in his hands. For, if deconstruction 
according to Miller 'annihilates the ground on which the building stands by 
showing that the text has already annihilated that ground... [that! the 
structure of the text. .. its apparent solid ground is no rock but thin air' 
(341), deconstruction A la Miller annihilates the critic, reveals instead 
that the critic dissolves into thin air. For, if everything and all is 
contained within the text, and any deconstruction is already anticipated 
and achieved by the text Itself, then the critic's secondary operations to 
Identify that which is already within, remain secondary, remain derivative. 
Rather than having pulled away the ground which as we said earlier, 
fertilizes the very existence of a primary apd a secondary term, Miller
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pulls away the ground from under the critic. In other words, Miller appears 
to have removed the ground from under the hierarchised pair of literature 
and criticism, but this serves merely as a pretext to another operation: as 
Miller's criticism alerts us, the literary host is inevitably inhabited, in 
a parasitic manner, by criticism; the removal of the ground from under this 
pair is less their total symbiosis than a means of purging the literary 
ground,from which both spring,of the last vestiges of the parasite, whose 
function then becomes merely to observe the great strong trunks of 
literature adopting the parasitic function by themselves. Miller's brand of 
criticism, then, while apparently inilnuating itself into the very gr<\ir\ of 
literature, once and for all displays, and even points to, Identifies, the 
very process of its Increasing redundancy, for those who can read between 
the lines already.
Literature, the literary, in other words, remains the privileged 
ground, the primary source that contains within it 'any deconstruction the 
critic can achieve'. Though all is contained/constrained within the text, 
'the critic', according to Miller, 'still has his uses' (1975: 31): 'this 
use may be no more than to identify an act of deconstruction which has 
always already... been performed by the text on itself' (31). Miller makes 
good use of his own formulae here, since 'with great effort* he can 
obviously Identify and has unlvocally identified this difference within, 
which makes up Great Literature, then we may say it is only a critic as 
great as Miller who is capable of such acts of identification. And here we 
come back to Harold Bloom, for not unlike Bloom, though rather more 
inadvertently, Miller also seems to make claims for his grandeur, greatness 
as a critic. Miller may well have said to Hartman then: "I have a
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superiority complex too vis-à-vis other critics”; or have exclaimed with 
Harold Bloom: "I too have opened a space for myself amongst the Great”. The 
question which still remains then is this: should we therefore accept that 
“out of the great comes forth greatness and when greatness has imposed 
itself long enough, then we learn to call it tradition, whether we like it 
or not"?
>
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3.5 Brotherhood of Man. Disorderly Readings
If Hartman, Bloom and Miller recognize great art when they read it, re-read 
the canon for its great self-deconstructing works of art, are the 
connoisseui— readers of this new canon, then they not only perpetuate one of 
the greatest monoliths in literary studies, but they have stopped short of 
the more radical implications of French thinking, or more specifically of 
Derridian deconstruction. 1 This is to say, rather than undermining the 
foundations on which canons are built and greatness can rest, on which 
oppositions find solid ground and hierarchies stand high, rather than 
dismantling the very notion of an opposition, and deconstructing any binary 
conceptualisation which gives rise to a privileged term, Yale criticism 
conceives of the opposing relation, be it between a primary and a 
secondary, between art and criticism, between literary and critical 
writing, merely in terms of an 'opportunist reversal' (Norris 1988a, 75)
or a revision. In other words, Yale reverses the status or revises the 
status quo which has governed this old hierarchy, instead of disinheriting 
all states on which privilege or notions of greatness may be founded; * 
which is precisely why all three critics have their own "personal primats", 
As we have seen, criticism for Hartman is like literature, another primary; 
criticism for Bloom is poetry; and criticism for Miller is subsumed in the 
great primary, literature. * Be it great criticism or great self­
deconstructing literary works, American deconstruction at Yale "thinks 
big", to put it mildly.
Let us briefly then reconsider Yale deconstruction. A one-time
poor bastard-offspring of literature, secondary and second-rate, criticism
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may now rate itself amongst the first, create its rank amongst the primats, 
reclaim for itself a new a priori status. If Hartman puts the critical on a 
par with literature, thus not so much putting into question the distinction 
between the critical and the creative, but raising the question of the 
distinctness, the "distinguished" nature of the critical! criticism ('as 
demanding as literature' ) could never be a bastard, but is a brother of, 
equal to literature. Bloom on the other hand, gives birth to a poet-reader, 
which is why second-hand art becomes art and which is also why there could 
never be a bastard in Bloom's family; after all, there are only strong 
fathers who breed legitmate sons. And what we are left with are two 
creators locked into an oedipal family feud. In Miller too, there is no 
poor relation, no illegitimate son claiming his inheritance, no meagre 
parasite feeding off his kin, because criticism is already subsumed, the 
parasite is already within literature itself. There are no adulterous 
relations here, no bastard-offsprings, for all is incestuously kept within 
the family.
Furthermore, literature is never compromised by its promiscuous 
relation with other forms of discourse (be it criticism, philosophy, 
popular literature...), is not the 'promiscuous intermingling' or blurring 
that Derrida's notion of écriture suggests, but literature at Yale has its 
unadulterated greats, whose pedigree is identified by the critic
distinguée. Literature, here, is never denigrated to writing, as the
'orphan-bastard', whose activity takes place in the absence of the father, 
as Derrida has it in Dissemination.* Neither is the literary work drawn from 
an 'immense dictionary' (Barthes 1977a: 160), nor is it language which
‘speaks', 'acts', 'performs' it anonymously. Hence, the ‘classless
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democracy of texts' <Krieger 1981: 291) which a Murray Krleger fears, 'the 
new egalitarianlzlng of writing' (288) which he deplores, that 'utterly 
primary' (288) which he sees de-authorized by 'the new vogue in criticism' 
<289), and this indulgent critical irresponsibility <288) which he blames 
on Yale <294-5), need not worry him; for the 'elite canon of works' <282) 
which he sees bastardized by the promiscuous intei— relations between 
discourses, is still intact at Yale, is still the thorough-bred that it 
traditionally has been.
If Yale merely reinscribed greatness into canonical literature and 
criticism, what then we may ask was this brand of deconstruction which they 
subscribed to so uncannily? We may cite Jonathan Culler at this point: 'to 
deconstruct an opposition is to undo and displace it, is to situate it 
differently', is in effect to give it 'a different status and impact* 
<Culler 1983: 150). Hartman, Bloom and Miller 'situate' criticism, of 
course, differently, give it a 'different status'. Though, whilst Hartman 
uses the old opposition between the privileged term <author, writer, 
literary text.,.) and Its denigrated other <critic, reader, critical 
commentary. . . ) to lend weight to the underprivileged term, and Bloom 
suggests that there is little difference between them, Miller protests from 
within the opposition to assert that criticism is contained within the 
literary already, none of then undoes, does away with hierarchy. To put this 
differently then, whilst Hartman uses the old opposition between the 
primary and the secondary, not really to reverse this opposition, but to 
reverse merely the status of criticism, to make it an equal, which, 
according to Norris, 'amountCsl to nothing more than a kind of opportunist 
reversal, a move to secure for criticism exactly the same value that has
V
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traditionally accued to writing under its "so-called" creative aspect' 
<1988a: 75>, Bloom revises the status of criticism to give it the same
status as poetry, and Miller merely raises the status of the literary as 
that which encompasses the critical. The literary, the creative is still 
therefore in place, positioned hierarchically.
This subsequent statement by Culler (elaborating Derrida) may be 
levelled at Hartman, in particular: • [ al ffirmation of equality will not 
disrupt hierarchy', because '[olnly if it Includes an inversion or 
reversal does a deconstruction have a chance of dislocating the 
hierarchical structure' <1983: 166). So, Hartman never really disrupts this
hierarchy by dislocating the very structure on which this opposition rests, 
for he, in effect, creates another hierarchy: the '"secondary" piece of 
writing turns out to be "primary"' <1980: 201). Let us cite Derrida here to 
offer a further critique of Hartman. Derrida 'strongly and repeatedly 
insists',
on the necessity of the phase of reversal, which people have perhaps 
too swiftly attempted to discredit. . . To neglect this phase of 
reversal is to forget that the structure of the opposition is one of 
conflict and subordination and thus to pass too 6wlftly, without 
gaining any purchase against the former opposition, to a
neutralisation which in practice leaves things in their former state 
and deprives one of any way of intervening effectively. *
Isn't it at this precise Juncture that Hartman arrives too quickly at the
'neutralisation' Derrida warns us of, reaches merely a 'precarious'
balancing act between the terms of the opposition, thus 'leaves things in
their former state', by merely claiming a reversal for the 6tatus of
criticism rather than a reversal, inversion of the opposition which it co-
lnhablts with literature? Indeed, by claiming autonomy for criticism, as we
saw previously, Hartman's affirmation of equality will be nothing other
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than the confirmation of the autonomy of both literature proper and 
criticism proper. To Invent a new status for criticism is one kind of 
intervention, but to create a new autonomy still operates very much within 
rather old conventions. Moreover, we may say that Hartman, Bloom and Miller 
never really 'gain purchase against the former opposition', never really 
deconstruct any opposition, because the poetic, the literary is the great 
yard-stick to which criticism still aspires, and they do not so much blur 
the distinction between the critical and the literary, but attempt to 
render the critical within the literary (Miller), render it literary 
(Hartman and Bloom). Only insofar as the literary is also critical, in 
Bloom's narrative (though this comes to be subsumed by the grand poetic), 
do we discern the merest hint of a literature impure rather than a 
literature propre. Thus the literary is always privileged, always the 
hierarchical other to aspire to.
If we thus seem to have reached some kind of conclusion about the 
tenants of the 'critical house of ill-fame* (Lentricchia 1983: 162) on the
Yale campus, we may now a6k where is the tenant Paul de Man? Or we should 
rephrase this point and say, where is de Man, the landlord of this critical 
house? 'Godfather de Man' (183), the '"canniest" of all' (Norris 1991: 
100), 'hard to forget' (Bathi 1989: 244), indeed 'Ctlhere is no way to say
adequately what the significance of de Man might be' (Jacobs 1989: 105), 
let us nevertheless hazard to write about this Great Man. Despite these 
laurels then, why have we not paid tribute to him before now? Why have we 
not drawn on his work earlier? Let it suffice to say here, that much of 
Yale writing is, indeed, indebted to de Man, much of Hartman, Bloom and 
Miller's work is, infact, based on de Man's work (Lentricchia 1983: 283)
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and thus de Man, at least, has Implicit ly informed our readings of their 
writings. This is to say, de Man's readings of the Romantics also 
influenced Hartman's readings of Wordsworth, de Man's misreading is picked 
up, although differently by Bloom, and Miller's notion of unreadability is 
nothing other than de Man's insistence on the impossibility of reading. 
Although de Man is also concerned with reading then, although he is also 
concerned with the relation between literature and criticism (philosophy), 
it is de Man's very specific 'insights' into the epistemology of reading 
which has warranted our treatment of his work more specifically for this 
concluding section on the Yale critics. Which is to say, precisely because
de Man deals with the ways in which we understand reading and read
understanding, that his work Is also of particular relevance viv-A-vis,
indeed. against the ways in which Iser, Culler and Fish saw reading linked
to a process of understanding.
What we have attempted to trace then, are the ways in which the 
question of reading and criticism, the question of the relation between 
reading and writing, criticism and literature, has been approached 
differently by our positive hermeneuts on the one hand, and their negative 
counterparts, on the other hand. If Iser/Culler/Fish advocate reading as a 
unified, consistent, ordered activity, Yale advocates (mis)reading as a 
dispersed, aporetic, disorderly 'buzzing' of activities. If texts for Iser 
and Culler were stable unified entities (Fish also seeks a stability of 
kind), texts for Yale are at least in part marked by Barthesian textualityj 
texts are not valued for their harmonious unity, but appreciated for their 
difference within. , Similarly, the Yale critic does not seek to Impose unity 
on the text, order the text through his readings, but procedes by 'the
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careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text 
itself' (Johnson 1980: 5), is careful to unravel, to follow 'some thread 
deep into the labyrinth of the text' (Miller 1978: 162). Textuality is not 
tamed here, but unleashed. The Yale critic does not therefore seek to 
contain the 'disorderly buzzing' of texts, does not set out to master the 
text by accounting for its buzzing, make sense of it, render it totally 
intelligible, arrive at a full understanding of it. Nor is theory used as a 
regulating principle, as a framework which makes manageable the 'disorderly 
buzzing' within, as we shall see. The Yale critic is not, to use Hartman's 
words here, 'the unitive or reconciling critic... [whose] devotion to 
"unity" may become a demand for "totality" and turn against art in the name 
of a more comprehensive... vision' (1978: 10-11), a charge with which we
have accused Iser, Culler and Fish. The Yale critic does not seek to 
understand a specific text in its totality, its wholeness, nor is this 
understanding the result of a system of intelligibility, to borrow Culler's 
term here; instead, texts are in parts, so to speak, and our understanding 
of a text is only ever partial. Indeed, and this is precisely why we wish 
to turn to Paul de Man at this Juncture, our understandings are the 
misunderstandings, the errors we make (de Man 1983). ** Let us turn then to 
de Man's impossible understanding of reading.
Once upon a time, we all thought we knew how to read, and then came de
Man... (Gozich 1983: xvl)
Even though Wlad Gozich tells us in his introduction to Paul de Man's 
Blindness and Insight, that 'such a statement remains misleading, for it is 
far from certain that we, as literary scholars, knew how to read' (xvil), 
we may add here also that "it is far from certain that we know how to read
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now". And It is in this additional sense, which is obviously quite de 
Manian, that we may fleetingly glimpse the flickering uncertain shadows of 
reading following de Man's radical scrutiny of the very idea of knowing how 
to read. Let us be certain though that far from suggesting that we could 
possibly read from this, from these hiatuses, de Man's shady past; what we 
are saying is that in Gozich's 'fairy tale motif', we may see some of the 
de Manian stand on reading, the sense of uncertainty which in his account 
veils the activity of reading, be it now or be it then, the limited insight 
we might gain of and from reading, the blindness which prevails, but also 
quite importantly, we may discern some of de Man's standing through 'the 
tone of respect, even reverence, with which the name of Paul de Man is 
mentioned' (Lentricchia 1983: 283), here by Gozich. Thus, from the writings 
of the 'Godfather' at Yale and father of Yale deconstruction, 'we must', 
according to Gozich, ' learn to read, and learn to read the question of 
reading in de Man' (xvi).
What then do we learn from what de Man says about reading, what do
we learn from his readings J To go some way towards answering our first 
question we may use Elizabeth Freund's succinct account of de Man on 
reading here:
From the perspective of a scrupulous linguistic scepticism, the late 
Paul de Man's closest of close readings demonstrate the view that 'the 
impossibility of reading should not be taken too lightly' 1 de Man 
1979: 2451 because rhetoric puts 'an insurmountable obstacle in the
way of any reading or understanding' 11311. <1987: 155)
If reading is impossible then it is because, rather than presupposing that
as a reader one's teleological and definite task is to pierce the
translucent skin of language, to penetrate into the last wrinkles of hidden
meaning, which, once stretched out, begins to unfold Itself, comes to the
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surface and is revealed in its full glory and plenitude, rather than this 
presupposition of reading as that which can uncover the eternal flame of
the texts' s truth, can reveal that ultimate flash of knowledge, can give us
the experience of some higher insight, reading for de Man is precisely not 
possible because language never communicates translucently, nor do texts 
communicate the full vision of some inner being. What de Man is at pains to 
illustrate then, is that 'Ctlhe possiblity of reading can never be taken 
for granted', because '[lit is an act of understanding that can never be 
observed, nor in any way prescribed or verified' (1983: 107), and more to
the point still, because it is ' an understanding that has to remain
immanent because it poses the problem of its intelligibility in its own 
terms' (107). Understanding, in this sense, is necessarily a 'fragmentary, 
and erroi— prone activity which can offer no hermeneutic guarantee that true 
communication has taken place' (Norris 1988a: xviii). Furthermore, since 
'every form of knowledge C...J is somehow contingent on the radically 
figural character of language' (1988a: 105), since 'all language tisl 
rhetorical' (de Man 1983: 135), and consequently, is also 'unreliable' (de
Man 1979: 19), rhetoricity marks the very limits of intelligibility, to
understanding: which is also why 'far from constituting an objective basis 
for literary study, rhetoric implies the persistent threat of misreading' 
(de Man 1983: 285).
The practice of close reading in de Man's writings then, pays 
attention precisely to those Instances which resist our understanding, 
ceases on those spots in the text which resist total insight, which resist 
the clear, "the beyond any shadow of a doubt" transmission of meaning. In 
other words, de Man's account of reading hinges on those spots where the
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disruption of meaning occurs. A disruption which 'occurs' precisely then, 
'when the literal or the figural status of the text's central event (its 
understanding) has to be and cannot be decided* . 7 As he elaborates this
point in Allegories of Reading, 'when we have on the one hand, a literal 
meaning and on the other hand a figural meaning, but when it is impossible 
to decide by grammatical or other linguistic devices which of the two 
meanings (that can be entirely incompatible) prevails', then 'Crlhetoric 
radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of 
referential aberration' (1979: 10). The point here is, of course, that 'it
is not a question of a literal meaning on the one hand, and a figural 
meaning on the other, but a genuine moment of blindness, an "aporia" or 
figure of doubt, when it is impossible to know which of the two mutually 
self-destructive meanings should be understood' (Young 1981: 266). This
‘aporia', the text's fissure of self-doubt, or these ' blindspots', do not 
only highlight the text's resistance to meaning, as well as the text's 
radical indeterminacy, they also constitute a 'vision contained in the 
text, and the vision's concomitant blindness' (Godzich 1983: xxix).
To put this differently, we may say that rhetorical blindspots will 
not allow criticism or reading to simply make visible that which is dark 
and hidden, that the spotting of them, so to speak, the very location of 
this resistance to meaning which they signify, the excess of signification 
they spotlight, will not give us some full vision. For, the knowledge of 
this very aporia is less a lightning, less an insight than a bringing to 
light of blindness: and by extension, the critic rather than following the 
spark of illumination, may be said to be wandering a blind alley: and the 
only "insight" he/she may have had, is that there is darkness, that there
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is blindness. For how could we possibly even lay eyes on blindspots when 
they signify that which is obviously impossible to give substance to, to 
substantially visualize, to detect clearly.
A criticism then, which seeks to bring light to where the reader may 
be in the dark or be blinded by indeterminable rays of signification, or to 
put it more generally, criticism which has traditionally seen its task in 
terms of bringing illumination, bringing about the complete understanding 
of a text, as a 'vehicle for transporting truth' (Gozich 1983: xxiii) is 
severely blinded. This is to say, a criticism which 'aims to achieve 
"controlled" or "correct" readings is seriously deluded' (Leitch 1983:
185), because it takes for granted that language gives unmediated access to 
the material world, assumes that the signifier has its unequivocal 
referent, that signifier and signified are Joined in a marital bond for 
eternity. Since this is not so in de Man's linguistic universe, it would 
not be untrue to say as Leitch does, that 'misreading is a necessary and 
inevitable constituent of literary history' (185), that, indeed, 'the
history of criticism constitutes itself as a systematic narrative of error' 
(187). Since, as de Man puts it, 'tnlo degree of knowledge can ever stop 
this madness, for it is the madness of words' (1979a: 68), words, language, 
rhetoric thus inevitably put 'insurmountable obstacle! si in the way of any 
reading or understanding' (de Man 1979: 131), make reading impossible,
understanding aberrant and criticism unreliable. Or as de Man had it in 
Blindness and Insight: 'iclriticism then is a metaphor for reading, and this 
act is Itself inexhaustible* (1983: 107).
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At this point, we also come to our second question: what do we learn 
from de Man's readings? Since criticism which is nothing other than 'the 
actualization In language of the potential language in reading' <de Man 
1963: 66), since reading, criticism speaks in language, since 'criticism 
emerges as the story of a story told in a figurative language about 
figurative language' (Leitch 1983: 188), and since we already know that
figurative language is loaded with rhetoric, then we
may also extend de Man's "insights" into literature to 
criticism. Not only therefore does de Man seek out 'the moments of 
necessary failure - the rhetorical bllndspots, swerves from intent [...] - 
that ensue when criticism seeks to achieve full understanding of the text* 
(1988: 162), but, moreover, when there is 'a willed blindness to the
omnipresence of flgural language, even in the writings that expressly or 
routinely mark themselves off from "literature" as such' (Norris 1988a: 
xi), does de Man take as his target the very rhetorical undecidablllties, 
those unreliable linguistic structures, which also, of course, inhabit and 
consequently undermine the writings of criticism. If de Man therefore 
seizes on the bllndspots in critical texts then it is to alert us through 
his close readings to the rhetorical tensions within any texts, be it 
literary, critical or philosophical. As Norris puts it in his book entitled 
Paul de Man:
... this applies equally to the language of philosophy, a discourse 
that has always (or at least since Plato's quarrel with the poets and 
rhetoreticians) considered itself exempt from the seductions of merely 
figural language. If such beliefs still hold sway - if indeed they 
constitute the very self-image of philosophy and the grounds for its 
existence as an autonomous discipline - then this can only be because 
(as de Man would argue) its texts have escaped, or its practition«^ 
actively discouraged, such close rhetorical readings. (1988a: xli)
If critical as well as philosophical texts therefore share what has been 
traditionally attributed to literary texts only, then de Man's 'most 
"original" achievement* according to Norris, ' is to have extended the 
techniques of rhetorical close reading developed by modern literary critics 
to the texts of other disciplines (like philosophy and criticism itself) 
where up to now those techniques have not been applied' (1988a: xii). 13
When de Man thus examines the work of other critics in Blindness and 
Insight he comes to the conclusion that ' a paradoxical discrepancy appears 
between the general statements [critics] make about the nature of 
literature (statements on which they base their critical methods) and the 
actual results of their interpretations' (1983: ix). To explain this 
crucial point in de Man's thinking we might say that a criticism which 
bases its critical method on notions of unity and coherence, a criticism 
which in other words, seeks out the unity in the text, sees a text as an 
organic unity (de Man here refers both to the New Criticism and to 
Hermeneutics), and at the same time acknowledges the ambiguity inherent in 
literary works (as indeed the New Criticism did when it argued for the 
ambiguity and irony in poems, or a Hermeneutics does when it postulates 
unity in multiplicity within texts), is a critical method which not only 
overlooks that 'this unity... resides not in the poetic text as such, but 
in the act of interpreting this text' (de Man 1983: 29), but also wishes to 
suppress the potential disruptive nature of language. This is to say, in 
assuming that everything that is ambiguous is finally acountable, and that 
any text should therefore make sense, such a criticism 'overcomes any 
obstacles in its. way', and, moreover, has no wish to ' expos! el textual 
problems and resistances that might Jeopardize the whole [of its critical]
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project' (Norris 1988a: 42); in other words, this kind of criticism does 
not want to recognize 'those deviant linguistic structures, or elements of 
rhetorical "undecidability", that work to undermine any form of self- 
assured hermeneutic understanding' (42).
Such a criticism then, is a particular 'method of reading' which, in 
de Man's account, will simplify, omit difficulties, will not problematize 
the question, in Robert Young's words, 'whether meaning should be integral 
to understanding at all costs', will not allow meaning 'to disintegrate 
under the negative elements in a text', according to de Man, but will 
silence those elements 'by suppression', 3 will silence that which resists 
the integration of those elements into a neat unity, a managable coherent 
framework. In a nutshell, it will suppress everything that threatens to 
explode the harmonious cohesion which a text is presumed to be. Such a 
criticism is not only self-deluded then, but is marked by a 'willed 
blindness', to re-iterate Norris once more. And it is precisely here that 
de Man will not only analyse the linguistic resistances within literary 
texts which other critics have suppressed in their readings, but will also 
put the very rhetoric of those critics under scrutiny,
De Man will, in other words, 'examine... the structure of an argument 
that approaches the limits of intelligible discourse by attributing every 
last concept and category to the workings of language or rhetoric' (Norris 
1988a: 43). So, when Stanley Fish, for Instance, argues in "Literature in 
the Reader: Affective Stylistics" that the 'author's language' (Fish 1980: 
47; de Man 1983: 287, his emphasis), to be more specific, that a particular 
'sentence' by Walter Pater 'deliberately frustrates the readers's natural
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desire to organize the particulars it offers' (Fish: 36: de Man: 267, his
emphasis), and we must remember that the bulk of Fish's essay puts forward
the thesis that ' the place where sense is made or not made is the reader's
mind rather than the printed page.••‘ (36), de Man singles out and
scrutinizes the very words 'sentence* and 'language' to suggest that it is
here that Fish's text seems to have 'its share of reservations and
ambivalences with regard to its own doctrine' (1983: 287), seemingly
ascribing agency - even deliberate and deliberating intention - to
'language' and 'sentences'. In short, de Man will have it, it seems that
Fish deploys anthropomorphising tropes at every turn, giving language a set
of desires, hopes, aims, and so on. In other words, if Fish is questioning
whether the '[artifact's] logical content is able to make sense' (36), if
he is challenging the presumed 'direct relationship between the meaning of
a sentence (paragaph, novel, poem) and what its words mean' (32), if he is
suggesting that a 'sentence doesn't [necessarily] mean what it says' (32)
thus urging us to 'think of language as an experience rather than as a
repository of extractable meaning' (67), persuading us that meaning lies
not in the object, but is performed by the reader, that it is an effect to
be experienced by the reader, and moreover that one treat any utterance as
a strategy (88), that it only 'makes perfect sense as a strategy, as an
action made upon the reader rather than as a container from which a reader
extracts meaning' (23), de Man, then revokes Fish's very claims by putting
the workings of the Fishian language to the test:
It is impossible to speak of a text as performing stategically without 
projecting into it the metaphor of an Intentional consciousness or 
subject. No trace in Fish's text suggests that the possibility of such 
an unwarranted metaphorization is ever being considered, let alone 
dominated. Yet it dominates his own discourse throughout, as is 
apparent, among other things, from his choice of examples. (1983: 287)
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In other words, de Man poses the question whether the 'grammatical
subjects' of these phrases (the sentence frustrates; the author’s language)
are not indeed the 'transitive verbs that perform highly anthropomorphic
gestures' <287>, since to say that Pater's ' sentence deliberately
frustrates...' or 'that errors are forced upon the reader by the "author's
language". . . is presumably not quite the same as Pater or the author doing
these things themselves' <287). Thus, despite all of Fish's emphasis on the
reader's role as performer of meaning, he gives himself away
linguistically, in de Man's close reading, for grammatically, a sentence
cannot do anything 'deliberately', unless Fish has already accepted that
behind the subject 'sentence' stood a higher Subject which governed this
subject as a direct object; or unless he was blind to the structures of
language he employed. This then must also be Fish's greatest insight by
default, for what he does not know linguistically we now know through de
Man's examination of 'the workings of language'. It is in this sense that
de Man may argue then that: 'CcJrltics' moments of greatest blindness with
regard to their own critical assumptions are also the moments at which they
achieve their greatest insight' <1983: 109). And, it is in this sense also
that de Man may claim for his essays in Blindness and Insight that:
Our readings have revealed even more than this: not only does the 
critic say something that the work does not say, but he even says 
something that he himself does not mean. <109)
If de Man's critical project then is about the error— prone nature of 
reading, about pointing out that which 'resists or disrupts the hermeneutic 
process and repeatedly [to] oppose an understanding which overcomes textual 
difficulties so tp hear in the text what it is thought to say' <Norris 
1988a: xv), then de Man's statement that 'our readings have revealed...
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this', in the light of what we have Just said, articulates an insight 
despite the error-prone reading which he postulates throughout his 
writings. In other words, de Man's 'readings have l truly] revealed even 
more than this. . . ' , they have revealed, despite his disclaimers of ever 
being able to reach an insight, that he is a critic who has 'a grip on the 
truth' (Lentricchia 1983: 284). Lentrlcchia thus comes to the conclusion
that although de Man
acknowledges that Blindness and Insight has its own pattern of 
blindness t 1061 which he, since he is its author, is incompetent (in 
one of his favorite phrases) 'to put into question', I believe that de 
Man's candor is only pro forma and that his various analyses, and 
especially the tone of those analyses, are marred at every point by 
the suggestion that he is in undisputed, authorative, and truthful 
possession of the texts he reads. (299)
It seems therefore that de Man not only reaches certain insights, but
possesses the right insight to distinguish and assess how blind some
readings are compared to others. When de Man, for instance, exposes
Derrida's deconstructive reading of Rousseau as erroneous, as a misreading,
and argues moreover that 'Derrida's blindness merely confirms Rousseau's
foreknowledge of the misinterpretation of his work* (1983: 139) and that
there was 'no need to deconstruct Rousseau' since it is rather 'the
established tradition of Rousseau interpretation twhich] stands in dire
need of deconstruction' (139), in other words, that Rousseau's text already
deconstructed itself, this merely re - poses the question as to whether
'Rousseau's foreknowledge of the misinterpretation of his work', the fact
that "Rousseau'1 had auto-deconstructed "his" text already, constitutes, in
fact, the same re-instatement of an author's intention, of an author's
deliberative and performative agency for which, as we have seen, de Man had
earlier critically deconstructed Fish's language.
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This is to say, is de Man not 'projecting into [Rousseau's 
foreknowledge} the metaphor of an Intentional consciousness or subject'? 
And is it not also possible at this Juncture to use de Man's words against 
"himself" here: for despite all his emphasis on the writer's and the 
reader's blindness, de Man gives himself away linguistically, through his 
close reading, for grammatically, the genitive between the name 'Rousseau' 
and the word 'foreknowledge', is an insertion testifying that Rousseau 
apparently possesses a certain foreknowledge, possesses knowledge, is not 
blind; and unless de Man has already accepted that behind the subject 
'foreknowledge' must stand a higher Subject which necessarily governs this 
subject as a direct object, he either brings back the author '° into a 
"deconstructive" project, thereby authoi— izlng his ' undisputed, 
authorative, and truthful' readings as a critic 11 who has 'come closer' to 
the text; or, on a more charitable note, contrary to Lentricchia's point, 
and in keeping with his arguments, he, de Man is also blind to the 
structures of language he employs.
Let us put this differently: have we here, in all modesty, Just 
deconstructed the Great (de> Man, or, to adopt his game-rules, are we 
utterly blind in thinking this, since there was, in fact, no need to 
deconstruct de Man. When we therefore claimed that de Man was blind to the 
structures of language in Blindness and Insight, this may well turn out to 
be our blindness, merely confirming de Man's 'foreknowledge of the 
misinterpretation of his work* , thus proving his point precisely - our 
blindness would Indeed be our greatest insight: 'ttlhe deconstruction is 
not something we have added to the text but it constituted the text in the 
first place' (de Man 1979: 17). So, it makes little difference whether it
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was de Man who was doing the deconstructing here or the text, because the 
deconstructive move was always within the writing of the text rather than 
its reading. Let us attempt to exploit the "play" in de Man's game-rules 
from a different perspective. For instance, when Hartman and Bloom 
versprachen a new status and impact for criticism, haben sich Miller and de 
Man versprochen when they attributed such a similarly primary role to the 
activity of reading. Let us consider then this statement from Allegories of 
Heading.
CA1 reading is not 'our' reading, since it uses only the linguistic 
elements provided by the text itself; the distinction between author 
and reader is one of the false distinctions that la] reading makes
evident. A literary [but also a critical] text simultaneously asserts 
and denies the authority of its own rhetorical mode, and by reading 
Ca] text as we did, we were only trying to come closer to being as 
rigorous a reader as the author had to be in order to write the
sentence in the first place, <1979: 17)
Should it come as a surprise here that de Man seems to be endorsing the
author, making the author a kind of model reader to which we should aspire?
Does this not rather Jar with the insinuation here that texts deconstruct
themselves? Or is he saying, in fact, that authors, quite deliberately,
make texts deconstruct themselves? How then, may this be squared with his
notion of 'the absolute randomness of language' <1979: 299)? Also, if
difference within is placed there, within the text, by the author, isn't
this the very kind of formalism which de Man has otherwise sought to
discredit, deconstruct? 13
So, have we spotted here a glaring contradiction in de Man's 
discourse? Or is de Man far more clever, so that we should really read 
this passage as an aporia? And if so, is our bringing to light of this 
glaring contradiction, an illustration of our blindness? For when we
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thought we had exposed de Man, and speak of a glaring contradiction have we
not fallen into the trap of claiming an insight for ourselves - an insight
that really turns out to be a blindness to the aporla which inhabits all
discourses. This passage, in other words, has deconstructed itself already,
auto-deconstructed the very moment the author was brought into the picture.
For how in the light of de Man’s writings could anybody in their right mind
argue that de Man could possibly have resurrected the figure of the author
behind the notion of the self-deconstructing text? Thus, this passage must
be practicing a difference within itself. And here, we have been forced
once more to let de Man off the hook, so to speak, for the notion of an
aporia in this passage, the undecidability between the false distinction
between reader and author and the approximation of the reader to the
author, allows de Man to get away with what would otherwise be regarded as
a shockingly traditional stance, particularly since it has emanated from
what many see as Yale's most radical deconstructionist. Having said all
this, and having been caught within de Man's jeu we are determined to have
the final word and say: the only insight there ever was, was this: de Man,
above all else and all others, knew of this aporia already. And here we may
also make our final move and say that de Man is playing the Derridian Jeu
("play", "give") not 'in the sense of the ludlc' (Derrida 1992: 64), but
'in the sense of that which, by the spacing between the pieces of an
apparatus, allows for movement and articulation'. Let us use therefore
Derrida's words against de Man here and say:
This play is sometimes what allows the machine to function normally, 
but sometimes the same word designates an articulation that is too 
loose, without rigor, the cause of an anomaly or a pathological 
malfunctioning. (64)
1 4 2
The question whether de Man's discourse is joyfully playful or 
malfunctioning here, presents us, of course, with a further undecidability. 
Rather than resolve this undecidability we shall provisionally let it play 
(perhaps let it play itself out), while we, for our own theoretical and 
strategic purposes, will play with his writings, use his texts, cite his 
words <’I am citing, but as always rearranging a little') in order to 
deploy "his" words for our own theoretical ends. This is to say, since we 
shall wish to argue for a strategic re-vision of the very term theory, even 
suggest the destabilisation of theory in the face of its multiplications, 
we will make use of de Man's theoretical aporia in order to further 
undermine the solid ground which theoretical thought has inhabited, or the 
unified perspective which it has always assumed for itself. Thus de Man's 
aporetlc discourse will re-surface when we address these Issues surrounding 
the question of theory in a later chapter.
For the moment though, if we accept de Man's thesis that his theory is 
based on rhetorical readings, and that this 'theory... in the form of an 
applied rhetoric. . . would mark exactly those points of divergence between 
what a text says - the stubborn materiality of the words on the page - and 
what the various critics have made it say for theoretical and ideological 
reasons of their own' (Norris 1988a: 42), and if we further accept that 
there is a divergence between what de Man's text says and what de Man says 
about (his) texts, and indeed what we as a critic have Just said about de 
Man's text, then the point we wish to bring out here 'for theoretical and 
ideological reasons of our own' is this: de Man's rhetorical readings have 
provided us with a different conceptualization of theory altogether. This
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subsequent passage from The Resistance of Theory will go some way towards 
illustrating the point:
The most elastic theoretical and dialectical model to end all models 
and they can rightly claim to contain within their own defective 
selves all other defective models of reading-avoidance... They are 
theory and not theory at the same time, the universal theory of the 
impossibility of theory. To the extent however that they are theory... 
rhetorical readings, like the other kinds, still avoid and resist the 
reading they advocate. (1986: 19, my emphasis) ,B
When Christopher Norris analyses this passage, he reaches a conclusion
which, in part, is not unlike our concluding remark about de Man's Jeu,
above:
This extraordinary passage brings out all the tensions and paradoxes 
that run through de Man's late essays. It presents a number of 
provocative theses in a language of straightforwardly constative or 
truth-telling force which scarcely seems to brook any kind of 
dissenting response. Yet in each case this authoritative stance is 
undercut by what the passage goes on to suggest: namely, that there is 
no vantage point from which any kind of theory, de Man's Included, 
could possibly claim to control or comprehend the workings of figurai 
language. (1988a: 42, emphasis added)
The point we wish to make via Norris then, is this: although de Man forces 
us to play by the rules which he sets, although the master leaves us little 
space for manoeuvre in coaxing us to accept his argument about the auto- 
deconstructive character of language, he has nevertheless also provided us 
with a conceptualization of theory, which may at any point undo de Man's 
own theory, undo ours, but moreover, here, theory s'est déjouée elle-même. 
In short, the mastery of theory is put into question.
This is because theory (for de Man and) for the purposes of our 
thesis, is at best partial, contradictory, disjunct... And it is at this 
precise juncture that (de Man and) we may 'hold!] out against the premature 
seductions of coherent sense' (Norris 1988a: 106). This is to say,
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'theory is strictly Impossible in so far as it aims - as most theories do* 
- according to Norris:
to achieve a sense of having thoroughly mastered the relevant problems 
and issues. To de Man, such illusions are precisely what criticism has 
to give up as it comes to recognize those deviant linguistic 
structures, or elements of rhetorical 'undecidability', that work to 
undermine any form of self-assured hermeneutic understanding. 'Nothing 
can overcome the resistance to theory since theory is itself this 
resistance' C de Man 1986, 191. (Norris 1988a: 42)
From this point of view then, it follows that any criticism which desires
to make sense of texts, or postulates that texts should make sense, any
criticism that, apparently 'overcomes any obstacles in its way', that tries
to reach a full understanding of and with the text, neither appreciates
that 'no degree of knowledge can ever stop... the madness of words', nor
'recognize! si this inbuilt liability of human understanding' (Norris 1988a:
xvi), which manifests itself in inevitable misunderstandings arising from
'deviant linguistic structures', from 'rhetorical undecidability'.
Therefore, the 'methodological completeness and rigor of... theories', 
such as the hermeneutics of Hans-Robert Jauss, 17 which 'cannot entertain 
the possibility... that reading may at any time come up against "linguistic 
factors" that "interfere with the synthesizing power of its historical 
model" tde Man 1986: 561', that displays a willed 'indifference to certain 
kinds of wordplay - puns, ambiguities', that has an 'aversion to 
poststructuralist theory and its doctrine of the "arbitrary" sign' (Norris 
1988a: 41), is a theory, de Man claims, whose 'ulimate aim of a
hermeneutically successful reading is to do away with reading altogether' 
(de Man 1987: 56). This is to say, precisely because a hermeneutics is a
theory which seeks to reconcile all that is disjunct, seeks to do
t
away with all that is undecldable, it promises an all-embracing model
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that could master any resistance, any obstacle, and it adopts such 'a self- 
assured method and grasp where no counterevidence - no difficulties met 
with in the process of reading - would suffice to deflect or to complicate 
that aim' (Norris 1988a; 41). Reading, in the light of a theoretical gaze 
of this kind, would assume that it not only translucently represents but 
also duplicates that which is there already. And it is against this notion 
of an unproblematic and all-encompassing theory, such as hermeneutics, 'e 
that de Man put6 his notion of close reading. For, a 'close reading', as 
Norris points out, is precisely what 'forces the critic to recognize those 
problematic elements of meaning, structure, and style which hold out 
against a reading intent upon reducing them to consistency with its own 
fixed ideas' (39).
Is it not also at this very point that we may return to Iser, Culler 
and Fish, to those positive hermeneuts whose stories of reading all shared 
a drive towards comprehension, sense-making and intelligibility (as argued 
in section 2.4). If Iser's interpretive project worked according to 'strict 
regulations', and Culler worked towards a regulating force of totality, 
Fish operated via the regulations of interpretive communities. And we must 
remember that readers, in their accounts of reading, could not but read 
consistently and coherently, they could not but render a text intelligible, 
they could not account for all the "discursive buzzing" in anything 
other than a manageable framework; in short, they put harmonious unity 
above all else. Theory, in their hands, as we previously argued, could 
therefore be seen as an Instrument for reduction of everything that could 
be deemed 'discontinuous, querulous, disordered' (Foucault 1972: 229); 
theory, in other words, was nothing other than a grand gesture which sought
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to encompass a total vision, sought to bring about a full understanding. If 
we drew attention to the regulating, ordering, systematizing force of their 
theories, it was to now suggest that theory can hardly be this all- 
embracing gaze, unless, of course, there is a wilful blindness amongst its 
praction ers to ignore any obstacles which might get in its sense-making 
quests and which might prove to expose or 'jeopordize [the] whole project' 
(Norris 1988a: 42).
Thus in de Man (as in Foucault), theory is not a quest to provide a 
comprehensive description of reading, articulate a systematic explication 
of its processes, its aim is not so much to illuminate, bring about the 
full understanding of what reading is, or what a text is. If the goal of 
theory was once meant to establish a transcendental truth-value about its 
object - here reading, we should, however, revert to theory's initial 
sense, for theatai has less to do with a-historical truths than with 
judgements upon events. Thus we may evoke Foucault here, whose distrust of
theory, whose avoidance of the very word, in a reaction against the
totalizing nature of theory with its advocacy of a total vision, and
quest for absolute knowledge, has led him to articulate the notion of a
'local criticism'. '* Theory here is theatai, it is local and regional, not 
global and all-encompassing. As Gilles Deleuze has it, 'a theory is always 
local and related to a limited field', and consequently, 'a theory does not 
totalize but is an instrument for multiplication' (Deleuze in conversation 
with Foucault 1977: 205, 208; we shall return to this point again later). 
And it is precisely in this sense that de Man's aporla, the undecldabillty 
between conflicting perspectives in "one" text, in "one" discourse, in de 
Man's "own" writing may be understood here. It is also, of course, how we
(that is myself and Michael Moriarty) understood Barthes's 'The Death of 
the Author' in section 2.4. Furthermore, it is also at this point that de 
Man's insistence (as well as Miller's) on the necessity of close readings 
finds its theoretical justification. For, we must remember, that only a 
'close reading' may '[force! the critic to recognize those problematic 
elements of meaning, structure, and style', which undermine a text at any 
point, and that a '[cl lose reading is to this extent the active antithesis 
of "theory" in its more doctrinaire or reductive forms' (Norris 1988a: 39).
Having thus drawn out de Man's arguments about the partial nature of 
understanding, the inevitability of our misreadings, the impossibility of 
theory, in short, the errors and the blindness which face us when we read, 
we may conclude our treatment of de Man by suggesting that despite all his 
non-totalizing moves, he nevertheless gestures towards the transcendent, 
towards the universal inspite of himself. For when de Man claims for his 
theoretical model - for his 'rhetorical [close! readings' - the status of 
a 'universal theory of the impossibility of theory' (1986: 19), and despite
this apparent paradox, de Man, very consistently, as Lentricchia observes, 
'speaks openly of the "whole of literature" responding to his thesis'
(1983: 284). This passage from the introductory essay in Allegories of
Reading and cited by Lentricchia (284) illustrates the point. De Man
writes:
The whole of literature would respond in similar fashion, although the 
techniques and the patterns would have to vary considerably, of 
course, from author to author. But there is absolutely no reason why 
analyses of the kind here suggested for Proust would not be
applicable, with proper modifications of technique, to Milton or 
Dante, or to Hölderlin. This will In fact be the task of literary
criticism In the coming years.
It would seem' that we are saying that criticism is the deconstruction 
of literature, the reduction to the rigors of grammar of rhetorical 
mystifications. (1979: 17) *
t 1+8
As Lentrlcchia aptly points out, de Man ’presumes to tell us not only what 
literature has been but also what it must be'. And Lentrlcchia adds, that 
'somewhat chillingly... he tells us not what literary critics ought to be 
doing but what "in fact" they shall be doing' <284). Thus, ' in the guise of 
the Derridian poststructuralist, de Man has been speaking that way about 
literature and criticism for many years' (284). 20 If this earns de Man the 
title of Don Paolo, capo dl tuttl capl, Godfather from Lentricchia's 
poisoned pen, then it is because de Man's most authoritative and masterful 
statements are about the destabilisation of figures of authority, of 
rhetorical/theoretical mastery. In other words, 'this! style at its most 
intimidating* (284), champions the notion of close readings to undo closed 
readings, when, in fact, he is re-writing the 'task of literary criticism' 
to prescribe his own readings as a model for Reading. If all readings 
should therefore be like de Man's readings, this not only suggests a closed 
'interpretive community', to use Fish's term, of de Manian readers, but 
represents a definite theoretical closure. De Man's proper 'interpretive 
community' therefore becomes his very own Brotherhood of Man. The question 
which remains then for our readers is: Do we really want another 
brotherhood of man?
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4. 1 Qui parie alnsi?
Thus far, we have compared and contrasted those critics who theorize 
reading as a coherent activity, which aims to understand the literary work 
in its plenitude, which seeks to make the artifact intelligible, with those 
critics who practice close readings, which bring to the fore the 'deviant 
linguistic structures' of textuality, which highlight those resistances in 
a text that frustrate the full interpretive grasp of the critic. Whilst 
reader— response criticism envisaged a central role for the reading subject 
in literary criticism, Yale made criticism the subject of a literary 
revisionism. Both redirected our thinking in terms of the secondariness of 
reading/criticism vis-à-vis its object, the literary text; "the fellowship" 
raised our awareness of the importance of reading in literary reception, 
whilst "the brotherhood" went one step further and elevated the status of 
criticism to literary production.
To put this differently, we have charted a shift from a concern with 
the coherent identity of the text, the unified and consistent reading, the 
theoretical stabilization through conventions of reading or communities of 
readers towards intertextuallty, misreadings, the destabilization of 
theory. We have not only moved from a positive to a negative hermeneutics, 
but since we have mapped out the moves by which criticism may also be 
understood as the writing of a reading, Indeed, that reading is a writing, 
and that criticism might even be literature, in short, that the secondary 
(if not necessarily elevated to a primary) is at least no longer a 
secondary and second-rate, we have produced the very conditions for a 
further revision of our thinking. This is to say, reading may no longer be
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a second-order product, and criticism may no longer be a second-hand art,
indeed reading may no longer be a product, and criticism may no longer be
an art, but reading/criticism may be in the process of becoming
performances of writing. No longer a product, but a process, no longer
passive, but active and participating, the reader/critic has moved into an
age, where we no longer ask whether something is true, but how it works,
how it performs. This then is the postmodern world where a reading does not
so much act out the score of the text, but plays with a script, plays it
out in an endless cycle of productions. In short, here the goal 'is no
longer truth but performativity' <1986: 46) to use Jean-François Lyotard's
slogan, and from here we may stake out our further moves to get beyond the
concept of reading, beyond the concept of criticism to writing, to
écriture. As Barthes put it in his 'Theory of the Text':
. . . all in all, it is the whole of criticism which is outdated. If an 
author comes to speak of a past text, he can only do so by himself 
producing a new text (by entering into an undifferentiated 
proliferation of the intertext). There are no more critics, only 
writers. We can put it still more precisely: from its very principles, 
the theory of the text can produce only theoreticians or practitioners 
(writers), but absolutely no 'specialists' (critics or teachers); as a 
practice, then, it participates itself in the subversion of the genres 
which as a theory it studies. <1981: 44)
If 'the real theory of the text is the practice of textual writing', 
and if this practice of écriture blurs the generic borders between the 
critical and the creative, between criticism and literature, it is here, as 
a practice then that it participates in the subversion of literature as a 
superior genre and an old style criticism as its subordinate. In short, it 
takes an active part in the bastardization of literature, for writing or 
écriture knows no generic boundaries; it has become that superb post-modern 
hybrid, which calls monism into question and gives birth to plurality. Here
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then, we no longer speak of reading/critlcism as this illegitimate off­
spring of literature, but speak of and for the labours of love, the 
pleasures of textuality. In short, we write (and) read écriture. Not only 
though, do we, as practitioners, participate in the subversion of the genre 
of literature, but we also take pleasure in the subversion of the genre of 
criticism which as a theory we have studied. 'How', Barthes asks then, 'can 
we take pleasure in a reported pleasure [...1 How can we read criticism?' 
(17) This is to say, how may we read criticism, the old-style critical work 
in the face of this new 'practice of textual writing', in the face of 
écriture? Barthes writes:
Only one way: since I am here a second-degree reader, I must shift my 
position: instead of agreeing to be the confidant of this critical 
pleasure - a sure way to miss it - I can make myself its voyeur: I 
observe clandestinely the pleasure of others, I enter perversion: the 
commentary then becomes in my eyes a text, a fiction, a fissured 
envelope. The writer's perversity (his pleasure of writing is without 
function), the doubled, the trebled, the infinite perversity of the 
critic and of his reader. (17)
If Barthes advocates that criticism, the critical work may be re-written 
here, reworked in, through, with écriture, then we may ask who is this 
practitioner, this writerly reader who takes such pleasure in textuality ?
Imagine someone. . . who abolishes within himself all barriers, all 
classes, all exclusions, not by syncreticlsm but by a simple discard 
of that old specter: logical contradiction: who mixes every language, 
even those said to be incompatible; who silently accepts every charge 
of illogicality, of incongruity... who endures contradiction without 
shame? (Barthes 1975: 3)
This someone, according to Barthes, exists. 'This anti-hero exists: he is 
the reader of the text at the moment he takes pleasure', and 'Ctlhus the 
Biblical myth is reversed, the confusion of tongues is no longer a 
punishment, the subject gains access to bliss by the cohabitation of 
languages working side by side', the text of pleasure is a sanctioned Babel'
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(3-4-). This then is the Borthesian "readei— scriptor" who mixes languages, 
and whose 'power is to mix writings' <1977a: 146), and who 'ought... to
know that the inner "thing" he thinks to "translate" is itself a ready- 
formed dictionary, its words only explainable through other words, and so 
on indefinitely...' (146). And if we have, though quite deliberately, mixed 
Barthes's writings here, mixed our citations from the "Barthesian 
dictionary", for, we have to remember, in 'The Death of the Author'
<1977a), Barthes is, to all effects and purposes, speaking about the end of 
the author and the burgeoning of the 'modern scriptor', whose writings, 
whose 'evëry text is always written here and nod (145), whereas in those 
passages from of The Pleasure of the Text (1975), he is speaking about the 
reader's Jouissance in a textuality 'where there is not, behind the text, 
someone active (the writer) and out front someone passive (the reader)' 
(1975: 16), then our mixing performed, at least to some degree, the very
'practice of textual writing', as articulated not in 'The Death of the 
Author' nor in The Pleasure of the Text, but in 'The Theory of the Text'.
Have we thus 'enter! ed] into a desperate plagiarism' (1975: 22)? Or, 
are we explaining the very terms of 'mixed writing' and 'plagiarism'? Are 
we, in fact, explaining, speaking in the very words of Barthes, through the 
very words of Barthes, with the very words of Barthes, or merely
'prattling' (5)? Is Barthes's thesis of the text beginning to perform
another thesis here, our own? Is it here that, 'twlith the writer of bliss 
(and Cher] reader) begins the untenable text, the impossible text' (22),
begins écriture, even écriture feminine? 'Why, in a text, all this verbal
display?' (23) Is it, in other, more words, that ' you cannot speak "on" 
such a text, [as The Pleasure of the Text], you can only speak "in" it, in
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its fashion, enter into a desparate plagiarism...' <22)? 'CClriticism is 
always historical or prospective: the constatory present, the presentation 
of bliss, is forbidden it' <22>, has forbidden us, Barthes's words cooly 
remind us.
Let us therefore delineate, soberly and respectfully, the larger 
philosophical rethinking, which is part of Barthes's thinking here. Let us, 
in other words, trace, historically and prospectively, the shift from a 
positively inclined criticism which sees our engagement with literary texts 
in terms of interpretation, states that criticism is about the 
interpretation of texts, to a negatively inclined hermeneutics, or more to 
the point here, a poststructuralist project, which engages us in writing, 
in écriture. Ernst Behler accuratey summarizes the stakes here: '[tlhe 
present preoccupation with texts, textuality, the textual character of 
everything is nowhere more directly articulated than in those two trends of 
contemporary thought... hermeneutics and deconstruction' <1987: 201). We shall 
therefore turn our attention to the Schrlften of Hans-Georg Gadamer and to the 
écriture of Jacques Derrida, whose divergent perspectives provide us with a 
prospective historical lynchpin which will further accentuate our descriptions of 
the previously discussed "fellowship" and "brotherhood", and radicalize further 
the differences between these groupings. Thus, with historical precision, we 
shall pinpoint April 23 and 24 in 1981, for there, at the Goethe Institute in 
Paris, took place the actual meeting of these two continental thinkers, took 
place the historic event of their discussion on 'Text und Interpretation'. ’
And although Gadamer spoke with Derrida in April 1981, 'deconstruction 
and hermeneutics (must still be] seen to occupy opposite poles within
N. •* /
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continental philosophy'; 2 although deconstruction and hermeneutics 'name 
what are often taken to be clashing, even mutually exclusive standpoints' 
(Michelfelder & Palmer 1989: 1), their differences after the "Paris Talks"
still remain unresolved; and despite the fact, that 'Gadamer has formulated 
his relationship to Derrida in terms of their communal!ties, whereas 
Derrida emphasized their differences' <Behler 1987: 221), we can only 
confirm that their differences over the specific question of the text, does 
not so much unite and perhaps divide them, as Gadamer has it, but merely 
brought them together in Paris in ' 81-
Even though it may be a little 'narrow', even 'misleading' to claim 
that both Gadamer and Derrida's work could be ' conceive! d] of... as a 
theory of literature' (Behler 1987: 203), primarily because much of their
thinking is concerned with textuality, we may nevertheless re-claim some 
of that work for our own writings on the relation between literature and 
its other; we may nevertheless make use of their work to articulate the 
shifting relations between literature and its denigrated other, be it 
reading, criticism, interpretation or <re)writing. For their different 
approaches to textuality may inform, indeed, have informed the differing 
formulations of the secondary (the denigrated Other). If for hermeneutics, 
the primary, the literary text is a unified entity which stands opposite 
its Interpreter, for deconstruction such an ldentltarlan relation always 
collapses under the notion of écriture. If for hermeneutics the gap between 
text and Interpretation needs to be overcome, if text and interpretation 
need to come together so closely that their difference must be annihilated 
for only then can the interpreter reach a full understanding of and with 
his/her object, for deconstruction the relation was always already marked
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by the play of dl ff ¿ranee. If for hermeneutics, In other words,
Interpretation is a means of entering a text, heangits inner voice, and 
becom.njOne with that voice, for deconstruction there never was an originary 
voice which might be clearly heard, but the voice has always been a species 
of writing, speech is already written (and thus already marked by the 
undecidability of the sign). As Derrida puts it, 'il n'y a pas d« hors
texte', thus reading and writing here are not separate entitles, but
reading is writing in the infinite play of supplementarity.
If deconstruction is concerned then, 'with the detailed dismantling of 
the integrity and unity of philosophical and literary texts, and suspicious 
of every trace of presence, of fixation of meaning, of points of secure 
understanding', hermeneutics, on the other hand, 'is committed to
interpretation, to understanding texts, to a reading which deepens meaning 
rather than breaking it up, and aims at a completeness of understanding' 
(Wood 1990: 118). This is to say, if the text for Derrida, is a tissue of 
contradictions, a play of dlff¿ranee, a plurality within, radically 
polysemous, it follows that every reading is always a writing, and will 
necessarily be different) here no truth can be extracted from the text, no 
univocal meaning can be determined, here the text does not present itself 
as a self-contained sameness which is merely understood in different ways. 
In short, plurality lies not within the structure of Interpretation (Risser 
1989: 99), and polysemy is not something that is dealt with in the
intermediary between the text and its interpretation, as is the case of 
Gadamer, but plurality is the necessary condition of all texts. In short, 
if Gadamer, 'locates polysemy not in the factual sign (expression) Itself, 
but. . . midway between word and response' , then, to use Behler's words,
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'[11 dent ity... precedes difference and ambiguity for Gadamer, whereas for 
Derrida, text and writing themselves are inherently structurally different, 
i. e. , polysemous* (Behler 1987: 208).
We may therefore argue, as Diane Michelfelder and Richard Palmer have, 
that the very 'signatures "Gadamer" and "Derrida" [...} name two radically 
different interpretations of interpretation, of writing, even of language 
itself' (1989: 1). Thus in the "Paris talks" was 'produced one of the great 
intellectual controversies of our time'(Behler 1987: 203) which radically 
split the academic community between those who faithfully hold onto the 
idea of a coherent text which communicates the harmonious unity of meaning, 
and those who are suspicious of such certainties and question the full 
presence of meaning as that which emanates from a unified textual 
masterpiece. In a nuthell, the notion of text is what ultimately brings 
Gadamer and Derrida together, but immediately also 'divides' them. It is at 
this point then that we shall turn to Gadamer's texts, his textualisation 
in detail, before turning to Derrida's textuallty.
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4.2 Hans-Georg Gadamer: Interpreting the Imperium
'The classic discipline concerned with the art of understanding texts is 
hermeneutics' <1975: 146) according to Hans-Georg Gadamer. Similarly, Paul
Ricoeur states that ' 1 hi ermeneutics is the theory of the operations of 
understanding in their relation to the interpretation of texts' (1981: 43). 
Consequently we may say, that hermeneutics is about understanding texts; it 
seeks to account for our understanding of a text, it seeks to explain the 
process of understanding between a text there/then and an interpreter 
here/now. If the process of understanding is central to hermeneutics, so is 
the act of interpretation. Moreover, since 'interpretation is not an 
additional act subsequent to understanding' (Gadamer 1975: 274), in
Gadamer’s account, 'but rather understanding is always an interpretation' 
which makes interpretation, of course, 'the explicit form of understanding' 
(274), then he may well conclude, as he does in Truth and Method, that 
'understanding and interpretation are ultimately the same thing' (350). 
Therefore, if understanding a text, means to interpret it, and if to 
interpret a text means to understand it, what does this mean for the 
reading subject, what does this mean for the reader reading a text?
Our understanding of a text is by no means guided by the author, in 
Gadamer's words, 'a text [is! no longer dependent on an author and his/her 
intention' (1989: 96), ' for the 'meaning of a text goes beyond its author'
<1975: 264). Neither is understanding located in the text, nor for that
matter in the reader. Instead, understanding occurs in the interaction 
between the text and its reader; 2 understanding occurs in the dialogue 
between text and reader. The text, in this sense, 'is not simply a given
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object, but a phase in the execution of the communicative event* <1989: 
35), in other words, the text is a kind of 'intermediate product 
(.Zulschenprodukt), a phase in the event of understanding* <31). Thus the 
text is a 'thou' with which the reader communicates <1979: 127), and the
reader can therefore be said to participate in a communicative event in 
which the text speaks; the reader, in other words, has entered into a 
conversation with the text. This then constitutes the dialogic principle 
which underlies the hermeneutic project.
This also takes us to the very point at which Gadamer .can argue that 
'the hermeneutic phenomenon also contains within itself the original 
meaning of a conversation and the structure of question and answer* <1975: 
333). As Gadamer explains elsewhere: '... reading and understanding mean 
that what is announced C the original announcement] is led back to its 
original authenticity' <1989: 35). Whilst this does not mean that we refer
back to the author's intention, it does mean, however, that we open up a 
conversation with the then/there, that we return to the initial speech 
event, to the dialogue then/there, if only insofar as to mediate with the 
there and then from our here and now. It is in this sense that we return 
not to the origin of that speech event, but to the original authenticity, 
or presence that any speech event can transmit; we return to the spirit, so 
to speak, that speaking embodies in a here and now. To put this 
differently, since 'all writing is... a kind of alienated speech' 
according to Gadamer, 'its signs need to be transformed back into speech 
and meaning... this transformation back is the real hermeneutical task'
<Gadamer 1975: 354-6).
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Gadamer's fear then - like Plato's - of 'the weakness of writing' 
<1975: 354), writing as divorced from the originary presence of the voice, 
as divorced from the context of its original utterance, leads him along a 
well-trodden phonocentric path (to use Derrida's term here), for in order 
to overcome this self-alienation, interpretation must act and bring that 
which was fixed in writing back to speech, back into a dialogic situation, 
back once more to a conversation with the present, back to a communicative 
event with the reader here and now. Speaking, conversation, dialogue is 
therefore presumed to give unmediated access to an unequivocal truth 
content. And it is in this sense that Gadamer can state that '[elven the 
simple act of reading in which one reads something to oneself is 
dialogical, in that in it one must bring the sound and the meaning as much 
as possible into harmony' <1989: 47). To understand therefore is a kind of 
'reading out loud', for 'Colnly then can writing return to speaking', 
precisely because we know that 'to]ne cannot read what is written without 
understanding it - that is, without expressing it and thereby making an 
intonation and modulation that anticipates the sense of the whole' (Gadamer 
1989: 118). 3 Intonation and modulation, we might say 'give away what 
someone has really wanted to say', and it is hermeneutics, of course, 
which reveals itself here as ' the art of grasping what someone has really 
wanted to say' <118, my emphasis).
If with the 'concept of écriture', and Gadamer has it that this 'seems 
perfectly reasonable', 'one is thrown back to this broader sense of what a 
word is', and more to the point, that since 'words are what they are only 
as spoken discourse', then it would be true to say, at least for Gadamer, 
that 'Cwlriting in all its spirituality, is only there when it is read'
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(Gadamer 1989: 124), and we must add when It is 'read out loud' in the here
and now of a conversation. In short, writing must be the living dialogue 
that we, as readers, have with the text. Words come alive, indeed language 
is alive, and meaning comes alive with language. For Gadamer then, language 
is a living thing through which we communicate, through which we enter into 
a dialogue with the other, through which we understand and reach an 
understanding of and with the other, be it another person, a text, a 
different time period. Language, to put this differently, is the very 
medium through which we express ourselves, the translucent tool which we 
use to communicate with, with the other, with each other.
Since 'Cflfor Gadamer, language is a living language - the medium of 
dialogue' <1989: 1) as Michelfelder and Palmer point out, it follows that
each partner in this dialogue needs to be open to the other, so to keep 
this conversation alive, so that this conversation may be a success. As 
Michelfelder and Palmer put it:
When in Truth and Method Gadamer holds up the Platonic dialogue as the 
model for philosophical conversation, he makes it clear that the 
success of dialogue depends on the continuing willingness of its 
participants [...] "to give in" to language, to be carried along by 
the conversation for the purpose of letting meaning emerge in an 
“event" of mutual understanding. <1989: 1) *
The willingness to understand here, is also a willingness to come to a
mutual understanding, in short to reach agreement. Since 'Culnderstandlng
begins when something addresses us' <Gadamer 1975: 266), and since this has
as its 'goal' that agreement is reached, for as a Gadamer puts it, 'the
goal of all communication and understanding is agreement concerning the
object' <1975: 260), then we can argue that in this 'to and fro of
dialogue' <1975: 348), through which the reader engages with the text, a
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mutual understanding of and with the text is reached, in short, the meaning
of the text is mediated and finally established here. In other words,
'(interpretation, like conversation, is a closed circle within the
dialectic of question and answer' <1975: 351), and it is this very
dialectic which brings about the successful mediation, synthesis between
the two separate horizons of text and interpreter, between the question
that the text poses and the answer that the interpreter puts forward. And
more to the point, once the text and the interpreter have found a 'common
language', they begin to communicate sucessfully, and then they may settle
on, agree on the 'correct understanding' <1975: 259), the 'real meaning of
the text' <1975: 263). As Gadamer sums up the point in Truth and Method.
... it is quite correct to speak of a hermeneutical conversation. But 
from this it follows that a hermeneutical conversation like a real 
conversation, finds a common language, and that this finding a common 
language. . . coincides with the very act of understanding and reaching 
agreement. Even between the partners of this 'conversation' a 
communication takes place as between two people, . . <1975: 349-350)
A true conversation does not simply mean that we 'get to know the
other', merely 'discover his standpoint of his horizon', but means Instead, 
that we seek genuine 'agreement concerning the object' <Gadamer 1975: 270).
Only then can both partners come to a mutual understanding, only then may 
we speak of genuine understanding, only then 'takes place a real fusing of 
horizons' <273). Since 'understanding [therefore!, is always the fusion of 
these horizons' <273), according to Gadamer, it follows that neither
horizon, neither that of the interpreter nor that of the text do survive in
tact, nor would it be the case that either one or the other partner
contributed more dominantly to this conversation which then produced this 
mutual understanding <so Gadamer claims). * As Georgina Warnke summarizes 
these points: ,
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In describing understanding as a form of dialogue, then, Gadamer is 
not suggesting that the successful outcome of the process of 
understanding favors either the initial claims of the interpreter or 
those of the object. Rather just as the conclusion of a genuine 
conversation is not the sole property of either one of the dialogue- 
partners, the outcome of Verstehen (...) just as in conversation... is 
a unity or agreement that goes beyond the original positions of the 
various participants; indeed the consensus that emerges in 
understanding represents a new view... <1987: 104)
In other words, the point here is that both partners need to be united with
one another, need to be able to 'agree with each other on the subject'
(Gadamer 1975: 347), need to be at one with each other concerning the
subject-matter. And it is precisely because 'the understanding they share
is not the original property of one or the other' <1987: 101) according to
Warnke, but this 'shared understanding of a subject-matter... [which then)
represents a new understanding of the subject-matter at issue' (101). It is
here then that the 'common language' is fully achieved in true Gadamerian
spirit. s
This then is the movement of a fully fledged dialectics. For here, 
thesis and antithesis are always aufgehoben in the final fusion, in the 
final synthesis. In Warnke's words, '[Hike Hegel, Gadamer conceives of the 
reciprocal integration of initially opposed opinions as a process of 
sublation <Aufhebung) or cancellation' <1987: 170). Thus, '[alt the
conclusion of a conversation, the initial positions of all participants can 
be seen to be Inadequate positions on their own and are integrated within a 
richer, more comprehensive view' (Warnke 1987: 170). This 'richer, more
comprehensive view' of the successful mediation between the one and the 
other, here, between text and interpreter, is nothing other than the happy 
vision of the resolution of their differences, of all differences. Indeed, 
as Hegel put it long before Gadamer:
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The speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason, apprehends the 
unity of terras... in their opposition - the affirmative, which is 
involved in their disintegration and in their transition. (1830 §83: 
119)
To put this differently then, we may say, that difference between is 
overcome here, is sublated and cancelled. Moreover, difference was never 
within, there never even was any question of a difference within, for 
'difference exists within identity* <1989: 125) according to Gadamer. In 
other words, if there is any difference within at all, then it remains
firmly enclosed and its borders stringently policed by the overarching
identity within which this limited differential movement must always be 
contained and curtailed. Thus when Gadamer adds in his next sentence that 
'[oltherwise, identity would not be identity' (125), then we have really 
come to the crux of Gadamerian thinking: a thinking which will brook no 
difference, and which will posit unity, coherence, consistency, identity at 
all costs. And even though he claims vis-à-vis Derrida that 'Ctlhis
standpoint ["which is the theme of my confrontation with Derrida"! has 
nothing to do with the establishment of the correct meaning of words' 
(125), indeed, 'as if meanings were firm or possessed a firmness that could 
be grasped' (125), we may simply remind ourselves here of his earlier claim 
that 'hermeneutics is the art of grasping what someone has really wanted to 
say' (118), and also quote the overall claim, we puts forward in this
concluding passage, that this after all was 'the unavoidabi 111 y of the 
hermeneutic standpoint' (125). The question which therefore remains, is how 
might Gadamer cope with the difference between various interpretations of
the "same" text?
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When Gadamer therefore states, here specifically with regard to the
temporal distance between a text then and an interpreter now, that
... the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never finished; it 
is in fact an infinite process. Not only are fresh sources of error 
constantly excluded, so that the true meaning has filtered out of it 
all kinds of things that obscure it, but there emerge continually new 
sources of understanding which reveal unsuspected elements of 
meaning... <1975: 265-266)
we might be slightly puzzled here by these apparent contradictory claims. 
For, on the one hand, if there is any notion whatsoever of a 'true 
meaning', even though it may never be 'finished', on the other hand, there 
is the yearning for this 'true meaning' which merely seems temporarily 
obscured. Similarly, if Gadamer indicates here that the process of 
understanding is infinite, for we know that 'there emerge continually new 
sources of meaning', how may we square this against his very positing of 
the concept of a 'true meaning'. For if we excuse Gadamer on the grounds 
that true meaning is only true as far as it relates to the very moment of
its emergence in the here and now of interpretation, then we are
nevertheless still left with the problem that there must be dif f erent
interpretations of the " same" text; and consequently these dif f erent
interpretation will also have to be mediated, cancelled out, or must be 
aufgehoben, after all Gadamer will brook no difference; and thus while 
'never finished', the interpretive process will nevertheless be arrested at 
least in the here and now by the temporary close of the dialectical 
synthesis. Therefore, if we take this dialectical urge even further, in 
true Gadamerian consistency, then we must also dialectically fuse this 
local fusion with a higher fusion, must Integrate this position with any 
other position that may be different from it, that may have come up with a 
different 'true meaning', that may have reached a different agreement of
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and with the text; in other words, we must integrate it ' within a richer 
more comprehensive view' <1989: 170) as Warnke put it. This is to say, the
apparent plurality within the structure of interpretation must reach some 
agreement in the end; for as we know, 'the goal of all communication and 
understanding is agreement concerning the object' (1975: 260).
What may we ask would happen then if agreement could not be reached? 
And with this point we have touched upon the Derridian critique of Gadamer. 
For agreement, mutual understanding, the success of communication, the 
'common language' we reach, are all notions so deeply engrained in the
hermeneutical project that we begin to suspect that Gadamer's dialectic of 
question and answer with which he describes the interpretive event, must 
have an overall answer in place already, before the question was even 
posed. To put this differently, we might say that a hermeneutics
presupposes that whilst there are two separate horizons between text and 
interpreter, they already share, indeed, are part of a larger horizon which 
forms a kind of stable backdrop, which has already to a large extent
structured our responses - here to the text - in a certain way. And this 
has to be the 'horizon of expectation' through which we have already come 
to expect, through which we know that communication must be possible, that
texts must be able to communicate, that, indeed, they must be readable.
What we may ask, at this juncture, happens in or even to this
Gadamerian world if language failed to communicate, if language showed
itself opaque, unintelligible, unreadable, despite the 'continuing
willingness' of itp users, despite all the good will of its 'participants' 
to reach understanding, to obtain mutual understanding? In other words,
V
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what happens when 'deviant linguistic structures', to use our earlier de 
Manian phrase, resist the emergence of an identifiable, unambiguous 
meaning, frustrate the interpretive grasp of the reader, hinder his/her, 
our understanding of a text? How does the Gadamerian urge for a 'common 
language' cope here?
The interpreter's task is, of course, according to Gadamer, to 'help!] 
the reader to an understanding of the text' (1989: 41), and consequently,
Gadamer can tell us, that 'whatever is alienating in the text, whatever 
makes the text unintelligible, is to be overcome and thereby cancelled out 
by the interpreter' (41). Thus,
the interpreter steps in and speaks only when the text (the discourse) 
is not able to do what it is supposed to do, namely to be heard and 
understood on its own. The interpreter has no other function than to 
dissappear completely into the achievement of full harmony in 
understanding ( VerstUndigung"). The discourse of the interpreter is 
therefore not itself a text; rather it serves a text. (41) 7
The interpreter's entrance into the dialogic event between text and reader,
is a kind of 'entering into the communication in such a way that the
tension betwen the horizon of the text and the horizon of the reader is
dissolved' (41). This then is, of course, once more the famous 'fusion of
horizons' which comes into operation here. As Gadamer explains: 'ttlhe
separated horizons, like the different standpoints, merge with each other',
which is to say, 'the process of understanding a text tends to absorb the
reader into that whicKthe text says, and in this fusion, the text Itself
dissappears also' (41, translation modified [German 1984: 46]>. Thus, we
may confirm that agreement, at least for the moment, remains salvaged,
preserved and protected here.
»
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Godamer is, of course, describing the reader's engagement with the 
literary text here, * which compels the stepping in of an interpreter. This 
is because the literary text 'is not simply open to interpretation, but in 
need of interpretation' (Risser 1991: 100). And it is in this sense that 
Gadamer, in Risser's assessment, objects to the 'privileging t of any! 
form!! of distorted communication as the normal case in textual 
interpretation* (100), and furthermore also rejects a 'hermeneutics of
suspicion as the paradigmatic case of textual interpretation' <100). For, 
when 'tdlistorted communication manifests Itself both as a disruption of 
possible agreement in understanding and possible consensus', then according 
to Gadamer, this merely 'motivates us to search for the true meaning behind 
the distortions' (1989: 39). 9 Since interpretation therefore always and
only occurs when 'the meaning content of the printed word i6 disputable and 
it is a matter of attaining the correct understanding of what is being 
announced' (Gadamer 1989: 35), it follows that 'as a written expression the 
text did not fulfill its task of being understood without any difficulties' 
(32). It was unreadable, it was marked by ' unreadablity' (32) to use
Gadamer's term here. But precisely because Gadamer postulates that a 'text
must be readable* (31), which is another way of saying that language must 
be readable, another way of stating that language is the very
'precondition' upon which comprehension is based (31), that we are
beginning to see just how important a transparent understanding is for the 
Gadamerlan hermeneutic project. This is to say, readability is so
intimately linked with comprehensibility and intelligibility, that the 
entirety of the hermeneutic project becomes subsumed by our will and 
ability to understand. As Gadamer puts it: 'tflor the hermeneutic approach
t...J comprehension of what is said, 16 the sole concern' (31). 10
V
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If 'the printed text must be decipherable, so that the comprehension 
of what is... written, is at least possible' (Gadamer 1989: 31), then
according to Gadamer,
We find confirmation here that we always already look ahead to an
understanding of that which is said in the text. It is only from this
point that we grant and qualify a text as readable. (32)
We may therefore say, that it is here that the reader or interpreter is
guided by the anticipation of the text's readability, is guided in advance
by the anticipation that the text does, indeed, must make sense, must be
meaningful. (Is guided by a grand 'horizon of expectation', as we also
indicated earlier.) This then is the projection of intelligibility which
Gadamer characterizes in Truth and Method as the 'fore-conception of
completion' or as the 'anticipation of completion' l' Vorgrlff der
Vollkommenheit' (1965: 278)1: as that which is 'fundamental for all
understanding' (1975: 261), as that which is 'obviously [really that
obvious, we intersperse) a formal condition of all understanding' (261);
this Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit 'states that only what really constitutes
a unity of meaning is intelligible' (261). Consequently, 'when we read a
text we always follow this complete presupposition of completion, and only
when it proves inadequate, ie the text is not intelligible, do we start to
doubt the transmitted text and seek to discover in what way it can be
remedied' (261), cancelled out, sublated, gotten rid off, in short
repressed, we should add here.
The point which emerges here is this. Not only does this anticipation 
of a unified meaning, of unity in meaning (rather than the dispersal of 
endless significations) ensure that a text is readable, unproblematleal1y 
readable and hence decipherable (there is no unreadability which might
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produce misreadings and thus disturb this harmonious Gadamerian universe),1’ 
but it also safeguards the reader from his/her own prejudices. This is 
to say, ' [al text would say whatever the reader wanted it to say' <1989: 
182) according to Risser, unless we presuppose this coherent, harmonious 
identity for the text. This 'demand for sense' <1975: 123), to use Culler's 
terms at this point, which is also, of course, 'the fundamental demand of 
the system' <123), that is to say, a system which 'is seeking unity' 
<Culler 1975: 174), which, indeed, seeks 'to account for everything' <171)
in the literary text, and which thereby reflects 'our drive towards
totality' <171), is therefore nothing other than what de Man saw as the 
ploys of a Unitarian criticism which does not ' hold! 1 out against the 
premature seductions of coherent sense' <1988a: 106) as Norris so aptly put
it. If, according to Risser then, the Gadamerian text 'has an interpretive 
free space precisely because what the interpreter follows is its meaningful 
sense and not the text itself (as literal)' <1989: 182) then we must add
here that this communicative free space between reader and text turns out 
to be, rather than a truly free space, a predetermined and controlled
environment which brings about, not merely the 'meaningful concretization' 
<183) which Risser speaks of, but the concrete actualization of a 'demand 
for sense', a will and 'drive towards totality'.
When Gadamer therefore states in Truth and Method that the 'process of 
construing is itself governed by an expectation of meaning' <1975: 259),
and since we know that this expectation "expects" 'the unity of meaning' 
<259), 11 then 'the hermeneutic rule' which has it 'that we must understand
the whole in terms of the detail and the detail in terms of the whole* 
<258, emphasis added), is only fulfilled when we can account for all the
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details, when we can 'account for everything' in true Cullerian fashion. 
Thus Gadamer puts forward the thesis that '[tlhe harmony of all the details 
with the whole is the criterion for correct understanding', and 
furthermore, that '[tlhe failure to achieve this harmony means that 
understanding has failed' (259). Gadamer's 'unitary understanding' <1989: 
244) 13 is nothing other than a demand to render that which might be
unintelligible intelligible, to render that which might be incoherent 
coherent, to gather that into unity which may have been dispersed, to 
'reduce', in short, the 'polysemantic possibilities' <Iser 1978: 220) of 
the text, to tame the 'disorderly buzzing of discourse' (Foucault 1972: 
229). Thus, to presume, as Risser points out, that 'in order to understand 
at all, a reader presupposes that the subject matter of a text has a 
perfected unity of meaning' (Risser 1989: 182), is not only to stipulate
that 'this perfected unity of meaning thus enables the text to stand as a
seif-present ing and authoritative whole' (182), but is, moreover, a means
of control: '[tlhe anticipât ion of meaning is more régulât i ve than
constitutive of text and reading' (182). In other words,, since ' [ al t ext
must be followed according to its meaningful sense l Sinngemäß] and this is 
what the communicative situation is directed towards' (182) in Risser's 
description, we may well say, using the words of Foucault, that the 
communicative situation here works according to 'strict regulations' and 
that it works within 'a closed community' (1972: 225); it works, in other
words within a closed hermeneutic community which sets up its very own 
horizons of interpretive expectations. Unity, agreement, consensus keep us 
going (but also keep us in check).
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It follows therefore that the unity of the text, rather than being an 
inherent quality of the text - as a hermeneutics would suggest - is 
something that is being imposed, if necessary and then at all costs. We are 
reminded then of Wolfgang Iser, who candidly put it that • [ i 1 f we cannot 
find (or impose) consistency, sooner or later we will put the text down' 
<1978: 220). We are also reminded of de Man's assessment of the New 
Criticism, which, whilst stipulating the harmonious unity of the work of 
art, nevertheless, and as de Man put it 'insplte of itself [...] becomes a 
criticism of ambiguity', thus revealing that this 'unity... resides not in 
the poetic text as such, but in the act of interpreting this text' (de Man 
1983: 28-29). Furthermore, if we therefore follow this 'process' (which
imposes consistency and) which 'is virtually hermeneutic', according to 
Iser, it is because we need to 'reduce the polysemantic possibilities to a 
single interpretation... thus extracting an individual, configurative 
meaning' (220) in order to prove, so it seems, that the very theory we, 
(let us rid ourselves of the consensual "we" that Iser Imposed on us here), 
that they, as good hermeneuts, have postulated actually also works in 
practice. This is to say, they, Gadamer and Iser (and the New Critics in de 
Man's account) seem to be ignoring any obstacles which might get in their 
sense-making quests, in order to 'protect!]', to use Norris's words once 
more, '[their] own methodological assumptions by not exposing them to 
textual problems and resistances that might Jeopardize [the] whole project' 
(1988a: 42) of their theory. To put this differently again, this theory
'cannot entertain the possibility... that reading may at any time come up 
against "linguistic factors" that "interfere with its synthesizing power' 
(1986: 56) as de Man pointed out in The Resistance to Theory. It cannot, in 
other words, tolerate any '"distortion of communication"
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t Kommunikatlonsverzerrung] ' Gadamer 1989: 31). In a nutshell, a
hermeneutics cannot have difference interfere, for it only entertains 
unity.
Unity is therefore the grand expectation which structures all "our" 
anticipations, fore-conceptions, it is the very aim "we" all seek to 
fulfill, "we" all share this goal, and thus it is “our" common goal. And we 
might just say that "our" hermeneutic legacy is "our" tradition of unity. 
Therefore, '[tlhe anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of 
a text is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the communality 
that binds us to the tradition' (Gadamer 1975: 261), that binds us moreover 
to this tradition of unity (as against Hillis Miller's new 'tradition of 
difference, for instance). It is also in this sense that we may say that
'tradition as a whole remains the largest (and ever expanding) context to
seek the greatest possible understanding of any text' (Shusterman 1989: 
218). This then is also why Gadamer posits tradition as the great 
arbitrator. For when Gadamer argues that •C i 3 n cases of conflict the larger 
context should decide the issue' (1989: 50), we already know that the
largest context is, of course, tradition. To put this differently then, we 
might say that the hermeneut, quite hermetically, lives in 'an all- 
embracing, common, unified tradition whose Lebenszusammenhang prestructures 
and ultimately guarantees our shared mutual understanding and the fusion of 
our different contexts or horizons' (Shusterman 1989: 218). Though
Shusterman also presses upon us that 'twle should remember that unity may 
admit of degrees and certainly does not require total uniformity, and that 
the coherence necessary to speak of a common, unifying tradition can be a 
coherence that embraces conflict and debate, even about the nature of
tradition itself' (1989: 219), we are inclined to be a little more suspicious
here. For when Gadamer has it that what ensures the fusion of different
horizons, is
... the one great horizon that (...] embraces the historical depths of our 
self-consciousness. It is, in fact, a single horizon that embraces
everything contained in historical consciousness. <1975: 271)
At this very point we begin to see that the two "different" horizons were
already joined, as Gadamer, Indeed, put it, 'in the depth of tradition' (273).
If finally then, we have found that 'understanding' for Gadamer, 'is not to 
be thought of so much as an action of one's subjectivity, but as the placing of 
oneself within a process of tradition, in which past and present are constantly 
fused’ (1975: 258), then we are compelled, determined to understand, hence
interpret, hence read through the constant mediation with tradition. And more to 
the point still, since we also know that 'tradition has a justification that is 
outside the arguments of reason and in large measure determines our 
institutions and our attitudes' (Gadamer 1975: 249), Gadamer not merely
confronts us, but overpowers us here with the sheer weight of the authority 
that tradition implicitly and unquestionably holds, at least for him. When he 
reminds us furthermore, that 'we stand always in tradition' (250), and that 
tradition moreover 'needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated* (250), we, 
certainly I, begin to recoil and shudder, for everything without fail here, is 
always, and forever after, 'shaped by existing relations of power' (Schott 1991: 
204) that remain utterly unacknowledged, whilst forever cloaked in the polite, 
affirming, harmonious conversation that we apparently all are. 'We who are a 
conversation' (Gadamer 1989: 110), perhaps do not wish to converse with a 
Gadamerian tradition, the canons it preserves, the old powers of an "imperium" 
it perpetuates, we perhaps do not want to reach a 'common language' with 
certain others, we do not even agree to differ here, ' * but differ from this 
universal, 'hermeneutic standpoint which is the standpoint of every reader'
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(Gadamer 1989: 31).
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4.3 Jacques Derrida: (The) Double (Writing of) Reading
For Gadamer interpretation means to reach an understanding of and with the 
text. Derrida, however, doubts this unmitigated faith in true 
understanding, is suspicious of the 'hermeneutic project which postulates a 
true sense of the text' (Derrida 1979a: 107), questions 'the idea that a 
truth can be wrestled from a reading' (Cook 1991: 113), puts into question 
this interpretive project which 'seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering 
a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign' (Derrida 
1978: 292), in short, rejects the 'interpretation proper' (Derrida 1990: 
73) which a hermeneutics proposes. Thus the 'exchange' between Gadamer and 
Derrida, writes Fred R. Dallmayr, 'revolves around a conflict of 
interpretations or conceptions of interpretation, conjuring up a powerful 
array of dichotomies or oppositions: understanding versus non­
understanding, immanence versus otherness, continuity versus rupture, truth 
versus non-truth... intentional activity versus non-intentional 
playfulness, ethics versus art, practical hermeneutics versus aesthetics' 
(1989: 83-4).
The conflict of deconstruction "versus" hermeneutics then, is the 
conflict between 'two interpretations of interpretation' (Derrida 1978: 
293). But, this conflict is not merely oppositional as Dallmayr suggests, 
is not merely a conflict between two positions which might easily be 
overcome, two conflicting positions which might yet reach a mutual 
understanding during a friendly hermeneutic conversation, to adopt a 
Gadamerlan perspective, but 'stand in a relation of alterity to each other, 
of non-oppositional difference' (Michelfelder & Palmer 1989: 9) to take a
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Derridian viewpoint. In other words, we can neither 'reconcile them' 
(Derrida 1978: 293), nor choose between them (293), for if we weret^ we
would have fulfilled the hermeneutic task (rather than played the 
deconstructive game), we would have closed the hermeneutic circle, we would 
have reached the common language, reached agreement, merged in Gleichnls, 
slnd glelch gemacht uorden, have submerged and submitted ourselves to the 
universal condition of a hermeneutics: identity, unity and equality before 
(and after) difference (we shall explore this point in detail in section 
4.4.). Instead then, we 'must acknowledge and accentuate their difference 
and define their irreducibility' (Derrida 1978: 293); and here we turn to
Derrida, and here also (as throughout this thesis) we align our sympathies 
(once more) with a deconstructive project.
Derrida, through his close readings of the major philosophical texts 
of the history of metaphysics, exposes logocentrlclsm as a frame of 
thinking which, since Plato, not only has based itself on 'some external 
point of reference, such as the notion of truth' (Jefferson 1982: 104), but
has also 'acted on the presupposition that language is subservient to some 
idea, intention or referent that lies outside it' (104). In other words, 
Derrida's project has been to expose the illusion 'that ideas, and indeed 
content of any kind, exist Independently of the medium in which they are 
formulated' (104), his aim has been to undo the privilege which content has 
held over form, which thought has held over and above its means of 
expression. This secondarisation of language as a mere medium, as a 
transparent vehicle giving access to the speaker's pure thought, getting 
across the speaker's true Intention, is also, of course, part of the 
infériorisation which writing has suffered at the hands of those that
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advocate speech. This is to say, long before Gadamer, Plato gave credence 
to the self-presence of speech which alone is (apparently) able to give 
direct and unmediated access to the sheer essence of the content or meaning 
of what is being said, expressed by an intention in the here and now of the 
speech-act; as opposed to writing (being a mere copy of speech), which as 
we already know from Gadamer, through its distance from its addressee, 
displays a 'weakness', takes certain risks, for 'no one could come to the
aid of the written word, if it falls victim to misunderstanding,
intentional or unintentional' (Gadamer 1975: 354).
Derrida counters such phonocentricism, counters this repression of 
writing which Gadamer implicitely suggests here, by coining the term archl- 
dcrlture, which not only describes language in general as a kind of
writing, but which also thereby reverses the hierarchy between the couplet 
speech/writing, makes it impossible, to differentiate between speech and
writing on a priori grounds. This is to say, in post-Sassurean terms, 
speech just as much as writing, is inscribed in the differential matrix of 
language, is structured by difference (rather than by identity). Since the 
very differentiation of signs, terms, phonemes, semes and so on, depends 
not merely on each sign's, term's... difference from the next, but also 
depends for its meaning on its association with other signs, terms which 
are not present in the linguistic sequence, but are absent, then signs, 
terms etc. take on meaning by their differential relations to other signs, 
terms etc., which are present and to those that are absent. It follows that 
signs, terms etc. are always marked by the present/absent graphism of 
archl-4crlture. In short, speech like writing is never totally present, but
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Is marked by presence and absence, is marked by distance just as much as 
writing.
Let us though accentuate the difference between Gadamer's 
phonocentricism and Derrida's archi-writ ing even further (let us fall 
victim to explaining away Derrida's "position" even more transparently). 
For when Derrida coins the term diff¿ranee, as a kind of "opposition" to 
logocentrism, the very word remains, of course, ambiguous. Its two senses 
that of differing and that of deferring not only explain the workings of 
language in a post-Sassurean fashion, 1 but also illustrate the Derridian 
point that writing does not copy speech, for here, the
difference between the two senses can only come across in writing, not as 
the phonocentrist might suppose through the directness of the speech event. 
Derrida's stylistic playfulness as well as his exploitation of the
resources of language becomes a far cry from Gadamer's sober analytic 
tracts. Moreover, the strategic use-value of drawing attention to the 
workings of language through his own writing supports the very point that 
language, rather than a mere means of expression, rather than a vehicle for 
expressing pure thought, cannot be separated from that which it formulates. 
If this is the case for Derrida's writing, it is also the case for his 
readings of other writer s' writings. For what a Derridian reading will
idle on (as a de Manian reading did) are precisely those 'deviant
linguistic structure in a text which unleash its signifying energies, and 
thus threaten to subvert the text's logic at any point; as Jefferson puts 
it, very specifically here, a deconstructive reading will try 'to bring out 
the logic of the text's language as opposed to the logic of its author's 
claims' (1982: 110). 2 This is to say, the uncontrollable excess of
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language's signifying energy, its disseminating force, escapes both the 
author's conscious control as the great proliferator of meaning, and the 
critic's control as the great gatherer of meanings. Language, in other 
words, prevents us from ever reaching closure.
Here, of course, the differences between hermeneutics and
deconstruction become accentuated most boldly. Whilst for a hermeneutics, 
language's signifying energy may always be verified, by the return to the 
spoken word of conversation, by the return to the presence of the spoken 
word, and whilst language's excess may always be accounted for by the 
return to the origin, the return to the consciousness of the speaker, in 
other words, whilst a hermeneutic discourse, according to Derrida,'remains 
in its pre-critical relation to the signified, in the return to the 
presence of the spoken word, to a natural language, to perception, 
visibility, in short, consciousness' (Derrida 1979a: 113), a deconstructive
discourse or 'reading must always aim at a certain relationship,
unperceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not 
command of the patterns of language he uses' (Derrida 1976: 158), will 
always, to put this differently, reveal 'the failure of intention to 
govern linguistic effects... [which) points to a deeper failure of 
intention to determine [a] meaning' (Knapp and Michaels 1987: 61); this
then points to the very failure of an originary Intention, points out the 
the failure of any point of origin.
Let us push this point further. Since any alleged origin, such as 
<nt<r\i 1 0 a <x li or-the full self-presence of speech is Itself positioned 
within language, and since language is marked by difference, and difference
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marks the absent/present (non-)relation between linguistic elements, or 
rather since every element of the system is marked in its difference from 
elements which are there and not there, bears the trace of those other 
elements, we may therefore argue, that any element is therefore not so much 
an (identiarian) "element" but a trace, and moreover, that any alleged 
origin is/was itself already riven with the differential traces of 
language. To put this differently then, since 'Ctlhese traces are not what 
a certain linguistics calls distinctive features, being nothing other than 
the traces of the absence of the other "element", which is moreover not 
absent in the sense of "present elsewhere", but is Itself made up of 
traces', it follows, that 'tel very trace is a trace of a trace' (Bennington 
1993: 75). This then is what constitutes the failure of the origin; as 
Derrida puts it in Of Grammatology.
The trace is not only the disappearance of origin - within the 
discourse that we sustain and according to the path that we follow it 
means that the origin did not even disappear, that it was never 
constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which thus 
becomes the origin of the origin. From then on, to wrench the concept 
of the trace from the classical scheme, which would derive it from a 
presence or from an originary nontrace and which would make of it an 
empirical mark, one must Indeed speak of an originary trace or arche- 
trace. Yet we know that that concept destroys its name and that, if
all begins with the trace, there is above all no originary trace. 
(1976: 61)
It is precisely here that we come to recognize that not merely signs, 
terms, phonemes, semes and so on, are traces of other signs, terms, 
phonemes, semes etc., but that any text is "itself" a trace of other 
texts, intei— text, archl-4crlture, and furthermore, we also come to 
recognize, 'we must recognize' according to Geoff Bennington, that 'any 
theory is an unstable network of texts in which every text bears the traces 
of all others' (1993: 92). In short, 'll n'y a pas de hors texte' (there is 
nothing outside of the text/ there is no outslde-textl (Derrida 1976: 158).
181
Here, Derrida begins to formulate a different conception of text. As
he puts it at some length in Positions:
The play of differences... Whether in the order of spoken or written 
discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to 
another element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving 
results in each "element" - phoneme or grapheme - being constituted on 
the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or 
system. This interweaving, this textile, is the text produced only in 
the transformation of another text. Nothing, neither among the 
elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or 
absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces. 
(1981a: 26)
Therefore, a text is 'Cnlo longer... defined by its markings: title, 
margins, beginning, end, and authorship' (Risser 1989: 177), a text is, to 
quote Derrida once more, 'no longer a finished corpus of writing, some 
content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, a 
fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than Itself, to 
other differential traces' (Derrida 1979: 84). It is in this sense also
that the text as enchaînement surpasses any notion of the origin, the very 
notion of original expressivity:
... I would say that if expressivity is not simply and once and for 
all surpassable, expressivity is in fact always already surpassed, 
whether one wishes it or not, whether one knows it or not. In the 
extent to which what is called "meaning" (to be "expressed") is 
already, and thoroughly, constituted by a tissue of differences, in 
the extent to which there is already a text, a network of textual
referrals to other texts, a textual transformation in which each
allegedly "simple term" is marked by the trace of another term, the 
presumed interlorlty of meaning is already worked upon by its own 
exteriority. It is always carried out outside Itself. It already
differs (from itself) before any act of expression... [Thus] the
notion of text, conceived with all its implications, is Incompatible 
with the unequivocal notion of expression. (Derrida 1981a: 33-4)
And here, of course, we may come back to hermeneutics as this
'interpretation proper', for here, we have acknowledged, indeed ' define!d]
their irreducibility', Gadamer's Interpretation of original expressivity
and Derrida's re-writing of expressivity, of the origin - of the arche. *
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If "expressivity" or "intention" is therefore marked by a 'network of 
textual referrals to other text', if in other words the "I" which engenders 
the text is "itself" a kind of Barthesian plurality of other texts which is 
infinite, and this "I" is 'cut off from any voice, borne by a pure gesture 
of inscription (and not expression), traces a field without origin... has 
no origin than language itself (Barthes 1977a: 146), then this "I" is 
"itself" textualized. There is a double absence at work here: 'cut off from 
any voice', from any source of expression, from any origin, and cut off 
from speaking with the other, from the originary conversation in the here 
and now with an addressee, the author's intention becomes doubly displaced. 
This is to say, intention or expressivity, 'tilt [not only] already differs 
(from itself) before any act of expression', but to supplement Derrida's 
point here, it always differs (from itself) after any act of expression. In 
short, it will always differ (from itself) after each and every act of 
expression in a new context, after each and every repetition or iteration.
With this point, we have come to Derrida's “other" dis-articulation of 
the authority of intention, of the source of expressivity, of the original 
voice of utterance... For, the very possibility of iteration, citation, in 
other words, the principle of iterability, of citability, undermines the 
authority of intention as the 'utterance-origin* (Derrida 1977: 193), as 
the 'source of the utterance' (193), as the unequivocal source of 
"meaning". And even though 'the category of intention will not dissappear' 
here, for 'it will have its place, but from that place it will no longer be 
able to govern the entire scene and system of utterance' (Derrida 1977: 
192), because 'the intention animating the utterance will never be through 
and through present to itself and to it6 content' (192). Thus, authorial
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expression 1 cannot govern the scene of utterance' (Knapp and Michaels 1987: 
61), and 'the author cannot enforce communication' (61), which is to say, 
that 'Cal speaker or writer can always fail to communicate' (61), and 
moreover, 'misinterpretation is always possible' (61). When Derrida
therefore speaks of the 'sender', the author, the 'lolne who writes in 
order to communicate something to those who are absent' (1977: 177), in
other words, communicates something to the absent 'receiver' or reader, he 
makes the point that 'the mark', the text 'which cuts itself off from him',
i.e. the 'sender', 'continues' as he puts it, 'to produce effects
independently of his presence and of the present actuality of his
intentions (.voulolr-direl' (177) which is, of course, because the author is 
absent at the very moment when the receiver, the future receivers or 
readers come face to face with "his” text.
Since, in other words, his/her/the/a/any text or mark is readable - 
and iterable - in a context other than its immediate production, it not 
only can perform in other contexts, other than the "original" context, but 
it, moreover, must be iterable, citable, repeatable in another context, it 
is necessarily open to re-contextualization ad infinitum. As Derrida puts 
it in 'Signature Event Context':
And this is the possibility on which I want to insist: the possibility 
of disengagement and citational graft which belongs to the structure 
of every mark, spoken or written, and which constitutes every mark, 
spoken or written, and which belongs to the structure of every mark, 
spoken or written, and which constitutes every mark in writing before 
and outside of every horizon of semio-linguistic communication; in 
writing, which is to say in the possibility of its functioning being 
cut off, at a certain point, from its "original" desire-to-say-what- 
one-means (.vouloli— dire) and from its participation in a saturable and 
constraining context. Every sign, linguistic or non-1inguistlc, spoken 
or written... can be cited, put between quotation marks; in so doing 
it can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new 
contexts in a manner which is absolutely Illimitable. (1977: 185)
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This then, once more, is that deep 'failure of intention to determine the 
meaning of a mark' <1987: 61) which Knapp and Michaels remarked on and 
which we wish to mark out here, as the very irreconcilability between the 
Gadamerian hermeneutics which as we have seen, seeks to mediate between 
contexts, seeks to overcome the gap between the original context of 
utterance and the present context of the interpreter, and a Derridian 
deconstructive enterprise which points to the ruptures between the text and 
its many contexts.
If a text or a 'writing' for Derrida 'is by definition destined to be 
read in a context different to that of the act of inscription', then 'from 
the start [writing] breakts] [ruptures] with its context of "production" 
and with every determined context of reception' (Bennington 1993: 85-6).
This inevitable 'recontextualisation' (Derrida 1992: 63) , this 'alteration 
in repetition' (63), this very 'structure of iterability which would 
prevent us... from distinguishing rigorously between performance and 
competence, as between producer and receiver' (75), also, of course 
prevents the text's unreadability, or more to the point, neccessltates the 
text's readability. This is to say, since '[a] writing that is not 
structurally readable - iterable - beyond the death of the addressee would 
not be writing' (Derrida 1977: 180), for as Derrida has it, '[t)o write is
to produce a mark that will constitute a sort of machine which is
productive in turn, and which my future dissappearance will not, In
principle, hinder in its functioning, offering things and itself to be read 
and to be re-written' (1980). It is in this sense then that 'the sign 
possesses the characteristic of being readable even if the moment of its 
production is irrevocably lost and even if I do not know what it6 alleged
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authoi— scrlptor consciously intended to say at the moment he wrote it, 
i.e. abandoned it to its essential drift' (182). And we must remember here 
that this absence, that 'his absence' not only 'belongs to the structure of 
all writing', but to the structure 'of all language in general' C177). Or 
as Bennington puts it, '"writing" will name properly the functioning of 
language in general' (1993: 49-50).
When Derrida therefore writes in Dissemination that ' [ e)ven while it 
keeps the texts it culls alive, this play of insemination - or grafting - 
destroys their hegemonic center, subverts their authority and their 
uniqueness' <1981: 344), then it is to stress '[the] unlimited power of
perversion and subversion' (Derrida 1978: 296) that is repetition. As he
put it in Writing' and Difference, ’ [tlhe return of the same does not alter 
itself [...] except by amounting to the same' <1978: 296). In other words, 
'[rlepeated, the same line is no longer exactly the same... no longer has 
exactly the same center, the origin has played1 (296)j and furthermore, 
'[t]his repetition is writing because what dissappears in it is the self- 
identity of the origin, the self-presence of so-called living speech' 
(296). Here, iterability is the 'very factor' which permits the mark 'to 
function', that is, 'the possibility of its being repeated another time', 
and here also, this very possibility 'breaches, divides, expropriates the 
"Ideal" plentitude or self-presence of Intention, of meaning (to say) and a
fortiori, of all adequation between meaning and saying'. * Here also,
Gadamer and Derrida are breached and divided, irreconcilable and
Irreducible. For, whilst one of the interpretations of interpretation 
'dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the 
order of the sign' (292>i the other Joyously affirms 'genetic
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indétermination... the seminal adventure of the trace' (292).
Writing then implies absence (the absent father), the risk of loss, 
even death, and if writing has therefore always been debased as a gamble, a 
bad risk, at worst a parricidal offspring of this absent, allegedly self­
present logos and at best a kind of bastard, the other in one's own home; 
writing has been rejected as a secondary and inferior operation to the 
fullness of speech and its secure delivery of meaning; and writing, 
furthermore, is feared because it may turn back, reflect on its alleged 
source, casting doubt and suspicion on the purity of the line and
perverting the spoken ' logos spermatikos' (Derrida 1981: 50), subverting
the ideal of transparent communication, of meaning consum(at)ed in the 
blessed fertile coition of speech and sign, scattering its seed and losing 
its substance. All writing becomes a ghost writing, marking the absence of 
its source at the same time as it doubles it, repeats it, without ever 
coming to (the) term.
If speech is always (running the risk of) dying through placing the 
burden of its inscription on the written, writing lives on, survives speech 
as its uncanny double, in repetition. Iterability constitutes its 
readability. Thus dissemination replaces - or perverts - Insemination: we 
no longer have to do with producing an other in our Own inr\a.<je , but 
with proliferating otherwise. The question ceases to be one of speech as 
the guardian and guarantee of writing, and becomes instead one of the 
iteration, repetition of writing in reading. Reading, however, is another 
iteration, a re-marking of writing, reinscribing writing. Reading, then, is 
(at least) a double writing. Survie reads sui— lit. überleben reads Übei—
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lesen. At this juncture, we may well use Derrida's words, and say, ' une 
théorie de l'écriture est inseparable d'une théorie de la lecture' ; s and 
here we may also say with Derrida that 'Ctlhere would be no reading of the 
work - nor any writing to start with - without this iterability' <1992: 
68). Addressing the iterability of writing becomes the re-iteration of 
writing through the addressee. One signature Implies another, 
<re)textualizes/contextualizes/inscribes/writes the other’s sign, another 
mark.
In the 'duel of writing and reading', 'in the course of which', as 
Derrida has it, we come to see a kind of play of signatures: 'a 
countersignature comes to confirm, repeat and respect the signature of the 
other, of the "original"', and moreover, comes 'to lead it off elsewhere, 
so running the risk of betraying it, having to betray it in a certain way 
so as to respect it, through the invention of another signature...' <1992: 
69) The text's repetition then, necessarily implies the 'multiplicity or 
proliferation of countersignatures' <69). And it is precisely in this sense 
also that 'no reading [could be] absolutely respectful of a text, for a 
total respect would forbid one from even touching the text, opening the 
book', from which follows, of course, that 'no countersignature [could be! 
absolutely respectful of the signature it countersigns' <Bennlngton 1993: 
165). Reading here exceeds the signature of the author, 'in spite of him' 
and 'thanks to him'. • Which is to say, that the function which Foucault 
ascribed to the author, as an lntltlator of discourses, sets in play a 
signifying excess which may be endlessly repeated, <re)read and <re)written 
by the countersignature.
188
If we have come here, as Bennington has it, to 'rethink reading as a 
relation of signature to countersignature' as one where 'the text's 
signature calls up the reader's countersignature', then we not only can 
'see more clearly that the countersignature it calls up is the 
countersignature of the other', but we may also see that this other 
signature may 'be that other myself' (1993: 162-3). In other words, this
'play of signatures countersigning each other, and thus committing each 
other' (163) is not only at work between writer and reader, sender and 
receiver, but is already at work when 'tals author, I am already addressee 
at the moment I write' (53). Or as Derrida puts it, 'writing is also 
already a countersigning reading, looking at it from the work's side' 
(1992: 69). Or even as Lyotard puts it, 'Ctlhey say that anyone who writes 
- an écrivant or more rarely, an écrivain - is his/her own first reader' 
(1989: vi). When Bennington therefore 'suggests that the two "activities" 
of writing and reading interact otherwise than in the obvious symmetry that 
constitutes their usual concept', he warns us, however, 'of celebrating too 
quickly the "death of the author" and believing that this death can be paid 
for by the "birth of the reader' (1993: 52). Instead, he postulates that 
'the death of the reader (and therefore of interpretation in its usual 
form) is an analytic consequence of the death of the author' (52). This is 
to say, since the mark, the text must be readable after the death of the of 
both sender and addressee, that this endows writing with the knowledge that 
both sender and addressee are both mortal (52).
Moreover, it emphasizes the very point that writing and reading are 
not separate categqrles, Independent entitles, but that writing - as the 
Barthesian 'ready-formed dictionary' (1977a: 146) not only lives before,
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but also always outlives both sender/recei ver. Survit writes sw— scrlt.
überleben writes Über sehr el ben. Since '"death" [thus! opens writing to
general alterity of its destination, but simultaneously forbids any sure or
total arrival at such a destination1 (Bennington 1993: 55), it follows that
'reading has no end, but is always to-come as work of the other' (56), as
an-other signature. It can therefore be argued that:
Here, the customary divisions between author and reader, sending and 
reception, dispatch and arrival are not watertight, t.,.1 The act of 
writing is from the first divided by this complicity between writing 
and reading, which immediately prevents one from considering this act 
so easily as an act, and blurs at the same time the activity/passivity 
(or production/consumption) distinction that underlies the usual 
understanding of writing. (Bennington 1993: 53-4)
This then describes a Derridian deconstructive move, for here, the
opposition between writing and reading is undermined and undone, opposition
gives away to the play of difference. As Derrida underwrites this move in
D1 ssemi natl ons\
If reading and writing are one, as is easily thought these days, if 
reading is writing, this oneness designates neither undifferentiated 
(con)fusion nor identity at perfect rest; the is that couples reading 
with writing must rip apart. One must then, in a single gesture, but 
doubled, read and write. (1981: 63-4)
And it suffices to say here that Derrida can hardly ever be the beneficiary 
of the understanding bequeathed him by Gadamer’s 'good will': this 
particular, hermeneutic, logos spermatlkos falls on deaf ears, on which 
surface it is repeatedly, relentlessly, disseminated.
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4. 4 Reading the Other
While Gadamer theorizes the text in a general and universal manner, as we 
have seen, Derrida's close readings of particular texts locate intei—  
textual performance at the scene of writing. Here each text is singular, in 
the sense that each text is different from itself, differs from itself, and 
reading is the return not to the origin, as Gadamer may have it, but the 
return and repetition of difference. The very condition for the possibility 
of a coherent, pan-textual discourse is not only undone here, but theory, 
be it of textuality, of reading or writing, is localized in the particular, 
not globalized as the general. For Gadamer, on the other hand, difference 
is located between text and reader, and as such must be overcome, not 
merely to guarantee the fusion of the one and its other (text and reader) 
in the harmonious unity of understanding that is the interpretive event 
(for we know that interpretation is understanding, that is, agreement, and 
therefore fusion between the one and its - already “its", its in advance - 
other), but also to safeguard understanding, indeed the very terms of 
understanding from fraying at the margins, from spilling over the 
demarcated seams or borders of the hermeneutical horizon. In other words, 
understanding of a text must be guaranteed, and moreover, understanding in 
general must also be guaranteed.
For hermeneutics then, a theory of the text, of reading, of writing is 
therefore a theory also of understanding, of the very terms of 
understanding which bring about, each and every time, the total 
understanding of the object under scrutiny. Theory here must be able to 
bring about this understanding, must be able to account for everything in
191
every instance to ensure total understanding, must be capable of providing 
us with the tools that safeguard this understanding each and every time, in 
each and every instance. This then is the universalizing dogma of a 
hermeneutic understanding, this then is also why a hermeneutics does not 
refer to itself as a theory, but presupposes that it is the theory of 
practice par excellence. Derrida's readlng/s, au contraire, locate the 
'textual fissures in the governing textual logic as an activity of an other 
[...] which leaves its trace or signs the text as a network or relay of 
textual displacements'. 1 And in this sense, a text is marked by the 
differential logic of (inter)textuality: no text, be it literary,
philosophical, critical or theoretical, stands outside textuality, is other 
than textual, escapes textual play, and would thus avoid the local 
indeterminacies of (deviant) linguistic structures. Theory here is Just 
another text, which is to say, it can neither generalize, nor extract an 
essence, nor mediate a full understanding, but remains partial, fissured, 
fractured, and consequently has no grounds for, nor ground from which to 
claim omniscience.
Since the reader's task for Gadamer is to come to an understanding of 
and with the text, and since 'understanding and interpretation are... the 
same thing' (Gadamer 1975: 350), as we have already seen, then it follows
that reading is understanding is Interpretation. This then is the 
comprehensive theory of reading that hermeneutics promises. If,
furthermore, as Gadamer clearly had it, 'comprehension... is our sole 
concern' (1989: 31), then reading seems to be subsumed under the grand 
horizon of comprehensibility, intelligibility, in short, understanding. We 
have not only come to expect that texts must be readable, must be
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comprehensible and intelligible, must be meaningful, but we require them to 
be just that, otherwise understanding would not be guaranteed. And here, 
of course, the Gadamerian 'fore-conception of meaning' becomes the very 
safeguard by which this might be ensured, becomes the 'formal condition of 
all understanding', according to Gadamer, which, to remind ourselves once 
more, 'states that only what really constitutes a unity of meaning is 
intelligible' (1975: 261). If unity of meaning is therefore
interpretation's presupposition, then so must be textual integrity and 
therefore also identity; that is a stable entity, called text. The 
Gadamerian I which is also, naturally, the classic stable unified subject 
of the humanist tradition, which enters a dialogue with this monolith of a
text, and thereby seeks, of course, to overcome the separated horizons
between him/herself and that of the text, seeks, in other words, to bridge 
the gap, overcome the difference between them, to merge with the text, so 
that both text and reader might dis appear in this fusion, unified beyond 
recognition, dissolved in this synthesis. When Ernst Behler therfore writes 
that ' [i]dentity... precedes difference and ambiguity for Gadamer', and 
also succeeds difference, we should add, 'whereas for Derrida', Behler 
continues, 'text and writing themselves are inherently or structurally 
different, i. e. polysemous' (1987: 208), we have, of course, come to the
irreconcilable difference between their ways of reading texts, and reading 
the world.
For, if 'identity... precedes difference' and results from its
overcoming in the hermeneutic universe, then the identity of the text must 
already be in plaqe before the reader comes onto the scene. (There is not 
merely an anticipation to be empirically determined at work here, but a
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presupposition, indeed, even a determinant transcendental prejudice). This 
is to say, the text comes before the reader, the text comes first, the 
reader comes after the text, comes second. We have come full (hermeneutic) 
circle then, for we began with a reader whose role was merely to fill in 
the gaps left by a generous but omniscient author; now, however, that 
Gadamer has given us a reader who produces of and with the text a full 
understanding, he has given us an active and determining reader; but since 
we find that through his/her acts of interpretation/understanding, this 
reader not only comes up against a text which is, or at least should be a 
stable entity, an integrated whole/ness, that this determining reader 
therefore becomes once again a reader determined not merely by the 
mediating instance, the last court of appeal - understanding as such - but 
moreover, that this reader is solely determined by having to understand the 
text. Furthermore, once agreement is reached, once understanding is 
completed, this reader dis appears altogether in the fusion with the text
(and so does the text, of course): subsumed, we might say in the act of
understanding.
We might therefore argue that the reader for Gadamer not merely 
fulfills a certain task, but fulfills also a certain function. A function 
that is not unlike the one Foucault ascribes to the author. This is to say,
the reader here, like the Foucauldian author in 'What is an author', is
only covertly endowed with an interactive role, a participatory role as 
producer of meaning. The reader, rather than the co-producer of meaning, 
alongside the text, with the text, might be said to be the very 'functional 
principle by which , in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in 
short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation,
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the free composition, and recomposition of fiction* <1984: 118-9). Or as
Foucault puts it in 'The Discourse on Language', we might describe the 
Gadamerian reader, as a principle 'to master and control the great 
proliferation of discourse, in such a way as to relieve its richness of its 
most dangerous elements; to organise its disorder so as to skate round its 
most uncontrollable aspects' <1972: 228). In this sense then, the reader
would take over where the author had left off, he/she would become ''ftlhe 
principle of a certain unity of writing' <Foucault 1984: 111). Though, we,
of course, already know that 'a text is no longer dependent on an author 
and his/her intention' <Gadamer 1989: 96), we might nevertheless rephrase
this statement here and say: though whilst not dependent on an author, a 
text is dependent on his/her reader, but only insofar as the reader is the 
hermeneutic tool or serves the hermeneutic quest, indeed, is the servant 
who ensures that understanding, above all else, is completed, brought to a 
close; in a nutshell, that hermeneutic theory sees its promises fulfilled.
What remains unquestioned here and throughout though, is that reading 
equals coming to an understanding, and that understanding equals reading: 
at no stage do we touch upon the questions of production in this double 
equation, this tautologous relation of reading and understanding. What we 
do not see is the covert position of authority provisionally granted to the 
producing instance of writing <i. e. in advance of understanding), which 
méconnaissance is instead epistemophllically glossed by the pan-textual 
theory of understanding. <Not unlike, of course, Iser's 'consistency 
building' or Culler's 'demand for sense'). The unity of textual 
understanding is preserved at the cost of the exclusion of writing: 
understanding erases text and reader, as I have said. Once again then, the
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repression of writing which, according to Derrida, constitutes the history 
of Western metaphysics occurs. Writing is repressed precisely because it 
would lend the absolute and unquestioned authority of the written word, the 
present text, to the interpreter, to those acts of disparate and multiple 
readings that, rather than bringing all readings under the one noiseproof 
hermeneutic umbrella, would turn all readings into rewritings. Thus the 
central dichotomy at the core of the Gadamerian project: the Indubitably 
self-present, meaningful text and the honest-to-God truthfulness of all the 
good will in the world of understanding; understanding is not reading (but 
interpretation) then - it is the erasure of reading in the constitution of 
understanding, and concomitantly the primal repression of writing. Once 
again then we must ask, what is so dreadfully dangerous about writing? The 
answer here, of course, is provided by Foucault: we fear the 'disorderly 
buzzing of discourse'. Derrida, on the contrary, rather than impeding this 
buzzing, seems to amplify it. And Derrida's 'bruit parasite' (Derrida 1981: 
128) is nothing other than Michel Serres's noisy interference. In other 
words, Derrida's double writing of reading, his reading as writing and 
writing as reading always comes dangerously close to 'leadlingJ (the text! 
off elsewhere' (Derrida 1992: 69), leading it astray. Such is the chance or
risk of "interpretation": dissemination.
We can see then that the ideal unity of reading and understanding, the 
original possibility of understanding that is always actualized in reading, 
locates difference wholly within its synthetic operations, effacing the 
difference between its textual constltutents and its hermeneutic acts. We 
can see, however, that this original and final understanding rests in turnI
on the repression of the difference between reading and writing. Against
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this totalizing gesture then, is precisely Derrida's diff6rance which
traces its fractal webs throughout writing, constituting writing as such.
The difference therefore between the 'two interpretations of
interpretation' might be further acknowledged through this subsequent
statement. According to Deleuze, there are
two readings of the world in that one bids us to think of difference 
in terms of similarity, or a previous identity, while on the contrary, 
the other invites us to think of similarity or even Identity as the 
product of a basic disparity. (1984: 52)
What we have drawn out thus far then, are not merely the differences 
between a positive hermeneutics and negative hermeneutics, as regards 
reading, the differences between hermeneutics and deconstruction, as 
regards Interpretation on the one hand, and writing on the other, but we 
have brought these different theoretical frameworks to a head, as it were, 
through our discussion of Gadamer and Derrida. What has thus implicitely 
emerged so far is, that the very terms by which we described our 
"fellowship" - as a positive hermeneutics, and our "brotherhood" - as a 
negative hermeneutics (as I have already indicated) , are not only a
misleading terminology, in that they liken deconstruction to hermeneutics, 
but is also an ill-chosen description of the tendencies in hermeneutics as 
against those of deconstruction. The term "positive" endows Gadamerlan 
hermeneutics, the hermeneutics of faith, with a good valuation, whilst the 
term "negative", as far as it describes (Yale) deconstruction, gives the 
latter nihilist overtones. This not only proves Inadequate, given that we 
have argued for their 'irreconcilability', but also because the terms 
"happy” and "unhappy", to distinguish a positive from a negative
hermeneutics, have become increasingly more apt. For, whilst a positive 
hermeneutics, rather than as Elizabeth Freund suggested, is marked by an 
'unhappy ending' (see section 2.1, particularly footnote 1), we might well 
argue that, instead, it is characterized by an "unhappy" disposition, in 
the sense that it continuingly fears 'the disorderly buzzing of discourse', 
fears the risks of writing and seeks toannihilate the dangers of the 
proliferation of significations, by containing the merest possibility of 
dissemination, by seeking to preserve, whatever the cost, the unity of 
meaning. And as such it stands contrary to what we therefore may call a 
"happy" (hermeneutics) deconstruction, which celebrates the 'joyous 
affirmation of play' (Derrida 1978: 292), which celebrates 'ttlhe second
interpretation of interpretation, to which Nietzsche pointed the way' 
(292); and it is precisely in this sense that we might regard a 
hermeneutics of faith as that 'saddened, negative, nostalgic, guilty... 
thinking' (292), which as such stands on the 'other side' of the 
'Nietzschean affirmation... the affirmation of a world of signs without 
fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active 
interpretation' (292).
Having thus 'defined', 'acknowledged', 'accentuated' some of the 
traits of their irreducibility, we may more clearly see why the meeting 
that took place in Paris was a failure, in as far as it did not bring about 
a dialogue between Gadamer and Derrida (though we can already see why 
Derrida might not have wanted to enter into a dialogue with Gadamer; and we 
may also say that Gadamer's incessant pleas for a dialogue with Derrida 
might well be born,of the frustration of bearing witness to the crumbling 
empire, based on understanding). In order though to sketch out this
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"failure" further, in order to bring to a head more fully the 
incompatibility between these "opposing" discursives frameworks, we must 
consider their relation to each other; not only from the point of view of 
how they relate to each other, but also how they relate at all, and above 
all, what they have to say about relating, about relations. For, the 
question which (still) needs to be addressed is: what, given the thesis so 
far, is therefore the relation that we may make between hermeneutics (be it 
positive, or unhappy) and deconstruction (be it negative, or happy)? How 
(and to an extent also why) can these disparate frameworks of thinking be 
brought together, how, in effect, and to what effect, can we relate these 
disparate (rather than opposing) discourses? For the moment though, it 
suffices to examine, how one discourse relates to the other, "its" other, 
and what they have to say about the Other. The offshoots of their Paris- 
talks then brings to the fore both Gadamer's and Derrida's very different 
stances on relating to the other. And here we might begin, first with 
Gadamer's stance on relating, how he describes a relation between the one 
and the other, before turning to Derrida's non-relation to the other. 2
First of all, relating to the other always, of course, involves a 
dialogic principle for Gadamer. Indeed, what 'first opens up in dialogue' 
(Gadamer 1989: 95) is 'the recognition of oneself in the other' (95). And 
this is, very precisely, what 'constitutes' for him 'the universality of 
the hermeneutical experience' (95). Similarly in Truth and Method he points 
out that:
To recognize oneself (or own's own) in the other and find a home in it 
- this is the basic movement of spirit whose being consists in its 
return to itself from what is other. (1975: 15, 1965: 1 1, translation
modlfled)
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If we recognize what is familiar to us in the other we relate to the other
as a kind of extension of ourselves: in other words we understand the other
in terms that are familiar to us. We are also required, however, to
familiarize ourselves with what is unfamiliar in the other. Putting oneself
in the shoes of the otKer so to speak; taking this step, Gadamer writes,
to understand means that one is capable of stepping into the place of 
the other in order to say what one has there understood and what one 
has to say in response C...1 understanding means to stand for the 
other and represent [him/her!... <1989: 96)
Gadamer further points out that this understanding takes place on condition
of 'remaintingl open to the meaning of the other person or of the text',
and he reminds us here however that 'this openness always includes our
placing the other meaning in a relation with the whole of our own meanings
or ourselves in a relation to it' <1975: 238).
The question that now arises is: does Gadamer step into the place or
indeed step on the toes of the other. Or does he take the necessary steps
when he formulates the highest principle of hermeneutics and states that
one should, 'always recognize in advance the possible correctness, even the
superiority of the conversation partner's position' <1989: 245)? And,
again, in Truth and Method, we find that:
it is characteristic of every true conversation that each opens 
himself to the other person, truly accepts his point of view as worthy 
of consideration and gets Inside the other to such an extent that he 
understands not a particular individual, but what he says. The thing 
that has to be grasped is the objective rightness or otherwise of his 
opinion, so that they can agree with each other on the subject. Thus 
one does not relate the other's opinion to him, but to one's own view. 
<1975: 347)
For hermeneutics then, as we have come to see, any relation takes the form 
of a dialogue. This dialogue is reciprocal, and as we already know, its aim 
is to find a common language between the partners of the conversation
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(Gadamer 1975: 349). One and the other partner are exchanging views in 
order to be able to agree with each other. Gadamer elaborates this coming 
to an agreement in the form of a dialogue: '(understanding is primarily 
agreement or harmony with another person. Men generally understand each 
other directly, i. e. they are in dialogue until they reach agreement* 
<1975: 158). This then, of course, points to the Gadamerian notion of the
'fusion of horizons' <'The separated horizons, like the different 
standpoints, merge with each other' [1989: 411). This agreement then takes
the form of a fusion of their horizons, a kind of mediation which produces 
a new understanding (which in return is mediated by the historical 
horizons, tradition can be seen to impose). 3 Furthermore, the agreement 
and understanding that is sought presupposes, we have to remember, the 
Infinite 'good will' of both partners ('Both partners must have the good 
will to try to understand one another' 11989: 331). This fusion or 
harmonious merger therefore advocates the unity or completion between the 
two elements in a relation; it mediates the very opposition between the 
partners of a relationship.
Gadamer's position towards the other (as was his position towards the 
text) may thus be summarized in key concepts such as: dialogue, good will, 
mediation, agreement, consensus, fusion, understanding. Derrida, in
contrast, questions the dialogic nature of understanding, the very 
possibility of arriving at a clear understanding of and with the other and 
points to the dangerous implications of concepts such as good will, 
mediation and consensus for the position of the other. * In his response to 
Gadamer therefore, Derrida poses questions about two Issues: the
completeness of understanding and good will. As he puts it:
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The first question concerns what [Gadamer] said to us last night about 
"good will", appealing to one's good will and to the absolute 
obligation to desire consensus in understanding. <1989: 52) E
This 'absolute obligation to desire consensus in understanding' is, of
course, Derrida's reference to Gadamer's claim that understanding,
'comprehension... is our sole concern' <1989: 31). For not only does this
assume that there is something to be understood, but also that something
is given and can be understood. Furthermore, if understanding always
involves a dialogue, ie, an understanding of and with the other, as we have
seen, and this understanding the other requires 'finding a home in it',
recognizing oneself in the other, then we may argue that the one annexes
the other in a kind of extension of the self e <having understood what is
familiar to us). Moreover, if the other can be understood on condition that
'one does not relate the other's opinion to him, but to one's own view', as
Gadamer has argued, then the one appropriates the other. Understanding thus
takes place on our own terms, the terms that are ours and not the other's.
There is another point to be made here. Understanding the other also
presumes the necessity for consensus and we are reminded of Gadamer's
statement that 'understanding is primarily agreement'. Agreement, we
already know, is reached in a dialogue with the other. The other, however,
becomes subsumed in this dialogue for its otherness is consummated by the
very notion of a communallty; it is consumed in this very fusion of
horizons. Can Gadamer's good will redeem this willing to subsume,
consummate, consume?
Josef Simon in his essay 'Good Will to Understand and the Will to 
Power: Remarks on ap Improbable Debate* puts forward a counterposition to
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good will. This 'counterpositlon', he argues, Is Derrida's and he plays It
out with regard to Nietzsche's concept of the ‘Will to Power':
ostensible "good will” to reach a commensurate understanding is, in 
Derrida's view, really only a delusion, eventually a self-delusion. 
Understanding is, then, imagining the other into one's own world- 
picture, reconstructing a world-picture whose coherence has been 
disturbed by the other. The presupposition of a common understanding 
is, on this reading, a means of making one's own understanding 
prevail. <1989: 165)
Simon therfore concludes that '"good will" to understand is seen as 
actually a "good will to power"' <165). Gadamer in stating that ' 1 he! 
sought to reach an understanding of and with Derrida' <1989: 119), may be
argued to have been attempting to willfully overpower Derrida as other, 
fuse the other in the fusion, so to speak. Derrida in return plays a kind 
of powei— game: he performs the very breach or rupture which he sees
inherent in 'understanding the other and one another' - he refuses to reach 
agreement in understanding, he refuses to engage in a dialogue with the 
other partner, he refuses appropriation by Gadamer. <And it is in this
sense also that 
irreconcilability 
'Structure, Sign, 
following terms:
we begin to 
between these 
and Play' ).
"understand" Derrida's insistence on the 
' two interpretations of interpretation' in 
Derrida thus puts it to Gadamer in the
Whether one speaks of consensus or of misunderstanding [...], one 
needs to ask whether the precondition for Verst ehen, far from being 
the continuity of rapport (as it was described yesterday evening), is 
not rather the interruption of rapport, a certain rapport of 
interruption, the suspending of all mediation? <1989: 53)
Whilst Gadamer sees mediation as a path to the other, as the meeting 
and fusion of paths, Derrida is more cautious when he states in Altérités-, 
'everything depends on the manner in which one handles mediation' <1986: 
82). This is because a Gadamerlan path to the other is less a path than an
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roundabout; this is to say, hermeneutics presupposes the complicity of the
other in the return to the one, closing the path in a limitless circularity
- closing the path to the other. Derrida points another way in Altérités-.
But there is a mediation which does not close off the path to the 
other, or to the completely other, just the opposite. The rapport to 
the completely other as such is a rapport. The relation to the 
completely other is a relation. <1986: 82> 7
He explains this in the following terms:
For a relation with the other to exist, interruption must be possible: 
the relation must be a relation of interruption. And the relation here 
does not interrupt the relation to the other, it opens up the relation 
to the other. <1986: 82)
Derrida thus points the way out of the Hegelian type mediation which
threatens to efface the other in its reconciliatory and totalizing
movement. He describes the relation to the other as a:
crazy relationship, a relation without relation, which understands the 
other as other in a certain relation of Incomprehension. It is not 
ignorance nor obscurantism nor resignation before any desire for 
intelligibility: but it is necessary that at a given moment the other 
remains as other, And if it is the other it is other: at this moment
the relation to the other as 
interruption. <1986: 82)
such is also the relation of
This then constitues Derrida's step away from the other rather than
stepping on the other, it is a step in­between the one and the other. Or to
put it differently, mediation between the one and the other as a kind of
integration or fusion is ruptured to avoid the force of appropriation. As 
David Wood points out: 'The word interruption is carefully attuned, to its 
purpose, to capture a break, a rupture, in the inter, the between by which 
we relate to the other' <1990: 127). *
When we therefore posed the question: what happens between the one and 
the other? - we, I, took the relation to the other as a crucial pointer to 
examine Gadamer's and Derrida's Irreconcilability. If this relation is
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based, as we have continuously seen, on the famous Gadamerian dialogue 
which presupposes the agreement/fusion between "I" and “thou", Derrida, 
from the very start, doubts the very notion of a unity, be it between two 
parties, or within "one" member of the party. Derrida rejects, in other 
words the notion of a stable identity within "itself" as well as the stable 
relation between “two" identities. The consensual "we" is not only an 
illusion for him, but an act of force. Indeed, Derrida uses the term 
dialogue only 'to talk crudely of the relation of force which exists even 
in dialogue* (1986: 83). This, according to him, is why he prefers to use 
the term negotiation (83). Consequently, we may say that whereas dialogue 
involves mediation and merger, negotiation suggests interruption and 
rupture; and if dialogue leads towards a completion of understanding, 
negotiation marks the very limits of understanding, highlights a kind of 
incompleteness. To put this differently, whilst hermeneutics seeks to 
secure an understanding of and with the other, deconstruction practices the 
difference. In short, one seeks closure, the other performs an excess.
To put what we have argued thus far in the context of reading, we 
might say that to read then is to to engage "oneself" with the text as 
other. Hermeneutically, this means to mediate with the other, 
deconstruct!vely, this signifies negotiating with the other. 
Hermeneutically, this mediation closes the gap between oneself and one's 
other, to appropriate the other not merely in an extension of oneself, but 
to overpower the other as other. It is, in other words, to relate the text 
to ourselves, to understand the other (the text) as a mere instance of 
understanding ourselves, which is, of course, already predetermined by the 
very way we (this is Gadamer and Hermeneuts Limited) have defined
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understanding itself. For if understanding always involves the mediation 
with the other, and the subsequent fusion with the other, then the very 
terms we have set for any understanding, the very rules we have set for 
understanding, have already determined the only possible way we might 
understand the other - i. e. through ourselves . Understanding here, is not 
simply the sole aim, but understanding as understood by hermeneutics is the 
precondition of reading the other. And text, in this sense, is never a 
'final product', but a 'mere intermediate product, a phase in the event of 
understanding' (Gadamer 1989: 31).
How then do we account for what makes a "proper" understanding for 
Gadamer, for surely he cannot be claiming that every reading is 
automatically an understanding, since we must work towards an
understanding? There must be some delimiting function that specifies, 
retains propriety of, a given text and its reading. This function then is, 
of course, appropriation, the maturation of understanding. For although 
'understanding and interpretation are... the same thing', the activity of 
reading, of coming to an understanding, of reaching agreement with a text, 
appropriation is not immediately thereby given; if this were the case, then 
there could be no (dis)agreement over what a text means. Appropriation then 
is the guarantor of the propriety, the identity of a text and its 
comprehending/comprehensive <full understanding) reading/interpretation. 
What then of the interpretation of particular texts? Similarly, if 
interpretation is given, there is no work for the hermeneut to do. That 
understanding could be simply given is, of course, naive, and nobody, not 
even Gadamer, is claiming this. There are internal obstacles to proper 
reading, just as there is work to do in the dialogue between understanding
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and interpretation. One such obstacle is polysemy, the threatening 
multiplicity of meanings that potentially swarm through a text, the hideous 
prospect of several readings being 'proper' readings, without being the 
same reading. And here, once more, we might come back to Ernst Behler's 
point that, ' Gadamer, in contrast to Derrida... locates polysemy not in the 
factual sign (expression) itself, but in the intermediary zone of dialogue, 
midway between word and response. Identity, in other words, precedes 
difference and ambiguity for Gadamer, whereas for Derrida, text and writing 
themselves are inherently and structurally different, i. e. polysemious' 
<1987: 208). Which is to say, once more, that the ideal unity of the text, 
of reading, of understanding, is based on the original possibility of 
understanding that is always actualized in reading, and that, as we have 
said already, locates difference wholly within its mediating operations. 
Consequently, what is suppressed, is not only the difference between 
writing and reading, but also the possibility of multivalent readings, the 
difference in (writing) reading.
Derrida, on the other hand, not only doubts the possibility of 
'completely understanding the other's meaning', but reads the other, as 
other, which is to say, Includes a necessary moment of distance, 
interruption to the other as part of their relation. Their relation though 
is not based an opposition, but plays out difference. For how could there 
be an opposition between two elements if an element is always already a 
trace, a residue. In other words, if the text is a trace of traces of other 
texts and the "subject", if the reading "I" is a trace of traces of other 
readings and texts, and so on and so forth. Thus text and reading are never 
present as stable entities for they multisect with other texts and
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readings/writings. It is therefore not a stable relation since the shifting 
relations diffuse a simple static binary opposition. Consequently, to 
arrive at an opposition between two elements is necessarily to refuse the 
residue, the excess of reference. Furthermore, it would imply that the very 
relation between text and reader can be mediated or harmonized. This then 
is why Derrida prefers to write about différance. Différance with an a 
defers the possibility of such a distinction or clear opposition. 
Différance with an a describes the tracery of relations thus indicating 
that there is no stable relation but relations which always defer to other 
relations. As Derrida puts it in Altérités: 'precisely because l différance] 
defers opposition, and therefore the dialectic, lit! is the mark or the 
name, of radical difference C...1 that which cannot be assimilated within a 
single unity' <1986: 83). Différance then is the ruptured or rupturing non- 
relation between the one and the radically other. It is the necessary 
interruption to the other for the other to remain other. It is the non- 
relation which splits the difference for difference was always already 
different from itself and to each other.
If reading and writing are thus constituted in a play of différance,
then reading and writing not only become indistinguishable, but différance
already marks a diffusion of reference or an excess which can never be
totally captured. And here we may recall this passage from Disséminât ion:
If reading and writing are one, as is easily thought these days, if 
reading is writing, this oneness designates neither undifferentiated 
(con) fusion nor identity at perfect rest; the is that couples reading 
with writing must rip apart. <Derrida 1981: 64)
In other words then, 'lolne must, in a single gesture, but doubled, read
and write' <64), arid one must, we may add, acknowledge that a reading that
is a writing, is a reading that is doubled, reinscribed as a re-writing, a 
diffusion, an excess.
How then, we may finally ask, can a hermeneutics read/interpret a
deconstructive discourse, and how can a deconstructive discourse, in turn, 
read/write a hermeneutic discourse. For, if hemeneutics reads the other 
(here deconstruction) in terms of itself, Insists on mediation, fusion and 
consensus, and if deconstruction reads the other (here hermeneutics) as the 
radically other, insists on the necessary distance, rupture and difference 
to the other, how might these disparate, conflicting discourses be 
translated for each other, how might the failure of their encounter in 
Paris be translated into a context where their relation to each other might 
be re-inscibed altogether. How may their discourses, or for that matter,
how may the discursive frame of our "fellowship" and that of our
"brotherhood", whose differences are mirrored to a large entent in these
Paris talks, be translated into one another1s idiom? Are their discourses 
translatable or not? It is at this juncture that we shall turn to the 
question of translation, not merely from the perspective of what Gadamer 
says about translation, or what Derrida writes of translation, but to 
examine the question of their un/translatability, of the 
ln/commensurabllity between discourses, theories, frameworks of thinking, 
ways of reading the world. . . As Richard Beardsworth puts it, 
' ti]ncommensurability is always a question of translation and of the limits 
of translatability' (1992: 71).
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5. 1 Reading the Alien Other
The Paris talks not only raise problems about human communication, about 
the very possibility of human relations, but have brought to the fore the 
split between a European tradition which largely follows Hegelian 
dialectics, which 'labours' (Hegel 1977: 10), and the more recent framework 
of thinking which embraces Nietzsche, and 'plays'. If the debate between 
Gadamer and Derrida has more specifically also been about the transfer of 
philosophical messages across the borders of the Rhine, it is here that the 
issue becomes one of communicating with the other, about one's relation to 
the other. At this point, the debate also, of course, becomes one about 
translation: about communicating with, or the reading of the radically 
other, the "alien" other. Translation, for the purpose of our thesis then, 
becomes a privileged site, not only because it highlights the interaction 
between different, even incompatible modes of thinking, but also because it 
makes visible the reading/writing of the other, a point we shall return to 
in sections 5. 3 and 5. 4.
The question of translation has also assumed an important role in both 
Gadamer and Derrida's thinking. For Gadamer this thinking is hermeneutic, 
of course: when he stipulates that 'the situation of the translator and 
that of the interpreter are fundamentally the same’ (1975: 349), and Indeed 
that 'every translation is at the same time an interpretation' and adds 
that ' [ w) e can even say that it is the completion of the interpretation
that the translator has made of the words given to him' (346), we can see
how translation here may be defined as a kind of 'extreme case that
duplicates the hermeneutic process' (347). Derrida, on the other hand, has
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It that 'deconstruction is also through and through the question of 
translation, and of the language of concepts, of the conceptual corpus of 
so-called metaphysics' <1991: 270), and as such it is also, of course,
about 'the problem of the very passage into philosophy' <1981: 72). This is 
to say, 'the difficulty of translation', and here Derrida makes specific 
reference to Plato's double-translatable term of the Pharmakon <writing as
poison, and/or as remedy?) and its <re)inscript ions by various translators 
in the tradition of philosophy <sometimes as poison, other times as remedy)
is,
a difficulty inherent in its very principle, situated less in the 
passage from one language to another, from one philosophical language 
to another, than already, as we shall see, in the tradition between 
Greek and Greek; a violent difficulty in the transference of a 
nonphilosopheme into a philosopheme. With this problem of translation 
we will thus be dealing with nothing less than the problem of the very 
passage into philosophy. <1981: 72)
Since the term Pharmakon, by its sheer plurivocality, challenges the pure
transfer of a signified, and since its 'undecidability' ' therefore 
undermines any notion of a transparent translation, it follows that what is 
at stake here, is, of course, the difference in one language ('plus d'une 
langue - more than one language, no more of one language' <Derrida 1986a: 
14-15) which poses itself in terms of a resistance to translatability, be 
it 'from one language to another', or within "one" language <Greek).
When Barbara Johnson therefore writes with particular reference to the 
translation of Pharmakon,
Derrida's entire philosophical enterprise, Indeed, can be seen as an 
analysis of the translation process at work in every text. In studying 
the dlf(6rance of signification, Derrida follows the misfires, losses, 
and infelicities that prevent any given language from being one. 
Language, in fact, can only exist in its foreignness to itself. But 
all of Westel-n philosophy has had as its aim to repress that 
foreignness... <Johnson 1985: 146-7)
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it becomes clear Just how much the Gadamerian project is "alien" to the 
Derridian enterprise. Thus when Gadamer had it that translation 'is the
completion of Can] interpretation', and if we furthermore put this 
statement in relation to Gadamer's point that we need to seek 'a common 
language' before we can reach agreement, consensus, fusion, completion 
etc. , as we saw previously, then we can accuse Gadamer here of repressing 
the foreignness within language. This is to say, since Gadamer argues that 
'tilf we really master a language then no translation is necessary' (1975: 
346), and adds that 'Cflor two people to be able to understand each other 
in conversation this mastery of language is a necessary pre-condition. 
Every conversation automatically presupposes that the two speakers speak 
the same language' (347, my emphasis), it becomes evident that Gadamer not 
merely takes as a given the unity of one language, but also assumes the 
very transparency of language, its translatability. Hence, for Gadamer,
foreignness, otherness is always (already) obliterated in (the quest for) 
the return of the same, as the return of the same. And we might rephrase 
Johnson's words here and say: all of hermeneutics has had as its aim to 
repress that foreignness.
Paul de Man's point that ' t wl e think we are at ease in our own
language, we feel a coziness, a familiarity, a shelter in the language we 
call our own, in which we think we are not alienated t 1906: 84], bears 
relevance here. For, as Norris explains, such assumptions, which de Man is 
exposing here, not only 'go deep', but also 'ignore [despite] the
evidence... offered by problems in the theory and practice of translation - 
that language may produce anomalous, aberrant, or seemingly random 
signifying structures that resist all forms of semantic accountability'
\
213
[1988a: 1181. This then becomes Derrida's 'entire philosophical
enterprise': to analyse 'the translation process at work in every text', is 
to unleash those deviant (de Manian) linguistic structures which misfire in 
a text. In the course of his readings/writings then, Derrida, more 
specifically, unfolds undecidable signifying structures, such as that of 
the very term Pharmakon.
As Johnson points out, Derrida's own writings present a challenge to 
translation also (we only need to refer to a text such as 'Living On Border 
Lines' >; it is here that we might see Derrida not merely unleashing 
foreignness (as Johnson puts it, he 'stick!si out his tongue - his mother 
tongue - at the borderline between translated text and original' [ 1985:
1471), but through the play of différence, through paying attention to the 
'functioning of his own écriture' (147) according to Johnson, he
'increasingly frustates the desire for unified meaning' (147) (even to the 
point of addressing the translator directedly about the un/translatability 
of Living On), and as such, pushes language to the limits of
translatabi11ty. This serves to highlight once more, that language is far 
from being one; Instead, it 'misfires', is ' foreign! 1 to itself'. To
repress this foreignness is in itself a repression of écriture, in favour 
of the écrit, a repression of writing in favour of "it is written", the
black and white of the law of understanding which is automatlcaly, the
understanding of the law. To therefore propose, as Gadamer does, that one 
return to the initial speech conversation, for there Is found, must be 
found a 'common language', is to repress doubly, through the closure of the 
written and the transparency of translation that which is forelgn/other inI
the search for the same.
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Derrida's 'problem of translation', is not only about the 'problem of 
the very passage into philosophy', but is also about the problem of 
reading/writing in(to) language in general, over which philosophy has 
always sought dominion; in short, it is also a problem of textuality. Thus
the 'problem' as a kind of 'passage' is, in effect, the problematic that
Barthes sees as part of textuality: ' 11 ] he text is... a passage, an
overcrossing; it answers not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but 
to an explosion, a dissemination' (Barthes 1977: 159). Texts are made of 
other texts, and as such texts are always translations of other texts. Here 
translation and inter— textuality imply each other. In this precise sense 
then, 'the translation process (is! at work in every text'.'Plus d'une 
langue'. If we put this in terms of foreignness, we could say that "a" text 
is also foreign to “itself”, and it is here that "a" text is marked by 
unreadability, by untranslatability, since the text, far from being closed, 
is an “open texture of quotation" etc. At this point, misprision,
misreading, mistranslation come into "their own". To put this differently, 
within the context of our "happy hermeneutic" discussion, misreading is 
always a possibility, since those deviant de Manian linguistic structures 
in a text that 'misfire' within it, not only constitute a text's 
unreadability in Miller's or de Man's sense, but also open the text up for 
'dissemination', for 'explosion'. In short, texts that are translated are 
also rewritten, when they are read in "one" language, or across an-other. 
Mis-translation as a necessary form of untranslatability is a productive 
force here; mis-understanding is productive - a point which Gadamer may 
never understand. For in the Gadamerian world, "we" interpret, understand, 
bring across to ourselves that which is other, render transparent that
twhich evades our grasp, make translatable that which threatens to disperse 
itself into the corners of the world...
We might argue here that for Gadamer translatability is a necessary 
condition of all understanding, for otherwise the hermeneutic promise for a 
full understanding could not be guaranteed, and as such he must presuppose, 
to put this in Derrida's words, a ' pre-critical relation to the signified' 
(1979a: 113), which is to say, the very 'theme of a transcendental
signified [takes] shape within the horizon of an absolutely pure,
transparent and unequivocal translatability' (1981a: 20); whereas for
Derrida, '[iln the limits to which it is possible, or at least appears
possible, translation practices the difference between signifier and
signified* (20). Since, however, 'this difference is never pure, no more so 
is translation', it follows that 'for the notion of translation we would 
have to substitute a notion of transformation’ (20). In short, total
translatability is never given, nor can translation preserve, keep intact, 
not touch that which must come across, but rather the crossing "itself”, 
inevitably, is a transformation, a transgression of borders, an
'overcrossing', a 'dissemination' - a mis-translation.
The quest of a hermeneutics is to unify, gather that which is 
dispersed, and deconstruction pays attention to that which resists such 
gathering that which may not be unified, that which 'misfires'.
Consequently, to outline translation in terms of a hermeneutics on the one 
hand, and a deconstructive enterprise on the other hand, makes clear the 
different movements by which each discourse proceeds: one ensures
translatability, the transfer of meaning - the other
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brings out
2 1 6
difference, and articulates for the very instances of untranslatability 
which undermine the ideal of a pure meaning which might be transferred 
intact. More specifically, this implies that a hermeneutics presupposes 
that something can and must be understood (be it a text, a discourse, even 
a philosophical framework, here deconstruction) and as such can be securely 
transferred/translated into another domain (tamed, appropriated, 
completed...), whilst deconstruction works on the assumption that 
misunderstanding is always a possibility, and that ' [ w] e will never have, 
and in fact have never had, to do with some "transfer" of pure signifieds 
from one language to another, or within one and the same language, that the 
signifying instrument would leave virgin and untouched' (Derrida 1981a: 20, 
translation modified).
So far, we have examined language as a relation of foreignness to 
itself. Let us now examine, not the relation within "self" or "other", but 
the relation between the one and the other, in other words, the relation
between text and translation. This is what Gadamer writes in Truth and
Method:
For every translator is an interpreter. The fact that it is a foreign 
language which is being translated means that it is simply an extreme 
case of hermeneutical difficulty, i. e. of alienness and its conquest. 
All 'objects' with which traditional hermeneutics are concerned are, 
in fact, alien in the same sense. The translator's task of recreation
differs only in degree, not qualitatively, from the general
hermeneutical task presented by the text (1975: 349, my emphasis).
The task is then how to overcome this gap to the other, the alien. According
to Gadamer, the translator is painfully aware of 'his inevitable distance
from the original', and, 'Chlis dealing with the text has something of the
effort to understand another person in conversation' (Gadamer 1975: 348).
This situation Involves, as he puts it, 'an extremely wearisome process of
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understanding, in which one sees the gap between one's own and that of the 
other person as ultimately unbridgeable' (348). However, Just 'as in 
conversation, when there are such unbridgeable differences, a compromise 
can be achieved in the to and fro of dialogue, so that the translator will 
seek the best solution...' He goes on to say, 'lals in conversation one 
tries to get inside the other person in order to understand his point of 
view, so the translator also tries to get right inside his author' C348). We 
must remember though that according to Gadamer, ' one does not relate the 
other's opinion to him, but to one's own views' <347>. This 'Irleaching an 
understanding in conversation presupposes that both partners are ready for 
it and are trying to recognize the full value of what is alien and opposed 
to them' (348). He thus concludes that, 'tilf this happens mutually I...1 
it is finally possible to achieve, an imperceptible but not arbitrary 
reciprocal translation of the other's position (we call this exchange of 
views), a common language and a common statement’ (348). In the 
hermeneutical conversation, like in the real conversation, this finding of 
'a common language... coincides with the very act of understanding and 
reaching agreement... a communication takes place' (349-350). And we may 
add, a fusion of the separate horizons has ensued.
Derrida, as we already know, not merely questions this dialogic 
nature of understanding, but rejects Oadamer's appeal 'to the absolute 
obligation to desire consensus in understanding' (Derrida 1989: 199), and 
thus reminds Gadamer of the necessary 'interruption of rapport' <1989: 53) 
in any communicative event. If for Derrida, as we have seen, any 'relation 
must be a relation of interruption' for only then is the relation opened up 
to the other <1986: 82), it follows that alterity, this 'relation without
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relation, which understands the other as other in a certain relation of
incomprehension' (82), seeks to ensure that the other may not be
overpowered by the movement of appropriât ion, by 'conquest' , to U6e
Gadamer's very term here, but can remain other. The other here is not
rendered translucent, but remains the dark other. In this sense, 'C11 his
other has not been, nor can it be, illuminated... but [remains] as a blind
spot or dark region'. * Undeflnable, this dark other cannot be categorized, 
but evades the definitive grasp; not unlike Irlgaray's notion of the Other 
(woman) as a dark continent. 3 The radical alterity which is put forward 
here does not insist on a common language, a communality of understanding, 
(on equality), does not seek complete understanding of and with the other, 
does not put up front, the ideal of communication, when Janus-faced, it 
smuggles in appropriation, 'conquest', overpowerment through the back door.
At this Juncture, Derrida's very treatment of the term communication
becomes revealing, for it throws further light on the issue. In 'Signature
Event Context', Derrida poses an incisive question: 'Is it certain that
there corresponds to the word communication a unique, unlvocal concept, a
concept that can be rigorously grasped and transmitted: a communicable
concept' (Derrida 1982: 309)? He goes on to reflect:
If communication had several meanings, and if this plurality could not 
be reduced, then from the outset it would not be Justifiable to define 
communication itself as the transmission of a meaning, assuming that 
we are capable of understanding one another as concerns each of these 
words (transmission, meaning, etc.) (309).
Isn't it at this very Juncture that we call up once more the Derridian
phrase: 'plus d'une langue’ , the very password he once attributed to
deconstruction. A flus d'une langue, we remember, plays out, of course, two
ofmeanings: more than one language, no more one language. If the word
t
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communication does not possess a unique identity it is more than one 
language - equally language can therefore no longer be one. The translation 
of this phrase into English bears out this point only too adequately. What 
is at stake here though, is, of course, Derrida's rethinking of 
translation.
At best, it (translation) can get everything across except this: the 
fact that there are, in one linguistic system, perhaps several 
languages or tongues. Sometimes - I would even say always - several 
tongues. This is impurity in every language. This fact would in some 
way have to threaten every linguistic system's integrity... (which) 
presumes the existence of one language and of one translation in the 
literal sense. . . So, if the unity of the linguistic system is not a 
sure thing, all of this conceptualization around translation (in the 
so-called proper sense of translation) is threatened. (Derrida 1965a: 
100)
What is questioned here is both the 'unity and identity of a language, the 
decidable form of its limits' (Derrida 1985: 173) By deconstructing the 
concept of translation, he pushes us to 'the almost unthinkable notion* in 
Peggy Kamuf's words 'of an originary translation before the posslbllty of 
any distinction between original and translation' (Karauf 1991: 242). We can 
make a sideways step at this point and mention once more Derrida's 
text/texts 'Living On Border Lines'. These parallel texts in an above and 
below margin, stage the very 'question of the relation between texts once 
their limits and borders can no longer be rigorously determined' (Kamuf 
1991: 255). In other words, what is at stake is the putting into question 
of the notion of text. Can a text have identifiable limits and borders, 
does it exist in a stable system of reference to other texts?
The answer 16, of course, dlff£rance here. Diff¿ranee does not 
institute an opposition as we have seen, but works to undermine oppositions 
such as that between text and translation, for instance. For, if the text
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to be translated is always already in relations with other texts, is always 
a trace of other texts, is already marked by intertextuality, then no text 
can stand in a clear relation to another, and more to the point, a text and 
"its" translation cannot stand in a kind of opposition to each other. For, 
as we have seen, there can be no opposition between two elements if an 
“element“ is always already marked by the traces of traces of other texts, 
if 'the translation process [is already! at work in every text' <1985: 
146), to cite Johnson once again. In other words, if the text is a trace of 
traces of other texts and the translation is a trace of traces of other 
translations and texts and so on and so forth, then the relation between 
text and translation, is not one where two stable entities are present, 
because "each entity in itself" multisects with other texts, is an 
intersection of other texts. Since difference defers any opposition, 'is 
the mark or the name, of radical difference [...] that which cannot be 
assimilated within a single unity' (Derrida 1986: 83), diff¿ranee then is
that ruptured or rupturing non-relation between the one and the radically 
other. It is, as we have already seen, the necessary interruption to the 
other for the other to remain other. Thus, text and translation are marked 
by the play of difference, the shifting intei— relations that are the 
ruptured or rupturing non-relations between the "one" and the radically 
"other”.
Difference, this word, or concept which is 'neither a word nor a 
concept' (Derrida 1973: 130), may only be circumscribed as that which 'can 
refer to the u/hole complex of its meanings at once, for it is immediately 
and lrreducibly multivalent' (Derrida 1973: 137). It thus marks a diffusion
of reference or an excess which can never be totally captured. It is at
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this point that Derrida's notion of supplément produces another more 
specific relay. For, the supplément, as we have also seen, is a double 
movement of addition and substitution. The supplément, 'adds itself, it is 
a surplus, a plentitude enriching another plentitude. . . ' . On the other 
hand, it ' adds only to replace. It Intervenes Itself ln-the-place of\ if it 
fills, it is as if one fills a void' (1976: 144-155). This double movement
has much in common with translation. For the translation will ' inevitably 
display material lacking in the original text, quite likely not apparent as 
lacking until the translation takes place, but then revealed as significant 
and necessary Cthus redetermining the original as another version of 
its/an/other 1. At the same time, the translation, by revealing this lack, 
reveals also a potentially infinite series of future translations providing 
further supplementations'. s
Translation, in deconstructive terms then, is not defined in terms of 
lack. Oadamer approaches this issue quite differently though, and writes:
Every translation that takes its task seriously is at once clearer and
flatter than the original. Even if it is a masterly re-creation, it
must lack some of the overtones of the original. <1975: 348)
If we, however, deploy a Derridlan reversal here (i. e. move in accordance 
with the logic of the supplement), and argue that it is the original which 
lacks, rather than the translation, after all, translation makes visible 
this lack by the sheer possibility of further supplementations, creating a 
demand in the original that it "go forth and multiply", that it be doubled 
by all others, i.e. constantly reaffirmed as original, then we can argue 
instead that translations put the notion of the original into question 
altogether. Not only do all translations affirm an indeterminacy of 
significations, but with each new reading/writing of the original, with
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each new translation, what is highlighted, is that meaning is not so much 
tampered with, but that the very notion of the "definable (definitive) 
original" is in question. Hence, also, a translation could never be a re­
creation. Translations necessarily defer and are different to their 
"original sources”, and as such enact the play of différance. Here, it is 
not a question how 'faithful we try to be' (Gadamer 1975: 347), nor is it a 
question whether the translation is, or as Gadamer has it, is not 'at 
liberty to falsify the meaning' (346), instead, the aftei— life of the text 
in translations constitutes the refusai/fallure ( Versagen) of the closure 
of their 'originals'. And the event of translation repeats this survival, 
guarantees it in and through the passage of translation. The supplément 
survives all after-lives, so to speak; it lives on as further 
supplementations. As Derrida puts it: 'translation is neither the life nor 
the death of the text, only or already its living on, its life after life, 
its life after death' (1979: 102-3); and when he adds that'ttlhe same thing
will be said of what I call writing, mark, trace, and so on* (103), we can 
begin to see that in both translating a text, or in reading/writing a text 
(which in this sense, must really be a double-writing), that in these kinds 
of iterations, texts live on Indefinitely, are rewritten indefinitely. It 
is this link between reading/writing and translation which will resurface 
in 5.4; not however through linear descent, but through grafts and 
supplementations, Indeed, fractal multiplication. K
It 16 in this sense also, that one need not lament that which is 
apparently lost in translation, for, unlike Gadamer, we do not (have to) 
expect to retain the totality of the original's 'overtones', and thus are
I
prone to dls6appolntments when (not if) the translation does not measure up
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to the great original. Indeed, Is Is not even a question of a "measuring 
up", for the very term "original” is already under erasure here), but we 
rejoice in the disseminating notes, tones, the variations on a theme, that 
the translation's new melodies will endlessly play. Furthermore, unlike 
Gadamer, we do not seek to conquer foreignness of the other, make it
•clearer', by rendering it transparent, make it 'flatter' by rendering it 
intelligible, master it, appropriate it. This 'traditional form [which!... 
has as its ideal, with exhaustive translatability, the effacement of
language' (Derrida 1979: 93-4), may well have been named a hermeneutics.
This effacement of language, of writing, of all that buzzes in
disorderly ways, is nothing other than the quest for a manageable, total 
understanding. Instead of this 're-creation', this kind of equivalence 
which Gadamer yearns for, but which always ends up as an impossible task, 
despite all the good will that is then exposed as a will to a mastery, we 
reiterate with Derrida that the original, rather than as this complete and 
unified (hermeneutic) construct, 'begins by lacking and by pleading for 
translation' (1985: 184). As such then, 'if the original calls for a
complement, it is because at the origin it was not there without fault, 
complete, total, identical to itself' <188), and its growth in the aftei—  
life of translation (this aftei— life which assures its survival), is then 
also its 'growth' as an original (Derrida 1985a: 122). Derrida reminds us
though, that '[als this growth... it does not reproduce: it adjoins by 
adding' <1985: 189), and as such translation operates according to the
logic of the supplément, rather than according to the order of
'representation', 'reproduction' or 'communication'. Here Derrida, 
following Benjamin:
I
Translation augments and modifies the original, which, insofar as it
is living on, never ceases to be transformed and to grow. It modifies
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the original even as it also modifies the translating language. This 
process - transforming the original as well a6 the translation - is 
the translation contract between the original and the translating 
text. In this contract, it is a question of neither representation nor 
reproduction nor communication! rather, the contract is destined to 
assure a survival... <1985a: 122)
If translation in deconstructive terms figures the 'tower of Babel' as 
'the irreducible multiplicity of tongues' and as such 'exhibits an 
incompletion, the impossibility of finishing, of totalizing, of saturating, 
of completing something on the order of edification...' C1985: 165) as 
Derrida writes in ' Des Tours de Babel', we might well argue that Gadamer 
not merely laments the fall, the post-Babylonian confusion, but lives in 
hope of reconciliation. Furthermore, within the context of our foregoing 
discussions of both Gadamer and Derrida, we might summarize their 
differences in the following terms: whilst a hermeneutics seeks to mediate 
a meaning, deconstruction negotiates the very instability of 
significations; while a hermeneutics seeks to complete an understanding of 
and with the text to be translated, deconstruction suggests the necessary 
distance, rupture to the other, for this other to remain other, foreign. To 
put this differently, if a hermeneutic practice seeks to secure an 
understanding of the text, striving towards the recovery of a meaningful 
content, a deconstructive practice will highlight the very indeterminacy of 
the communicative process. A hermeneutics will work towards a solution of a 
text's "truth" and its acceptable meanings, seeking to overcome the 
differences between original and the new context, and deconstruction will 
perform the plurality of its discursive possibilities, foregrounding the 
(con)text as a site of Inexhaustible productivity. If hermeneutics gives 
understanding the central role in our engagements with texts,
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deconstruction marks the very limits to any total understanding; and if 
hermeneutics seeks to come to an agreement with the other, deconstruction 
practices the difference between them.
When Gadamer and Derrida theorize translation, what is posed 
resepectively by them, is the question of translatability and 
untranslatability. Having said this, we also have come back to our initial 
question: what is the relation between hermeneutics and deconstruction, and 
are their different idioms translatable, or not translatable, into each 
other. If translation has been singled out here as a site of conflict 
between their 'two readings of the world' (Deleuze 1904: 52), this site
becomes both a stage where these ' two interpretations of interpretation' 
may be played out, but also a specific stage of their in/commensurability, 
depending of course, whether one adopts a hermeneutic view of the world 
(the difference of/ distance from the other can be bridged), or takes a 
deconstructive stance (the distance, from/ difference of the other must be 
maintained). Since, according to Derrida, a text (or a discourse) must be 
translatable, transferrable - for otherwise, as he puts it in 'Living On 
Border Lines’, 'totally untranslatable... the text dies immediately' 
(Derrida 1979: 98), it would not live on, not survive; and since a text 
(equally a discourse) is also untranslatable for if it were 'totally 
translatable... it disappears as a text' (90), T we can argue, that 
translation lives on in precisely this double-bind. It survives because it 
practices both: translatability and untranslatability. With reference then 
to our discourses, we mu6t argue that their different idioms are not 
translatable into each other, nor are their idioms untranslatable, but both 
- hermeneutics and deconstruction - live on in translation, and as such
\they also live on in a double-blnd. Neither are these disparate,
contradictory discursive frames fused (hermeneutically), nor ruptured 
(deconstructively), but - as in translation - they are necessarily and 
Impossibly brought together, transformed, exploded. In translation then 
might be reflected the mlse-en-ablme of textuality, might also be refracted 
the pluralisation of theory "itself".
The 'necessary and Impossible* task of our thesis to bring together
two contradictory discourses. This bind has been the subtext of our writing
throughout, and in consequence we must ask what the purpose has been in
bringing together a fellowship of Unitarian critics (Iser, Culler, Fish)
and a brotherhood of disseminating critics (Hartman, Bloom, Miller, de
Man), and finally bringing them face to face in the encounter between
Gadamer and Derrida, at the Goethe Institute, in Paris, in 1981.
For it could be argued that we have brought into play here two
unconnected theoretical frameworks, have caused them to collide in
this aporia between discourses; and only in translation, have we connected
these two disparate discourses, have performed an "unhappy" (positive)
hermeneutics of faith together with a "happy" (negative) hermeneutics of
suspicion/deconstruction? Could it not therefore be the case, that
translation has served here as that hybrid space, that space in-between,
which could accommodate two disparate discourses, that para-site that
can/has both separate/d and Join/ed these two Incommensurable discourses?
That is to say, does the site of translation not both separate and Join a
hermeneutic and a deconstructlve discourse? A space, Indeed, that,
has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle from which it grows 
and overspills... [it! operates by variation, expansion, conquest, 
capture, offshoot,,, it is always in the middle, between things, 
interbeing, intermezzo. (Deleuze 4 Ouattarl 1988; 25)
2 2 6
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Such is Deleuze and Guattari's description of a rhizoraatlc space. The 
rhizome, they write, is: 'unlike a structure defined by a set of 
points and positions, with binary relations between the points... [but! the 
rhizome is made only of lines' (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 21). Indeed, 'any 
point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be' . It 
thus 'ceaselessly establishes connections' <1988: 7). This then is the 
connection which this thesis seeks to establish between a hermeneutic 
discourse and a deconstructionist discourse: translation has been the very 
hybrid, that in-between (para)-site which grafts the tensions between these 
disparate discourses, hybridizing and supplementing each (as though "one" 
were original). It thus draws a connective line between the disparate 
discourses: it does so via ' the logic of the AND* (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 
25) to return to the rhizome. And we must add that it is not even that the 
AND is neither a fusion nor re-fused nor an either/or; but rather an and- 
and-and-. . . It is the middle where hermeneutic understandings are fused and 
worked towards a synthesis and where deconstruction interrupts and returns 
marginallty. It is where both separate - AND (with capital letters) - 
clash. . .
Translation as a terrain where conflicting discourses vie for 
performative superiority, becomes a kind of Lyotardian 'agonistic field', 
within which we no longer ask whether something is true, but how it works. 
Here, translation is no longer governed by meta-prescriptions such as 
truth, authenticity, universality; nor is the theory by which we articulate 
translation bound by those rules. External forms of verification and 
legitimation have been usurped and deposed, and we are therefore left with 
an agonistic terrain where each discourse sets its own stakes, sets its own
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strategic and tactical alms in direct conflict with every other discourse.
No longer a question whether discourses find legitimation or not, it
becomes a question of their performatlvlty. Translation here becomes a kind
of post-modern enterprise, which entertains the competition and the toil of
a struggle between conflicting, incommensurable discourses. The goal is not
'truth but performativity'. Since performativity is equated by Lyotard with
the goal of power, 'ttlhe question [then] is to determine what the
discourse of power consists of...' (Lyotard 1986: 46). We should like to
rephrase this question slightly differently and ask, what kind of power
relation does a hermeneutic and a deconstructionist discourse consist of,
what powers do they exercise or possess? To map Foucault's notion of micro-
and macro-physics onto a deconstructionist and a hermeneutic discourses,
allows us to make this tactical move:
Now the study of this micro-physics presupposes that the power 
exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a 
strategy, that its effects of domination are attributed not to 
'appropriation', but to dispositions, manoevres, tactics, techniques, 
functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, 
always in tension, always in activity, rather than a privilege that 
one might possess... acquired and preserved (Foucault 1977: 26).
While deconstruction performs power strategically and its effects are 
attributed to manoevres, techniques, and so on, it can be seen as a micro­
power - a power from below: hermeneutics on the other hand, exercises a 
power which is conceived as a property, a privilege that is acquired and 
preserved, and whose effects are attributed to appropriation, so that it 
could be seen as a macro-physics - a power from above. This then is our 
argument: if deconstruction is a strategic, subversive power, hermeneutics 
is a tradition-bound, imposing power. So far though, in our argument, we 
have not suggested the fusion, complementarity or balance of power between 
these two disourses. Instead, we have pointed to the logic of the AND to
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out-maneuver the aporla between unconnected discourses. And Why? (At this 
precise Juncture, our subtext moves into the main corpus of our thesis): to 
avoid totalization and aggravate the power to be dispersed. This is to say, 
for Foucault, as for us, power is never overcome, but redistributed through 
its conflict with other powers. This is why the two theoretical discursive 
frameworks of this thesis do not merge in an overarching totality but
activate a multiplication via the logic of the AND. Here, we also finally 
return to our much quoted snippet of this conversation between Deleuze and 
Foucault. As Deleuze says,
A theory does not totalize, it is an instrument for multiplication and 
it multiplies itself. It is in the nature of power to totalize and it 
is your position, and one I fully agree with, that theory is by nature 
opposed to power. As soon as a theory is enmeshed in a particular
point, we realize that it will never possess the slightest practical 
importance unless it can erupt in other areas. (Foucault 1977a: 208)
And we would like to add, here the double writing of reading and "its"
theory erupted in the domain of translation, without making recourse to a
singular overarching and totalizing description. This is to say, we have
kept the critical process open, have not used theory to master the object
of our enquiry, but have allowed it to multiply. In short, we have allowed
postmodernism into the realm of theory. And it is this passage which we
shall explore in the following sections.
*
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5.2 Babelian ddToun about Theory
If hermeneutics and deconstruction thus 'stand In a relation of alterity to 
each other, of non-oppositional difference' (Palmer 1989: 9), and if 'we
cannot choose between them' <1978: 292), as Derrida clearly suggests in
'Structure, Sign and Play', then we may say with Richard Palmer that 'one 
must practice both, speaking more than one language at once' <1989: 10).
The playfulness of plus d’une langue already adumbrates this pluralization 
of theory. For as Derrida puts it in ' Des Tours de Babel' 1 'no
theorization, inasmuch as it is produced in a language, will be able to 
dominate the Babelian performance' (Derrida 1985: 175), which is to say,
that no one, single reading or singular theory will be able to dominate, 
let alone totalize that which it attempts to read/theorize. And,
translation, "itself" this inbetween-ness - what we shall from now on call 
the para-site - of a Babelonian performance, practices this performativity 
of theory, its plurallsatlon. In this sense also, 'theory does not express, 
translate, or serve to apply practice, it is practice' (Foucault 1977a: 
208), for, we can add with a slight twist, and pertinent to our discussion, 
since the para-site of translation reveals the very limits of the 
applicability of one theory, it highlights the plurallsatlon of theory, and 
it makes visible that
from the moment a theory moves into its proper domain, it begins to 
encounter obstacles, walls, blockages which require its relay by 
another type of discourse (it is through this other discourse that it 
eventually passes to a different domain). Practice is a set of relays 
from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one 
practice to another. (Deleuze 1977: 206)
In this account, theory is not applied to a practice, from an above, 
nor does practice in any way 'inspire theory* (Deleuze 1977: 205). The
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relation between theory and practice is no longer to be 'understood in
terms of tsuch! a process of totalization' <205), precisely because that 
relation is 'far more partial and fragmentary' (205) than we may hitherto 
have thought. Which is precisely why Deleuze has argued that 'a theory is 
always local and related to a limited field' (205), z rather than imposed 
from an omnlclent, global perspective. Theory is both local and site- 
specific; etymologically then we have returned to its roots, that of
theatal, which means to watch, contemplate, look at, etc, and which in
Greek is also related to theatron, the word for theatre. The link between 
theatai and theoria is therefore, according to Herbert Blau, that 'in the 
act of seeing, there is already theory' <1982: 1). Seeing, spectating, 
speculating are also acts of Judgment, which means that the final verdict 
lies with the spectator, in his/her Judgments upon events, rather than in 
the articulation of ' ahistorical truths' (Birmingham 1989: 206). Since 
spectators are part of events, participate in events, it follows that their 
Judgments and speculations are also tied to a very specific, we may say, 
localised particular event, production.
This is clearly related to Foucault's notion of 'local criticism' (as 
we discussed in the final part of 4.4). In Foucault's terms, 'the local 
character of criticism indicates in reality. . . an autonomous, non-
centralised kind of theoretical production, one that is to say, whose 
validity is not dependent on the approval of the established régimes of 
thought' <1980: 81). As such, this noncentrallsed production gives onto a
multiplicity of speculations and readings, a profusion of perspectives. 
Rather than taking these perspectives as at least potentially constituted 
in advance by the avowed presence of a collection of individuated
consciousnesses, these multiplicitous theoretical-theatrical productions do 
not, in Foucault's words, constitute a 'soggy eclecticism' (81) through the 
reduction of production to individuals, but rather an additional 
multiplication of theoretical-theatrical production through other channels. 
Every perspective, rather than being the location for a free and autonomous 
point of view on an equally free and autonomous object, is precisely a 
local production, a relay in a generalized network of other productions.
Theory should no longer be thought of as a kind of total vision, 
'(demanding] of itself that it should provide a comprehensive description’ 
(Gruber 1989: 194); but rather in Foucauldian 'local criticism', 
theorizing, criticizing, reading or seeing, spectating and speculating are 
always partial, fragmentary, refracted. Local theory then undertakes to 
break apart, break open the very object under scrutiny as well as that 
totalizing comprehensive vision Implied by "Theory" (with a capital T). 
Theory becomes hybrid by the partiality of its visions, by the partiality 
of its speculations, Just as the object, that unified entity, which theory 
sought to reveal, or at least sought to construct, becomes a re-source for 
competing theoretical productions. 3 It is in this light that Foucault 
writes: 'theory... is local and regional C...] and not totalizing' (1977a: 
208).
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Foucault's avoidance of the word theory is also de Man's resistance to 
theory. As we saw in section 3.5, for de Man, 'theory is strictly 
impossible', that i6, according to Norris, 'in so far as it alms - as most 
theories do, to achieve a sense of having thoroughly mastered the relevant 
problems and issues' (1988a: 42). When de Man therefore writes in The
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Resistance to Theory, that 'Cnlothing can overcome the resistance to theory 
since theory is Itself this resistance' (1986: 19), we can begin to read de
Man's own aporetlc discourse, the undecidability between his blindness or 
his insight, as this precise resistance to "Theory" (with the captlal T>. 
De Man's own discourse performs the aporia of theory, the aporia between 
theorems, in an attempt to undermine the solidity of Theory, and to undo 
this unified perspective which theory, by its very definition, had thought 
to furnish. 'To de Man, such illusions', in Norris's words, 'are precisely 
what criticism has to give up as it comes to recognize those deviant 
linguistic structures, or elements of rhetorical "undecidabilities", that 
work to undermine any form of self-assured hermeneutic understanding' 
(1988a: 42). The linguistic undecidabilities, be it in a literary or a 
theoretical text, are what is at work in language, are at work in phrases 
such as plus d'une langue and Sprache verspricht sich.
Once again, theory is as much part of language, as it is 'another text
in an unstable network of texts' (Bennington 1993: 92), part of the Babel
of textuality. Barthes's essay 'The Death of an Author* (see section 2.4),
exemplifies this point, not only because 'the structure of the essay is
*
fragmentary, discontinuous paragraphs articulated by no linear logic' 
(Morlarity 1991: 101), but also because it plays out the very contradiction
between a positive and a negative hermeneutics. When Michael Moriarty 
therefore points out that 'Ctlheory here is itself implicated in this 
process: it assumes the status of a word-hoard, a store of signifiers used 
to produce further signifiers (writing)' (102), and thus draws attention to 
the 'fragmentation of discourse' and the consequent 'multiplicity of 
discourses' in 'The Death of the Author', it is to argue that this
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■plurality of discourse' is 
writing about writing can be
one of 'the indispensable conditions in which 
true to its object, to itself* (102).
Moriarty*s notion of the 'inexhaustability of discourse* (102), is not 
unlike David Carroll's call for the openness of critical practice. Carroll, 
however, does not follow through the implications of this rethinking of 
theory in terms of a writing practice, does not deal with the 'plurality of 
discourses' within a particular theoretical text, as Moriarty does, but 
turns to the question of the "state" of "theory" " in more general terms. 
Examining "theory's state/s" in the light of the increasing plurallsation 
of theory within various disciplines, Carroll writes in his introduction to 
The S ta te s  o f  ’Theory":
The best forms of theory could be said to imply a critical practice 
that does not seek to institute itself and its way of doing theory and 
thus exclude or dominate all others... [These forms of theory] seek to 
ask different kinds of questions or to ask questions in a different 
way, to make possible other forms of critical practice. Theory in this 
sense has the goal to keep the critical process open, of undermining 
and exceeding the state of theory at any particular moment, as well as 
the states of the various fields and disciplines with which it 
intersects, t/] In its critical form at least, theory may be best 
described as the hybrid and open field in which the possibilities of 
the various disciplines and fields it crosses through and which cross 
through it are persued and experimented with, where alternate critical 
practices are developed and tried out. It is where the assumptions, 
presuppositions, and limitations of the various fields and disciplines 
are analyzed, confronted, and exceeded, where "the given" or "the 
unquestioned" is never taken as determining. <1990: 3)
Theory in Carroll's terms must both exceed its own, proper state, and
constitute the site where assumptions of various fields, disciplines are
exceeded; theory, for Carroll must both be capable of transforming "Itself"
and the fields it irrigates. As he explains only a few pages later, all
disciplines or fields 'come to be involved in the same critical-theoretical
task of transforming not only their own state but the state of theory as
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well' (5). K We have already seen in the context of our own discussion of 
translation, how it came to be involved in the same critical-theoretical 
task of transforming not only its own state (it became marked by both a 
reading and a writing, an interpretation and écriture, a hermeneutic and a 
deconstructive discourse) but also in transforming the "state" of theory 
"itself", insofar as theory ceased to be the singular totalizing 
description of a field and became instead irreducibly plural. In short, 'no 
theorization, inasmuch as it is produced in a language, will be able to 
dominate the Babelian performance' (Derrida 1985: 175), will be able to 
dominate a field or discipline, or more to the point here, the site of 
translation. s
The double movement which has emerged for us so far, is both the 
transformation of the state of translation and the transformation of the 
state of theory from cyclops to Babel. Each movement has an effect on the 
other. Translation as the very site which highlights this plural of theory, 
simultaneously makes visible its own re-formation(s) at the hands of this 
theorization. Before we consider this re-formation of the "state" (and 
status) of translation though, we need to examine the implications of this 
pluralization of theory further. In an essay entitled ‘Some Statements and 
Truisms about Neologisms, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms, and other small 
Seismisms' (which also forms part of the book The States of 'Theory') 
Derrida, by addressing the 6tate/s of "theory", directly concerns himself 
with the question of the 'pluralization of the "states" of theory* (1990: 
71). He writes,
There are two interpretations possible for this plurality which cannot 
be reduced to any form of eclecticism or conceivable dialectic. Those 
two interpretations of this convergent competition are themselves 
engaged in a nonsymmetrleal. . . competition. (71-72)
236
Derrida describes one of these Interpretations as being interpretive 
•through and through'; the other he describes as merely including an 
•interpretive moment'. Interpretation proper, as we might therefore call 
it, is that interpretation, according to Derrida, which 'lends meaning to 
this convergent competition' (72). As he puts it, 'Cilt is enough for this 
interpretation to say that conflicts of theories are conflicts of 
interpretation, competitions aiming at the hegemony of one interpretation 
and of what an institution of a community of interpreters represents' (72). 
Derrida consequently sees this kind of interpretation as operating on the 
principle of the 'will to power', and as such we might easily see how, 
though unnamed, a hermeneutics might fit this description. The 'other 
relationship to competitive plurality' operates on the principle of 
nonclosure, operates according to 'disseminal alterity or alteration, which 
would make impossible the pure identity, the pure identification of what it 
simultaneously makes possible' (72), and 'which would thus delimit and 
destabilize the state... to which it gives rise in order for this state... 
to take place' (72). Furthermore, 'that which thus allows them to take 
place has no stable or theorizable place', and consequently, 'it is in this 
non-place that the appearance of the effects of deconstruction can be 
situated' (72).
These 'two general interpretations possible of this plurality', of the 
"states" of theory can also be mapped onto the 'two interpretations of 
interpretation' which Derrida outlines in 'Structure Sign and Play'. The 
Interpretation which seeks 'to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth' 
<1978; 292), is precisely the one which is 'interpretive through and
through', whereas the 'second interpretation', as that joyous
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interpretation which 'affirms play' <292), merely includes an interpretive 
moment. This 'second interpretation' neither excludes the other
interpretation, nor sets itself up against it in opposition, instead, 
Derrida writes, ' it would deal with this multiplicity as a law of the 
field, a clause of non-closure...' <1990: 72) This 'interpretation', which
is 'neither a theory nor a philosophy... neither a school nor a method. It 
is not even a discourse, nor an act, nor a practice. It is what happens...' 
<85), he gives the name of deconstruction. Though these 'two
interpretations of interpretation... are absolutely irreconcilable' <1978: 
293), and 'although the] dotes] not believe that today there is any 
question of choosing1 <293) between them, these disparate, heterogenous 
interpretations are nevertheless not antagonistic.
The assertion that these 'absolutely irreconcilable', divergent 
interpretations of interpretation are nevertheless not antagonistic 
requires some clarification, to say the least - as Luce Irigaray puts it, 
'[pleaceful coexistence? I don't know Just what that means' <1985a: 130). 
Thus when Derrida writes that ‘the conflict and competition' between 
theoretical 'Jetties', as he calls them, is not 'a matter of an 
opposition', 7 nor a matter of 'an antagonistic confrontation', he gives 
two very specific reasons:
The first reason is that each Jetty... claims to comprehend itself by 
comprehending all others - by extending all its borders, exceeding 
them, inscribing them within itself. C...1 The second reason which is 
closely related to the first... doesn't allow any Jetty to give rise 
to the reading of a table C'chart','tree of theory' <64)1, the reason 
of a table which would thus classify the totality of the theoretical 
potentialities - this second reason is that each species in this table 
constitutes its own identity - by contamination, parasitism, grafts, 
organ transplants, incorporation, etc... <1990: 66)
The first 'Jetty* clearly moves according to the rules of a macro-physics 
(Foucault), moves in a totalizing gesture of appropriation. This is the 
•stabilizing jetty' (84) which seeks to preserve itself by incorporating 
the other and as such, we can say, seeks to find a home for the other in
Itself, in which case, it acts as a kind of host, and is not antagonistic
but rather accommodating; we may name this the hermeneutic 'Jetty', on 
Derrida's behalf. The second 'Jetty' manc«uvers according to the logic of a 
micro-physics, not from above but from below. It does not incorporate the 
other by subsumption, but inhabits the other, as a parasite might inhabit 
its host-system. This 'destabilising or devastating Jetty' (Derrida's 
terms, not mine, 84) adapts to its host who adapts to it. It is where host 
and parasite inter-sect in that 'non-place' (72) of deconstructive
' parasitism' .
When Derrida therefore writes in Of Grammatology that 'Ctlhe movements 
of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not 
possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by
inhabiting those structures' (1976: 24), we begin to see, not only why this
theoretical 'Jetty' cannot stand in an antagonistic relation with an/other 
'Jetty', for it inhabits the other from within, but also why it is not a 
matter of an opposition between two, conflicting Jetties. 'Operating 
necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic 
resources of subversion from the old structure' (24), it becomes no longer 
possible to either distinguish, or as Derrida proceeds, 'to Isolate their 
elements and atoms' (24), which is precisely why, of course, ' the very 
enterprise of deconstruction ["itself" also] always in a certain way falls 
prey to its work' (24). Both parasite and host fall prey to 'parasitism'.
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The very borders between their "bodies" are thus deconstructed, as well as 
each body, "each" theoretical corpus.
Furthermore, since 'Derrida's philosopher knows', according to Spivak, 
'that there is no tool that does not belong to the metaphysical box, and 
proceeds from there' <1976: xix), and thus 'makes do with things that were 
meant perhaps for other ends' <xix>, as a 'bricoleur makes do', we have to 
realize Just how much and despite 'the Joyful yet laborious strategy of 
rewriting the old language... we are within the "clôture" of metaphysics, 
even as we attempt to undo it' <xx>. For, as Robert Bernasconl put it, if 
'Colne of the readings remains Inside metaphysics, while the other stands 
outside' :
To maintain only the one or the other ['Jetty'] would be... to remain 
bound to the system of metaphysical oppositions. Only by maintaining 
both readings can one "displace" that logic* . The text is ultimately 
undecidable between the twin readings. <1989: 246)
Since we cannot therefore step outside of metaphysics, nor are able to
devastate it from the outside, Derrida lays out a strategy to dismantle, or
as he puts it in Margins, ' to deconstruct the metaphysical and rhetorical
schema at work in [the other 'Jetty'!..., not in order to reject or discard
them, but to reinscribe them otherwise' <1982: 215).
Whether we call this strategy a 'convergent competition' between a 
'stabilizing' and a 'destablllng Jetty' as Derrida does, or a 'double 
reading, a 'twin reading', a 'Juxtaposition of readings', a 'unitary 
reading' against a 'disseminating reading' <1989: 248) as Bernasconi does,
we can nevertheless see how it is part of the wider theme of 'parasitism';
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precisely because parasitism works not by opposition, but infusion, 
intussusception: that which contaminates, grafts, transplants...
In a similar register, Hillls Miller develops deconstruction's
parasitism. Miller rewrites the 'relation of a "deconstructive"
interpretation to "the obvious or univocal reading"' <1979: 218). We
remember that M. H. Abrams saw deconstructive readings as parasitical on the
'obvious and univocal reading' that is possible from a text. Miller
proceeds to deconstruct this, by suggesting that the 'obvious and univocal
reading' may itself be the parasite in this relation, may not at all be the
natural reading per se, but may have imposed itself upon us, may have
infested us like a virus, inhabited us, our thinking, Just like a parasite
might inhabit its host (Miller 1979: 222-223, my section 3. 4).1 Both
readings, Miller argues, are linked, not in an oppositional relation to the
other, nor in a 1 dialectical synthesis' (224) but instead:
On the one hand, the "obvious and univocal reading" always contains 
the "deconstructive reading" as a parasite encrypted within itself as 
part of itself. On the other hand, the "deconstructive" reading can by 
no means free itself from the metaphysical reading it means to 
contest. [A text] in itself, then, is neither the host nor the 
parasite but the food they both need... Both readings are at the same 
table together, bound by a strange relation of reciprocal obligation, 
of gift or food-giving and gift of food-receiving. (225) “
This is why Miller can argue that 'Ctlhe two, logocentricsm and nihilism,
are related to one another in a way which is not antithesis and which may
not be synthesized in any dialectical Aufhebung“ <228). Indeed, it is only
in this 'tension between dialectic and undecidability' that 'this form of
criticism remains open, in the ceaseless movement of an "in place of"
without resting place* <250), resists totalization. This is also the
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Derridian 'non-place where the effects of deconstruction can be situated' 
(Derrida 1990: 72), from which parasitism operates.
Is that 'non-place' also our para-site from which parasitism operates? 
(No, we may preemptively assert.) And despite our allegiancles to a 
deconstructive discourse, do we wish to remain parasitists with Derrida, 
'make do' with deconstruction, as deconstruction 'made do' with the 
'metaphysical box of tools'? Can we really not free ourselves from a 
'metaphysical reading' as Miller has it, 3 despite all the 'devastating' 
tendencies that Derrida foresees for deconstruction? Can we really not 
'reject and discard' metaphysical schema, are we condemned to merely 
'reinscribe' them? Derrida may have displaced in Bernasconi's words the 
logic of oppositions, but as yet has not ob-literated it with a logic of 
profusion. Deconstruction is, forever, burdened by the weight of 
metaphysical closure, at once imminent and deferred. By concentrating on 
the problem of closure, deconstruction has a certain and inevitable 
limiting effect. The problem of closure, as such, builds in a mechanism 
that wards off 'off-the-wall interpretationisi' (1980: 357), to use a
Fishian phrase, and institutes an 'indispensable guardrail' (Derrida 1976: 
158) as a safety measure to protect us from the "anything goes", protect us 
from a 'critical production tthatl would risk developing in any direction 
at all and authorize itself to almost anything' (158), i.e. the logic of
.9
profusion. 10 Could it therefore not be argued that Derrida's (or Miller's) 
parasitism, as a destabilising deconstructive strategy, whilst it is an 
"instrument for the plurallzatlon of theory", is not, however, the 
Deleuzian 'instrument for multiplication' (1977: 208), which we applied to 
the deadlock formed by hermeneutics and deconstruction?
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Let us answer this question by using the resources of the term 
parasite, that Miller made available to us, even further. Hermeneutics, for 
instance, from the moment it is confronted with two different sites <para: 
between), it feels compelled to get closer to this other (par: alongside, 
near, beside). Hermeneutics is very much a host, wanting to be a host-site 
(host merges with the (para) site, having overcome the between, the para). 
Different theories are thus cordially invited to share the food (sito6) of 
the host over some friendly conversation.- Since this food though is to be 
thoroughly digested and utterly consumed, the para (between) site is 
overcome, and the parasite agrees with the host that both must reach a 
common ground; in other words the host-site. Deconstruction, on the other 
hand, practices parasitism, which is to say, it inhabits and by inhabiting 
it interferes (le parasite: interference). Once it has interfered, the host 
may well end up as the stranger (ghos-ti: stranger, guest, host), and the 
parasite may well turn out to be the socialite to this stranger, This move 
is deconstructive, of course. Our move is to take the parasite,
parasitisim, deconstruction yet one more step "forward", and "through" 
(per).
And is the para, to use Miller's words, that 'double antithetical 
prefix signifying at once proximity and distance, similarity and
difference, interiorlty and exteriority' (1979: 219), also fusion and
rupture, mediation and interruption (our para between hermeneutics and
deconstruction) then? If the para, according to Miller, 'is not only 
simultaneously on both sides of the boundary line between inside and
outside', but •is-also the boundary itself, the screen which is a permeable 
membrane connecting inside and outside', and if it thus 'confuses them with
243
one another, allowing the outside in, making the inside out, dividing and 
joining them' (219, emphasis added), then we may well ask at this Juncture, 
is this our para also, that which divides and Joins a hermeneutic and a 
deconstructive discourse? Or could we not go one step further here (per) 
and suggest that our para-site (with a hyphen) not merely divides and Joins 
two sites, but perhaps is itself already further hyphenated into localised 
micro-sites? Our hyphen then between the para and its sites indeed further 
sub-divides and disjoins the parasite, further multiplies "its" sites; 
works according to the logic of the virus, that 'most frightening version 
of the parasite... who has... the strange capacity... to turn the host into 
multitudinous proliferating replications of itself' (Miller 1979: 222), to 
turn any site into multitudinous proliferating replications of fractal 
para-sites.
Whilst deconstructive parasitism claims a non-conflictual, non- 
antagonistic co-habitation, and its parasite merely inhabits to 
destabilize, to disrupt and interfere, our parasite proliferates and 
exhausts the available resources, multiplying the vectors of infection. 
Nevertheless though it is this deconstructive parasite, and its brand of 
parasitism which has given us the very germs of this logic of
proliferation. Deconstructive parasitism might not work according to the 
logic of the AND, might not operate according to the logic of profusion, 
but at least provides the food (sltos). or nourishment on which our
subsequent argument can feed further.
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5. 3 Making a Difference: Simulacra
The implications of Derrida's notion of the pluralization of theory 
(parasitism) as against Deleuze's multiplication of theory (para-sites) can 
be explored further via a consideration of Deleuze's essay on 'Plato and 
the Simulacrum'. The function of simulacrum is not unlike that of our para­
site (with a hyphen), and might as such be used to draw to a conclusion not 
only our discussion of theory a6 a 'an instrument of multiplication', but 
draw together our observations so far on translation, as the very site of 
this multiplication.
The world Deleuze describes in 'Plato and the Simulacrum* is not the 
world of the 'two interpretations of interpretation' which Derrida 
describes in 'Structure Sign and Play*. For, the 'two readings of the 
world', which Deleuze outlines in his essay - 'one [which] bids us to think 
in terms of similarity, or a previous identity, while. . . the other invites 
us to think of similarity or even identity as the product of a basic 
disparity' (1984: 52) - multiply even further in the course of his
argument. According to Deleuze '[t]he first one defines exactly the world 
of copies or of representations... The second, against the first, defines 
the world of simulacra'. 1 The first one asks questions as to whether the 
copy is a good likeness of the model: if it is, then the difference between 
model and copy is bridged, Indeed the difference between them becomes 
effaced. If the copy does not ressemble the’ model, if it is a bad likeness, 
it is a bad copy, precisely because it shows up the difference between 
original and copy. 2 The second reading assumes that the model "itself" is
I
already constructed around disparity, and as such expects there to be a
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difference between model and copy. As a result, It asks different kinds of 
questions as regards the copy. Rather than relating the copy to that which 
is already a disparity <i.e. the model), rather than negatively comparing 
the copy to the model, it examines ’the status or position* (52) of the 
copy "itself". To therefore assume "originary" disparity, 3 is no longer to 
to presuppose the copy as secondary, second-rate, as that bad imitation, 
that “parasite", which has failed to faithfully model that from which it 
apparently derives. Consequently, there is a shift of enquiry: it is less a 
question of the relation of model to copy, than one of the nexus-relays 
between copies. This constitutes a move away from a world of superior 
models/plentiful originals with its inferior copies/poor reproductions, to 
a world of endless simulacra/productions. This then is the world of 
dispars, where, as Deleuze has it, 'Ctlhe simulacrum is not a degraded 
copy, rather it contains a positive power which negates both original and 
copy, both model and reproduction' (1984: 53). In short, the simulacrum's
'positive power' is that it is productive.
The Deleuzlan Simula crum not only undermines or subverts
hierarchies, but 'renders the notion of hierarchy impossible' (53), indeed, 
•ttJhere is no possible hierarchy: neither second, nor third....' (53). 
Derrida also, of course, dismantles hierarchies, though he proceeds very 
differently. Whilst seeking out the privile ged term in an opposition, then 
reversing this opposition by demonstrating the play of difference, the 
tracery of relations which always already contaminates each element in an 
opposition, he undermines any notion of the stability between “two 
elements", and thus dislocates the (non)opposltlon. This renders untenable, 
for Instance, the stable relation between a model on the one side, and its
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copy on the other side. The Derridian strategy which is operative here, 
does not so much 'reject or discard' the model <i. e, metaphysics is the 
model as far as Derrida is concerned), but seeks 'to reinscribe [it! 
differently' <1982: 215). In deconstructive terms then, we might see how
the model becomes contaminated by the trace of the copy, and how the play 
of différance between "model'' and "copy" endlessly reinscribes their
relation differently, reinstates their new non-hierarchical, non- 
oppositlonal non-relation. The model was always already a copy. Always and 
already. Still and forever. The future as an endless return of the model 
that is a copy: and thus, the difference between model and copy, is the 
undecldable movement of dlfférance. Neither model nor copy, but différancer, 
(neither host nor parasite, but parasitism) Neither/nor.
Since Derrida moreover, as we have seen, uses tools from a 
'metaphysical box' (Spivak 1976: xix) to undermine and subvert metaphysics 
from within (the microphysics of Derridian parasitism), and if
deconstruction is a reading strategy of 'infinite complexity', according to 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, which draws within itself the 'outer limit of the 
closure' of metaphysics <1993: 39), then it remains simultaneously inside
and outside of this (en)closure: it remains between and cannot make a 
choice between. This nelther/nor - neither stasis, nor movement - this 
rather negative economy, is precisely the Juncture at which it becomes 
impossible for deconstruction to choose between 'two interpretations of 
interpretation':
For my part, although these two interpretations must acknowledge and 
accentuate their difference and define their irreducibility, I do not 
believe that 'today there is any question of choosing - in the first 
place because... the category of choice seems particularly trivial; 
and in the second, because we must first try to conceive of the commom
ground, and the difference of this irreducible difference. (Derrida
1978: 293)
In an attempt to defer his own binary totalization (the "either/or" of a 
'common ground' between two interpretations), Derrida defers the very 
question of interpretation: neither a question of choice between the 'two 
interpretations', nor a question of choice at all. Neither/nor.
The question, which arises for us then, is this. Is the 'common 
ground' of the two interpretations different from difference? Does 
difference lie alongside the common ground or destroy it irrevocably? Does 
difference inhabit the common ground while somehow leaving the communality 
of this ground intact, still common? All these questions are resultant upon 
Derrida's refusal to choose between the two interpretations, since "either 
(one) or (the other)'' would turn the common ground into the ground of the 
separation between the proper and the improper. If the common ground 
remains, however, then on it is established the impropriety of the proper, 
and this as a property of the proper. What difference does difference make, 
then? The common ground puts up (with) parasitic difference quite happily, 
it is not in the least troubled by it, not disturbed or uprooted. Derrida's 
replacement of the "either/or" of choice with the "neither/nor" of 
undecidability thus constitutes a prosponement of intervention. What this 
"Indifferent difference" is then, is simply the refusal of choice, the 
defusing of any strategy that might make, might be productive of (a) 
difference. Where is productivity, the production of difference? Where is 
the politics of an in(ter)vent ion here? ,
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To revise the relation between model and copy as an undecldable, 
differing and deferred movement, to reinsrlbe the model as a trace of 
•copy', Is merely to undermine the ground of the model, an intervention, 
rather than an invention of the model as a copy. If Derrida's world is 
marked by undecidability, Deleuze’s world of the simulacra, on the other 
hand, as a copy of a copy of a copy is not the different réinscription of 
the model in its relation to the copy, but its rewriting as a copy. The 
model is not reinscribed differently, but rejected and discarded, re­
written and re-invented altogether. When he therefore writes that '[tlhe 
goal is the subversion of the world' <1984: 53) for, '[tlhe simulacrum... 
negates both original and copy, both model and reproduction' and adds in 
the same breath that '[ilt doesn't even work to invoke the model of the 
Other, because no model resists the vertigo of the simulacrum' (53), then 
we can see how Deleuze ' sets up a world of nomadic distributions and 
consecrated anarchy' <53) where we no longer speak of n/either model n/or 
copy, but of simulacra.
Deleuze's simulacrum not only presumes that there is "disparity" in 
the model (as Derrida does, of course), but, more importantly, that there 
is little point in 'invokeingl the model' in the first place. Deleuze thus 
bypasses the model, and chooses instead to concentrate on the production of 
the copy as copy. How does this come about? Paradoxically, the copy is 
produced by the return. This is a paradox Insofar as we would assume that 
the return is always a return of something, and that this something would 
be what gives rise to the possibility of its -copy. The copy then, we would 
assume,would be the copy of this something which somehow would remain the
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same and constitute thereby the basis for its return, much like a xerox. 
Deleuze writes that
not everything constitutes a return. The Return is still selective, 
establishing differences... What is excluded, what does not constitute 
a return, are those things that presuppose the Same and the Like, 
those things that pretend to correct divergence, to recenter the 
circles or to make order out of chaos, to provide a model and make a 
copy. (55, translation modified)
The same then does not constitute a return: rather the return constitutes 
difference. This is to say, that for the same to return there would need to 
be a difference between the same as same and the numerically distinct same 
that would return to it. The return of the same then constitutes at least a 
repetition of numerically distinct "sameness". This "sameness" is then 
clearly an elision of the (at least numerical) distinctness, the difference 
constitutive of the possibility of repetition. Insofar then as the same 
does not constitute a return, since the return is only possible on the 
basis of (not merely numerical) difference, we can see that what returns is 
the copy, since the copy affirms its status as a product of difference.
Logically then it follows that the model must ' maket] of unllkeness 
the only resemblance' (55), for how otherwise could it make itself distinct 
from the copy? Since this is also however the very condition of the copy, 
as we have just seen, then the model is not unlike the copy, Indeed it has 
the same qualities as the copy (thus far, we have only, following Deleuze, 
Insisted on numerical or quantitative distinction), it is not different to 
It, but the same as it. In other words, it is a simulacrum. The model, 
here, is not merely marked by "copy", the model is not simply a copy also, 
but the copy becomes a model. Difference here is not relnscrlbed, In the 
Derrldian sense, but conditions the becomirvg-copies of the copy per se.
Whereas difference is always reinscribed through différence, this Derridian 
deconstructive move must proceed from the presumption then, that difference 
is already inscribed before the possibility of any reinsription (Yale 
criticism's 'within')[ * for Deleuze though, difference is not something
that happens (as Derrida claimed for deconstruction! 'it is neither a 
theory nor a philosophy... neither a school nor a method. .. nor an act, nor 
a practice. It is what happens...' (1990: 85 1), but something that is 
always in production and produced. The return is the production of the 
copy, and what is endlessly produced is the very logic of simulation, the 
simulacrum. As Deleuze sums up this point, the simulacrum 'does not 
presuppose the Same and the Like, but rather, sets up that which differs as 
the only Same and makes the unllkeness the only resemblance' (55). Which is 
also, of course, why Deleuze argues that 'not everything constitutes a 
return' as we have seen.
By insisting that '[tlhe Return is still selective, establishing 
differences', and that 'twJhat it chooses t sélectionner] are all the 
processes that oppose choice* <1984: 55), Deleuze turns the possibility of
productive difference into a necessity (both strategic and otherwise). This 
is not therefore to say that there is always the possibility of further 
choice, but the return has usurped the possibility of the same and 
instituted the neccessity of productive difference. Undecidability (the 
Derriddian non-choice) will no longer do (silence will not do)j ré­
inscription will no longer do (difference within will not do), precisely 
because it avoids the necessity of this choice, that transforms choice into 
neccessity. We might say then, if for Derrida there is only the
(in)difference of différence, for Deleuze there is only the affirmation
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(the neccessity) of becoming different (copies of copies, the 'eternal 
return* of difference). To illustrate this point, we shall rewrite this 
Deleuzlan passage:
For between the Cre]construction which conserves and perpetuates the 
established order of representations, models, and copies, [and the 
deconstruction which reinscribes difference in identity, ascribes that 
there is no difference between (the old) model and (its) copy, because 
there is only (in)difference; J and the destruction of models and 
copies which sets up a creative chaos, there 16 a great difference; 
that chaos which sets in motion the simulacra, Cis not something that 
happens, but has no option but be actively produced, it produces 
difference, makes a difference]. 8
The difference is then, that Derrida's philosopher still uses the 
tools of the metaphysical box, even though he subverts, revises and
reinscribes them by inhabiting them. For the Deleuzlan theoretician though, 
'a theory is exactly like a box of tools. I...J It must be useful. It must 
function. And not for itself' (1977: 208). Thus Deleuze boldly asserts: 
'[wle don't revise a theory, but construct new ones, we have no choice but
to make others...' (Deleuze 1977: 208) We might therefore argue that if a
hermeneutics transforms a theory, then it is by subsuming it, if
deconstruction transforms theories, then it is by inhabiting them, the kind 
of post-modern Deleuzlan move though is to transform the "state" of
"theory". Theory is not a coherent structuration or framework, nor a 
strategy for intervention, but it is a tactics, a 'box of tools', from
which we can take what is useful, what we need for the moment. We take what
is appropriate, not to appropriate or to inhabit, not to make it our 
property or to borrow its properties, and not to add together with, fuse it 
with "our own" to gain a greater vision, a more comprehensive all- 
encompassing Theory, nor to supplement it, revise and deconstruct
an/other's theory, but to invent and construct with that which is useful,
f
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new theoretical 'Jetties'. Rather than retracing, remapping that which lies 
in the past, the Deleuzlan theorist travels a new terrain. She neither 
reconstructs nor deconstructs, but she pillages from the rags of post­
modernity, and adds to what she has already poached, multiplies her spoils. 
Above jlj else, "theory" must function, it must be productive, it must make 
a difference.
How then does this transformation of theory transform the field of 
translation <to return to the second part of our opening question for this 
section)? What difference can theory as this 'instrument for 
multiplication' make to translation? (Later, we shall also deal with the 
question of how this theoretical approach, which at least theoretically can 
make a difference to a field, can make a difference in practice to 
translation?) Translation, as we have seen, falls between multiple and 
conflicting demands. As this agonistic field, it sustains within it a 
multitude of discourses, and contains within it the struggle amongst these 
different discourses; an in-between site where disparate discourses ‘meet, 
clash or exist in a modus vivendi' (Hoesterey 1991: x); not a 'non-place' 
(Derrida), but a heterotopic place (Foucault), a para-site, so to speak, 
where discourse connect rhlzomatlcally. What we have been mapping then, is 
neither a hermeneutic unified, nor a deconstructive undecidable space, but 
a productive post-modern terrain for translation.
'Postmodernism', according to Ihab and Sally Hassan, 'has become a 
current and tenacious trope of tendencies in theatre, dance, music, art, 
and architecture; in literature and criticism; in philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, historiography, in mass 'communications, cybernetic
I
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technologies, and sometimes even in the sciences...' (1983: 14), we can now 
add translation to this list. The Zeitgeist of post-modernism, as the very 
crossroads where a multitude of debates from different areas intersect, is, 
of course, unrepentantly babylonian: always at the crossroads with other 
disciplines, always between different disciplines, between cultures, 
contexts, texts, languages and theorems, always transgressing into other 
spheres. At precisely this juncture, translation crosses paths with post­
modernism, and at this Juncture also, it finds itself transformed. This is 
to say, if no single theorization can dominate the Babelian performance, “ 
can master the plus d'une langue which manifests itself with such 
unrivalled force in (the field of) translation, then translation forces the 
very theories which articulate it to transform, and in turn, it transforms 
itself into that post-modern hybrid which calls all monism into question 
and gives birth to multiplicities. Henceforth, translation is not only the 
para-site for the Babel of theory, transforms/"babelizes" theory, but 
"itself" becomes transformed into a supremely post-modern product. Such is 
the transversal connection we have drawn between theory and translation
The post-modern mode, which characterizes (our approach to) theory 
(and in turn gives translation its transformed character) is, to use 
Wolfgang Welsch's words here, 'exoteric', i. e. open and capable of relating 
a multitude of discourses, and not 'esoteric' like the integrative unifying 
mechanisms of its traditional precursor modernism (Welsch 1988). We can 
gain an insight here of how post-modernism works: if modernism Itself is 
marked by plurality, it nevertheless strives to regain the lost centre, if 
modernism is marked by fragmentation, it tries to recuperate the lost 
unity. In other words, if modernism has lamented this very fragmentation of
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existence, post-modernism welcomes the loss of a totalizing coherence. 
Following Welsch, this constitutes an important shift of attitude: one is 
plagued by lament, the other celebrates and embraces the promise of 
multiplicity. Modernism and post-modernism are not in opposition to each 
other, rather, modernism has promised multiplicity (through its own 
plurality) but retracted, modernism has harboured within it the very 
promises which post-modernism then claims and produces. Post-modernism 
cashes in, so to speak, on modernism and it does this joyfully and without 
regret. This clearly relates to the shift which we have traced from a kind 
of hermeneutic either/or which seeks to overcome the very schism between 
either and or, to a deconstructive neither/nor which is suspended in the 
negative economy of the very undecidability between neither and nor, to the 
post-modern 'logic of the AND1 which affirmatively produces differences. 
This is also then, why modernism and post-modernism do not stand in 
opposition to each other: hermeneutically that opposition is not overcome, 
deconstructively the trace or diff¿ranee does not blur the boundaries, but 
in good post-modern fashion the post-modern virus turns the modern host 
into 'multitudinous proliferating replications of itself'. It is in this 
sense that post-modern theory can claim a potential which was part of 
modernism. It does not, however, incorporate, include, make a modernist 
discourse a part of its own, its own property, nor merely resist, subvert 
and relnsrlbe modernism, 7 but, in effect, it multiplies the sheer number 
of discourses at its disposal. In doing so, it clearly is capable of 
h- eotopia; it is open and conflictual, but never intergrative, unifying or 
totalizing.
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Translation in accord with this post-modern mode, also undergoes a 
shift from 'the one to the many' (Calinescu 1991). No longer devalued as a 
bad copy, and measured against the superiority of the Great Original, no 
longer accused of betraying its source, attention is shifted to its many 
multivalent versions. s No longer subject(ed) to the notion of a universal 
and timeless quality of the original model, one need no longer search on 
the bookshelves for the authoi— ized translation, the definitive version, 
verified and legitimated by the Author, but one may select amongst the many 
translated versions for as customers, which is as capital defines us, one 
may enjoy the consumer's choice. It is this positivity in attitude which 
post-modernism gives to translation, and as such there should also be a 
concomitant change of treatment: whereby translation is not regarded in 
terms of loss but gain. And here, it is not merely that the arrival of each 
and every newly translated version always already calls its original into 
question, nor that translation always already signals the failure of the 
closure of its original, in the face of the sheer plurality of translated 
versions, but, more importantly, in Deleuze’s sense, that translation as 
simulacrum produces difference, and affirms its new status through making 
the interminable production of difference into a necessity.
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5.4 Beyond (Two) Interpretation(s): Translation as (Re)Writing
Rather than searching for a theory of translation (Toury 1980), rather than 
postulating an integrative approach for translation studies (Snell-Hornby 
1988), rather than prescribing a Grundlegung elner allgemeinen 
Translationstheorie (Reiss & Vermeer 1984), and rather than deploring the 
lack of a 'coherent and consistent theory [which is still] required for 
translation' (Graham 1981: 23), we have signalled throughout this chapter
(see particularly 5.2) that translation is precisely what pushes Theory 
(with a capital T) to its very limits. Repeatedly then, we have argued 
against the very notion of an omniscient theory which masters its objects; 
and to reiterate some of these points one more time, what we have taken 
issue with, are theories which set out to 'reduce the [text's] polysemantic 
possibilities to a single interpretation' (Iser 1988: 220); we have
resisted a hermeneutics which seeks to 'fit everything together in a 
consistent pattern', 'impose[s] consistency' (219), as well as the 'drive 
for totality' (Culler 1975: 171), which compels the theorist to organize
all multiplicity into a 'model of unity' (174), and urges that one should 
'account for everything* in a text. In short, we have rejected the kind of 
theory which is 'logophobic' to use Foucault's word, that fears the 
'disorderly buzzing of discourse' (1972: 229), and that 'cannot entertain
the posslbllty. . . that reading may at any time come up against "linguistic 
factors" that "Interfere with the synthesizing powers of its... model [de 
Man 1986: 56]”' (Norris 1988a: 41).
A theory whose quest it is to comprehend the text as a totality, to 
reach a full understanding of it, and to establish the truth about the
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text, is a theory, in Barthes's view, which champions 'the idea of a model 
transcendent to several texts (and thus, all the more so, of a model 
transcendent to every text)' <1971: 44). Such a theory yearns for the
correct reading or understanding of the text, and, by implication, also 
stipulates the correct translation of a text. Indeed, many translation 
theories favour the concept of the kind of Unitarian theory which we have 
taken to task. Statements such as: ‘translatability of a text (can be!
guaranteed by the existence of universal categories (Wilss 1982: 49), 'the 
received text must be coherent' (Reiss & Vermeer 1984: 114) ' exemplify
Just this. Despite of themselves, many of these translation theories often 
depend, according to Edwin Gentzler, on various notions of equivalence, 
such as 'linguistic structural/dynamic equivalences..., corresponding 
literary function,.., or similar formal correlation governed by...
acceptability' (1993: 144); 2 Gentzler therefore finds, that 'despite the
different approaches, each theory is unified by a conceptual framework 
which assumes original presence and re-presentation' (144). Texts are 
managed here, rendered manageable or tamed, which is also the very kind of 
approach to translation that Lawrence Venuti criticizes in his essay 
'Simpatico'. As the translator of de Angelis, he points out that a de 
Angelis poem or 'text does not offer a coherent position from which to 
understand it' <1991: 7), and it is precisely this type of writerly text or 
'difficult writing' which a 'transparent aesthetic... would try to
domesticate... by demanding a fluent strategy' (10).
It follows for Venuti that what is needed is ' resistancy as a 
translation strategy' (15), to challenge this 'dominant (literary and 
translational] aesthetic in the target-language culture' (10). (He is in
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particular referring to the tendencies at work in Anglo-American
translatory conventions. > Consequently, he seeks to implement a strategy of
translation (here of De Angel is's poetry) which: 'in effect opens up tthe)
contradiction in the poem, foregounds it, and perhaps reveals an aspect of
De Angelis's thinking of which he himself was not conscious or which, at
any rate, remains unresolved...' (14). Venuti's translational strategy of
resistance is not unlike Miller or de Man's (un)readings of the undecidable
structures contained within a text or even a word. Their ' deconstructive
close readings', which pay attention to the irreducible heterogeneity
within texts, constitute a kind of resistance to the totalizing tendencies
which, in their view, reigns over the majority of criticism. Venuti's
translator, like the Yale reader, seeks out the contradictions (bindspots)
in a text. Venuti's translator, like Barthes's reader opens up the text
(breaks the text up, interrupts it). This then is a strategy which,
. . . exceeds the source language text, supplementing it with research 
that indicates its contradictory origins and thereby puts into
question its status as the original, the perfect and self-consistent 
expression of authorial meaning of which translation, is always a 
copy, ultimately imperfect in its failure to capture that self-
consistency. (14) 3
In this statement, Venuti also pinpoints the plight that translation 
has suffered at the hands of theories which hail the original as a self- 
contained plentitude, and consequently inferiorize the translation, not 
only for not measuring up to this perfection, but more Importantly in order 
to preserve the traditional privilege of the author as sole creator of
meaning, and thus to serve a system of beliefs which derives a sense of 
security and certainty, if meaning remains contained in the benevolent 
hands of one originator, if the potential for the ' cancerlous and
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dangerous proliferation of significations' (Foucault 1986: 118) is halted
safely at the very source. Foucault's author-function reminds us that to 
enshrine the author as the all powerful depositor of the riches of 
meanings, to endow the author with the control of meaning, is to constitute 
a guardrail against the 'disorderly buzzing of discourse' (1986: 229);
specifically in the context of translation, this guardrail works to prevent
meaning going out of the author's hands and into the hands of the
translator (s). The insistence on loss In translation then, the
concentration on its failures, is not only a way of reducing its status to
a second-order product, to be measured against its first-order model, but 
constitutes the very attempt to reduce its potential for proliferation.
This is to say, we inferiorize translation, devalue it, because we fear it, 
since it is the flaunting manifestation of textuality's most
'uncontrollable aspects' (Foucault 1972: 228). Foucault's thinking marks,
of course, a significant departure from many of the very author— centred
approaches which are still operative in translation studies circles, and 
the concomitant humbleness with which many translators describe the 
practice of translation, their craft as second-hand artists.
There is another important shift which Venuti begins to formulate in 
this essay: it is a shift from considering the original as a source to re­
constituting the text as a resource. Again, both the work of Barthes and 
that of Foucault shine through here. When he therefore writes that
'resistancy as a translation strategy', 'far from proving more faithful 
to... texts, in fact abuse!s] them by exploiting their potential for 
different and incompatible meanings' (Venuti 1991: 16), he might be
"unfaithful" to a text and "abuse" it, but does nevertheless not betray it,
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at least in the sense of betraying its constitutive plurality. What is at 
stake for Venuti, as he points out, is the Derridean notion that 'there 
are, in one linguistic system, perhaps several languages, or tongues' 
(Derrida 1985a: 100, qu. in Venuti 1991: 20). Plus d' une longue, we may
say, is the very point of departure for his approach to translation: 'I am 
arguing that the strategy of resistancy would go some way towards marking 
this difference in translation' (Venuti 1991: 20). When Venuti thus cites
Deleuze & Guattari who have it that 'a language is open to intensive 
utilizations that make it take flight along creative lines of escape' 
(1986: 20, qu. in Venuti 1991: 17), it becomes quite evident that Venuti
both utilizes and exploits the text as a resource rather than preserves it 
as a sacred origin/source. What the Venutian translator unleashes, in other 
words, is the polysemantic potential in textuality.
This exploitation of the flights of language, or the abuse of 'deviant
linguistic structures’ (1988a: 42), to evoke Norris's phrase once more,
takes its impetus from Philip Lewis's strategy of 'abusive fidelity'.
Indeed, Venuti quotes this very passage from Lewis:
The translator's aim is to rearticulate analogically the abuse that 
occurs in the original text, thus to take on the force, the 
resistance, the densification, that this abuse occasions in its 
habitat, yet, at the same time, also to displace, remobilize, and
extend this abuse in another milieu where, once again, it will have a 
dual function - on the one hand, that of forcing the linguistic and 
conceptual system of which it is a dependent, and on the other hand, 
of directing a critical thrust back toward the text that it translates 
and in relation to which it becomes a kind of unsettling aftermath (it 
is as if the translation sought to occupy the original's already 
unsettled home, and thereby, far from "domesticating" it, to turn it 
into a place still more foreign to itself). (1985: 43, qu. Venuti
1991: 10)
The kind of translation which Venuti (himself) produces, in accord with the 
Lewis strategy of abuse, is, in his words, 'an estranging translation'
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(1991: 18). “ This is to say, his own translations 'resist the hegemony of 
transparent discourse in English-language culture' which means that 'the 
foreign text also enjoys a momentary liberation from the target-language' 
(18). K When Venuti thus adds that '[his translations) do this from 
within, by deterritorializing the target language itself' (18), we can see 
clearly how Venuti resists the very 'imperialist tendencies' (18), as he
calls them, which are at work in translational approaches which prefer
(indeed impose) the fluency which is their own, the transparent readability 
which they see as proper to their target system.
To come back though to the strategy that Lewis outlines above, and
that Venuti follows, we also come up against a double-bind. On the one
hand, the translator is to 'rearticulate', reproduce the abuse that occurs
in the "pre-text" (original), on the other hand, s/he is to 'remobilize’,
'to extend this abuse', in other words, to transform and adapt this abuse
in the translation ("post-text"). Lewis is well aware though that these
formulations 'constitute an untenable contradiction' (1985: 43), and
furthermore, that they are constitutive of 'the necessity of a double
articulation', of 'the pressure for two interpretations':
the one in compliance with the target language, the other in alignment 
with the original text. The response would consist in assuming the
contradiction and making something of it... In terms of method, the
question would predictably, focus on'a paradoxic imperative: how to 
say two things at once, how to enact two interpretations at once. Or 
in the framework of our inquiry here, how to translate in acquiescence 
to English while nonetheless resurrecting a certain fidelity to the 
original French. (44)
What does Lewis make of this contradiction then? When he writes that * in 
this impasse, up against an apparent contradiction, one discovers the
t
necessity of a double articulation, of that plurallzed, dlslocutory,
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paralogical writing practice that Derrida has so often cultivated and
explained a double-edged writing as, precisely a response to the
pressure for two interpretations...' (44) then what emerges here, is
•double writing' (37), as the very strategy which sets this contradiction
into operation, puts it into practice as the very 'operator!1 of
undecidability' (44). Lewis proceeds to explain this writing as a
strategy, [which] analytic as well as discursive, is grounded in the 
capacity of discourse to say and do many things at once and to make 
some of the relations among those things said and done indeterminate. 
C... this then is] my quite limited project of delineating the 
elements of a translation practice that devolves from a disruptive or 
deconstructive writing practice, so as to suggest that, in 
translation, the difficulty of an already complex performance of 
language is aggravated, and with that heightened difficulty the very 
abusiveness that is made more difficult becomes that much more 
necessary. (44-45)
'Double writing' (37), as a translational practice, as an operator or 
instrument of undecidability, is a translational strategy, which
'acknowledges the complications post-structuralism has 
translation, particularly the concept of meaning as a 
plurality' (Venuti 1992: 12), and 'therefore shifts the
attention away from the signified "to the chain of signifiers"
brought to 
dif f erential 
translator's 
[Lewis 1985:
421' (12).
When Venuti furthermore explains that 'the invention of analogous 
means of signification... supplement the foreign text by re-writing it' 
(1992: 12), then we begin to see a clear link emerging between invention
and rewriting <i.e. translation is not merely an intervention and a 
reinscription, see also section 5.3). The question we need to pose here, 
however, is whether 'double writing', as a translational strategy, as the 
operator or mobllizor of undecidability merely reinscribes the "post-text”
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poststructurally, or does indeed rewrite the "pre-text" following the logic 
of post structural ism? Do Lewis and Venuti make a productive difference to 
translation in the Deleuzian sense? To put this differently, is the 
•necessity of a double articulation', this 'pressure for two 
Interpretations' which governs translation, adequately responded to by 
Lewis when he indicates that an indeterminate 'double-edged writing', can 
inscribe this undecidability between two interpretations in translation? 
Can 'double writing' as the very 'operator!] of undecidability' "translate" 
the 'paradoxic imperative' of having 'to say two things at once', of having 
'to enact two interpretations at once', into translation? Is it not here 
that we come to the limits of undecidability once more; that we come up 
against the deadlock of the Derridian ' I do not believe that today there is 
any question of choosing <1978: 293)?6 Neither in compliance with the 
target, nor in realignment with the source, but undecidably between. And 
the neither/nor finally locates difference, isolates it from its 
proliferating potential, as a kind of difference within.1 Does the concept 
of 'double writing' therefore not quickly shift the stakes from a profusion 
to a limiting function, continuing to police productive difference - not in 
the name of the same but in that of indifference.*
As a final step, how can we translate this "non-choice" into a 
necessary option. For this purpose, we add to our existing theoretical 
‘Jetties', a Quebecols feminist 'Jetty'. For here, shows itself in practice 
that which Lefevere sees as the power of rewriting.3 Rewriting here, in 
alignment with our discussion, i6 the opened sluice that once served to 
buttress all those institutions for controlling the 'disorderly buzzing of 
discourse*. The translator, as Lefevere points out, is, of course, the most
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obvious rewriter that intervenes in a given cultural system, but also, for 
our purposes, that is an inventor, bringing into operation all the devices 
of proliferating discourses available to her. Here, she makes a critical 
difference and takes Theo Hermans's translation as manipulation one step 
further. Translation à la Québécois highlights, foregrounds, indeed 
•flaunts' to use Barbara Godard's term, the unspeakable manipulation that 
occurs in translation, and that dared not speak its name until Hermans' s 
collection of essays entitled The Manipulation of Translation <1985). When 
Susan Bassnett therefore argues that studying translation means 'being 
aware of the processes which shape a culture at a given time’ <1989: 1), we 
can see, through the work of the Québécois translator/theorists, how theory 
began to transform itself by adding to the kind of Derridean deconstruction 
which seeks to intervene, a Deleuzian feminist tack which seeks to invent. 
In short, Québécois*s in<ter)vention as a translational strategy is already 
an index how a given cultural climate is in the process of being 
transformed at this very point in time, how the theoretical account of the 
manipulation of translation has here "translated", multiplied itself into a 
deliberate strategic practice in Canada.
What the Feminist Québécois translators do, is to produce texts in 
translation, rewrite texts in translation 'in other than received ways' 
<Lefevere 1985: 225). Feminism, and the translation strategy of the 
Québécois is not merely though an alternative Ideology and poetics ,0 to 
the dominant patriarchial one; it is this, but it is also more. Thus we can 
take the notion of an alternative, implying as it does, an 'other' to the 
same' of the dominant, one step further and argue that whilst feminism is an 
alternative, an alternative amongst other alternatives, it presents itself
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to the feminist as a necessity, in such a way as to effectively cancel the
status of 'alternative': for "us", women, there is no option but to create
new spaces, to rewrite, parasite, invent - to multiply. Here, of course,
the work of the Québécois takes on an even wider significance, it is of
necessity that She institute new ways of constructing worlds. Thus we
cannot merely accept 'the existence of two language worlds, those of men
and women' , and consequently 'advocate!] that women use the language of the
dominant to persuade and to transform it' (Gagnon 1977: 69, sum. by Godard
1990: 87), but must rather Insist on re-inventing the world. 'As an
emancipatory practice [then], feminist discourse is a political discourse
directed towards the construction of new meanings and is focused on
subjects creating themselves in/by language' (Elshtain 1982: 617, sum. by
Godard 1990: 88). And it is precisely here, that the site of translation as
a ground for feminist in(ter)vent ion, becomes irremediably and profusively
parasitic, intervening not merely to inhabit, but also to replicate. This
is because 'CfJeminist discourse is translation in tat least, we should
add! two ways: as notation... what has been hitherto "unheard of", a muted
discourse CIrigaray 1985: 132], and as a repetition and consequent
displacement of the dominant discourse' (Godard 1992: 90); ' ' our third
way, of course, is the outright rejection of the dominant and the
consequent unleashing of the viral, parasitic 'disorderly buzzing of
discourse' . It is in this sense also, that Québécois translators, such as
Barbara Godard, Kathy Mezel, or Suzanne de Lotblnière-Harwood, insist not
on the reproductive aspect of translation, but on the productive aspect in
translation. Translation as production, as transformation, as invention. '•*
Though traditionally a negative topos in translation, 'difference' 
becomes a positive one in feminist translation. C...1 Meaning 
discerned and assigned by the translator becomes visible in the gap or 
the surplus which separates target from source text tBrlsset 1986:
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207J. The feminist translator, affirming her critical difference, her 
delight in interminable... re-writing, flaunts the signs of her 
manipulation of the text. Womanhandling the text in translation would 
involve the replacement of the modest, self-effacing translator. 
(Godard 1990: 9*) 13
What with? The exuberant operator of multiplication, of course. Thus, '[dlo 
not ask me to remain the same: leave it to the bureaucrats and our police 
to see that our papers are in order (Foucault 1972: 17)!
Rather than finalizing this thesis by bringing its questions to a 
conclusion, we shall re-iterate them as questions. What then, is the 
connection between reading and criticism? What then is the connection 
between criticism and translation? What then, is the connection between 
between translation and theory? What then is the connection between 
translation, feminism and theory? The connection which has been forged 
between them, is that where reading crosses indiscernably into writing, 
here, not only does the question between the secondary and the primary 
become Irrelevant, but the purchase of this hierarchization becomes 
progressively weakened by the unleashing of the 'disorderly buzzing of 
discourse'. Here also, the question of the difference between "original” 
text and refraction, literature and criticism, or between this and that
theory collapses; the attempt to contain difference within, as some kind of 
pluralistic concession to an inherent complexity of eternal signification 
which will keep us Intellectuals in the business of generating 
interpretations, comes to be superceded by productive difference; and we 
must therefore move beyond that undecldable (in)difference that Inhabits
discourse, which not so much frees us from having to take up a position
within discourse 'but imprisons us within it, forcing us to assume a non-
position and must parasite whatever lies at our disposal, and more, to
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make a difference. In this way also, we can keep the rhizome proliferating, 
ceaselessly establishing connections, and forging new ones. We have thus 
charted a map of connections between those activities which 'do not 
resemble that from which they derive' (de Man 1986: 84), but are not unlike 
each other only in that, at each Juncture where they cross with each other, 
they multiply: X.
This thesis has been 1 a discourse about discourses' , about
(re)readings, (re)writings, criticisms, translations, theories:
but it is not trying to find in them a hidden law, a concealed origin 
that it only remains to free; nor is it trying to establish by itself, 
taking itself as a starting-point, the general theory of which they 
would be the concrete models. It is trying to operate a decentring 
that leaves no privilege to any centre. The role of such a discourse 
is not to dissipate oblivion, to rediscover, in the depths of things 
said, at the very place in which they are silent, the moment of their 
birth (whether this is seen as their empirical creation, or the 
transcendental act that gives them origin); it does not set out to be 
a recollection of the original or a memory of the truth. On the 
contrary, its task is to make differences... (Foucault 1972: 205) ,K *
*
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Notes
Notes to Preliminary Remarks
1 See David Daiches (1960) The Writer and the Modern World, where he 
suggests a broad difference, between nineteeth and twentieth century 
literature, along these lines.
2 My explication follows Ann Jefferson a David Robey's 'Introduction' to 
Modern Literary Theory (1982).
3 Leavis goes on to say, 'Cu]pon this minority depends our profiting by
the finest human experience of the past... Upon them depend the Implicit 
standards that order the finer living of an age... ' (1930: 3-5).
4 More recent perspectives in literary theory, such as that of misreading 
or the notion of the limitations to intelligibility will be dealt with 
in Chapter 3 when we come to consider Yale Criticism.
5 This gradual evolutionary approach which has been characterized here, 
does not suggest a linear process of such historical continuity, but has 
been adopted to conveniently illustrate the broad historical backbone 
from which literary theory has arisen.
6 'In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, writes 
Antony Easthope, showed that most of the time the scientific community 
sails along happily within a paradigm, a consensus about methods and 
ends. From time to time, however, new evidence or contradictions within 
the paradigm accumulate until the paradigm itself falls into doubt. At 
this point there is a crisis, a return to "first principles" and an 
intense interest in theory (for which there is no need while the 
paradigm rides high). Thereafter, a new paradigm is established, 
theoretical questions are put on the shelf and things return to normal' 
(1991: 3).
7 This Barthes quotation is an epigraph in Robert Scholes (1989: 1).
8 'Refraction' is Sammelbegriff used by André Lefevere to designate
'translation, criticism, historiography...' under a more general term. 
Moreover, a refraction is 'the adaptation of a work of literature to a 
different audience' (Lefevere 1982: 4). I am also using refraction as a 
Sammelbegrlff in order to conveniently circumscribe all those 
"secondary" activities such as reading interpretation, criticism, 
commentary, and translation..., 'activities' which in Paul de Man's
words, 'resemble each other in that they do not resemble that from which 
they derive' (1986: 84). Derived rather than orginal, secondary rather 
than primary, their status has also been 'second-rate'; this is the very 
point that Theo Hermans makes vis-à-vis translation in particular (1985: 
8 ) .
9 The underlying theme of this thesis throughout then is, that a
refraction, be it a reading, an interpretation, a piece of criticism,
commentary or 'translation is, of course, a rewriting of an original 
text'. Moreover, as Bassnett & Lefevere point out, 'all rewritings, 
whatever their intention, reflect a certain ideology and a poetics and 
as such manipulate literature to function in a given society in a given 
way. Rewriting 16 manipulation, undertaken in the service of power, and 
its positive aspect can help in the evolution of a literature and a 
society'. Whereas Bassnett à Lefevere also point out that 'rewriting can 
also repress innovation, distort and contain' (Preface in Lefevere 1992: 
vii), we shall argue that whilst certain (unified) theoretical
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assumptions compel refractions to do Just this, we shall suggest a 
different approach to Theory (with a capital T), which may open up the 
way for a more radical approach towards considering rewritings, not as 
distortions of their source text, but as an exploitation of a text as a 
resource, for multiple rewritings.
Notes to 1. 1
1 The term 'initiator of discourse' is the translated version by Sherry 
Simon 4 Donald F, Bouchard (Foucault 1977). I have chosen this term 
rather than 'originator of discourse', as appeared in Josue V. Harari's 
translation of the essay 'What is an Author', which was reprinted in The 
Foucault Reader (1986). 'Originator' seems an ill-chosen term given the 
context of Foucault's argument, which is precisely to deconstruct any 
notion of source or origin.
Notes to 1. 2
1 see Susan Bennett, Theatre Audiences (London: Routledge, 1990), on the 
range of Barthes's writing. She also makes the point that, 'Ctlhe label 
of readei— response criticism is too narrow for Barthes's theory' (p.
63).
2 Susan Suleiman (1980: 32) uses the terms positive and negative
hermeneutics to draw a distinction between those theorists who are 
concerned with issues of unity and those who are concerned with 
difference. In other words, she is marking the difference between 
"faithful" theorists (a term I have borrowed from Paul Ricoeur's 
writing) and post structuralists. Though I find these terms ill-chosen 
for reasons which shall be discussed in the Gadamer/DerrIda section, 
they, for the moment, serve the purposes of my argument adequately well. 
All subsequent references to Suleiman's introduction will appear in 
brackets after the quotation. See also footnote 1 of the following 
section 2. 1, which deals with the terminology used, by suggesting that 
one strand of hermeneutics might be negative, and the other positive.
Notes to 2. 1
1 We should point out here that Yale readings, i. e. "negative 
hermeneutics" are not marked by the 'happy endings', according to 
ELizabeth Freund, which characterize the narratives of Iser, Culler or 
Fish, whose readers are those would-be heroes, who 'successfully 
tovercome] the textual obstacles in the achievement of Ctheir) quest for 
meaning and self-realization' (Freund 1987: 88). For, with 'the onset of 
deconstruction twas) generated an alternative plot in which the reader is 
the agonist or anti-hero... who puts -in question his ill-starred quest 
for meaning' (89). But rather than assuming that the Yale hermeneut is 
negative (Suleiman), that his reader is the anti-hero of an unhappy 
ending (Freund), or even suggesting that reading might be considered a 
suspicious activity rather than one of trust, we would prefer to couch 
these terms of description slightly differently. 'Negative' as a word, 
does not by any means indicate that Yale Criticism as a negative
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hermeneutics, Is In any way devalorlzed vis-a-vis the work of the 
positive hermeneutic critics, indeed the very term, as we shall see in 
section 4.4 will be re-evaluated altogether, and 'negative1 is not to be 
understood in terms of something that, per se, is bad; in other words, it 
bears little resemblance to what we might associate with the terms 
"negative", "happy" or "heroic" in everyday language.
Having said this though, we nevertheless feel that implicit in terms 
such as negative and positive, is still the question of value. And here, 
it is, of course, a differential comparison between two theoretical 
approaches, that of, as we shall refer to it, the 'unitarian criticism' 
of Iser, Culler and Fish, and that of Yale Criticism which champions 
'difference within'. Since differential comparisions have the habit of 
inevitably subjugating a "lower" term to a "higher" term, it emerges that 
value is always implicltely hierarchical. And although, we have Just said 
that Yale as a negative hermeneutics, by no means indicates that it 
therefore is to be understood as the underprivileged term, as the 
"lower", "inferior" term in this binary, and that instead there has 
already been a revaluation of these terms, we nevertheless are still 
operating within oppositions which necessarily foreground valorizations, 
hierarchies, etc. We shall therefore use a number of different terms to 
describe a (positive) hermeneutics and (negative) deconstructive 
approach. Thus, thoughout, we shall make use of the terras "positive" and 
"negative" hermeneutics, but we shall also use terms such as "unhappy" 
and "happy" hermeneutics, "unitarian" and a "disseminating" criticism, 
or a "fellowship of discourse" (advocates reading as a unified, 
consistent, regulated/ordered activity) and the "brotherhood of Yale" 
(advocating (mis)readlng, as a dispersed, aporetic, disorderly 'buzzing' 
of activities).
Notes to 2. 2
1 It should be pointed out that there is nothing particularly 'natural' 
about 'shared conventions'. Indeed, as Mary Louise Pratt points out, 
Culler's notion of an interpretive competence is not something that is 
given to all readers equally, but 'an elaborate shoring up of the 
dominant status quo, and of the interpretive authority of the academy* 
(1986: 42)
2 In this sense, readers are no longer autonomous, spontaneous
individuals, but institutionalized products. As Culler writes, 'Ct)he 
meaning of a poem within the institution of literature is not, one might 
say, the immediate and spontaneous reaction of individual readers but 
the meanings which they are willing to accept as both plausible and 
Justifiable when they are explained' (1975: 124)
3 To recall this earlier quotations from Jane Tompkins: 'When discourse is 
responsible for reality and not merely a reflection of it, then whose 
discourse prevails makes all the difference' (1980: xxv).
Notes to 2. 3
1
2
Fish's note to 'Literature in thè Reader: 
reprinted in Jane Tompkins (ed.> (1980: 70).
This is a retrospective comment by Flteh on
Affective Stylistics', 
the ' Interpreting the
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Variorum* essay, which he makes in Is There a Text in this Class which 
is, of course, Fish's own edited version of his work (1980: 1*7)
3 Fish is quoted in Jane Tompkins (1980: xxiii).
4 op. cit.
5 As Jonathan Culler puts it, 'what Fish reports is not Stanley Fish 
reading but Stanley Fish imagining reading as a Fishian reader... his 
accouts of the reading experience are reports of Fish reading as a 
Fishian reader reading as a Fishian reader' (1982: 66-67).
Notes to 2. 4
1 I have used A. M. Sheridan Smith's translation of société de discours
here (1972), rather than Ian McLeod's translation 'societies of
discourse' which appears in Robert Young (ed.) (1981).
2 Though Iser and Fish are influenced by phenomeneology, and Barthes as
well as Culler by structuralism, we may nevertheless argue that what is 
common to both traditions of thinking, be it phenomenology or
structuralism, is a concern with unities.
3 As Barthes puts it: '[Un the multiplicity of writing, everything is to
be disentangled, nothing deciphered...' (1977a: 147).
4 We must remember here, that for Iser 'CtJhe words of text are given, the 
interpretation of the words is determinate and the gaps between given 
elements and/or interpretations are the indetermlnacies' (1981: 83), and 
it is these textual gaps/indeterminacies which 'stimulate the reader 
into filling the blancs with projections' (1989: 33-4). This is part of
Iser's response to Fish in a debate from Diacritics. We can see very 
precisely here, why Fish does accuse Iser of ' something that is
determinately given', if not in the Iserian text, but by it. As Freund 
puts it, '[flor Fish, nothing is given, and the reader supplies
"everything, the stars in a literary text are not fixed: they are just 
as variable as the lines that join them" [Fish 1981: 71' (Freund 1987: 
149). Fish is also, of course, rephrasing Iser's statement here, 'Ctlhe 
"stars" in a literary text are fixed; the lines that Join them are 
variable' (1984: 282).
5 Though Robert Holub (1984: 152) referring to Fish here, I am borrowing
his words's since they can also apply to Culler.
6 These are the discourses which Moriarty sees at work in 'The Death of 
the Author': 'historical (the genealogy of the figure of the Author), 
literary historical (a survey of modernism), linguistic, political' 
(101). We also, however, see a hermeneutic and a poststructuralist 
discourse at work in this essay.
7 Though Derrida is in particular writing about the relation between 
structuralism and poststructuralism in 'Structure Sign and Play', the 
kind of points he makes about structuralism - 1. e. the tendency to 
unify, to decipher a truth... - are points which may also be applied to 
hermeneutics. This is precisely also, what Diane Mlchelfelder 8t Richard 
Palmer also indicate in their Introduction to the Gadamer/Derrida Debate 
(1989: 9).
8 This is a phrase by William Pritchard, to describe the Yale School of 
Criticism (qu. ,in Lenticchia 1983: 283).
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Notes to 3. 1
1 Compare Barthes's unfolding of the readerly here: ' To depart/ to travel/
to arrive/ to stay. the journey is saturated. To end, to fill, to Join, 
to unify - one might say that this is the basic requirement of the 
readerly as though it were prey to some obsessive fear: that of omitting 
a connection. What would be the narrative of a Journey in which it was 
said that one stays somewhere without having arrived, that one travels 
without having departed... ?' (1974: 105; my emphasis) This passage also
echoes my Foucauldian critique of Iser, Culler and Fish.
2 Barbara Johnson is referring to Barthes's reading practice in S/Z, 
whilst I am using her words here to say something about Barthes's 
writing practice of S/Z (1980: 6-7).
3 Humanist feminists such as Showalter would not agree that it may be
desirable to suspend the question "Qui parle" when dealing with texts, 
particulary when engaging with texts by women writers. Rather than 
preempt later discussion, I shall provide these two citations by Toril 
Moi at this point: 'What feminists such as Showalter... fail to grasp is 
that the traditional humanism they represent is in effect part of 
patriarchial ideology. At its centre is the seamlessly unified self - 
either individual or collective - which is commonly called 'Man'... In 
this humanist Ideology the self is the sole author of history and of the 
literary text: the humanist creator is is potent, phallic amnd male - 
God in relation to the world, the author in relation to his text. . . ' 
(1985: 8). Moi also writes: 'For if we are truly to reject the model of
the author as God Father of the text, it is surely not enough to reject 
the patriarchial ideology implied in the paternal metaphor. It is 
equally necessary to reject the critical practice it leads to, a 
critical practice that relies on the author as the transcendental 
signified of his or her text. For the patriarchial critic, the author is 
the source, origin and meaning of the text. If we are to undo this 
patriarchial practice of authority we must take one further step and 
proclaim with Roland Barthes the death of the author' (62-63). We agree 
with Moi here, that Barthes' work can be used "fruitfully" for a 
feminist discourse. Indeed his very notion of a productive reading, 
which is really a writing, will resurface in our argument via the work 
of a number of Québécois feminists, whose work we shall consider in 5.4.
4 I reformulated Barthes's phrase: Reading, 'tilt is a form of work (...]
since I write my reading' (1974: 10).
5 The author Barthes is referring to here, is Flaubert rather than Balzac.
6 The notion of 'reading here and now' ties the practice of reading to the 
contemporary. This is to say, we can not escape reading from the 
perspective and knowledge of the present.
7 My quotation of Culler's phrase (1981: 38) is taken from E. Freund
<1987: 80).
»
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Notes to 3. 2
1 Geoffrey Hartman <1992, 1972) 'Preface', in Harold Bloom, Paul de Man,
Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Hartman, Hillis Miller (eds) Deconstruction 
and Criticism, New York: Continuum, ix.
2 Wallace Martin (1983) 'Introduction', in Jonathan Arac, Wlad Godzich, 
Wallace Martin (eds) The Yale Critics: Deconstruction in America, 
Minneapolis: Minnesota UP. xv. This book is an excellent, and the most 
comprehensive collection of essays on Yale to date.
3 Compare Roland Barthes's statement from S/Z '... the author is a god
(his place of origin is the signified); as for the critic, he is the 
priest whose task is to decipher the Writing of god' <1974: 174).
4 Christopher Ricks <16 May 1981) 'In Theory', The London Review of Books, 
3-6. Ouoted in Christopher Norris <1988: 211).
5 As David Robey points out, 'ttlhe term 'New Criticism' is usually used 
for the literary theory that began with the work of I. A. Richards and 
T. S Eliot before the war in England, and was continued by figures such 
as Charles Crowe Ransom, Cleanth Brooks and Allen Tate in the United 
States during the forties, fifties and sixties' <1982: 65).
6 Murry Krieger adds that, '[iln the flurry of interpretations and
reinterpretations - with the consequent evaluations and réévaluations - 
all mystery was to be discursively exposed in a burst of hermeneutic 
hubris such as criticism had probably never known. And it may well have 
been this excess which prepared the way for the inversion which the very 
concept of criticism as a serving art had undergone in recent years. I 
may in my turn have to suggest that the claim to critical autonomy - 
with its denial of priority to literature - is itself excessive' (1981: 
284). With his final observation, Krieger, of course, aligns himself 
with critics such as Wayne C. Booth, who has it that the emancipation of 
criticism 'brings us to a final test: Does the critic either acknowledge 
the superiority of the texts he deconstructs over his own readings or 
genuinely earn his claim to superiority? I cannot argue the point here, 
but for me the presumption of superiority is always initially on the 
side of any classic as against the critic. It is extremely improbable, 
though of course possible, that any one modern critic will be as richly 
endowed as Homer, Sophocles, Molière, Racine, Shakespeare, George Eliot, 
or William Butler Yeats. A critic who denies the authority either of 
author or text is trying to fly away without a supporting medium. He 
thus subjects himself to a peculiarly dangerous test: he must prove his 
own equality or superiority' <1977: 422). Both statements comprise a
particular reaction against Yale Criticism; whether Hartman, Bloom, 
Miller, or de Man, indeed wish to claim superiority over literary 
authors or their works, is quite a different question, and rather ill- 
conceived by Booth, as we shall see.
7 Hartman* s decription of the "traditional" critic is in many respects 
reminicient of our own assessment of the Isei— Culler-Fish fellowship of 
the previous chapter. Busily engaged in curtailing the dangerous 
' buzzing of discourse' , the critic here can be seen to adhere to the 
established order of a logocentric universe; furthermore, this critic, 
even if only implicit ly, puts the author back into the picture, put6 
him centre-frame, thus necessarily contributing to his/her own 
marginalized position with literary history.
8 Though in the "context" of the Searle-DerrIda debate, see Christopher
Norris <1991: 110).
*
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9 Or, as Hartman puts it in The Fate of Reading-. ‘Interpretation is a 
feast not a fast. It imposes an obligatory excess' C1975: 18).
10 See Peggy Kamuf' s commentary on 'Living On Border Line' <1991: 255).
11 This passage (as well as many other passages that I am using here with 
regard to the relationship between criticism and literature) were 
written by Hartman with regard to Derrida's Glas. The specific chapter 
in Criticism In the Wilderness <1980), which thus deals with Glas as a 
paradigm of the 'contaminating' relation between "primary" and 
"secondary", is entitled 'Literary Commentary as Literature' (see 189- 
213).
12 It should be pointed out here that there is nevertheless a difference
between Barthes's notion of reading as a 'form of work' and Hartman's 
notion of 'the work of reading'. If for Barthes texts are 'ready made 
dictionaries', and for Spivak/Derrida, a 'text belongs to language', 
for Hartman, as we shall see, texts, despite his references to 
intertextuality, belong to a 'mastei— spirit' (Hartman 1975: 255), in
short belong to tradition. It is at this point that Hartman's American 
brand of deconstruction is a far cry from French thinking on 
intertextuality. His statement (which we will deal with in a moment), 
that 'trleading is not a neutral technique; it is shaped by the classics 
it in turn supports' <1975: 304) is more akin to Eliot than to Derrida. 
As T. S. Eliot puts it: 'No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete 
meaning alone. His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of 
his relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; 
you must set him for contrast and comparison, among the dead...' (from 
Frank Kermode <ed. ) (1979) 'Tradition and the Individual Talent',
Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot, London, 38.
13 This passage is based on Marvin Carlson's economic illustration of how
Derrida's notion of the supplément may be used to describe the relation 
between text and performance within a theatrical context. As Carlson put 
it, 'A play on stage will inevitably display material lacking in the 
written text, quite likely not apparent as lacking until the performance 
takes place, but then revealed as significant and necessary. At the same 
time, the performance, by revealing this lack, reveals also a
potentially infinite series of future performances providing further
supplementations’ (1985: 9-10).
14 The French word propre has the following meanings (amongst others):
•own', 'clean', 'pure', 'specific'. As Morag Shiach points out, though 
writing about Hélène Cixous, 'the violence of the propre' is *a term 
suggesting propriety, property, and homogeneity, which is generally 
translated as "the selfsame"' (Shiach 1991: 16).
15 Burke argues furthermore: 'In his fervour to dissolve the distinction 
between primary and secondary, Hartman plays squarely back into its 
clutches. By writing so sensitively, so well, so explicatively about 
Glas, he makes of it a canonical text but only at the price of declaring 
his own work secondary, parasitic and sponsorlal' (192: 161) Our 
argument takes a different point of departure from Burke's thesis, and 
does not arrive at the conclusion that Hartman deems his writing 
secondary and inferior to Derrida's, thus not falling into the trap of 
his own logic as Burke clearly suggests here, we, Instead, wish to make 
the point that Hartman wishes to elevate his own work to the same 
primary status he bequeaths on Derrida' p writing; in short, he (Hartman) 
wishes Hartman's work to be as canonical as Derrida's.
16 Hartman uses the term ’indecisiveness' ' when he assesses Maurice
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Blanchot's work as a 'literary essayist': 'We all know that in England 
and America criticism enjoys a doubtful status. As a philosopher you are 
something even if you write on Nothing. But as a literary essayist 
you remain a no-thing, a hybrid or borderer between philosophy and 
literature, indecisive, or making indecisiveness your speciality' <1981: 
x-xi). What this passage shows once more, is that Hartman hovers 
' indecisively’ between the post-structuralist condition of hybridity and 
its denial through an institution of borders and limits. Hartman sits on 
the fence, so to speak.
17 A 'poise of balance' is Vincent B. Leitch's term for the hesitation 
between 'a simplifying humanism versus an indefinitizing 
deconstruction'. As he puts it, 'Ctlhe future of critical reading and 
writing hang in the balance. Glas is a forceful summa. While CHillisJ 
Miller chooses deconstruction, Hartman chances a poise of balance. [...] 
Wordsmith, worried, Hartman realizes that Glas is the moment when 
deconstruction turns on criticism and deconstructs its limits and its 
substance' <1983: 209-210). Compare this passage also with Leitch's
later statement that Hartman 'both admires and dreads Glas, for it 
raises a fearful specter of unreadable critical texts and a hierarchized 
civilization, yet it holds out the alluring promise of a new and 
productive creative writing and reading for criticism' <229). Leitch is 
supporting our own claim that Hartman is 'indecisive', is hovering 
between the '"language" of intei— textuality' and the '"logic" of 
autonomy', is sitting on the fence between deconstruction and its 
denial, is not, in other words, pursuing the full implications of post­
structuralist thought, but is concerned to preserve notions such as 
civilization and uphold notions such as tradition.
Notes to 3. 3
1 Compare also Bloom's statement here that 'any poem... to make room for
itself - it must force the previous poems to move over and so clear some 
space for it' <Bloom 1975a: 121).
2 Source studies are concerned with tracing the influence, that one poet
may have exerted on another, thus reconstructing the origins of the 
influence. Bloom has it that his project is quite different. To 
illustrate his claim, let us consider the following quotations: 'tolnly 
weak poems, or the weaker elements in strong poems, Immediately echo 
precursor poems, or directly allude to them. The fundamental phenomena 
of poetic influence have little to do with the borrowings of images or 
ideas, with sound-patterns, or with other verbal reminders of one poem 
by another.' And Bloom goes on to say, 'A poem is a deep misprision of a 
previous poem when we recognize the later poem as being absent rather 
than present on the surface of the earlier poem, implicit or hidden In 
it, not yet manifest, and yet there' < 1975a: 66-67). The point of
Bloom's notion of influence seems to be then, that the precursor poem 
ignites in the ephebe the sparks of innovation. The ephebe needs to free 
him/herself to be different. Since, however, as Jonathan Culler points 
out, there is 'a turning from text to persons' in Bloom's strand of 
"lntertexuality", in other words, the subject has crept back into the 
Bloomlan discourse, Culler raises this .question: 'Is not Bloom's account 
of influence and misreading actually a theory of origins...?' <1981: 
109) And we may therefore say, that the Bloomlan 'intei— reading' may be
2 7 6
far closer to the notion of'source studies’, than it Is to any notion of 
intertextuality. We merely wish to foreshadow this issue at this point.
3 'Intel— reading' Is not only to be understood here in terms of one poet
reading another, but extends to the readings of a poem by a critic. A 
point which we shall explore shortly.
* See The Pursuit of Signs, for here Culler writes that Bloom's theory of 
influence is in 'radical opposition to the theory of his French 
predecessors' <1981: 108). If for Barthes textual production is
'generated by an infinite network of anonymous citations'... For Bloom, 
on the contrary, the intertextual is not a space of anonymity and 
banality but of heroic struggles between a sublime poet and his dominant 
predecessor'. Again, there occurs a shift from text to person, which 
leads Culler to conclude that intertextuality derives 'from la] family 
romance, Cal cosy and murderous intertextuality of sublime poets' (109). 
Hence, 'Itlhere are origins after all; the precursor is the great 
original, the intertextual authority' (see ibid.)
5 The quotation from Adrienne Rich was cited by Kolodny, whose argument we 
have followed closely here. It should also be pointed out here that much 
of Bloom's work on "influence studies" has fed into the work of Feminist 
critics. Thus, Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar use Bloom's critical 
revisionism for their book The Madwomen in the Attic, which puts forward 
a feminist transformation of the canon. Moreover, as Culler points out, 
Gilbert and Gubar, as feminist critics, 'have shown considerable 
interest in Bloom's model of poetic creation because it makes explicit 
the sexual connotations of authorship and authority. This oedipal 
scenario, in which one becomes a poet by struggling with a poetic father 
for possession of the muse, indicates the problematical situation of a 
women who would be a poet' <1983: 60). The question here is, of course,
as Culler poses it, 'What relation can she have to tradition*. The 
question which should also be posed here though, is: Why have two 
feminist critics adopted the Bloomlan approach, particularly since Bloom 
has expressed more than once his 'own deep-rooted sense of the 
inadequacy of the female tradition' and has, moreover, 'expressed anti­
feminist sentiments' <de Bolla 1988: 12)? When de Bolla raises this
question, the point he fails to make, is, not only that Gilbert and 
Gubar are very critical of Bloom's 'linear patriarchial fill ation' (see 
Johnson 1987: 36), but also, more importantly, that Gilbert and Gubar
read Bloom also through a kind of 'revisionary impulse'. In short, it 
may be claimed that they reclaim Bloom for a feminist project, which, in 
Itself, is, of course, a feminist move or strategy (see also below).
6 What we are alluding here to, is Bloom's patriarchial attitude to women,
which may be illustrated via these citations. The first one is from a 
recent interview with Tom Moynihan, where he states: 'Most feminist 
poetry, of course, is like black poetry. It isn't poetry. It isn't even 
verse. It isn't prose. It is Just... I have no term for it. May be it i6 
the cultural equivalent on one level of the literary criticism, say, of 
Mr Hilton Kramer or Mr Joseph Epstein, or Mr Norman Podhoretz. These 
groups would not care for one another, but as demotic enterprises they 
have much in common. That is to say, they all all ideologues' (Moynihan 
1986: 9, qu. in de Bolla 1988: 12). Bloom's sentiments may be countered
here with his ,own words from A Map of Misreading, where the antipathy 
can actually be shown to be the result of a deep-rooted sense of fear, a 
threat Bloom perceives from feminism. Here, Bloom speaks of Western 
literary tradition in terms of a passing aV»d a renewal (adopting Ernst
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Robert Curtius's terms): 'The later Enlightenment, Romanticism,
Modernism, Post-modernism; all these... are one phenomenon and we still 
cannot know precisely whether or not that phenomenon possesses 
continuity rather than primarily discontinuity in regard to the 
tradition between Homer and Goethe. Nor are there Muses, nymphs who 
know, still available to tell us the secrets of continuity, for the 
nymphs certainly are now departing. I prophesy though that the first 
true break with literary continuity will be brought about in generations 
to come, if the burgeoning religion of Liberated Women spreads from its 
clusters of enthusiasts to dominate the West. Homer will cease to be the 
inevitable precursor, and the rhetoric and forms of our literature then 
may break at last from tradition* <1975: 33). At this point we refer our 
reader once more to Barbara Johnson’s chapter 'Gender Theory and the 
Yale School' <1987: 32-41), for a detailed critique of Yale from a
feminist perspective.
7 Critics such as Murray Krieger, Gerald Graff, Wayne Booth, the German 
critic Ulrich Horstman, would level such charges not only at Bloom, but 
also at Yale criticism as a whole.
8 Compare Sean Burke's thesis that: 'This development', and here he is
referring to Hartman, Bloom, Barthes, Derrida and Foucault, 'from strong 
reader to rewriter to writer has led many poststructuralists to suggest 
that criticism itself has become a primary discourse <Burke 1992: 159).
Whilst Burke makes the point that this really institutes the notion of 
the author once more, brings in a rival Author through the back door, 
and though we agree with his point here to an extent, at least inasfar 
as this refers to Bloom <but also, to a lesser degree to the other Yale 
critics we are dealing with), we do not think that this extends to 
poststructuralist writing as a whole, which is also onecfthe precise 
reasons why we do not regard the Yale critics as poststructuralist <see 
also section 3.5 on Paul de Man, particularly footnote 11).
9 See Thomas Carlyle <1987) 'Heroes and Hero-worship from Lecture 5: The
Hero as a Man of Letters', in Selected Writings, Hammondsworth: Penguin, 
233-256. The heroes as men of letters, for Carlyle, are 'a perpetual
priesthood, from age to age, teaching all men that a God is still
present in their life... <237) I...1 Cilf Men of Letters are so 
incalculably influential, actually performing such work for us from age 
to age, and even from day to day, then 1 think we may conclude that Men 
of Letters...' <245), to put this into our own words, are what Tradition 
with a capital T is made of.
10 Or should we rather say that 'isolated dialogue', that 'exclusive 
comparison' between father and son, that excludes, at least in Bloom's 
case, all mothers?
11 See Lentricchia point here; 'Bloom's warfare with his New-Critical
fathei— figures is not so much given up in his later books as it is
augmented by sibling rivalry. . . The threatening siblings turn out to be
no other than the new French critics, the structuralists, and
particularly poststructuralist figures like Jacques Lacan, and (most 
troublesome of Bloom's siblings) Jacques Derrida. Against the New- 
Critical precursors in America and the new rivals from the Continent, 
Bloom continues, with unfortunately misleading emphasis, to attempt to 
clear a space ,for himself in order to create his critical identity out 
of nothing. Despite his strenuous efforts, he remains a captive of the 
positions he opposes, a perfect illustration of his theory' <1983: 326).
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Notes to 3. 4
1 versprechen: to promise
Jemandem/einander versprochen sein: to be betrothed
sich versprechen: to pronounce a word/words wrong(ly), to make a slip of 
the tongue
sich von Jemandem etwas versprechen: to expect something from somebody/ 
to have certain hopes
The phrase ' Sprache verspricht <slch)‘ is used by Paul de Man (1979a: 
277), following Heidegger's 'Sprache eprlcht' , with reference to 
Rousseau. The more general point de Man is making here is, that language 
is by constitution misleading precisely insofar as the text promises "to 
tell the truth". Language, in other words, evades the control of its 
user, or in de Man's words: 'language itself dissociates the cognition 
from the act' (277). Whilst Hillis Miller explicates this phrase from de 
Man in '“Reading“ Part of a Paragraph' (1989: 167), our use of it is to
re-enact as readers of this phrase, the failure to read which takes 
place In language Itself C'the failure to read takes place inexorably 
within the text itself' (Miller 1987: 53), the failure of language to
signify 'an obvious or univocal reading' (see note 3 below). This phrase 
therefore serves us with the kind of play on words Miller often employs 
in order to highlight the undecidability and/or instability in language 
Itself.
See also J. L. Austin How to Do Things with Words. For Austin has it 
that 'performatives are contractual... utterances' (7). The performative 
phrase 'I promise that' conveys that 'it is appropriate that the person 
uttering the promise should have a certain intention, viz. here keeping 
his word'. However, Austin asks, 'Cdlo we not actually when such an 
intention is absent, speak of a "false” promise? Yet so to speak is not 
to say that the utterance "I promised that,.." is false, in the sense 
that though he states that he does, he doesn't... Cflor he does promise: 
the promise here... is given In bad faith. His utterance is perhaps 
misleading, probably deceitful and doubtless wrong, but it is not a lie 
or a misstatement. At most we might make out a case for saying that it 
implies or insinuates a falsehood or a misstatement (to the effect that 
he does intend to do something): but that is a very different matter.' 
(1962: 11)
The point about Austin's performative 'I promise that', is of course, 
that he sees any performative utterance firmly associated with its 
speaker and his intention; but there is no Instance in which the 
utterance 'I promise that' could be said to be either true or false. 
However, the actions that ensue from such a statement may be in flagrant 
apparent contradition with the promise. Thus Austin opens the way for 
our double performative of Sprache verspricht (sich) which reveals that 
the very structure of language is undecldable, for 'language promises' 
already contains within it the trace of 'language makes a slip of the 
tongue* .
2 Words strain,
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still.
(T. S. Eliot, The Four Quartets)
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3 Although this sentence from Miller's essay entitled '"Reading" Part of a 
Paragraph in Allegories of Reading was written with reference to Paul 
de Man, and as such is an explication of one of the main tenets of de 
Man's work, we may nevertheless say that what is expressed here, is also 
true for Miller's own work. As has often been pointed out, Miller and de 
Man's writings display many affinities; which is also precisely why 
Hartman sees both Miller and de Man as • boa-deconstructors', whilst 
aligning himself with Bloom as being 'barely deconstructionist' (Hartman 
<1979: ix>. It should therefore be noted that all subsequent quotations 
in our text from the Miller essay on de Man, serve to explain de Man's 
work Just as much as they explicate Miller's own work, which will become 
quite evident. And on a more important note, we should also point out 
here that whilst we will deal with Hartman's, Bloom's and Miller's work 
in separate sections, we will deal with the de Manian project as part of 
our summary section on Hartman, Bloom and Miller entitled 'Brotherhood 
of Yale: Disorderly Readings': for these critics are so indebted to de 
Man's work that his writings may sum up, or Indeed may be used to sum up 
the Yale project as a whole. To support our claim, we refer our reader 
to Frank Lentricchia. As he puts it: 'Reading the prefaces and 
acknowledgements of Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman and J. Hillis Miller, 
one is struck by the tone of respect, even reverence, with which the 
name of Paul de Man is mentioned. It is not difficult to locate reasons. 
Bloom's latest thesis about literary history was announced by de Man 
three years before the appearance of The Anxiety of Influence; Hartman's 
thesis in his book on Wordsworth was anticipated by de Man in an obscure 
essay; Miller's turn from Poulet was not much more than a repetititon of 
de Man's earlier essay on Poulet.' (1983: 283)
4 This phrase is quoted in Miller <1979, 217) from M. H. Abrams (1976)
Critical Inquiry II: 3 (Fall): 457-58.
5 Ibid. The point here is, of course, that Abrams's assertion is Itself a 
citation from Wayne Booth (1976) ' M. H. Abrams: Historian as Critic, 
Critic as Pluralist', Critical_ Inquiry II: 3 (Sprong): 441. As Miller 
(1979) puts it, ' M. H. Abrams cites Wayne Booth's assertion, that the 
"deconstructionist" reading of a given work "is plainly and simply 
parasitical" on the "obvious or univocal reading". The latter is Abrams' 
phrase, the former Booth's' (217).
6 See M. H. Abrams (1977) 'The Deconstructlve Angel', Critical Inquiry 3: 
425-38 (431). Abram's critique of Miller in this essay, is responded to 
by Miller (1977) in the essay 'The Critic as Host', Critical Inquiry 3, 
which is the early version of the revised and expanded contribution in 
Deconstruction and Criticism.
7 We wish to note the patriarchlal overtones of this statement and also
draw attention to either the absence of women in Yale writing, or the 
negative treatment of women. The latter is particularly clear in 
Hartman's statement that ' tmluch reading, is Indeed, like girlwatching, 
a simple expense of spirit' (1978: 248); and also 'li1nterpretation is
like playing a football game. You spot a hole and you go through it. But 
first you may have to Induce an opening' <1970: 351). We will return to
critique this phallogocentric discourse which is very much part of the 
"Yale Brotherhood (of men)" in a later chapter. Barbara Johnson (1987) 
has also dealt| with this in A World of Difference, particularly in 
chapter 4, entitled 'Gender Theory and the Yale School' (32-42).
8 Miller's etymological tracings of the words "parasite" and "host" are 
too intricate and too performative to do justice to in an exposition
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here; the reader is therefore referred to 'The Critic as Host' itself. 
It suffices to say here that '"parasite comes from the Greek parasitos, 
"beside the grain", para, beside <in this case) plus si tos, grain, food’ 
<1979: 220). Thus 'Cal parasite was originally something positive, a
fellow guest, someone sharing the food with you, there with you beside 
the grain' ; rather than later on when, '"parasite" came to mean a 
professional dinner guest, someone expert at cadging invitations without 
ever giving dinners in return' (220).
9 For this citation I have replaced Miller's word "poem" for “literary 
text". See 'The Critic as Host' <1979: 22*).
10 Michel Serres offers three readings of "parasite": 'The three meanings 
of the word parasite - physical noise <static), living animal, and human 
relation - suddenly beat time together to the same rhythm and with the 
same sounds' <203). As the translator, Lawrence R. Scher, explains in 
the introduction: 'The parasite is a microbe, an insidious infection 
that takes without giving and weakens without killing. The parasite is 
also a guest, who exchanges his talk, praise, and flattery for food. The 
parasite is noise as well, the static in a system or the interference in 
a channel. These seemingly dissimilar activities are, according to 
Michel Serres, not merely coincidentally expressed by the same word <in 
French). Rather they are intrinsically related and, in fact, they are 
the same basic function in a system. Whether it produces a fever or Just 
hot air, the parasite is a thermal exiter. And as such, it is both the 
atom of a relation and the production of a change in that relation. ' 
<1982: x)
Although there are clearly certain overlaps here between Miller and 
Serres, the "parasite" in Serres's account is a static, an interference 
which renders this parasite far more active, subversively 
interventionist than a parasite that is merely a manifestation of the 
difference within structures. It is this latter point • which we shall 
explore more fully in 5.2.
11 This quotation is taken from the early version <1977) 'The Critic as 
Host', Critical Inquiry 3.
12 Compare Jacques Derrida: 'The movements of deconstruction do not destroy 
structures fromthe outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can 
they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. 
Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and all 
the more when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the 
inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion 
from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say 
without being able to Isolate their elements and atoms, the enterprise 
of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work. 
This is what the person who has begun the same work in another area of 
the same habitation does not fail to point out with zeal. No exercise is 
more widespread today and one should be able to formalize its rules.' 
<1974: 24) We shall return to the full Implications of this 'parasitism' 
as Derrida also calls it in 5.2.
13 See also Vincent B. Leitch who states that ' the project of 
deconstruction for Miller is to redefine Tradition by putting the 
"tradition of difference" in place of the dominant "tradition of 
metaphysics" <1983: 196).
14 Miller's phrase 'theories of unity' <1982: 5) can be well applied to the 
work of Iser, Culler and to an extent also to Fish's work. Miller's own 
"difference within", be it within a word or'texts, rather than that of
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harmonious unity or unlvocality In literary works, or at least Imposed 
on literary texts by "theorists of unity", has of course, become the 
hall-mark of Yale. It is in this sense that Yale distinguishes itself 
most clearly from the work done by 'theorists of unity' with their 
emphasis on unity, consensus, etc. In other words, this is the crucial 
Juncture where the Yale brotherhood of 'negative hermeneuts' departs 
most stridently from the Isei— Culler— Fish fellowship with their 
'positive hermeneutic' stance.
Notes to 3. 5
1 See Wlad Gozich's essay entitled 'The Domestication of Derrida' C1983: 
20-43) which raises precisely this issue.
2 Compare Murray Krleger's point, that 'Cflor the first time, I believe,
criticism has gone beyond rearranging the canon: in its recent
revolutionary mode, criticism has undermined the very principle on which 
the canon - as a collection of primary works - exists, reconstructing it 
precisely in order to make place for itself within' <1981: 287). Though 
Krieger is right to suggest that recent criticism (and here he is 
clearly referring to Yale Criticism) has reconstructed the canon in 
order 'to make a place for itself', his prior point that this same 
revolutionary critical zest has also gone 'beyond rearranging the canon' 
is hardly true for the case at Yale (as we have seen 
discussions). However, Krieger's point might be better applied to the 
projects of Feminist criticisms which have sought to expose the canon 
for its partiarchal basls/bias (see Judith Fetterly, for instance), or 
have sought to re-write the canon (Kate Millet), and have, moreover, 
questioned the very idea of a canon. As our observations show, Yale very 
much colludes with the great tradition.
3 We would like to remind our reader, that Miller insisted on the notion
of 'great works of literature'., that for Hartman, the 'great work of 
art is more than a text. It is the "life-blood" of the "master-spirit"', 
and for Bloom, the great influential master, as always, stands before 
the anxious ephebe. Thus the critic here does not 'draw from an immense 
dictionary' or 'mix writings' A la Barthes, but serves his primary well, 
even to the point of seeking to measure up to its grandeur. Thus, unlike 
the Barthe6ian "scriptoi— reader" who belongs to language, the great 
critic of Yale firmly belongs to literature. This is to say, he (there 
being very little doubt about his gender), he does trace a field with an 
origin, and that origin is always the great tradition of literary 
writing - literature with a capital L. Here, textuallty is barely 
lntertextual, at least not in Barthes's sense of the term (as we
indicated earlier), and the text is hardly that Bartheslan
'multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them
original, blend and clash'. Rather, the texts that Yale critics prefer, 
are the great canonical texts of "our" tradition.
4 In Dissemination <1981: 85), according to Donald G. Marshall, 'Derrida
sees Plato as defending the "living" oral word against "dead" writing, 
severed from its “father" and available to a promiscuous audience, 
unstitching the unity of the logos in its endless texture and
ramifications' <1989: 203). Binary oppositions such as speech and (over)
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writing have dominated metaphysics since 'Egyptian, Babylonian and 
Abysslan mythology'. Other binaries Derrida cited are: 'legitimate 
son/orphan bastard, soul/body, inside/outside, good/evil,
seriousness/play, day/nigh, sun/moon ect.. . ' One term has always, of 
course, been privileged over the other according to the logic of 
logocentricsm. Also, compare Hélène Cixous's deconstruction of these 
terms in an essay entitled 'Sortie' which was first published in English 
by Elaine Marks, Isabelle de Courtivron, eds, (1980). New French 
Feminisms.
5 This passage from Derrida's Positions <1981a: 41) is translated from the
French <1972: 56-57) by Jonathan Culler and quoted in On Deconstruction
<1982: 165). We have used Culler's translation for our text.
6 Compare also J. Hillis Miller's statement that 'understanding contains a
residue of misunderstanding' <1989: 167).
7 This quotation from de Man's foreword to Carol Jabob's The Dissimulating
Harmony <1978) is cited in Robert Young <1981: 265). Also compare de
Man's elaboration of these points in Allegories of Reading <1979, 9-12). 
Here, he give the example of Yeats's poem 'Among School Children' which, 
of course, ends with the line: 'How can we know the dancer from the 
dance?' The point de Man makes here, is that the this last line can be 
read both literally and figuratively <11>. Figuratively the line ususally 
suggests the union, 'the potential unity between form and experience, 
between creator and creation', it can also be read literally thus 
leaving us not with a rhetorical question , but with the questioning, of 
'how... we Ccouldl possibly make the distinctions that would shelter us 
from the error of identifying what cannot be identified'. As de Man 
concludes this point: '...two entirely coherent but entirely
incompatible readings can be made to hinge on one line, whose 
grammatical structure is devoid of ambiguity, but whose rhetorical mode 
turns the mood as well as the mode of the entire poem upside down. 
Neither can we say. . . that the poem simply has two meanings that exist 
side by side. The two readings have to engage each other in direct 
confrontation, for the one reading is precisely the error of the other 
and has to be undone by it. Nor can we in any way make a valid decision 
as to which of the readings can be given priority over the other, none 
can exist in the other's absence...' <12) De Man's point here is, of 
course, that language is unstable, unreliable, indeed that the poem 
'Among School Children' deconstructs itself, which is precisely why we 
are faced with this undecidability.
We would also like to draw attention to Stanley Fish's essay 
•Interpreting the Variorum* <1980) which focuses on Milton's twentieth 
sonnet 'Lawrence of virtuous father virtuous son'. Here, the controversy 
over the different readings of the final lines, 'He who of those 
delights can Judge, and spare/ To interpose them oft, is not unwise', 
springs from the word 'spare', for which there are two possible 
readings: 'leave time for, refrain from'. As Fish points out, 'Obviously 
the point is crucial if one is to resolve the sense of these lines. In 
one reading 'those delights' are being recommended - he who can leave 
time for them is not unwise; in the other, they are the subject of a 
warning - he who knows when to refrain from them is not unwise.' <150) 
Fish, as we know, rejects, that meaning is embedded in the artifact, and 
proposes Instead that meaning is to be experienced by the reader. Since 
textual evidence proves inconclusive here to reach any decision as 
regards the meaning of these lines, Fish nevertheless draws this
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conclusion: 'But what If that controversy is Itself regarded as 
evidence, not of ambiguity that must be removed, but of an ambiguity 
that readers have always experienced? What, in other words, if for the 
question 'what does "spare" mean?' we substitute the question 'what does 
the fact that the meaning of “spare" has always been an issue mean'? 
(150) This according to Fish can be answered. For the reader's
participation in these 'contradictory readings'... 'becomes evidence of 
the equal availability of both interpretations'. 'In other words', 'the 
lines first generate a pressure for Judgement - 'he who of those
delights can Judge' - and then decline to deliver it; the pressure,
however still exists, and is transferred from the words on the page to 
the reader (the reader is 'he who'), who comes away from the poem not
with a statement but with a responsibility, the resposibility of
deciding when and how often - if at all - to indulge in 'those delights' 
(they remain delights in either case). This transferring of
responsibility from the text to its readers is what the lines ask us to 
do - it is the esence of their experience - and in my terms it is
therefore what the lines mean’ (151).
Both examples thus illustrate how de Man and Fish operate their
readings; moreover though, these examples also highlight their
similarilties and differences. If de Man suggests an inevitable aporia, 
unresolvability, which constitutes what the poem is about (literature is 
about deconstruction), Fish decides for us that the decision we have to 
take is, precisely, what the poem means. Although their assertions are 
very similar here, both propose ,to know what the poem is about
(undecidability within all liguistlc structures t de Man]; undecidability 
transferred to the reader CFishl), their overall aims differ. If de Man 
'canonizes' undecidability (in true Yale-ian spirit), celebrates the 
undecidability in reading, the dlsorderllness of reading, Fish brings a 
certain order to the reader's decisions, he orders undecidablity out of 
the text's existence, and makes the reader the regulator of decisions.
8 Norris is adamant here that this does not suggest that there is a 
blurring of the distinction between the reading of a literary and a 
philosophical text. Indeed, such a conclusion about de Man's reading
"technique" is far too simpl-istic according to Norris. When Norris 
therefore writes 'that philosophy when analyzed in terms of its textual 
or rhetorical constitution will always turn out to be "an endless
reflection on its own destruction at the hands of literature" [ de Man 
1979, 115)' (Norris 1988a: xii-xiii), thus making the point that
'literature' is a very 'different kind of writing... from phllosphy', we 
prefer to make the point here, that rather than suggesting that there is 
no blurring between literature and philosophy in de Man's thesis, that 
there is a "blurring into the distance" of the critical/philosophical in 
de Man: for, as also in Miller, de Man subsumes all (great) writing
under the aegis of the literary. It is, in other words, the literary 
which is most prone to the kinds of deconstructive readings, de Man 
engages in. And since he reads the works of critics for their auto-
deconstructive moments, we may well say that only the great 
crltlcs/phllosophers (such as Rousseau, or Derrida, or Derrida on 
Rousseau, but more to that later) yield for de Man the kinds of 
deconstructive.readings which he sees implicit in the literary. It is in
precisely this sense, that de Man can conclude in his essay 'The
Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida's Reading of Rousseau' (1983: 
102-141), that 'Derrida can be "right" ’on the nature of literary
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language and consistent In the application of this insight in his own 
text, he remains unwilling or unable to read Rousseau as literature' 
<138). Hence, 'Derrida's text is less radical, less mature than 
Rousseau's, though not less literary' (140). We also wish to note de 
Man's tone of rhetoric here.
9 This quotation from de Man's foreword to Carol Jabob’s The Dissimulating 
Harmony (1978) is also cited by Robert Young (1981: 265).
10 De Man also suggests that, he as a reader, was 'only trying to come 
closer to being as rigorous a reader as the author had been...' (see 
subsequent long quotation in my text). This "authoi— centeredness" also 
comes out when de Man writes, here with reference to Derrida on 
Rousseau, that 'Derrida Cwas! deconstructing a pseudo-Rousseau by means 
of insights that he could have gained from the "real" Rousseau? (1983: 
140, my emphasis).
11 The authoi— god and the great authoi— ized critic go together, of course. 
And although we are not suggesting that de Man is treading the path that 
Barthes maps out in 'The Death of the Author', there are nevertheless 
certain instances in de Man, where Barthes's descriptions of the authoi—  
god and his great critic come dangerously close to de Man. When Barthes 
writes, for instance, that 'such a conception suits criticism very well, 
the latter then slotting itself the important task of discovering the 
Author... beneath the work: when the Author has been found, the text is 
'explained - victory to the critic' (1977a: 147), we become alert to the 
implications of de Man's claim that he is 'only trying to come closer to 
being as rigorous a reader as the author had been'(ibid), and we become 
sympathetic to Lentrlcchia's insinuation that de Man's 'analyses are 
marred at every point by the suggestion that he is in undisputed, 
authorative, and truthful possession of the texts he reads'.
We should also point out here, that the major difference between Yale 
criticism and Barthes's writing which has slowly been emerging (and we 
are not denying that there are many shared concerns, as we have, indeed, 
seen) is, that whilst Yale Institutes a Great Critic, for Barthes 
'[tlhere are no more critics, only writers... the theory of the text can 
produce only theoreticians or practioners (writers), but absolutely not 
"specialists" (critics or teachers)' (1981: 44). Flippantly, we may say 
then, this is more poststructuralist than de Man etal. could ever hope to 
be, this is, in many inverted commas, "proper" post structural ism: and 
here, we could be presumptuous enough to state, that Lentricchia might 
even agree with us on this!
12 We may ask here whether this phrase illustrates that language 
deconstructs itself, or whether de Man deconstructs his text here, for 
how can 'randomness' be 'absolute'?
13 As Lentricchia aptly points out: 'The Yale Derrldlans will not in the
long run threaten every partisan of traditionalism, because they will 
turn out to be traditionalism's last formalist buttress' (1983: 169, my
emphasis).
14 This phrase is from Derrida (1987: 89). We should point out though that 
not only have we taken this citation out of context, there is also no 
relation between our own methodology and Derrida's claim in the sentence 
which follows our citation of him, that our reader should ' tg)uess the 
number of false citations in my publications...’ However, the point that 
we took his citation out of context, together with the playfulness of 
Derrida's remark poses important theoretical questions (which we will 
turn to in a subsequent chapter). The issue, at hand, is that
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'plagiarism', in Kathy Acker's sense of the word/practice 'callts] 
attention to a post-modern understanding of "reproductive rights" 
(certainly a feminist concern)' according to Diane Elam (1992: 161), and
in this respect, the issue - though it is a digression here - links with 
our notion that a reading is always a re-writing, and that this is our 
'reproductive right' as women readers.
15 We should merely like to point out that we are following Norris's 
exposition in this instance closely; and that this passage by de Man is 
also quoted in Norris (1988a: 42).
16 The context of this citation in Norris (1988a) is as follows: 'Thus 
Miller can enlist de Man on the side of a readerly ethics whose
imperative is that of cleaving always the letter of the text and holding 
out against the premature seductions of coherent sense. Compare also to 
Norris' s summary in Deconstruction and the Interests of Theory, where 
'ethical reading' is a 'moment Cwhich! occurs when reading comes up 
against stubborn, resistant, or problematic details in the text, details 
one is tempted to ignore of reinterpret in the interests of maintaining 
coherence and sense' (Norris 1988: 165, referring to Miller 1987).
17 In section 4. 1 we will deal with hermeneutics in detail. Though we 
should say here that the Reception Theory which Hans-Robert Jauss
advocates, and which seeks a union of hermeneutics and poetics, and 
which, furthermore, has come out of the work of the Constance School, 
shares many features, particularly with Wolfgang Iser.
18 We have to remember that hermeneuts, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer,
believe in 'the universality of the hermeneutical experience' (Gadamer 
1989: 95).
19 On Michel Foucault's distrust of theory, see Peg Bi rmingham's excellent 
essay entitled 'Local Theory' (1989: 205-212, 205).
20 The sense of grandeur which we have previously pointed out in the other 
Yale critics, emerges here very clearly also in de Man. Another claim to 
greatness may also be illustrated through de Man's statement that '... 
if you have a poor text, you cannot make up a very rewarding
construction' (1983: 185, my emphasis). Presumably, only a rich text
will yield readings of the de Manian calibre, It is in this sense that 
this particular statement is linked to his point that there are 'good' 
misreadings of a text. As he puts it: ' by a good misreading, I mean a 
text which can itself be shown to be an interesting misreading, a text 
which engenders additional texts. If you have a poor text...' (1974: 
51). This begs the question, according to Lentricchia, 'CwJhat purpose 
such traditionalist terms can serve in a poststructuralist context. . . ' 
(1983: 185).
Notes to 4. 1
1 If we have suddenly shifted our explorations away from a positive and a 
negative hermeneutics to hermeneutics and deconstruction, then it is 
because to put a "positive fellowship" and a "negative brotherhood” 
under the grand umbrella of a hermeneutics is itself a hermeneutic move. 
This is to say, hermeneutics will always claim a universal status for 
its interpretlye approach, a grand metaphysical move, which is, has been 
the aim of deconstruction to undo. Therefore, we wish to keep both quite 
sepirate (contrary to the claim of many critics who see deconstruction 
as a branch of hermeneutics, which is lit itself, precisely, a grand,
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trancendental hermeneutic gesture). Thus we shall herewith revise the 
terms which we have used thus far to describe what are in effect the 
unifying hermeneutic tendencies of the "fellowship" and the 
disseminations of the "brotherhood”. In short, a positive hermeneutics 
is a hermeneutics and a negative hermeneutics, far removed from a 
hermeneutic spirit, and is thus part of deconstruction. Again, the 
inadequacies of the terras "positive" and "negative" hermeneutics becomes 
visible here.
2 David Wood U990 ) suggests that they are 'often seen to occupy opposite 
poles within continental philosophy*, rather than as I have suggested 
that they must be seen to do so. Wood's article seems to be suggesting 
that Oadamer is far closer to Derrida, far more deconstructionist, than 
we are willing to suggest here. Wood may, indeed, almost be accused of 
making a hermeneutic gesture in terms of claiming Gadamer for a 
deconstructive project; we wish to make a more Derridan move and suggest 
that their relation is a non-relation, in other words, that their 
relation is marked by radical alterity, that their respective discourses 
are radically incommensurable (which is a point which will emerge 
through our subsequent discussions).
Notes to 4. 2
1 Gadamer adds here that he shares this view with Derrida: 'Cclertainly I 
shore with Derrida the conviction that a text is no longer dependent on 
an author...' (1989: 96).
2 There is a clear parallel with Iser's approach here: 'meaning must 
clearly be the product of an interaction between the textual signal and 
the reader's acts of comprehension' (1978: 9).
3 As Gadamer puts it, 'in living conversation one tries to reach 
understanding through the give-and-take of discussion, which means that 
one searches for those words - and accompanies them with intonation and 
gesture - that one will get through to the other (...] everything that 
is fixed in writing refers back to what was originally said, but must 
equally as much look forward; for all that is said is always already 
directed towards understanding and Includes the other in itself. ' (1989: 
34). '
4 Mlchelfelder and Palmer add: 'CwJhile Derrida would agree that the
meanings generated by language always exceed our intentions, he proceeds 
from a view of language where language is presumed to be always already 
writing, where the spoken word is seen as an already disrupted sign, 
infiltrated by absence. So he remains continually on the alert as to how 
otherness lurks within meaning, and how, for a particular concept at 
issue, there may be no possibility of deciding, from among its competing 
meanings, one that is true or authentic' (1989: 1). Here is summarized
one of the crucial differences between Gadamer and Derrida, which we 
shall consider in detail in subsequent sections.
5 JUrgen Habermas criticizes Gadamer on precisely this point: the power 
relations that might be Involved in a speech situation. What Habermas 
and Gadamer share though, is a faith in the possibility of reaching 
consensus. ,
6 Despite all the openness to the other is there not the risk of 
appropriation, is there not a risk of misusing one's power, if for a 
moment we assumed that one partner in this dialogic event was actually
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stronger than the other? This is precisely the kind of' critique that 
Derrida levels at Gadaraer, and which we shall examine in section 4.4, 
when we bring Gadamer and Derrida into direct play with each other.
7 As Paul de Man has pointed out, ’the ultimate aim of a hermeneutically 
successful reading is to do away with reading altogether’ <1986: 56).
8 Gadamer does draw a distinction between literary texts and non-literary 
texts. When he therefore argues that ’a literary text is not Just the 
rendering of spoken language into a fixed form...’ <1989: 42), we can 
presume that it is more "complicated", "complex” than spoken language. 
In other words, contrary to a deconstructive practice, which sees 
language as something inherently ambiguous, unstable, indeterminate, and 
thus blurrs the distinctions between literary and non-literary text, 
Gadamer is firmly holding on to the specifics of generic boundaries.
9 Kommunikatlonsverzerrung is a Habermasian term.
10 Since ’every reading that attempts to understand is only a first step
and never comes to an end’ <Risser 1989: 185), and since hermeneutics
sees its task in terms of developing a procedure of understanding in 
order to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place 
<Gadamer 1975: 263), we may well say that hermeneutics is concerned
with the terms of understanding rather than with understanding a 
particular text. This is precisely a point which we raised in our 
Preliminary Remarks. Though when we discerned a shift in literary theory 
precisely from the particulars of understanding a text to the more 
general terms of understanding, we may now see yet another turn: one 
that promotes a kind of Foucauldisn local criticism which rejcts the 
comprehensivenmess of Theory <with a capital T); this remains an issue 
which we shall return to in 5. 2.
11 We have quoted Gadamer selectively here in order to get our point across
£ more clearly. Gadamer's argument is thus more intricate than we may have
suggested. For further details please see Truth and Method, 259.
11 We must add here, that misunderstanding, whilst possible, occurs mostly 
with regard to the written word. This is to say, because 'written words' 
are 'cut loose from any specific situation of commuication. . . [they] 
risk misuse and misunderstanding because they dispense with the obvious 
corrections resident within living conversation' <Gadamer 1989: 34).
Furthermore, '[a] misunderstanding will arise if the reader is not 
experienced and does not hold him or herself open to the voice of 
tradition' <1991: 111) according to Deborah Cook. This is, of course, as 
Cook also points out not the case for poststructuralists.
13 Bernasconi is really referring to Gadamer's 'unitary understanding of
Nietzsche' <1989: 244) here. This is precisely the point, of course, at
which Gadamer and Derrida's readings of Heidegger reading Nietzsche also 
differ.
14 Derrida's refusal to "communicate", converse with Gadamer altogether, 
shall be our theme in 4. 4.
Notes to 4. 3
1 As Jefferson explains, 'ttlhe function or meaning of an element is never 
fully present because it depends on its association with other elements 
to which it harks back and refers forward. (Thus meaning is always 
deferred.] At the same time its existence as an element depends on lt6 
being distinct from other elements' (19)82: 105). We will explain
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difference in further detail in section 4.4.
2 Here, of course, we are thinking of Derrida's treatment of Rousseau in 
Of Gramnatology.
3 Compare Barthes's statement vls-i-vls the author here: 'Did he wish to 
express himself, he ought to at least know that the inner "thing" he 
thinks to "translate" is itself only a ready-formed disctionary, its 
words only explainable through other words, and so on indefinitely' 
< 1977a: 146)
4 These fragment citations from Derrida's 'Limited Inc abc' Glyph 2 <1977) 
200, are quoted in this precise sequence by Knapp and Michael (1987: 62).
5 This constituted Derrida's response to Paul Ricoeur at a round table
discussion, in La Communication, vol II, 413-414, quoted by Gary Madison
<1989: 293).
6 Compare Derrida's statement on "the chance of other interpretations"
from Dissemination here: 'And yet these links go on working of
themselves. In spite of him? thanks to him? in his text? outside his 
text? but then where? between his text and the language? for what 
reader?' <1981: 96)
Notes to 4. 4
1 This quotation is taken from an unpublished seminar paper by John 
O'Reilly, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, which he 
kindly gave me to read.
2 The Other is also an important pointer here: not only does the other 
always stands in a relation, be it to oneself, to others, to itself, but 
more crucially for our argument, it may also be used to describe the 
relations such as that between author and critic, writer and reader, 
literature and criticism. Since one term tends to be hierarchized (in 
this "equation", "opposition"), the other becomes denigrated, or 
repressed (this is of course the logic of a binary system, which Derrida 
has sought to expose). The other term therefore tends to be "outside", 
"off-centre", "marginal". To relate this back to our argument then, it 
becomes crucial to see what Gadamer and Derrida have to say about the 
other, about each other, for it has a bearing not only on their relation 
to each other, but also how they define relations; in other words, we, 
may use their "definitions" also to make certain points (as we shall 
see) about the relations such as that between author and reader, 
literature and criticism, etc.
3 We might recall Richard Shusterman's statement here: 'But what for him
ensures the possibility that these different horizons can be fused? The 
answer is that they are already implicitly Joined (hence not fully 
distinct) "in the depth of tradition" CGadamer 1975: 2731; for tradition 
is portrayed as all-encompassing and ever-developing, continuous and 
unified totality: "A single horizon that embraces everything contained 
in historical consciousness" CGadamer 1975: 2711' <1989: 217).
4 Gadamer indeed voices 'Derrida's qualms' as he puts it, 'about this! 
venture of thought: Is there not in hermeneutics - for all its efforts 
to recognize otherness as otherness, the other as other [...] - too much 
conceded to reciprocal understanding and mutual agreement?' (1989: 97)
And he also writes, 'Derrida would object by saying that understanding 
always turns into appropriation and so involves a covering-up of 
otherness' (1989: 119).
t
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5 I have quoted Herman Rappaport's translation of this Gadam.er passage
here (1989: 199>.
6 The point that the one annexes the other in the GadameWan discourse is
also made by Joseph Simon <1989: 165); whilst David Wood also has it 
that Gadamerian dialogue works as a kind of 'extension!] of ourselves' 
<1990: 125).
7 David Wood's <1990: 118-131) translation of these sections of Altérités
(1986) have formed the basis of my citations.
8 David Wood's essay 'Vigilance and Interruption: Derrida, Gadamer and the
Limits of Dialogue' <1990) has proven invaluable to my argument for this 
particular section of my thesis; though we must point out that we do not 
share Wood* s discursive move by which he makes Gadamer a
"(serai)deconstructionist", in other words, his move to appropriate 
hermeneutics for a deconstructive project!
Notes to 5. 1
1 It is precisely the Derridian notion of ' undecidability' which we will 
come to criticize in 5. 3 and 5. 4.
2 This quotation is taken from a different context, Gentzler is refering
to Foucault, not Irigaray <1993: 152).
3 We can make a link here between woman as other and translation as 
other: both have been marginalised. Indeed, in 5. 4, we will turn to the 
question of translation and feminism..
4 This is how Derrida elaborates on the phrase plus d' une longue-. 'But is
there a proper place, is there a proper story for this thing
(deconstruction)? I think it consists only of transference, and a 
thinking through of transference, in all the senses that this word
acquires in more than one language, and first of all that of the 
transference between languages. If I had to risk a single definition of 
deconstruction, one as brief, elliptical, and economical as a password, 
I would say simply and without overstatement: plus d'une longue - more 
than one language, no more of one language.' (1986: 14-15)
5 I have rewritten this quotation from Marvin Carlson <1985: 10). For
precise quotation see Notes to 3.2.
6 Compare Christie V. McDonald's point, addressed to Derrida, in the
Roundtable Discussion on Translation in The Ear of the Other, that 'the 
relationship between reading and writing. . . seems to have been taking 
shape in your work for a long time now in terms of translation 
considered as an enterprise that is at once possible and impossible', 
and she adds that 'any question of translation becomes right away a 
problem of reading' <1985: 117).
7 Derrida's point that a text, if 'totally translatable... disappears as 
a text', seems to echo Gadamer in that for the latter, 'the text as 
intermediate product dissappearts) in the communicative event'.
Notes to 5. 2
1 ' Des Tours de Babel' is itself a plurallzed phrase. As Gentzler 
explains: '"Des" resonates... with "some", with "of the", with "from
the”, with "about". . . it carries the connotation of "on" in the sense of 
"living on" or "survival". .. "Tours" conjures up notions of towers,
290
twists, ticks, and turns... Together, "Des" and "Tour" form détour, 
which recalls the defer/delay connotations important to the neologism of 
dlfférance... "Babel" is even more complex, containing a reference to 
"father" <Ba in oriental tongue) and "God" (.Bel in the same), father in 
this case of Babylonia', in short, each term 'resonates 
polysemantically". . . <1993: 163-164). We have borrowed some of Derrida's
phrase for our title to doubly indicate that whilst we are still 
involved in a discussion of translation, we need to make a "detour” 
around theory at this Juncture. This is because we need to lay the basis 
for our subsequent discussion of productive theory against a theory of 
undecidability. In 5.4 we shall finally then explore the implications 
for translation, of a theory of undecidability as a against a theory 
which seeks to make a difference.
2 For Deleuze, 'to practice theory, is to use it like a 'box of tools
[...] It must be useful. It must function' <1977: 208). We shall come
back to the point more precisely in 5. 3.
3 We may well say at this point, that her gaze is not inscribed in the 
event here, nor prescribed by its positioning, but the (male) gaze 
becomes fractured ad Infinitum.
4 "State" is put into inverted commas because it does not Indicate a 
stable condition; and "theory" is put into inverted commas, because it 
does not designate Theory (with a capital T), in other words one all- 
embracing Theory.
5 We have recontextualized Carroll's quotation for our own purposes here.
Carroll is, of course, not referring to translation here, but, within 
the context of his own argument, he is talking about '[hlistory and art 
(which] thus come to be involved in the same critical-theoretical task 
of. . . ' (1990: 5)
6 Compare Peggy Kamuf s point here: when Derrida has it, with reference to
his reading of Benjamin's 'The Task of the Translator', that he is 
'translating "in this] own way the translation of another text on
translation* 11985: 175]', Kamuf writes, that 'Itlhis description not 
only recalls that reading and writing are first of all versions of
translation, but it signals as well the limits on any theory of
translation. "No theorization", writes Derrida, "inasmuch as it is
produced in a language, will... be able to dominate the Babellan
performance"' (Kamuf 1991: 243).
7 We recall Miller's statement from 'The Critic as Host', 'Ctlhe uncanny
antithetical relation exists not only between pairs of words in this
system, host and parasite, host and guest, but within each word in
itself' (1979: 221).
8 Where we have inserted "text" in this quote, Miller writes "poem".
9 Miller's insistence that we cannot free ourselves from a metaphysical
reading, can also be related to the question of the Yale Critics'
adherence to the tradition of a/the canon (as we stressed throughout 
Chapter 3.
10 Surely, we must add here, neither Gadamer nor for that matter Derrida
need to fear the Foucauldian 'disorderly buzzing of discourse'. For, the 
institution will not merely tame deconstruction into deconstructionism, 
but has already accounted for, categorized, made recognizable the shapes 
of even the most radical 'Jetties' it may have encountered <1990: 84),
as Derrida has indeed pointed out. The institution knows how to
accommodate, even the most anarchic relativists, find a cosy home for 
them in this or that interpretive community, select this or that label
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for this or that relativism, file and photocopy each and every, 
distribute, dilute... There is little doubt, interpretive communities 
have a certain way with competitive discourses, have a sure way of 
handling any conflict; Just as Stanley Fish has a certain way with 
words. Thus when 'Abrams, Hlrsch and company spend a great deal of time 
in search for ways to limit and constrain interpretation', Fish tells 
us, we can send this brief, sharp and to the point ' message' to them: 
•not to worry' (Fish 1980: 321), after all everything will sooner or
later find its (proper) place.
Notes to 5. 3
1 On occasions we have used segements form John Johnston's translation of
Deleuze's essay rather than Rosalind Krauss' (Johnston 1992; 48); we
have also used our own translations.
2 Simulacrum,in Plato's terms, is, of course, a bad copy. See Johnston's
essay entitled 'Translation as Simulacra' (1992: 42-56, particularly
48).
3 Deleuze quotes Blanchot here: 'A universe where the image ceases to be
second in relation to the model, where imposture pretends to the truth, 
or, finally, where there is no more original, but an eternal sparkle 
where, in the glitter of detour and return, the absence of the origin is 
dispersed' (Blanchot 1965: 103, Deleuze 1984: 53).
4 To do Justice to Derrida though, rather than relating him to the Yale
Critics in this instance, we may recall Derrida's II n'y a pas de hors 
texte, which dismantles the very notion between inside and outside (see 
1974: 158-159 in particular).
5 This is the "original" Deleuze passage: 'For between the destruction 
which conserves and perpetuates the established order of 
representations, models, and copies which sets up a creative chaos, 
there is a great difference; that chaos, which sets in motion the 
simulacra and raises a phantasm, is the most innocent of all 
destructions, that of Platonism’ (1984: 56).
6 We can recall Derrida's sentence once more, that '[nlo theorization
Inasmuch as it is produced in a language, will it be able to dominate 
the Babellan performance' (1985: 175).
7 Hal Foster, for instance, suggests that post-modernism does not simply 
'react' to modernism, but 'resists' modernism and in that, it subverts 
its very basis (1983: vii-xiv).
8 Equally in the field of Translation Studies, there has occurred a shift 
of enquiry from source-centred approaches to target-oriented approaches.
Notes to 5. 4
1 Edwin Gentzler, in his book Contemporary Translation Theories, deals 
with the shortcomings of translational approaches that concentrate on 
notions such as unity and wholeness. The titles that I have been citing 
as Instances of unified translation theories, are covered in 
considerable depth in his book.
2 The very notion of 'acceptability' echoes Culler's conventions of 
acceptability which we took issue with in 2.2, as a constraining 
mechanism. In Translation Studies this notioh though, has been used to
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free translation from the more traditional assumptions such as that of 
equivalence. Nevertheless though, since the very notion of acceptability 
is dependent upon Institutional consensus, we might see at work here 
mechanisms of constraint and power which remain unacknowledged as such.
3 We can make another link with de Man here, for if language, in de Man1s 
words, is not 'made by us as historical beings, it is perhaps not even 
made by humans at all' <1985: 39), then 'meaning', Norris explains, 
'depends upon... "linguistic properties" which belong not to us as 
individual speakers but to language' <1988a: xvii). What is undermined, 
is, of course, the expressivity of the coherent subject, and the control 
of this subject over his/her utterance. This Barthes citation sums up 
the problematic well: 'Did he wish to express himself, he ought at least 
to know that the inner thing he seeks to “translate" is itself a ready- 
formed dictionary. . . ' <1977a: 146). At this point, also, we have come
back to both Barthes's proclamation of the death of the author, and 
Foucault's authoi— function.
4 Lewis and Venuti reject the principle of fluency in translation because
it domesticates the foreign text, and favour a kind of is Benjamlnian 
approach, which calls for the estranging translation, introducing the 
foreign text as other. This dichotomy between a fluent translation and a 
resistant translation, echoes the dichotomy which Goethe
formulated in 1824. One demands 'that the author should be brought over 
to us, so that we can regard him as our own; the other demands of us 
that we should go across to the stranger and accustom ourselves to his 
circumstances, his manner of speaking, his peculiarities' (qu. in Prawer 
1973: 75).
Carol Jacobs may be said to represent the most exterae pole of 
Lewis's proposition for abuse in translation. When Jacobs writes that 
translation 'renders radically foreign that language we believe is ours' 
<Jacobs 1975: 756, qu. in Gentzler 1993: 174), what this leads to, 
according to Gentzler, 'will not be natural, whole, and unified re­
productions; instead the "monstrosity" of translation will rear its 
head', which is to say, 'Cal heterogeneity emerges which "dismantles" 
all syntax and "dismembers" conventional, natural forms' (174). In 
short, 'word-for-word translations are preferred to those which 
synthesize and unify' <174).
When Jacobs thus analyses Harry Zohn's translation of Walter 
Benjamin's 'The Task of the Translator’, she finds, in Gentzler's words, 
that ' Zohn's desire for unity, coherence, and logical connections causes 
him to suggest that the simile [the fragments of the amphora! be read as 
follows: as fragments of a vessel can "be glued together must match in 
the smallest details" to form a larger, whole vessel, so too can 
translations be seen as fragments of a larger language [emphasis 
Gentler's, Benjamin trans. Zohn 1969: 78!' <175). Gentzler explains
further, that what Jacob's alternative translation suggests is, 'that as 
fragments, as the "broken parts" of a vessel "in order to be articulated 
together, must follow one another in the smallest details", so too does 
translation make recognizable the broken part of a greater language 
[emphasis Gentzler's, Jacobs 1975: 762!' (175). Summing up Jacob's point
then, Gentzler writes: 'tn!ot tempted by the urge for a consistent, 
whole "text", Jacobs translates literally, word for word, and thus her 
rendering leaves the passage incomplete in a Western sense. She does not 
Join the translation and original, and instead offers the translation as 
a BruchstOck, consistent with not Just Benjamin's metaphor, but also
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with what she sees as Benjamin's "strange" and "monstrous" mode of 
articulation. (175)
5 Venuti also points out here, that even though 'the foreign text... 
enjoys a momentary liberation form the target-language culture', it is 
merely momentary, because the target reader 'reterritorializes' the 
text, makes it 'recognizable, transparent', or makes of it 'some reading 
amenable to the major aesthetic in English' (18). It should be added 
though that there are also practices of reading, which are resistant to 
what they see as the dominant aesthetic. A deconstructive reading of a 
text would indeed deterritorialize the translated text even further, and 
as such would not wish to render a text transparent, but would seize 
precisely on those points in the text which are foreign to themselves 
and consequently resist the totalizing gesture of a 
reterritorializing/appropriating reading.
6 We have so far argued that undecldabillty, as that which defers the 
question of choice, leaves us in a state of critical limbo, whereas the 
Deleuzian route, leaves us no option but to choose to make a critical 
difference. Our turn to Deleuze at this point, was of strategic 
necessity within the terms of a feminist argument, which is precisely 
where we shall turn to in the remainder of this section, as but one 
example where theory can make a critical difference (be it to 
translation, literature, language...). As such it is interesting to 
consider Derrida's own revision of the implications of the notion of 
undecidability. In a recent interview (1987) about the question of 
feminism, he makes this point: 'In ,a given situation... which is the 
European phallogocentric structure, the side of women is the side from 
which you start to dismantle the structure. So you can put undecidability 
and all the other concepts which go with it on the side of femininity, 
writing and so on. But as soon as you have reached the first stage of 
deconstruction, then the opposition between women and men stops being 
pertinent. The you cannot say that women is another name, or a good 
trope for writing, undecidability and so on. We need to find some way to 
progress strategically. Starting with deconstruction of
phallogocentricsm, and using the feminine force, so to speak, in this 
move then - and this would be the second stage or second level - to give 
up the opposition between men and women. At this second stage "women" is 
clearly not the best trope to refer to all those things: undecidability 
and so on. The same could be said for undecidability! Undecidability is 
not a point of arrival. It is also a letter, a misconceived letter, 
because undecidability - the theme, the motive of undecidability - has 
to do with a given situation in which you have an opposition or a 
dialectical logic' (194-195, I am grateful to David Spooner for having 
pointed out this quote to me in conversation). Is this then a turning 
away from différence? As we have seen in 5.3, Derrida merely relnsribes 
the opposition in terms of the non-opposition - différence - rather than 
discarding the very notion of an opposition, thus still remaining, even 
whilst inhabiting and subverting from within (inside and outside also of 
course become undecidable for Derrida, as is performed in the phrase 11 
n'y e pes dehors texte), caught up by the webs of logocentri sm. Is this 
then Derrida's admission that this is the inevitability of the notion of 
undecidability,, to always remain neither quite within logocentric 
thinking, nor quite within its alternative, différence, and as such 
then to remain imbricated within that which ought to be dismantled
altogether, 1.e. the dialectics of logocent^icsm?
I
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7 We may point out here, that this Is not at all unlike the kinds of 
moves, we have have come to associate with Yale Criticism.
8 Let us unfold Lewis a little further. Rather than adhering to the more
'conventional view of translation', which itself Is also, of course, 
plagued by contradiction, for here, 'a good translation should be also a 
double interpretation, faithful both to the language/message of the 
original and to the message-orienting cast of its own language' (Lewis 
1985: 37), Lewis begins to shift the stakes. Whilst a good translation,
in conventional terms, is meant to be faithful, be it to source or the 
target, it never can though get beyond the 'insurmountable fact that 
these two interpretations are mutually exclusive' which has the effect 
of ' consign! lngl every translation to inadequacy' (37); for how could a 
translation be faithful to two things at once, since to be faithful to 
the one must necessarily be the betrayal of the other, and vice versa. A 
good or strong translation on Lewis’s terms (a kind of strong Bloomian 
misprision as a writing?) does not betray the abuse in the "original'', 
but reproduces the abuse 'analogically' (similar by analogy, but not the 
same, alike in key respects, but not the same), and, more to the point, 
remobilizes and exceeds this abuse, which has the effect of highlighting 
the difference between languages. This leads to a 'new axiomatic of 
fidelity' (42), an 'ab-iraitative fidelity' (42) that displaces the 
traditional 'logic of identity or equivalence' (42) with the logic of 
the supplement (replacement and addition), i.e. the logic of excess. The 
method here, is, of course, double writing, for in double writing, both 
that which replaces what was produced in the original and that which 
adds what cannot be reproduced, comes to be articulated. Hence we are 
left with the undecidable movement in the translation, according to 
Lewis, between that which is ' in realignment with the original text' 
and that which is 'in compliance with the target language'. This 
undecidability, we already know, 'is grounded in the capacity of 
discourse to say and do many things at once and to make some of those 
things done and said indeterminate' (44). Having said all this, we 
nevertheless should pose the question whether Lewis's ' ab-imitative 
fidelity' is not merely fidelity in another guise. For when we consider 
his statement that 'the strong forceful translation [against the 'weak 
servile translation') that values experimentation, tampers with usage, 
seeks to match the polyvalencies or plurivocities. . . of the original by 
producing Its own' (41, my emphasis), then we must ask whether this 
'strength of translation [which) lies in its abuses - in 'productive 
difference' (41) according to Lewis, really also makes the productive 
difference, he claims for it; for 'to match' is not 'to produce'!
9 As Lefevere explains: "'... the term rewriting absolves us of the
necessity of drawing borderlines between various forms of rewriting, 
such as "translation", "adaptation", "emulation"' (1992: 47). Other
rewritings are therefore also Included: 'Whether we produce
translations, literary histories or their more compact spin-offs, 
reference works, anthologies, criticism, or editions, rewrlters adapt, 
manipulate the original they work with to some extent, usually to make 
them fit in with the dominant, or one of the dominant ideological and 
poetologlcal currents of their time' (8). There are also instances 
though when rewpiters 'go agaist the system' (Lefevere 1985: 225), which 
i s of course the Juncture at which we shall situate the work of 
Quebecols translators.
10 As Lefevere puts it with regard to the »*ewriter, which may also be
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applied to the Québécois: 'He or she may choose to go against the 
system, to try and operate outside the constraints of his or her time, 
by reading works of literature in other than received ways, by writing 
them in ways different from those considered great at a particular time 
and in a particular place, by rewriting them in such a manner that they 
tend not to fit in with the dominant poetics or ideology of his or her 
time and place, but with an alternative ideology, an alternative 
poetics' (1985: 225).
11 On a slightly different note, we may also say here, that woman is always
translating herself, onto the page, into the world, into a void. Thus we 
can assume that through translating herself she also becomes visible, on 
the page, in the world. As Marguarite Duras writes: 'I think "feminine 
literature" is... translated writing... translated from blackness, from 
darkness. Women have been in darkness for centuries. They don't know 
themselves. Or only poorly. And when women write they translate this 
darkness... Men don't translate. They begin from a theoretical platform 
that is already in place, already elaborated. The writing of women is 
really translated from the unknown, like a new way of communicating 
rather than an already formed language' <1975: 174). Indeed, it is 
precisely these observations on 'the writing of women1 that Québécois 
translators put into practice when they translate. In other words, they 
bring to light that which has been repressed, effaced, concealed; as 
Godard puts it, in a dominant 'theory of translation as equivalence', it 
is 'her manipulative work [which]... is rendered invisible' <1990: 91).
For in this schema, the translator is 'understood as a servant, an 
invisible hand mechanically turning the words of one language into 
another. The translation is considered a mere copy and not a creative 
utterance' (91). It is in this very precise sense then, that the 
question of translation and the question of woman become intimately 
connected: both have been concealed by (the) history (of literature).
12 As Michel de Certeau also points out, 'translation smuggles in a 
thousand inventions which, before the author's dazzled eyes, transform 
his book into a new creation' <1984: x>.
13 When David Hemel and Sherry Simon therefore define translation in terms
of that which 'recreates the process of writing in the target language' 
and moreover add that this is precisely what is responsible for 
'carrying the reader directly, actively, into the theories of writing 
and reading as practiced by feminist theorists' (Hemel & Simon 1988: 
48), we can also, at this Juncture, return to the theories of reading 
(as writing), which we discussed in chapter 3. For, '[t1ranslation is... 
a reading and a writing of a text' (Hemel and Simon 1988: 48), or as
Mezei puts it: ' C w] her) I translate I read the text... thenl reread the 
text and reread the text, and then I write in my language, my words - I 
write my reading and the reading has rewritten my writing' (Mezei 1985, 
qu. in Bassnett 1993: 156). The translator is thus a reader/writer, that
Barthesian scriptor who breaks open the text, (wo)manhandles the text, 
and multiplies the text. Moreover, the text here is never a source, but 
a resource from which we multiply our writings. And rather than saying 
that the scriptor's 'only power is to mix writings' (Barthes 1977....) 
we can translate this Barthesian fragment into a Québécois context and 
(re)write: her power, very precisely, is to mix writings. And, power 
here is productive (not simply repressive) in the Foucauldian sense, 'it 
traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, 
produces discourse' (Foucault 1980: 119).' Thi6 is the positive power
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that Lefevere gives to rewriting (1992: 15), and the power which also
produces the Québécois discourse of translation as a multiplier of 
(re)reading and (re)writing.
14 As Eagleton writes with reference to deconstruction: 'it also frees you
from having to assume a position...' (1983: 145).
15 This footnote is dedicated to Iain Hamilton Grant, that omnlverous 
reader, who I live with, who shares my books, whose books I share, and 
who has the gift always to come up with the right quote, Just at the 
right time.
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